

INTL 8215: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Special Topics in IR)

Instructor

Professor Andrea Everett
Office: 311 Candler Hall
Hours: T 1:00 – 3:00 pm

Course Information

Spring 2014
T 3:30 pm – 6:15 pm
Location: Candler Hall 117
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COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course is intended as a survey of major topics related to domestic politics and international relations. Its purpose is to introduce students to some of the key theoretical and empirical debates in this important segment of the international relations literature. The course proceeds in three parts. We begin with several weeks devoted to the actors and institutional structures that influence foreign policy and international political outcomes. In this section we will examine the sources of these actors' interests and preferences, and consider arguments about their respective roles in the policy process (including how these are affected by different political institutions). The remaining two sections of the course consider applications to empirical debates in the fields of international security and conflict, and international economic relations. Key methodological issues are addressed in context.

OBJECTIVES

By the end of the course students should:

- Be familiar with major arguments about the institutional and societal origins of foreign policy and international relations, and understand how these arguments relate to other international relations theories
- Be familiar with several of the most important empirical debates and research agendas in this field
- Have developed an improved ability to critically analyze and evaluate the claims of scholarly arguments and articles, both orally and in writing

READINGS

We will read the majority of four books, which I therefore recommend for purchase:

- Robert M. Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2004.
- Dan Reiter and Allen C. Stam, *Democracies at War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2002.
- Rebecca Hamilton, *Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide*. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan. 2011.

- James Raymond Vreeland, *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2003.

The remaining readings consist of either academic journal articles or chapters from books not listed above. Journal articles are available through the university's electronic journal archives. As needed, I will distribute or post additional readings (book chapters, mostly).

REQUIREMENTS and EVALUATION

Participation (25%)

Because this class is a seminar, grades will depend heavily on attendance and active participation. The goal of our discussions will be to critically dissect the assigned material each week. Therefore, students are expected to complete all readings *before* the class meeting for which they are assigned. In-class participation will be graded on a combination of attendance and the quality and quantity of the student's contributions to discussion. You will be permitted one unexcused absence during the semester (for which there is no need to contact me) without effect on your participation grade. During class, your goal should be to participate regularly and thoughtfully, demonstrating that you have not only read, but critically analyzed – and considered ties between – the readings. This will comprise 60% of your participation grade, or 15% of your overall grade.

In addition, *each student will be responsible for helping to lead the discussion during two weeks, and for writing separate two-page discussion memos to coincide with the student's discussion leads*. The idea of these memos is NOT to summarize, but to raise issues for discussion in class, bring together common themes across readings, highlight issues that you found unclear or unconvincing, or raise methodological questions and concerns. It is not necessary to cover all of the readings for the week in your memo, but it should function as an agenda (including questions) for discussion. Memos should be circulated by email to the class (including me) no later than 5 pm on Monday for each Tuesday session. The entire class is responsible for reading the discussion memos each week. The student discussion leader will then use his or her memo to help frame the conversation in class. We will discuss who will be in charge of which weeks during the first class meeting. The summaries and discussion lead will comprise 40% of your participation grade, or 10% of your overall grade.

Analytical Papers (20% each)

Each student will be responsible for writing two 6-8 page analytical papers based on the readings from the course. These papers should take the form of brief review essays of the literature on a particular topic or set of topics. They should (briefly!) summarize key works and then the bulk of the space should be devoted to laying out your own views of these works. In picking your topics you will face a choice: 1) You may pick a subject and then compare works from several perspectives, or 2) You can pick a single theoretical issue and write an essay on it. Before writing these essays, you may find it useful to review a few examples of academic book reviews (examples can be found, for example, in every issue of *PS: Political Science and Politics*, as well as many other journals). *These papers will be due in-class on February 18 and April 22. The paper for April 22 must discuss (but need not be limited to) material from after the exam.*

Exam (35%)

There will be one in-class, cumulative exam, to be held on April 8th. During this exam, you will be asked to respond to two essay questions designed to simulate the kinds of prompts you may expect to encounter in the international relations PhD comprehensive exam. You will have the entire course period to complete the exam. For PhD students, this will serve as useful practice for your actual exams. For master's students, it will hone and test your ability to develop clear, analytical answers to complex questions within a constrained timeframe. We will spend more time discussing the exam, and preparation strategies, as the date draws near. Finally, for MIPS students, if desired we can come up with an alternate writing assignment more suited to your needs and interests.

POLICIES

As always, your work in this course is subject to the University's academic honesty policy, "A Culture of Honesty," and the Student Honor Code. All academic work must meet the standards described in "A Culture of Honesty" (found at www.uga.edu/honesty), including the policies that cover plagiarism. Lack of knowledge of the academic honesty policy is not a reasonable explanation for a violation. Any student caught cheating or engaging in plagiarism in this course will be referred to judicial affairs. This includes submitting work completed for another course.

In addition, as participants in this seminar you are expected to abide by the standards of basic etiquette. These include arriving on time, silencing cell phones prior to the beginning of class, using laptops for course-related purposes only, refraining from the use of insulting language, and in all other ways treating your fellow classmates and me with respect. Failure to uphold these standards of conduct may result in dismissal from the classroom. Further information on UGA's Code of Conduct and Non-Discrimination / Anti-Harassment Policy is available at www.uga.edu/judicialprograms/code_of_conduct/codeofconduct.pdf, and www.uga.edu/eoo/pdfs/NDAH.pdf, respectively.

Finally, as this is a graduate seminar, I assume that you want to be here. Barring a documented medical or family emergency, there will be no extensions on the papers or alternative exam dates. Students requiring accommodation for a documented disability, or who anticipate conflicts with any class meeting for reasons related to religious observance (beyond the one absence discussed above), should contact me no later than the second class meeting. I will do my best to respond to course-related emails within 48 hours during the week, but I may not check them over the weekend. Students should plan accordingly.

COURSE PLAN

**The course syllabus is a general plan for the course; deviations announced by the instructor may be necessary.*

Week 1: January 7 — Introduction

Where does the study of domestic politics fit within international relations?

Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998): 29-32+34-46.

J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics* 14(1) (October 1961): 77-92.

James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 1998(1): 289-313.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 46(1) (2002): 1-9.

Additional Literature:

Kenneth Waltz. *Man, the State, and War*. 1959. (Chapters 4-5 cover the ‘Second Image’).

PART 1: WHO INFLUENCES FOREIGN POLICY? HOW?

Week 2: January 14—Political Institutions & Policymakers

Who makes foreign policy? Where do leaders’ preferences come from? How does variation in the political institutions that determine who makes foreign policy and whom these leaders are answerable to affect outcomes?

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2003. Read Chapter 1, pages 1-12 only, and all of Chapters 2-3.

Lisa L. Martin, *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2000. Read Chapters 1 – 3.

Additional Literature:

Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1997.

James M. Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters,” *Political Science Quarterly* 107(4) (Winter 1992-93): 607-628.

Week 3: January 21 – Bureaucracies and Pressure Groups

What role do bureaucracies and interest / pressure groups play? Do they reduce the quality of foreign policy? How do we know?

Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review* 63(3) (1969): 689-718.

Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," *Foreign Policy* 7, (1972): 159-179.

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, *Special Interest Politics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2001. Read Chapter 1.

Trevor Rubenzer, "Campaign Contributions and U.S. Foreign Policy Outcomes: An Analysis of Cuban American Interests," *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1) (January 2011): 105-16.

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby," *London Review of Books* 28(6) (March 2006): 3-12. Available at <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby>.

Daniel W. Drezner. "Methodological Confusion: How indictments of The Israel Lobby expose political science's flaws." *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, February 22, 2008.

Noam Chomsky, The Israel Lobby? March 28, 2006, at <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20060328.htm>

Additional Literature

Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *World Politics* 24 (1972): 40-79.

Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty, Eds, *Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2010.

Mearsheimer & Walt's response to their critics, "Setting the Record Straight." (On ELC)

Week 4: January 28 – Public Opinion and the Media

Does public opinion influence foreign policy? If so, how does it influence leaders' calculations? How about the media? What is the nature of interaction between the media and public opinion? Do public attitudes simply reflect media framing?

John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'" *American Political Science Review* 83(1) (March 1989): 123-141.

Thomas Knecht And M. Stephen Weatherford, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The

Stages of Presidential Decision Making,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3) (September 2006): 705-727.

Zaller, John. "Coming to Grips with V. O. Key's Concept of Latent Opinion." In *Electoral Democracy*. Edited by Michael MacKuen and George Rabinowitz. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003. P.311-334.

Robert M. Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2004. Read Chapters 1, (p.1-28), one of Chapters 2 – 4, and Chapters 5-6 (p.95 – 146).

Matthew A. Baum, “Soft News and Foreign Policy: How Expanding the Audience Changes the Policies,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 8(1): 115-145.

Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” *World Politics* 43 (July 1991): 479-512.

Additional Literature:

Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus,” *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (4) (December 1992): 439-466.

John Zaller, “Strategic Politicians, Public Opinion, and the Gulf Crisis,” in *Taken By Storm*. P.249-274.

Matthew A. Baum, “Sex, Lies, and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the Inattentive Public,” *American Political Science Review* 96(1) (2002): 91-109.

Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. *The Rational Public: Fifty years of trends in Americans' policy preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1992.

Week 5: February 4 – No Class (Out of Town for Conference)

Week 6: February 11 – Bringing the Outside World Back In

How do international structures affect and interact with domestic politics? How can we answer this question in the context of democratization?

Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed,” *International Organization* 32 (1978): 881-912.

Stephen D. Krasner, Revisiting “The Second Image Reversed.” Paper prepared for a conference in honor of Peter Gourevitch, University of California San Diego, April 23-24, 2010.

Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42(3) (Summer 1988): 427-460.

Application: International Sources of Democratization

Jon C. Pevehouse, "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization," *International Organization* 56(3) (Summer 2002): 515-549.

Sarah Sunn Bush, "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures," *International Organization* 65(1) (February 2011): 103-137.

PART II: APPLICATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT & SECURITY

Week 7: February 18 – Domestic Institutions & the Use of Force (an Introduction)

How do domestic institutions – including the need for public consent – affect the wars states fight? Are democracies better at staying out of war, or at winning the wars they start?

Dan Reiter and Allen C. Stam, *Democracies at War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2002. Read Chapter 2 (Including Appendix) and Chapter 6.

Alexander B. Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *International Security* 33(4) (Spring 2009): 9–51.

William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse. "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force," *International Organization* 59(1) (February 2005): 209-232.

Jessica L. Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 106(2) (May 2012): 326-347.

Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," *American Political Science Review* 104(3) (August 2010): 430-445.

Additional Literature:

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith , "Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War ," *World Politics* 56(3) (April 2004): 363-388.

Brian Lai & Dan Slater, "Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992," *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 113-126.

William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, *While Dangers Gather*. 2007. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Week 8: February 25 – Debating the Democratic Peace

Are democracies especially good at avoiding war with each other?

Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 80(4) (December 1986): 1151-1169.

Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," *American Political Science Review* 87(3) (1993): 624-638.

Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97(4) (December 2003): 585-602.

Slantchev, Branislav L., Anna Alexandrova, and Erik Gartzke. "Probabilistic causality, selection bias, and the logic of the democratic peace." *American Political Science Review* 99(3) (2005): 459-462.

Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Common Interests or Common Politics," *Journal of Politics* 59(2) (May 1997): 393-417.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D Morrow, Randolph M Siverson, and Alastair Smith. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 4 (1999): 791-807.

Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20(1) (Summer 1995): 5 – 38.

Additional Literature:

Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, Eds, *Debating the Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader* (compilation of many of these articles, plus others).

Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19(2) (Fall 1994): 235-269.

John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19(2) (Fall 1994): 50-86.

Joanne S. Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*. 1999.

Week 9: March 4 – Audience Costs

Are democracies better at preventing crisis escalation and deterring the use of force against themselves?

James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *The American Political Science Review* 88 (3): 577-92.

Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," *International Organization* 61(4) (2007): 821-840.

Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," *The American Political Science Review* 105 (3): 437-56.

Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62(1) (Winter, 2008): 35-64.

Kenneth A. Schultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review* 92 (4) (December 1998): 829 – 844.

Additional Literature:

Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser, "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization* 66(3) (Summer 2012).

March 10 – 14: SPRING BREAK

Week 10: March 18 – Sources/Manipulation of Public Attitudes on War

If public consent for war is so critical in democracies, what drives it? Do leaders seek to manipulate it to their advantage? How?

Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, "War, Casualties, and Public Opinion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3) (June 1998): 278-300.

Chris Gelpi, Jason Reifler and Peter Feaver. "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," *International Security* 30(3) (Winter 2005/06): 7-46.

Adam Berinsky, "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 69 (4)(2007): 975-997.

William D. Baker and John R. Oneal, "Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature and Origins of the "Rally 'Round the Flag" Effect," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(5) (October 2001): 661-687.

Christopher Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(2)(April 1997): 255-82.

James Meernik and Peter Waterman, "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents," *Political Research Quarterly* 49(3) (September 1996): 573-590.

Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Election Cycles and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(2) (June 1991): 212-244.

Additional Literature:

John E. Mueller. *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*. New York: Wiley. 1973.

Matthew A. Baum and Tim Groeling, "Reality Asserts Itself: Public Opinion on Iraq and the Elasticity of Reality," *International Organization* 64(3) (2010): 443-479.

Matthew A. Baum, "The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon," *International Studies Quarterly* 46(2) (June 2002): 263-298.

Danny Hayes and Matt Guardino, "The Influence of Foreign Voices on U.S. Public Opinion," *AJPS* 55 (4):831-851.

Terrence L. Chapman, *Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2011.

Charles W. Ostrom and Brian L. Job, "The President and the Political Use of Force," *American Political Science Review* 80(2) (June 1986): 541-566.

Richard J. Stoll, "The Guns of November: Presidential Reelections and the Use of Force, 1947-1982," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28(2) (June 1984): 231-246.

Jon Western, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2005.

Week 11: March 25 – The Conduct of War

Do Democracies Fight More Effectively? Or do Efforts to Limit Costs Undermine Effectiveness and Restraint?

Dan Reiter and Allen C. Stam, *Democracies at War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2002. Read Chapters 3 & 7.

Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (4) (August 2004): 525-546.

Alexander B. Downes (2007). "Restraint or Propellant? Democracy and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.51: 872-904.

Jonathan D. Caverley (2009/2010). "The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam." *International Security* Vol.34: 119-157.

Stathis N. Kalyvas & Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 104(3) (2010): 415 – 429.

Additional Literature:

Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*. Cambridge, UK & New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 2003.

Alexander B. Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2008.

Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2012): 67 – 84 (18 pages).

Week 12: April 1 – The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention

Chaim D. Kaufman and Robert A. Pape, “Explaining Costly International Moral Action,” *International Organization* 53(4) (Autumn 1999): 631 – 668.

Jonathan Mermin, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 112(3) (Autumn 1997): 385-403.

Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(4) (August 1998): 395-417.

Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide.” *The Atlantic*. September 2001: 84 – 108.

Rebecca Hamilton, *Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Read Chapters 1-8, 14.

Additional Literature:

Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. 2002. New York: Basic Books.

Gary J. Bass, *Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*. New York: Knopf. 2008.

Week 13: April 8 – In-class Exam

PART III: APPLICATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Week 14: April 15 – The Domestic Politics of Trade Policy

Where do domestic actors’ trade policy preferences come from? What effects do they have on outcomes? How does this depend on – and affect – political institutions?

Helen Milner, “The Political Economy of International Trade,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 91-114.

Michael J. Hiscox, “Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade,” *International Organization* 55(1) (Winter 2001): 1-46.

Gene M. Grossman; Elhanan Helpman, "Protection for Sale," *The American Economic Review* 84(4) (September 1994): 833-850.

Alexandra Guisinger, "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?" *International Organization* 63(3) (July 2009): 533-557.

Helen Milner & Bumba Mukherjee, "Democratization and Economic Globalization," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (June 2009): 163-81.

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," *International Organization* 56(3) (2002): 477-513.

Ronald Rogowski, "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions," *International Organization* 41(2) (Spring 1987): 203-223.

Additional Literature:

Helen Milner, "Trading Places: Industries for Free Trade," *World Politics* 40(3) (April 1988): 350-376.

Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," *American Political Science Review* 94(2) (June 2000): 305-321.

Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry Weingast, "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy," *World Politics* 49(3) (April 1997): 309-338.

Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota, "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries," *International Organization* 59(1) (Winter 2005): 107-143.

Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1989.

Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995.

Beth Simmons. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994.

Peter J. Katzenstein, "International relations and domestic structures: Foreign economic policies of advanced industrial states," *International Organization* 30(1) (December 1976): 1-45.

Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Crisis*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1986.

Michael J. Hiscox, "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation," *American Political Science Review* 96(3) (September 2002): 593-608.

Jeff Frieden, "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940," *International*

Organization 42(1) (Winter 1988): 59-90.

Week 15: April 22 – International Development

James Raymond Vreeland, *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Read the entire book.

J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes, “Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund,” *International Organization* 60(1) (Spring 2006): 367-399.

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *The American Economic Review* 91(5) (2001): 1369-1401

Additional Literature:

Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1990.