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**Tables and Figures**

# Part 1: Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies[1]

As discussed in the text, the concept of complex humanitarian emergencies describes the set of conflicts in which severe violence might most reasonably prompt peace operations to protect civilians. It allows us to distinguish between the many conflicts that are bad for civilians and those that are the most devastating, where it makes the most sense to study variation in international efforts to shield civilians from the effects of violence. In Part 1 of this appendix I discuss a number of key issues related to the *post-Cold War Complex Emergencies Dataset*. First, Section A addresses 1) how it relates to the growing body of data on civilians' experiences in conflict, 2) the definition of complex emergencies, 3) the quantitative and qualitative indicators used in the coding guidelines, 4) the basic structure and justification for the major coding decisions and quantitative thresholds employed 5) the data sources used, and 6) provides a brief overview of the dataset. Finally, Section B includes the full set of coding guidelines.

## A. OVERVIEW: IDENTIFYING COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

### *Justification for the Dataset*

The dataset of complex emergencies presented here fills a significant hole in the growing body of data available for scholarly research into civilians' experiences of violent conflict. Over the last decade, a burgeoning literature has made great progress in understanding the connections between large-scale violence and the experiences of civilians. Much of this research has sought to improve our knowledge of the consequences of war for civilians and of why some wars are so much worse for them than others. Scholars have examined such questions as how war affects public health (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003, Iqbal 2010) and why belligerents kill large

[1] The material contained in this first part of the appendix is also included in a related article, "Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Introducing a New Dataset" (*Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 2015), which is separately posted at www.andreaeverett.com.

numbers of civilians or commit crimes like mass killing and genocide, both during and outside war (Valentino 2004, Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004, Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006, Harff 2003, Downes 2006, 2007, Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat 2006).

In the process, they have collected a wealth of data that reflect, in one way or another, civilians' experiences during war and other forms of large-scale political violence. Benjamin Valentino (2004, Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004), for example, collected data on instances of mass killing, defined as the intentional killing of fifty thousand or more noncombatants over five or fewer years. The Political Instability Task Force has produced a well-known list of genocides and politicides (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2011). Both Valentino et al. (2006) and Alexander Downes (2007) also collected data on the number of civilians that individual belligerents killed in inter-state wars. Meanwhile, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) records data on one-sided violence against civilians by governments and other formally organized armed groups (Eck and Hultman 2007). Finally, several other datasets on conflict-related deaths include but are not limited to civilian casualties: Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) collected data on total battle deaths in civil and inter-state wars, and UCDP's Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg et al. 2012) includes civilian deaths caused by inter-communal violence.

With these data, scholars have made great strides in describing trends and patterns in various types of conflict and in uncovering the causes of large-scale violence against civilians. At the same time, the questions they are designed to answer are quite different from those about peace operations and civilian protection I investigate in this book. In particular, such questions tend to rely on certain assumptions about a conflict's political characteristics, focusing exclusively on wars, for example, or on incidents of mass killing. In contrast, in this book I require a means of comparing conflicts on the basis of their human consequences, and

independent of such specific political circumstances. As a result, these existing data sources are not well suited to my needs in this book, for at least two reasons.

First, the datasets described above record only those deaths that are direct, intentional, or both. As a result, they do not reflect a great deal of the suffering that modern conflict creates. Indeed, in many conflicts most civilian suffering and mortality results from indirect causes, especially starvation and disease, rather than directly from violence or battle (e.g., Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003). It results from the destruction of infrastructure that is critical to maintaining public health – such as hospitals, clinics, electricity grids, and sewage treatment plants – and from the forced displacement of people from their homes as they flee violence.

Sometimes indirect deaths are intentional, as the above-mentioned datasets on genocide and mass killing recognize. Still, many are not clearly attributable to the intentions of a specific belligerent. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), over a decade of war and crimes against humanity beginning in the 1990s cost millions of lives. Yet *despite* the intentional targeting of civilians, the vast majority of civilian deaths were caused by disease or malnourishment associated with civilian flight from warring militias. Indeed, as of 2006, only about two percent of deaths had been caused by violence directly (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.167). Therefore, while direct and intentional deaths are a major part of what makes some conflicts much worse for civilians than others, they are by no means the full story.

Second, each of the above sources of data focuses on a single type of violence. Yet in practice, various kinds of violent events generate very severe and large-scale civilian suffering. These include both wars (whether civil or inter-state) and anti-civilian violence committed outside of war. They can also include inter-communal violence, conflict between social groups usually based on religion or ethnicity in which the state is not a primary party. For example,

between 1999 and 2002, fierce fighting between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas Islands and Sulawesi, Indonesia, is estimated to have killed at least 12,500 people directly, while displacing over a million (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008, 2009, United States Committee for Refugees 2003 p.120-21).[2]

In addition, there is considerable variation *among* wars, *among* cases of one-sided violence against civilians, and *among* inter-communal conflicts. Crimes such as genocide and mass killing can occur in any of these contexts, but are not the norm for any of them. Even absent these crimes, certain wars and instances of inter-communal violence can be utterly devastating for civilians, while others are much less so. As a result, sources of data that are limited to any one of these types of conflicts or only to the worst atrocity crimes exclude at least some conflicts with comparable humanitarian consequences. Simply combining them all, on the other hand, would yield a set of conflicts with wildly disparate consequences for and levels of disruption to civilian life.

In contrast to these data, complex humanitarian emergencies represent the worst of a variety of different types of political violence and focus on their consequences for civilians. By incorporating the indirect and unintentional effects of violence, the concept captures not only conflicts that involve many intended civilian deaths, but also those like Somalia, where since the early 1990s direct violence against civilians has generally been low but its indirect effects have often been catastrophic. It is, therefore, uniquely suited to facilitate research questions such as those I ask in this book, which are agnostic about the causes of conflict but require comparison based on humanitarian effects.

[2] For more information, see the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR)'s World Refugee Survey 1999 p.108; 2000 p.139, 145; 2001 p.133-36; 2002 p.121-123; and 2003 p.119-121.

***Definition & Existing Sources***

Unfortunately, most definitions of complex emergencies – including those from the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA, 1999) the Complex Emergency Database (CE-DAT) project at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Université catholique de Louvain, former director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Andrew Natsios (1995), and Raimo Väyrynen (1996) – are of limited use for empirical social science research. Among other issues, they exclude categories of violence that can be equally as devastating as those they include, use insufficient criteria to identify and compare conflicts' severity, and refer to the appropriate policy response to a complex emergency.

Still, these definitions agree on three key themes that form the core of the definition presented in Chapter 1. First, they emphasize that complex emergencies occur as the result of political violence, and are distinct from natural disasters. Second, they highlight the disruption to normal civilian life caused by such violence, and in particular the heightened risk of death – both direct and indirect – that such violence generates. Third, they emphasize that such disruption occurs at least in part because local authorities are unwilling or incapable of meeting the conflict-affected population's needs. Drawing on these three points, as noted in Chapter 1, I define a complex humanitarian emergency as *an episode of political violence that severely and extensively disrupts civilian life, and in which the government responsible for public welfare is unable or unwilling to effectively shield the population (or facilitate outside efforts to do so)*.

As with the existing definitions, several lists of complex emergencies put together by and for the humanitarian relief community lack a clear and consistently applied set of criteria for identifying these events. The list used by the CE-DAT project, for example, is not even limited to conflicts that meet its definition of a complex emergency. Instead, it includes countries of

interest to partner organizations and relief groups, such as states that may potentially experience a humanitarian crisis, states that host large refugee populations, and fragile states. Moreover, it includes only conflicts for which CE-DAT has been able to collect health and mortality data.[3] This represents a source of potential bias, as the collection of such data is most difficult in the worst security environments. Similarly, OCHA's process for recognizing complex emergencies reflects the needs and interests of its humanitarian partners. It generally includes emergencies covered by a UN Consolidated Appeal for relief funding and designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the UN body responsible for the inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. The introduction of a UN Consolidated Appeal, however, depends in part on where aid organizations wish to devote their time and resources.[4]

Finally, more scholarly efforts to identify complex emergencies are subject to their own limitations. The most promising list, by Juha Auvinen and Wayne Nafziger (1999), does identify complex emergencies using clear and consistent criteria based on a conflict's human consequences, including battle deaths, refugee flows, malnutrition, and disease. Still, it only covers the period from 1980 – 1994, and uses data taken at the national level even though many conflicts are sub-national.

***Key Indicators***

Given these limitations, I developed the *Post-Cold War Complex Emergencies Dataset* by building on several features of these events highlighted by existing definitions. First, to reflect the extent of a conflict's disruption of civilian life, existing definitions of complex emergencies emphasize loss of life and increased mortality. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the number

[3] David Hargitt, CE-DAT Data Manager at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université catholique de Louvain. Personal communication by email.
[4] Shuichi Odaka, ReliefWeb (OCHA). Personal communication by email.

of civilian deaths is the best single indicator of the suffering a conflict generates. Yet these definitions also emphasize large-scale population displacement. Civilians displaced from their homes by conflict are commonly known as forcibly displaced persons, and may include refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons. The scale of forcible displacement can indicate the size of the civilian population exposed to both the direct and indirect risks of violence (eg, Burkle 2006, United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) 2004 p.8).

Still, estimates of civilian deaths and displacement are not always available, especially as conditions change over time in a conflict. This can generate uncertainty about the extent to which certain conflicts, and certain years within them, disrupt civilian life. In these circumstances, a variety of supplemental indicators – mostly qualitative – may provide additional information about conditions on the ground. Such indicators can offer either confirming evidence of significant disruption to civilian life, or mitigating evidence that such disruption may not, in fact, be all that dire. For example, an outbreak of infectious disease, deteriorating health and nutrition statistics, poor sanitation conditions at displaced-person camps, or a shortage of basic necessities such as food, health care, or shelter, can provide confirming evidence of a serious threat to civilian life.[5] On the other hand, evidence that most displacement is temporary may mitigate our impression of the disruption to civilian life, since temporary displacement is less likely to contribute to outbreaks of infectious disease and the disruption of the food supply.

Second, to reflect governmental ability and willingness to shield civilians from the worst effects of violence, the best indicators are generally qualitative. Again, they may provide either

[5] Of these indicators, health and nutrition statistics are inherently quantitative, while the others are qualitative. However, across the period and conflicts of interest here, such statistics are not readily available in comparable, quantitative form. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) use country-level changes in them as an indicator of complex emergencies, but this precludes identifying complex emergencies at the sub-national level and thus excludes a number of severe but localized conflicts. Thus, I use evidence that health and nutrition statistics have deteriorated as a confirming indicator of disruption to civilian life, but do not assess the extent of such disruption based on quantitative information about them.

confirming or mitigating evidence concerning the presence of a complex emergency. First, if civilians are the intended targets of a large-scale campaign of rights abuses this is probably the single best confirming indicator of a government's unwillingness or inability to respond. In such cases, the government is either the perpetrator – and thus unwilling to protect the population – or the abuse provides evidence of the government's failure to protect its victims. Likewise, if a government initiates large-scale hostilities in densely populated areas without attempting to remove or protect the population this can also indicate its lack of concern for civilian welfare.

Further confirming evidence that a government is unable or unwilling to meet civilians' needs often relates to the accessibility of emergency relief. As OCHA's (1999) definition notes, complex emergencies tend to involve "the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints" and "significant risks to humanitarian relief workers in at least some areas." Relief organizations typically play a vital role in ministering to the needs of conflict-affected populations. Thus, efforts to hinder them, or the failure to effectively protect them, can indicate that a government is unable or unwilling to ensure that civilians' basic needs are met. Evidence may include official denial of access to external relief organizations; the inability to deliver aid because of fighting, attacks against aid workers, or infrastructure devastation; or aid agency evacuation from conflict regions due to insecurity.

In contrast, evidence that a government *is* able and willing to respond to a conflict-affected population's needs may mitigate the effects of disruption to civilian life (and thus potentially indicate that a complex emergency is not occurring). Such evidence may include international praise for the efforts of the government to respond to the humanitarian crisis, swift and successful efforts to end inter-communal violence, or indications that most displaced persons are adequately cared for.

***Coding Guidelines Overview***

Using these indicators, I developed a set of operational guidelines to identify complex emergencies (see Section B below for the full list of coding rules). These guidelines explain 1) how much disruption to civilian life is required to determine that a complex emergency has begun, is continuing, or has ended; 2) how to distinguish one complex emergency from another when there is a break in violence, a change in belligerents, or multiple conflicts in the same country; 3) how to tell if the government is unable or unwilling to act on behalf of conflict-affected civilians; and 4) how I deal with uncertainty in this information. As noted in Chapter 3, to qualify as a complex emergency a conflict must either kill at least 20,000 or forcibly displace at least 500,000 civilians within 5 or fewer years as a baseline for disruption of civilian life. In addition, annual proportions of these thresholds determine onset, continuation, and termination for each complex emergency. For example, to count as the beginning of a complex emergency a year must produce at least 10% of the baseline (thus, 2,000 deaths or 50,000 displaced persons). A lower proportion (6%) is required for a complex emergency to continue in subsequent years.

These thresholds necessarily exclude some smaller conflicts that otherwise meet the definition of a complex emergency. Such conflicts may include shorter but, on average, equally intense episodes of violence, as well as devastating conflicts in small societies. The thresholds, then, require a tradeoff between clarity and inclusiveness, and other scholars have employed various approaches to deal with such tradeoffs. Sambanis (2004), for example, argues in favor of measuring the magnitude of civil wars in per capita terms in order to avoid overlooking significant conflicts in small countries. By contrast, in his work on mass killings, Valentino (2004, p.10-12 p.10-12, see also Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) intentionally sets a high threshold of 50,000 deaths to avoid debate about which cases truly reflect the events he

seeks to understand. In order to balance these concerns while including as many conflicts as possible that most people would likely recognize as severely disruptive to civilian life, I use the lower fatality threshold of 20,000 in the same 5-year period used by Valentino. Finally, since relatively small portions of people who are displaced typically die as a result, the threshold for displacement must be much higher. Comparing the two is complicated, however, not least because there is both inter- and intra-conflict variation in the conditions displaced people face and in the portion who die. Drawing loosely on guidelines used by international organizations and relief agencies for identifying humanitarian emergencies, I use the figure of 500,000, which also seems likely to meet with broad acceptance as extensive disruption to civilian life.[6]

Additional guidelines identify how to distinguish one complex emergency from another where this is not immediately apparent. These guidelines follow largely on coding rules developed by scholars of civil war (eg, Sambanis 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003) for how to deal with issues such as changes in combatant groups, breaks in the violence, or the presence of multiple conflicts in the same country at the same time. Along with the quantitative thresholds, they provide the basic building blocks for identifying complex emergencies.

Nevertheless, alone these thresholds and guidelines are insufficient. First, they do not incorporate information about a government's willingness and ability to respond to civilians' needs. Second, they provide no means to proceed where there is uncertainty about whether the quantitative thresholds are met. Third, they fail to account for mitigating evidence that even

[6] The World Health Organization and various humanitarian groups define a crude mortality rate of 1 per 10,000 of the affected population per day as the threshold for an emergency. Assuming a stable displaced population (aside from these deaths), this would equate to a death rate of nearly 4% for an emergency that lasted a year. In practice, of course, displacement varies over time as people are newly displaced or go home, and so it would be unrealistic to extrapolate further for a multi-year period. Still, recognizing that thousands of people are typically displaced each year in a complex emergency, the 4% ratio of 20,000 civilian deaths to 500,000 displaced seems broadly consistent with the standards the humanitarian community uses to recognize humanitarian emergencies.

large-scale displacement sometimes generates only a limited threat to civilian life. To address these issues, I developed an additional set of coding schemas to reflect my confidence in the extent to which each conflict identified as a complex emergency, and each 'emergency-year' thereof, fully reflects the definition introduced above.

These schemas integrate both the quantitative thresholds and the available confirming and mitigating qualitative evidence. They reflect both the extent to which a coding decision depends on supplementary qualitative information, and the extent to which this information either confirms or mitigates a conflict's severity and the government's inability or unwillingness to respond to civilians' needs. In general, where there is significant mitigating evidence, this is reflected in less certainty that the emergency or emergency-year in question truly belongs in the list of complex emergencies. (In some cases this information was clear enough to leave a conflict out of the dataset entirely). Where there is clear confirming evidence, this is reflected in a higher level of certainty that the emergency or emergency-year belongs in the dataset. Overall, given the difficulty of obtaining accurate annual data, this seems a reasonable way to acknowledge and measure the unavoidable uncertainty that remains in the dataset. As discussed in Chapter 3 and in Part 5 below, I use these certainty schemas to perform robustness checks of my quantitative results by dropping observations involving the few complex emergencies that do not achieve the highest level of certainty.

***Data Sources***

Compiling the list of post-Cold War complex emergencies was a two-stage process. First, I used a number of datasets that provide evidence of substantial ongoing violence or disruption to civilian life to generate a list of possible cases. Next, more detailed reports on these conflicts helped determine which ones meet all operational criteria, and in which years.

As noted above, complex emergencies may arise out of various types of conflict. For civil and inter-state wars I used several lists and data sources to identify potential complex emergencies, including version 4 of the Correlates of War project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), version 4-2012 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002), and civil war datasets from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2004). Similarly, for atrocity crimes and violence aimed primarily at civilians I referred to PITF's Genocide and Politicide Problem Set (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2011) and lists of mass killings by Valentino (2004) and Easterly et al (2006).[7] Except for UCDP/PRIO, for each of these datasets I treated each conflict-year identified as a potential complex emergency.[8]

Finally, as an additional check on these data sources and to identify cases of communal violence excluded by them, I also referred to the Forcibly Displaced Populations (FDP) dataset (2009).[9] These data are based primarily on information compiled in the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants' (USCRI) annual World Refugee Survey (WRS) series. Since 1965 this series has reported various information on populations of refugees, asylum-seekers, and IDPs who have been forcibly displaced by political conflict, including the total number originating from a given country by year. They exclude migrant populations whose

[7] I also examined UCDP's One-Sided Violence dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007), but was limited by the fact that it identifies violence against civilians only according to the perpetrator and not the conflict or victims. As a result, when an actor (usually a government) kills civilians in multiple distinct conflicts in the same year, one cannot determine how many deaths are part of which conflict. Still, by highlighting actors that committed extensive one-sided violence this data provides added confidence that I did not miss any large-scale atrocities.

[8] In the UCDP/PRIO data events are identified either as minor conflicts (25 to 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year) or wars (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths). From this dataset I further examined only conflict-years that reached the 'war' threshold (and those immediately before or after), unless another data source also identified them as a potential complex emergency.

[9] As noted earlier, UCDP's Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012) records civilian deaths due to communal conflict but does not separate them from combatant deaths. I thus found the FDP dataset more useful for uncovering cases of large-scale communal violence.

movement is prompted purely by unrelated economic or climatological conditions.[10] Because the FDP dataset records stocks rather than flows, it does not reflect the amount of new displacement generated in a given year.[11] Still, when a country is identified as the source of many forcibly displaced people, this is generally a strong indicator that violence probably either *is* or recently *was* occurring. I investigated all country-years that produced 15,000 or more forcibly displaced (and those immediately before and after) as potential complex emergencies. These overlapped considerably but not entirely with the other datasets, and the wide range of sources used provides grounds for confidence that this process identified all events that meet the definition and quantitative thresholds for a complex emergency.

Next, for each conflict identified by any of the above sources as going on between 1989 and 2009, I sought additional evidence about its impact on civilians and governmental willingness and ability to shield the population. Although I focus on the post-Cold War years, some of this period's worst conflicts began beforehand and inspired peace operations in the 1990s. To capture these, I examined the full length of all conflicts that qualified as complex emergencies and were ongoing in 1989 or later, even if they started earlier.

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[10] One cause of conflict-related forced migration, of course, is a livelihood lost or threatened by ongoing violence. In certain conflicts, moreover, violence and climatological conditions such as drought become intertwined and mutually reinforcing. People displaced under these conditions *are* included in the USCRI, and hence the FDP dataset, numbers. Finally, none of this excludes the possibility that the FDPs identified by the dataset were influenced about where to relocate by other economic or political conditions (see, e.g., Moore and Shellman 2006, Moore and Shellman 2007). Still, this should not matter here since what is important for assessing disruption to civilian life at home is the total conflict-displaced population including both IDPs and refugees, which is exactly what the FDP dataset records.

[11] Data on stocks of forcibly displaced persons are also available from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). I relied on the FDP dataset because USCRI covers more countries and supplements UNHCR data with a variety of other sources, including assessments made during the frequent visits of USCRI staff to conflict areas. Moreover, since 1981, USCRI editors have made concerted efforts to distinguish between refugees and asylum seekers in need of a permanent home and those who have been successfully resettled (UNHCR does not). USCRI also weighs the credibility of the various sources of information available to it in making its estimates.

Various sources helped provide this in-depth information. I relied heavily on the WRS yearly country summaries, which compile information from both USCRI's own investigations as well as from outside sources such as the U.S. State Department, the UN, and local and international human rights groups. As a result, these reports typically provide a wealth of detailed information on annual estimates of civilian deaths and new displacement, the conditions of life for displaced persons, and evidence of government efforts (or lack thereof) to provide for civilians' basic needs. Where the WRS reports proved unclear or insufficient, I also examined reports from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), U.S. State Department, human rights groups, truth and reconciliation commissions, and academic case studies. When different sources give conflicting information on whether an overall or annual threshold for death or displacement is met, the relevant 'certainty' coding is consistent with the lower estimate.

***Dataset Overview***

As noted in Chapter 3, the dataset includes 61 complex emergencies that began after or were already ongoing in 1989. Several countries experienced multiple concurrent complex emergencies caused by politically and geographically distinct conflicts. For instance, in 1999 Indonesia experienced no less than three, involving different actors and political issues in different parts of the country: East Timor, Aceh, and the Moluccas/Sulawesi. Thus, the unit of analysis at the annual level is the emergency-year, rather than the country-year. There are a total of 495 emergency-years (of which Indonesia in 1999 accounts for 3). Of the complex emergencies, 43 (70%) started in 1989 or later, and 394 (80%) of the total emergency-years were in 1989 or later. The earliest complex emergencies started in 1975 in Angola and Lebanon (both ended in 1991). Nine complex emergencies (15%) were ongoing at the end of 2009. They occurred in 39 countries, and ranged in length from one to 25 years (with several of the longest

still ongoing at the end of 2009).[12] While most complex emergencies affected an entire country, a number were limited to a sub-national region such as a province or island, as in Indian-controlled Kashmir or the three complex emergencies in Indonesia.

Table W1 (reproduced below from Table A1 in the book) lists the complex emergencies, along with my certainty from 1 (low) to 3 (high) that they fully reflect both the definition and quantitative thresholds. Fifty of them meet the highest standard. In the eleven others, the uncertainty most often arises from mitigating evidence suggesting that even a conflict that displaces half a million people may not severely threaten civilian life, or that a government has made a serious effort to provide for the civilian population's basic needs (rather than from uncertainty about the scale of death or displacement). Finally, for each complex emergency the right-hand column lists all peace operations that began during, or within the year after, each complex emergency, and to which at least one potential intervener contributed. It also identifies complex emergency-potential intervener pairs excluded from the analysis, as noted in Chapter 3.

When compared to existing datasets of recent complex emergencies, this list identifies most of the same conflicts, and then some. This provides validation that the process I employed to generate it was consistent with existing ideas about what defines these events.

[12] This is based on treating Russia and the USSR as separate countries.

## Table W1: Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies & Peace Operations

| Complex Emergency Name | Start Year | End Year | Certainty | Associated Peace Operations* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan I / Soviets | 1978 | 1992 | 3 | UNGOMAP |
| Afghanistan II / Civil War | 1992 | 2001 | 3 | |
| Afghanistan III / OEF & After | 2001 | Ongoing 2009 | 3 | *Excluded from analysis for all potential interveners* |
| Cambodia | 1979 | 1990 | 3 | UNAMIC; UNTAC (1992) |
| India I / Kashmir | 1990 | 2004 | 2 | |
| India II / Northeast | 1993 | 1998 | 2 | |
| Indonesia I / Aceh | 1999 | 2004 | 3 | |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | 1999 | 1999 | 3 | INTERFET; UNTAET (2000) |
| Indonesia III / Moluccas & Sulawesi | 1999 | 2002 | 3 | |
| Myanmar / Burma | 1988 | Ongoing 2009 | 3 | |
| Pakistan | 2004 | Ongoing 2009 | 3 | *Excluded from analysis for USA only* |
| Philippines I / Govt. vs. NPA | 1986 | 1992 | 3 | |
| Philippines II / Govt. vs. Muslim Insurgents | 1996 | 2009 | 3 | |
| Sri Lanka I | 1983 | 2001 | 3 | |
| Sri Lanka II | 2006 | 2009 | 2 | |
| Azerbaijan - Armenia (USSR) | 1988 | 1991 | 3 | |
| Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh | 1992 | 1994 | 3 | |
| Bosnia | 1992 | 1995 | 3 | UNPROFOR/NATO support; Deliberate Force; |
| Croatia | 1991 | 1995 | 3 | UNPROFOR/UNCRO; UNTAES & UNMOP (1996) |
| Russia / Chechnya I | 1995 | 1996 | 3 | |
| Russia / Chechnya II | 1999 | 2004 | 3 | |
| Tajikistan | 1992 | 1993 | 3 | UNMOT (1994) |
| Turkey | 1992 | 1998 | 3 | |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | 1998 | 2000 | 3 | Allied Force; KFOR |
| Algeria | 1992 | 2003 | 3 | |
| Angola I | 1975 | 1991 | 3 | UNAVEM I; UNAVEM II |
| Angola II | 1992 | 1994 | 3 | UNAVEM II; UNAVEM III (1995) |
| Angola III | 1998 | 2002 | 3 | MONUA |
| Burundi | 1993 | 2004 | 3 | AMIB; ONUB |
| Congo-Brazzaville | 1997 | 1999 | 3 | |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 2002 | 2004 | 3 | ECOMICI; MINUCI; UNOCI; Op. Licorne (Fr) |
| DRC (Zaire) I | 1992 | 1996 | 3 | |
| DRC (Zaire) II | 1996 | 1997 | 3 | |
| DRC (Zaire) III | 1998 | Ongoing 2009 | 3 | MONUC; Artemis (EU); EUFOR RD-Congo |
| Eritrea / War w/ Ethiopia | 1998 | 2000 | 3 | UNMEE |
| Ethiopia / Civil War | 1988 | 1992 | 3 | |
| Kenya | 2008 | 2008 | 1 | |
| Liberia I | 1990 | 1996 | 3 | ECOMOG; UNOMIL |
| Liberia II | 1999 | 2003 | 3 | UNMIL; ECOMIL; JTF Liberia (US) |
| Mozambique | 1982 | 1992 | 3 | ONUMOZ |
| Nigeria | 1997 | 2006 | 3 | |
| Rwanda | 1990 | 1999 | 3 | UNOMUR; UNAMIR; Op. Turquoise (Fr); Support Hope (US) |
| Sierra Leone | 1991 | 2001 | 3 | ECOMOG; UNOMSIL; UNAMSIL; Op. Palliser (UK) |
| Somalia | 1988 | Ongoing 2009 | 3 | UNOSOM I; Provide Relief; UNITAF; UNOSOM II; AMISOM; Various Anti-Piracy efforts (Allied Provider, Atalanta, Allied Protector, Ocean Shield) |
| South Africa | 1986 | 1995 | 2 | |
| Sudan I / North-South civil war | 1983 | 2004 | 3 | UNMIS (2005) |
| Sudan II / Darfur | 2003 | Ongoing 2009 | 3 | AMIS; UNAMID; EUFOR TCHAD/RCA; MINURCAT |
| Sudan III / Southern violence | 2008 | Ongoing 2009 | 2 | UNMIS |
| Uganda I | 1987 | 1991 | 3 | |
| Uganda II / LRA | 1996 | 2006 | 3 | |
| Zimbabwe | 2005 | 2008 | 3 | |
| Colombia | 1985 | Ongoing 2009 | 3 | |
| El Salvador | 1980 | 1990 | 3 | ONUSAL (1991) |
| Peru | 1983 | 1994 | 2 | |
| Iraq / Kurds I | 1987 | 1989 | 3 | |
| Iraq / Kurds II | 1991 | 1993 | 3 | Provide Comfort; UNGCI |
| Iraq / Shiites | 1991 | 1998 | 2 | Southern Watch |
| Iraq / US-led coalition | 2003 | Ongoing 2009 | 3 | *Excluded from analysis for USA & UK* |
| Kuwait | 1990 | 1990 | 1 | *Excluded from analysis for all potential interveners* |
| Lebanon I / Civil war | 1975 | 1991 | 3 | MNF; UNIFIL |
| Lebanon II / Israeli air attacks | 2006 | 2006 | 1 | UNIFIL |

*Peace operations with dates in parentheses began the year after the end of the complex emergency. All others began during the complex emergency. Peace operations not involving a great power democracy are excluded, but listed in Part 2 of the web appendix. Emergency-potential intervener pairs excluded from the analysis in Chapter 3, as described in the main text, are listed in italics.

## B. CODING RULES

### *1) Ongoing Violence & Disruption to Civilian Life*

*A) Baseline Threshold*

A complex emergency displaces at least 500,000 civilians or generates at least 20,000 civilian deaths due to a combination of the direct and indirect consequences of violence within a period of 5 or fewer years.

*B) Annual Thresholds*

*i) Onset*
A complex emergency begins in the first year in which it reaches 10% of the overall threshold – either 50,000 persons displaced or 2,000 civilian deaths, during the year, as a direct or indirect consequence of violence.

*ii) Continuation / Termination*
A complex emergency continues through each year in which the number of newly displaced civilians or civilian deaths reaches 6% of the overall threshold – either 30,000 newly displaced or 1,200 civilian deaths. Thus, the last year of a complex emergency is the last year that meets either of these criteria, although lower-level violence may continue. This requirement ensures that a single complex emergency is characterized by persistent, sustained violence.

### *2) Episodes of Political Violence*

*A) Change in Actors / Political Issues*

Since it is defined as an episode of political violence, a complex emergency is identified in part by the actors involved and the political issues at stake. Thus, when there is a fundamental change in the basic political issues or the major actors, a new complex emergency is coded thereafter (as long as all the other characteristics are met by the ensuing violence).[13]

For example, although Afghanistan has experienced no significant break in violence since 1978, 3 identifiable complex emergencies occurred during this time:

1) 1978 – 1992: The basic conflict was between the USSR and its Afghan puppet regime on the one hand, and the US-supported Mujahideen on the other.
2) 1992 – 2001: The basic conflict was between different Afghan groups vying for power with one another.
3) 2001 – Ongoing 2009: The basic conflict was between the United States, the Afghan government, and their allies on the one hand, and the Taliban on the other.

[13] Changes in actors' names are okay, as is the addition/subtraction of some actors over time as long as this does not fundamentally change the nature of the conflict among the others.

*B) Breaks in Violence*

If a complex emergency experiences a break in violence, a new one begins thereafter if the break in violence lasts at least one full year (assuming all other criteria are met when violence resumes). If the break in violence is shorter, only a single complex emergency is coded.

*C) Multiple Complex Emergencies in a Country*

When a single country experiences multiple concurrent conflicts, separate complex emergencies are coded if it is possible to identify separate actors in distinct geographical regions, and uniquely identifiable political issues generating the violence (again assuming that each conflict also meets all the other criteria). Otherwise, only one complex emergency is coded.

For example, multiple Burmese ethnic groups distributed in different geographic areas have concurrently fought the Burmese government for greater autonomy or independence. These conflicts generate only one complex emergency, however, because a single, consistently applied policy of heavy-handed government treatment of civilians in these regions is primarily responsible for the extent of disruption to civilian life.

In contrast, in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, the province of Aceh experienced a separatist civil war (1999 – 2004), which – on its own – met all the criteria of a complex emergency. Meanwhile, far away in the Moluccas (1999 – 2002), inter-communal violence between Muslims and Christians separately met all of these criteria. These are coded as separate complex emergencies.

*D) Cross-Border Violence*

Because complex emergencies are defined in terms of a government's responsibility to its own citizens, evidence used to identify them must reflect this. Thus, although inter-state conflicts or cross-border insurgencies are in some sense single episodes of political violence, such conflicts are coded as separate complex emergencies if all of the other criteria for a complex emergency are met on each side of an international boundary. Otherwise, a complex emergency is coded only where the conflict's effects on the population of a single state meet these criteria.

For example, although the Lord's Resistance Army has attacked and displaced civilians in northern Uganda, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, only in Uganda did this conflict clearly meet the quantitative threshold for a complex emergency (at least, through 2009). Thus only one complex emergency is identified related to this group's activities, in Uganda.

***3) Incorporating Qualitative Information and Measuring Uncertainty***

To incorporate qualitative information about disruption to civilian life and governmental willingness/ability to respond to the threat to civilians, each complex emergency receives a numerical coding based on a combination of the available qualitative and quantitative information. This coding measures my certainty about whether each complex emergency fully

meets both the quantitative thresholds and the overall definition of a complex emergency. It ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 reflects the most uncertainty and 3 reflects the least. A second coding – from 1 to 5 – performs the same function for each year of each complex emergency.

*A) Types of Information*

Qualitative information incorporated in these coding schemas is of four basic types. The first two provide either mitigating or confirming evidence about whether or not the responsible government appears to be unwilling or unable to shield civilians from the worst effects of violence, and the last two provide similar information about whether a conflict generates severe disruption to civilian life. Here, where it is clear that the quantitative threshold is met, mitigating evidence can suggest that a complex emergency is not ongoing. Where there is insufficient quantitative evidence to determine whether a conflict (or a given year within it) met the relevant quantitative threshold, confirming qualitative evidence can increase our confidence that it is likely to have done so.

In general, the more the available confirming evidence, and the less the available mitigating evidence, the more likely it is that a complex emergency is occurring. The coding schemes reflect this basic insight.

*i) Governmental Inability/Unwillingness*

Mitigating Evidence:
The responsible government's reaction to the violence appears adequate and appropriate to meet civilians' needs. Evidence can include international praise for the responsible government; government success at swiftly ending inter-communal violence; or indications that most displaced persons are adequately cared for.

Confirming Evidence:
A concerted campaign of rights abuses directed against the physical security of civilians serves as *confirming* evidence of a complex emergency. If carried out by the responsible government, we can infer that this government is unwilling to protect civilians. If carried out by another actor, we can infer that the government is unable to protect civilians. Similarly, evidence that a government initiates large-scale hostilities in densely populated areas without attempting to remove or protect vulnerable civilians; or that aid operations are subject to attacks or serious disruption due to insecurity, can serve as confirmation that a government is unable or unwilling to mitigate a conflict's effects on civilians.

*ii) Disruption to Civilian Life*

Mitigating Evidence:
Occasionally, a conflict that displaces 500,000 civilians in 5 years may not truly represent a severe threat to civilian life, for reasons *other* than effective government response. Typically, this occurs where civilians are able to flee large-scale violence of which they are not the primary targets and also do not experience significant shortages of basic necessities. Evidence that the vast majority of displaced people find housing with individual families

(thereby avoiding overcrowded, unsanitary conditions in displaced-person camps) or that almost all displacement is temporary (a few weeks or a couple of months), can thus mitigate a judgment that a complex emergency is occurring.

Confirming Evidence:
Evidence of a widespread and potentially life-threatening shortage of access to the basic necessities of subsistence – food, water, health care, and shelter – can serve as confirming evidence that the quantitative threshold for a complex emergency is likely to be met, even if clear quantitative estimates are unavailable. Evidence of widespread malnutrition; starvation; outbreaks of disease related to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions; substantially elevated child or maternal mortality or significantly decreased life expectancy; a large population without shelter; or a large population unreachable by humanitarian aid organizations indicates extensive exposure to the dangerous indirect effects of ongoing violence.

*B) Measuring Overall Uncertainty*

**Coding of 1**: A conflict meets the overall quantitative threshold for a complex emergency, but evidence of at least one mitigating indicator – either about the government's ability / willingness to respond to civilians' needs, or about the extent of disruption to civilian life – suggests that it may not truly reflect the definition.

Example: Israel's 2006 war against Lebanon, in which the vast majority of displaced people were able to return home quickly

**Coding of 2:** Quantitative estimates are unclear about whether the overall threshold for a complex emergency is met. There may be multiple competing estimates, or available estimates may be slightly below the threshold. However, at least one confirming qualitative indicator suggests that the available quantitative estimates may significantly underestimate the true extent of disruption to civilian life. In general, these events appear consistent with the definition of a complex emergency, and there is good reason to suspect that the quantitative threshold is met.

Example: Violent Iraqi suppression of the Shiite community, 1990s

**Coding of 3:** There is clear evidence that civilian deaths and/or displacement met the quantitative threshold, and no significant mitigating evidence. This represents the highest level of certainty that a conflict reflects the definition.

Example: Sierra Leone's civil war, 1991 – 2001

*C) Measuring Annual Uncertainty*

**Coding of 1:** There is evidence that the quantitative threshold is met, but there is at least one form of mitigating evidence – either about the government's ability / willingness to respond to civilians' needs, or about the extent of disruption to civilian life – to suggest that it may not truly reflect the definition.

*Emergency-years coded **1** may not truly reflect the definition of a complex emergency*.

**Coding of 2:** There is *either* some quantitative, *or* some confirming qualitative evidence of an ongoing complex emergency, but it is unclear whether the quantitative threshold for onset or continuation is met. Specifically, there is at least one major confirming qualitative indicator, or at least one of two kinds of quantitative information:

1) There is some new displacement and/or civilian deaths, but it is unclear whether they exceed the relevant threshold (such as when 'Tens of thousands were displaced this year').

2) There is a single estimate for deaths or displacement over multiple years that include the year in question, where the *average* number displaced or killed over this period exceeds the relevant quantitative threshold. For example, if there are an estimated 50,000 deaths over 5 years (including the emergency-year in question), the average is 10,000 / year, well over the threshold for onset (2,000) or continuation (1,200). If this is the only information for any of these years, they are coded '2.'

*Emergency-years coded **2** reflect good reason to <u>suspect</u> a complex emergency is ongoing, but the clarity of the available evidence is limited.*

**Coding of 3:** There is at least *some* quantitative evidence of a complex emergency, *and* this is supplemented with at least some confirming qualitative evidence. Specifically, there is at least one of the two kinds of quantitative information just described, *and* at least one confirming qualitative indicator.

*Emergency-years coded **3** reflect considerable evidence of an ongoing complex emergency, but there is some doubt about whether the relevant threshold is attained.*

**Coding of 4:** There is at least *some* quantitative evidence that a complex emergency is ongoing, *and* this is supplemented by multiple forms of confirming qualitative evidence. Specifically, there is at least one of the two kinds of quantitative information just described, and at least two confirming qualitative indicators.

*Emergency-years coded **4** reflect strong evidence of an ongoing complex emergency.*

**Coding of 5:** There is clear evidence that the relevant quantitative threshold (for onset or continuation) is met and no significant mitigating evidence. Thus, the onset year is coded '5' if there is clear evidence of 50,000 newly displaced or 2,000 civilian deaths. Each subsequent year is coded '5' if there is clear evidence of 30,000 newly displaced or 1,200 civilian deaths.

*Emergency-years coded **5** reflect a very high level of confidence that a complex emergency is ongoing*.

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## Part 2: Coding Ambitions & Resources for *Contribution Type*

This appendix provides detailed justifications and sources for the coding of the two key components of contributions described in Chapter 3: ambitions (as reflected in operational goals and military strategies), and the resources potential interveners contribute to each mission. First, Table W2 lists the names of all operations identified by acronym below.

Complex emergencies that received no peace operations are not covered here. For the remaining observations, this second part of the web appendix is divided into two sections. First, Section A covers resource commitments, and lists and justifies the coding for each great power democracy's commitments to each operation. Second, Section B covers ambitions. Although in theory these could be different for different states that contribute to the same mission but that impose substantially different restrictions or caveats on their troops while deployed, I did not find sufficient evidence of this to code different sets of ambitions for the same operation. Thus, there is one entry per operation, with a few exceptions where ambitions changed significantly over time. For these I include a separate entry for each period in which the ambitions require a unique coding. Full reference information for the sources cited is included in a separate bibliography at the end, except where links are provided for webpages.

*Notes*: Throughout, 1) "MB" stands for IISS' *Military Balance*; 2) Gray shading indicates the state(s) did not to my knowledge contribute to a particular operation.

## Table W2: Peace Operation Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AMIB | African Mission in Burundi |
| AMIS | African Mission in Sudan |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission to Somalia |
| CIS/PKF | Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Force (Tajikistan) |
| ECOMICI | ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire |
| ECOMIL | ECOWAS Mission in Liberia |
| ECOMOG | Military Observer Group (ECOWAS, Liberia) |
| ECOMOG | West African Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOWAS, Sierra Leone) |
| EUFOR Tchad/RCA | European Union Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic |
| EUFOR RD Congo | European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| IFOR | Implementation Force (Bosnia & Herzegovina) |
| IMT | International Monitoring Team (Philippines) |
| INTERFET | International Force East Timor |
| JTF Liberia | Joint Task Force Liberia |
| IPKF | Indian Peacekeeping Force (Sri Lanka) |
| KFOR | Kosovo Force |
| MINUCI | United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire |
| MINURCAT | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad |
| MNF | Multinational Force (Lebanon) |
| MOG | Military Observer Group (Rwanda) |
| MONUA | United Nations Observer Mission In Angola |
| MONUC (I, II) | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (I, II) |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| NMOG (I, II) | Neutral Military Observer Group (I, II) (Rwanda) |
| OMIB | Organization of African Unity Mission in Burundi |
| ONUB | United Nations Operation in Burundi |
| ONUMOZ | United Nations Operation in Mozambique |
| ONUSAL | United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador |
| SAPSD | South African Protection Support Detachment |
| UNAMIC | United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia |
| UNAMID | African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur |
| UNAMIR (I, II) | United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (I, II) |
| UNAMSIL | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone |
| UNAVEM (I, II, III) | United Nations Angola Verification Mission (I, II, III) |
| UNCRO | United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (Croatia) |
| UNGCI | United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq |

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|---|---|
| UNGOMAP | United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan |
| UNIFIL (I, II) | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (I, II) |
| UNITAF | United Task Force (Somalia) |
| UNMEE | United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea |
| UNMIL | United Nations Mission in Liberia |
| UNMIS | United Nations Mission in Sudan |
| UNMOP | United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka |
| UNMOT | United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan |
| UNOCI | United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire |
| UNOMIL | United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia |
| UNOMSIL | United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone |
| UNOMUR | United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda |
| UNOSOM (I, II) | United Nations Operation in Somalia (I, II) |
| UNPROFOR | UN Protection Force (Croatia & Bosnia) |
| UNTAC | United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia |
| UNTAES | United Nations Transitional Authority In Eastern Slavonia, Baranja And Western Sirmium |
| UNTAET | United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor |

# Part A: Resource Commitments

| Complex Emergency | Operation | Resources: US | Sources/Justification: US |
|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan I / Soviets | UNGOMAP | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Cambodia | UNAMIC | 1 | UNAMIC was authorized late in 1991 and contributions do not show up in *Military Balance* for that year, but given that the US contributed only 17 observers to UNTAC in 1992 (see below), I code it as 1 for UNAMIC also. |
| Cambodia | UNTAC (1992) | 1 | MB 1992: 17 observers; MB 1993: 49 observers. |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | INTERFET | 3 | Schwartz (2001, p.3): "According to unclassified records drawn from the author's personal files, the United States reached its maximum presence in East Timor on November 11, 1999, when we had 235 troops in Timor; on November 27, the U.S. reached its maximum in Australia, with 353. The maximum total complement, which included a marine expeditionary unit off shore, was just over 3000 in early October. The United States provided strategic and tactical fixed wing airlift, tactical helicopter airlift, intelligence, communications support, a civil-military operations center, a logistics planning cell, and other support. The Australians particularly valued the off-shore presence of an amphibious readiness group, which included the marines and served as an important demonstration of U.S. interest and resolve, as well as alliance solidarity." |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | UNTAET (2000) | 1 | MB 2000: Token (3) |
| Philippines II / Govt. vs. Muslim Insurgents | IMT | | Beginning in 2003, the U.S. provided diplomatic support and funding for the peace process between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). I found no evidence, however, that this extended to direct support for the IMT. See Martin and Tuminez 2008. In addition, as of mid-2010, the State Department page for the Philippines mentioned the IMT, but there was no mention of any direct U.S. involvement. See "Background Note: Philippines," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm, accessed July 3, 2010. |
| Sri Lanka I | IPKF | | No evidence of involvement |
| Tajikistan | CIS/PKF | | No evidence of involvement |
| Tajikistan | UNMOT (1994) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Bosnia | UNPROFOR | 1 | UN vote / financing only |

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|---|---|---|---|
| Bosnia | NATO Support to UNPROFOR | 3 | The US did not contribute directly to UNPROFOR, but it did contribute to all of NATO's various support efforts (which I treat as a single mission given that they shared the same purpose and are regularly discussed together in my sources).<br>MB 1993: Doesn't say how many are deployed, but p.15 clearly says US aircraft are part of Deny Flight, that US aircraft have participated in Provide Promise since 1992, and that the Navy contributes to Sharp Guard;<br>MB 1994: Provide Promise, 29 aircraft; Deny flight, 2600 personnel, 74 aircraft, 1 ship; Sharp Guard, about 9 ships and some aircraft;<br>MB 1995: Provide Promise, 1 C-130; Deny flight, 2000 Air Force personnel, 87 aircraft, 1 ship; Sharp Guard, 4 ships |
| Bosnia | IFOR | 3 | MB 1996: 18,400 in Bosnia, plus 1675 in Croatia (deployed 1995) |
| Bosnia | Operation Deliberate Force | 3 | US supplied about 141 aircraft (Sargent 2000 p.204). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that this is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel. |
| Croatia | UNPROFOR /UNCRO | 2 | MB 1993: 290, MB 1994: 322, MB 1995: 345 (Army field hospital) |
| Croatia | UNTAES (1996) | 1 | MB 1996: 41 civilian police (not military personnel, and "token" size contribution in any case) |
| Croatia | UNMOP (1996) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | Operation Allied Force | 3 | The US deployed some 50,000 personnel from all four service branches to Allied Force, plus some 740 aircraft (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, p.117; see also Peters et al 2001, p.23). |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | KFOR | 3 | MB 2000: 5500 in Yugoslavia (+450 in Romania); See also Gerstein 2005, p.212. |
| Sierra Leone | ECOMOG | 1 | According to Berman and Labonte (2006 p.151), in 1998 the US "contributed $3.9 million…to fund improvements in ECOMOG logistics, although this exhausted all State Dept funds available at the time for peace operations in Africa." They also note (p.152) that, "In early 1998, the United States agreed to transfer American-supplied vehicles, in service with Nigerian units in Liberia, to Sierra Leone." Assistance continued in 1999. See also Kabia 2009, p.117. |
| Sierra Leone | UNOMSIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Sierra Leone | UNAMSIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Sierra Leone | Operation Palliser (UK) | | No involvement |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liberia I | ECOMOG | 1 | According to Adeleke (1995, p.589), "The United States preferred to limit its contribution to finance and logistical support, providing, by April 1994, $28.7 million to ECOMOG, $270 million for humanitarian assistance, and a further $30.83 million to the Liberian Trust Fund established by the UN Secretary-General in September 1993 to support the expanded ECOMOG."<br>Adebajo (2004 p.294) adds that, "Washington contributed $500 million in humanitarian assistance to Liberia during the civil war, but did not support ECOMOG substantially until near the end of its mission, when it provided crucial logistical support for disarmament" (see also Whiteman and Yates 2004 p.373).<br>Kabia (2009 p.82) points out that the early U.S. aid was support for the Senegalese contingent from 1991 – 1993. |
| Liberia I | UNOMIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Liberia II | UNMIL | 1 | MB 2004: Token (11) (deployed in 2003) |
| Liberia II | ECOMIL | 1 | To facilitate its deployment, "The United States contributed roughly $26 million to ECOMIL from the time it was deployed until October 1, 2003" (See Murphy 2004, note 12). |
| Liberia II | JTF Liberia (US) | 3 | The U.S. deployed some 4,350 military personnel to the region in June 2003 as part of operation JTF Liberia, most of whom remained on warships off the coast as a deterrent force. Only about 200 went ashore to assist ECOMIL in providing humanitarian assistance and providing security in Monrovia. They departed in October on the arrival of UNMIL (See eg, Murphy 2004; Adebajo 2004 p.300). |
| Burundi | OMIB | | No evidence of involvement |
| Burundi | SAPSD | | No evidence of involvement |
| Burundi | AMIB | 1 | The United States provided funding for the troop contingent from Ethiopia (Svensson 2008 p.13). |
| Burundi | ONUB | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Mozambique | ONUMOZ | 1 | MB 1994: Token (5), but not until over a year after end of complex emergency (would not affect coding even if earlier) |
| Angola I | UNAVEM I | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola I | UNAVEM II (1991) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola II | UNAVEM II | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola II | UNAVEM III (1995) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola III | MONUA | 1 | UN vote / financing only |

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|---|---|---|---|
| Somalia | UNOSOM I | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Somalia | Provide Relief | 2 | The force involved a total of about 20 planes from the US, Canada, & Germany (see Seybolt p.112-113). They "worked with the UN World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on a purely logistical operation which moved supplies from Kenya to the interior of Somalia where the famine was worst" (Seybolt p.54). |
| Somalia | UNITAF / Restore Hope | 3 | MB 1992 p.14: "At its peak the US force numbered some 25,000 men, including naval units offshore." |
| Somalia | UNOSOM II | 3 | MB 1993: 4,100 (+ unspecified # of Marines offshore). |
| Somalia | AMISOM | 1 | The US provided assistance for contingents from Uganda as well as Burundi and Djibouti, including support for equipment, training, and transport. Direct support to AMISOM between 2007 and early 2010 amounted to some $185 million. See "U.S. Policy in Somalia," Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson and Ambassador Ertharin Cousin, March 12 2010. http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Somalia | Anti-Piracy | 2 | All three NATO anti-piracy missions (Operation Allied Provider, Operation Allied Protector, & Operation Ocean Shield, which I group together along with EU NAVFOR Atalanta because of their close coordination and same purposes) were conducted by NATO's two Standing Maritime Groups, which means that the particular assets deployed at different times were a function of which states were contributing to which group (and which assets they were contributing), as well as which group was responsible for the missions at different times. Still, the US consistently contributed ships to these missions. In 2009 it provided ships for both Allied Protector and Ocean Shield. See http://www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/CC_MAR_Naples/operations/allied_provider/forces.html and also NATO's page on "Counter-Piracy Operations," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm. |
| DRC (Zaire) III | MONUC | 1 | MB 1999 - 2009: UN vote / financing only; MB 2010: Token (2) |
| DRC (Zaire) III | Operation Artemis (EU) | | No Contribution |
| DRC (Zaire) III | EUFOR RD Congo | | No Contribution |
| Cote d'Ivoire | ECOMICI/ECOFORCE | 1 | The US provided officers to help with mission planning and "provided support towards strategic transportation within the mission area and two-thirds of the force's food requirements" (Kabia 2009 p.145). |
| Cote d'Ivoire | MINUCI | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Cote d'Ivoire | UNOCI | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Operation Licorne (France) | | No Contribution. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rwanda | MOG/NMOG I, II (OAU) | | No Contribution. |
| Rwanda | UNOMUR | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Rwanda | UNAMIR | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Rwanda | Op. Turquoise (France) | | No Contribution. |
| Rwanda | Support Hope (US) | 3 | Several sources provide different figures for the size of the US deployment to Operation Support Hope, but all of them place this deployment at greater than 1,000 troops (with the lowest at 1210 and the highest at 3,600). Only about 200 of these personnel were actually deployed on the ground in Kigali, Rwanda or Goma, Zaire, with the rest deployed in supporting roles elsewhere. The mission headquarters was Entebbe, Uganda.<br>See MB 1994: US deployed "225 engr, cargo handling at Kigale and Goma (Zaire); 985 elsewhere in Africa."<br>In addition, Seybolt (2008 p.120) notes that the U.S. deployed 3600 people to the region in support of the mission. Finally, a DoD estimate says they deployed 2100 personnel to the region as part of the operation: United States Department of Defense, "Summary - Report to Congress on U.S. Military Activities in Rwanda, 1994 - August 1997." http://www.dod.gov/pubs/rwanda/summary.html. Accessed July 8, 2010. |
| Sudan II / Civil War | UNMIS (2005) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Sudan II / Darfur | AMIS | 1 | See extended discussion on contribution in Chapter 7 of the dissertation. Briefly, according to Ekengard (2008 p.18), the State Department "agreed to fund a contract with Lockheed Martin subsidiary Pacific Architectural Engineers (PAE) to handle camp construction, water and food provision, and laundry. During the period June 2004 to December 2005, PAE built 32 camps around Darfur. In November 2006, total costs for PAE's work amounted to 7.8 million U.S. dollars per month." Also, NATO "agreed on 8 June 2005 to support the AU's efforts in Darfur by assisting with intelligence, strategic airlift and command and control training" (MB 2005 p.360).<br>Also, MB 2008: Token observers (2). |
| Sudan II / Darfur | UNAMID | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Sudan II / Darfur | EUFOR TCHAD/RCA | | No Contribution. |
| Sudan II / Darfur | MINURCAT | 1 | MB 2010: Token contribution (2, deployed in 2009) |
| Sudan III / Southern Violence | UNMIS | 1 | MB 2008, 2009: None -- Thus UN vote / financing only |
| Eritrea / War with Ethiopia | UNMEE | 1 | MB 2003: Token (7), but not until over a year after end of complex emergency (would not affect coding even if earlier) |
| El Salvador | ONUSAL (1991) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |

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| Iraq / Kurds II | Provide Comfort | 3 | Byman & Waxman (2000 p.44): "More than 10,000 U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel participated in Operation Provide Comfort." |
| Iraq / Kurds II | UNGCI | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Iraq / Shiites | Southern Watch | 3 | According to Global Security, the US deployed over 6000 Air Force personnel in support of the operation (though it does not state the number that participated directly or for how long this number were deployed; it may have only been for a short time early on). In addition, US aircraft and crews flew some 28,800 sorties by the end of January 1997. (Global security, "Operation Southern Watch." http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/southern_watch.htm. Accessed July 9, 2010.).<br>The MB reports are not terribly clear about the numbers deployed over the years. MB 1993 notes that the Air Force had units on rotation in Saudi Arabia, and that numbers varied (incl: F-4G, F-15, F-16, F-117, C-130, KC-135, U-2, J-STARS). 1 Patriot bn.) MB 1995 notes essentially the same ("Southern Watch: USAF units on rotation, numbers vary (incl F- 15, F-16, F-117, C-130, KC-135, E-3)". It also notes several thousand Army and Air Force personnel deployed in Turkey on Provide Comfort, who may have also played a supporting role for Southern Watch. |
| Lebanon I / Civil War | MNF | 3 | In September 1982 the US deployed about 1200 Marines; this number would reach about 1800-2000 over the following year (see O'Ballance 1998 p120; Caligaris 1984 p.266). |
| Lebanon I / Civil War | UNIFIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Lebanon II / Israeli air attacks | UNIFIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |

| Complex Emergency | Operation | Resources: UK | Sources/Justification: UK |
|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan I / Soviets | UNGOMAP | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Cambodia | UNAMIC | 1 | UNAMIC was authorized late in 1991 and contributions do not show up in *Military Balance* for that year, but given that the UK contributed only 38 observers to UNTAC in 1992 (see below), I code it as 1 for UNAMIC also. |
| Cambodia | UNTAC (1992) | 1 | MB 1992, 1993: Token (38 observers) |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | INTERFET | 2 | The UK deployed a contingent of Royal Gurkhas (around 290 personnel) on the ground as part of the peacekeeping force. It also provided several C-130 aircraft, which, "as well as transporting the Gurkhas to Dili, played a major part in the logistic effort to establish and sustain INTERFET." In addition, a destroyer (the HMS Glasgow, whose complement numbered slightly under 300) also briefly deployed to help the Gurkhas with humanitarian tasks, and the ship's medical team helped to establish a clinic. I could not find evidence that these contributions exceeded 1000 personnel. See "British Troops Withdraw From East Timor." 2nd December 1999. http://www.gov-news.org/gov/uk/news/british_troops_withdraw_from_east_timor/49512.html. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | UNTAET (2000) | 1 | MB 2000: Token (4) |
| Philippines II / Govt. vs. Muslim Insurgents | IMT | | No evidence of involvement by 2009, but the EU became involved in 2010. See "EU confirms willingness to participate in International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao." May 18 2010. http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SNAA-86494Y?OpenDocument. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Sri Lanka I | IPKF | | No evidence of involvement |
| Tajikistan | CIS/PKF | | No evidence of involvement |
| Tajikistan | UNMOT (1994) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Bosnia | UNPROFOR | 3 | MB 1993: 2281; MB 1994: 3,688; MB 1995: 4,440 (The MB 1995 listing does not include its additional contribution to the Rapid Reaction Force that year of over 5,000 troops -- See Seybolt p.237 note 47). |
| Bosnia | NATO Support to UNPROFOR | 3 | The UK also contributed to all of NATO's efforts to support UNPROFOR (which I treat as a single mission given that they shared the same purpose and are regularly discussed together in my sources).<br>MB 1993: Provide Promise, 35 personnel + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 400 + 13 aircraft; Sharp Guard, 9 ships;<br>MB 1994: Provide Promise, 41 + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 580 + about 30 aircraft; Sharp Guard, about 7 ships + 2 aircraft;<br>MB 1995: Provide Promise, 20 + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 540 + about 24 aircraft; Sharp Guard, about 6 ships + some aircraft. Though total personnel are not listed if you include those on the ships, I assume that they reached over 1000. |
| Bosnia | IFOR | 3 | MB 1996: 10,500 (deployed 1995) |

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| Bosnia | Operation Deliberate Force | 3 | UK supplied about 28 aircraft (Sargent 2000 p.204). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that this is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel, given associated support assets. |
| Croatia | UNPROFOR /UNCRO | 2 | MB 1992: 263; MB 1993: 250; MB 1994: None listed; MB 1995: Token (6) |
| Croatia | UNTAES (1996) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Croatia | UNMOP (1996) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | Operation Allied Force | 3 | The UK deployed 45 aircraft, in the next largest contingent after the United States & France (see Peters et al 2001, p.22). The Royal Navy also deployed 2 submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, and 6 destroyers/frigates. For a full list of deployed assets see the Defence Ministry report, "Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis," Annexes B, D, and F. Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel, but the assets listed in the report are clearly equivalent to well over 1000 personnel. |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | KFOR | 3 | MB 1999 p.31: The UK deployed just over 10,000 initially in the summer of 1999; MB 2000: 3,500 still deployed in 2000 |
| Sierra Leone | ECOMOG | 1 | According to Berman (2003 p.209),"UK assistance to ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone included materiel. Three distinct assistance packages were provided during 1998 and 1999, including vehicles, communications equipment, uniforms, rations, small arms, light weapons, and ammunition. Lethal equipment included rifles, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)...London earmarked materiel specifically for Ghanaian troops serving in ECOMOG, but also allowed the ECOMOG force commander to allocate equipment as he saw fit."<br>Also, Berman and Labonte (2006, p.152) report that in 1999 the UK provided $18 million. |
| Sierra Leone | UNOMSIL | 1 | MB 1998, 1999: Token observers (2-5) |
| Sierra Leone | UNAMSIL | 1 | MB 2000: 18 observers; MB 2001: 24 observers |
| Sierra Leone | Operation Palliser (UK) | 3 | Sources are inconsistent on the size of the British contribution to Operation Palliser: According to Pentland (2005) and Whiteman and Yates 2004 (p.369), it sent 1 battalion (about 800 troops) in 2000. But MB 2000 claims it was 1000, and Kabia 2009 (p.128) claims there were 2500 British troops involved in the operation in May 2000. Berman & Labonte (2006 p.181) note that, “All told, some 4,500 British soldiers, sailors, and marines participated…on land and offshore.” This is sufficient to code a 3. |
| Liberia I | ECOMOG | | No evidence of involvement. |
| Liberia I | UNOMIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Liberia II | UNMIL | 1 | MB 2004: Token (3) |

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| Liberia II | ECOMIL | 1 | The UK supported ECOMIL's deployment by providing £400,000 towards the running costs of the mission. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Support to African Peacekeeping Missions," http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1094236371951. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Liberia II | JTF Liberia (US) | | No evidence of involvement. |
| Burundi | OMIB | | No evidence of involvement. |
| Burundi | SAPSD | | No evidence of involvement. |
| Burundi | AMIB | 1 | According to its Foreign and Commonwealth office, the UK provided £3.7 million in direct support the Mozambican contingent and an additional £2 million in general support. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office. "Support to African Peacekeeping Missions," http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1094236371951. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Burundi | ONUB | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Mozambique | ONUMOZ | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola I | UNAVEM I | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola I | UNAVEM II (1991) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola II | UNAVEM II | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola II | UNAVEM III (1995) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola III | MONUA | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Somalia | UNOSOM I | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Somalia | Provide Relief | | No evidence of involvement. |
| Somalia | UNITAF / Restore Hope | 2 | The UK contribution to UNITAF consisted of two Royal Air Force (RAF) transport aircraft (C-130 Hercules), which helped deliver relief supplies into Somalia. See "Britain ends mercy flights into Somalia." |
| Somalia | UNOSOM II | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Somalia | AMISOM | 1 | "In March 2009 the UK contributed £10 million to the UN Trust Fund in support of AMISOM in addition to the £5.7 million directly provided to the African Union." See United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, "Somalia." Available at http://ukun.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-at-un/geographic-issues/somalia/. Accessed July 7, 2010. |

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| Somalia | Anti-Piracy | 2 | All three NATO anti-piracy missions (Operation Allied Provider, Operation Allied Protector, & Operation Ocean Shield, which I group together along with EU NAVFOR Atalanta because of their close coordination and same purposes) were conducted by NATO's two Standing Maritime Groups, which means that the particular assets deployed at different times were a function of which states were contributing to which group (and which assets they were contributing), as well as which group was responsible for the missions at different times. The UK consistently contributed ships to these missions. It also had the headquarters for EU NAVFOR. See NATO's page on "Counter-Piracy Operations," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm, and the EU's Atalanta "About Us" page at http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/. |
| DRC (Zaire) III | MONUC | 1 | MB 1999 onward: Token few military observers |
| DRC (Zaire) III | Operation Artemis (EU) | 2 | MB 2003: Contributed a team of military engineers and one transport aircraft |
| DRC (Zaire) III | EUFOR RD Congo | 1 | MB lists no military contribution. The Consilium website for EUFOR RD Congo lists the UK as a contributing nation, however, but doesn't say that its contribution is military (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1095&lang=en, Accessed July 10, 2010). I also did a news search and could find no record of UK soldiers being sent, so I code as financial/logistical support. |
| Cote d'Ivoire | ECOMICI/ECOFORCE | 1 | The UK provided £3 million in logistical and communications support for the Ghanaian contingent, and a £500,000 contribution to ECOWAS for general costs of running the mission (Kabia 2009 p.145). See also United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Support to African Peacekeeping Missions," http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1094236371951. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Cote d'Ivoire | MINUCI | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Cote d'Ivoire | UNOCI | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Operation Licorne (France) | | No Contribution. |
| Rwanda | MOG/NMOG I, II (OAU) | | No Contribution. |
| Rwanda | UNOMUR | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Rwanda | UNAMIR | 2 | Initially the UK's contribution was financial/logistical, as evidenced by its UN vote / financing only. Beginning in the summer of 1994, however, it sent some 650 soldiers to be part of UNAMIR (deployment July 30 to November 1, 1994). They played a primarily humanitarian and logistical role in support of UNAMIR's mandate. See ParaData's UNAMIR page at http://www.paradata.org.uk/events/rwanda-operation-gabriel. Accessed July 10, 2010. (ParaData provides information about "The living history of The [UK's] Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces"). |
| Rwanda | Op. Turquoise (France) | | No contribution |

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| Rwanda | Support Hope (US) | | No contribution |
| Sudan I / Civil War | UNMIS (2005) | 1 | MB 2005:Token contribution (4) |
| Sudan II / Darfur | AMIS | 1 | According to Ekengard (2008, p.22): "In December 2004, the British government provided 143 vehicles. In 2005, British contractor Crown Agents was set to provide another 476 vehicles. The company also provided communications equipment, in particular Thuraya satellite phones and satellite data transfer systems (VSAT). All in all, Crown Agents delivered over 1,000 vehicles to AMIS."<br>The UK 's Foreign & Commonwealth office later reported that it had "allocated almost £32 million to the AU mission" in "significant logistical assistance…including delivery of over 600 vehicles, support for the airlift of Nigerian troops, and rations packs and maps" and "military planning expertise to the AU and...a British observer...The UK has also been heavily involved in securing €92 million of support for the AU mission from the EU peace Facility for Africa."<br>See "Support to African Peacekeeping Missions," http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1094236371951. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Sudan II / Darfur | UNAMID | 1 | MB 2009: Token (1) |
| Sudan II / Darfur | EUFOR TCHAD/RCA | 1 | MB 2008 reports none, but MB 2009 reports a token contribution (4) deployed with EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. |
| Sudan II / Darfur | MINURCAT | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Sudan III / Southern Violence | UNMIS | 1 | MB 2008, 2009:Token contribution (3-4) |
| Eritrea / War with Ethiopia | UNMEE | 1 | UN vote / financing only up to 2001; After this MB 2002 shows 6 observers. |
| El Salvador | ONUSAL (1991) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Iraq / Kurds II | Provide Comfort | 3 | The UK sent about 5,000 troops to Northern Iraq as part of Operation Provide Comfort in April 1991 (Walker, Vulliamy, & Norton-Taylor 1991). Thereafter, MB 1992 notes there remained in Turkey 30 Army and 150 RAF personnel, plus 8 Jaguar and 2 VC-10; MB 1993 notes 260 personnel + 8 Harrier GR-7, 2 VC-10 tkr. |
| Iraq / Kurds II | UNGCI | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Iraq / Shiites | Southern Watch | 2 | MB 1993: 150 + 6 Tornado GRI; MB 1994, MB 1995: RAF 310 + 6 Tornado, 1 VC-10; MB 1996: 230 + 6 Tornado, 1 VC-10; MB 1997: RAF 400 + 6 Tornado GR- IA, 1 VC-10 (tkr); MB 1998: RAF 400 + 6 Tornado GR-IA |

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| Lebanon I/ Civil War | MNF | 2 | Reports of the UK contribution are somewhat inconsistent, but point to a coding of 2. MB 1983 says they had 87 people deployed (1 reconnaissance squadron), and Caligaris (1984 p.266) cites a similar figure of about 100. O'Ballance (1998, p.120), however, claims that the UK contribution eventually reached about 600 soldiers. |
| Lebanon I/ Civil War | UNIFIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Lebanon II/ Israeli air attacks | UNIFIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |

| Complex Emergency | Operation | Resources: France | Sources/Justification: France |
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| Afghanistan I / Soviets | UNGOMAP | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Cambodia | UNAMIC | 2 | France contributed 114 people to UNAMIC between October 1991 and February 1992 (Stern 1998 p.127). |
| Cambodia | UNTAC (1992) | 3 | MB 1992: 1400 ground + aircraft |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | INTERFET | 2 | France deployed 600 personnel in the region as part of Operation Santal, its contribution to INTERFET. These included "a transportable surgical unit in Dili; an air transport group, with 3 C-130 Hercules to assist with personnel transport and humanitarian supplies; a surveillance frigate and a landing platform dock (LPD); a light transport vessel." See France in Australia: Embassy and Consulate-General, "Overview of France's contribution to INTERFET." http://www.ambafrance-au.org/france_australie/spip.php?article304. January 2000. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | UNTAET (2000) | 1 | MB 2000: Token observers (3) |
| Philippines II / Govt. vs. Muslim Insurgents | IMT | | No evidence of involvement by 2009, but the EU became involved in 2010. See See "EU confirms willingness to participate in International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao." May 18 2010. http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SNAA-86494Y?OpenDocument. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| Sri Lanka I | IPKF | | No evidence of involvement |
| Tajikistan | CIS/PKF | | No evidence of involvement |
| Tajikistan | UNMOT (1994) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Bosnia | UNPROFOR | 3 | MB 1993 (p.257) says 4 total infantry battalions deployed to Bosnia in Oct 1992, and that in 1993 one French one reinforced them; MB 1993 p.30 also says in 1993 France has 3 infantry battalions in Bosnia. Thus I infer that 2 French battalions were sent as part of the initial 4 total in 1992.<br>Also, MB 1993: 3096; MB 1994: 4872; MB1995: 3826 (and this last estimate does not include their contribution to the Rapid reaction force that year). So contribution was at the level of 3 every year from 1992. |

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|---|---|---|---|
| Bosnia | NATO Support to UNPROFOR | 3 | France also contributed to all of NATO's efforts to support UNPROFOR (which I treat as a single mission given that they shared the same purpose and are regularly discussed together in my sources).<br>MB 1993: Provide Promise, 3 C-130; Deny Flight, 160 personnel, 10 Mirage 2000C, 4 Mirage FI-CR, 1 DHC6; Sharp Guard, 2 frigates;<br>MB 1994: Provide Promise, 3 C-130; Deny Flight, about 35 aircraft; Sharp Guard, 2 frigates and 1 naval air squadron;<br>MB 1995: Provide Promise, 1 C130; Deny Flight, about 33 aircraft; Sharp Guard, 1 frigate + 1 other ship.<br>It is unclear exactly how many personnel are involved with the aircraft and ships, but they clearly exceed 1000. |
| Bosnia | IFOR | 3 | MB 1996 (p.56): 7,500 in Bosnia, plus an air component in Italy of 4 Mirage 2000C, 2 Mirage2000D, 5Mirage Fl-CR, 1C-135, 1 E-3F,5 Jaguar, 3 SA-330,1 C-262 (deployed end 95). Elsewhere (p.32, IFOR discussion), it says the total deployment was 10,500. |
| Bosnia | Operation Deliberate Force | 3 | France supplied about 47 aircraft (Sargent 2000 p.204). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that this is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel. |
| Croatia | UNPROFOR/UNCRO | 3 | MB 1992: 2900, MB 1993, 2239; MB 1994: 826, MB 1995: 829 |
| Croatia | UNTAES (1996) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Croatia | UNMOP (1996) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | Operation Allied Force | 3 | France deployed over 100 aircraft (primarily fighters, but also support), in the second largest contingent after the United States (see Peters et al 2001, p.18-21). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that such a large number of aircraft is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel. |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | KFOR | 3 | MB 1999: 6000; MB 2000: 5080 |
| Sierra Leone | ECOMOG | | No evidence of involvement |
| Sierra Leone | UNOMSIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Sierra Leone | UNAMSIL | 1 | MB 2000, 2001: Token (1-3) |
| Sierra Leone | Operation Palliser (UK) | | No contribution |
| Liberia I | ECOMOG | | No evidence of involvement |
| Liberia I | UNOMIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Liberia II | UNMIL | 1 | MB 2004: Token (1) |
| Liberia II | ECOMIL | | No evidence of involvement |

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|---|---|---|---|
| Liberia II | JTF Liberia (US) | | No contribution |
| Burundi | OMIB | | No evidence of involvement |
| Burundi | SAPSD | | No evidence of involvement |
| Burundi | AMIB | | No contribution |
| Burundi | ONUB | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Mozambique | ONUMOZ | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola I | UNAVEM I | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola I | UNAVEM II (1991) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola II | UNAVEM II | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Angola II | UNAVEM III (1995) | 1 | MB 1995: Token (8) |
| Angola III | MONUA | 1 | MB 1998: Token (3); Nothing noted for '99 b/c MONUA was removed in Feb '99, but they almost certainly stayed until the mission's departure in 1999. |
| Somalia | UNOSOM I | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Somalia | Provide Relief | | No Contribution |
| Somalia | UNITAF / Restore Hope | 3 | France sent about 1500 to 2000 troops. Lee M. Katz, "France Quick to Offer Troops," USA Today. December 4, 1992. |
| Somalia | UNOSOM II | 3 | MB 1993: 1083; No longer listed in MB 94 because the mission departed early in the year (before MB's tally). However, Wheeler (2000 p.199) notes that European forces withdrew with the United States in early 1994. |
| Somalia | AMISOM | 1 | According to its UN website, France spent 3 million Euro training 5,000 men to participate in AMISOM. The site also references contributions to the UN trust fund for additional support (at least some of which may have been funneled through the EU, the trust fund's largest donor). See Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, "Somalia." Available at http://franceonu.org/spip.php?article3820, Accessed July 7, 2010. |

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| Somalia | Anti-Piracy | 2 | France began providing naval escorts for World Food Programme ships in November 2007 (this was known as Operation Alcyon), before the establishment of any of the NATO or EU operations. These efforts continued in 2008, and upon the formation of EU NAVFOR (Atalanta) that December, were channeled through that mission. Thereafter, France participated continuously "with the permanent deployment of a frigate during the whole operation and the participation of a reconnaissance airplane based in Djibouti," and also offered logistical support through its own pre-positioned forces in Djibouti. See Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, "Somalia." http://franceonu.org/spip.php?article3820, Accessed July 7, 2010.<br>See also NATO's background page for Operation Allied Provider at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/CC_MAR_Naples/operations/allied_provider/background.html and France Diplomatie, "Somalia," http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/somalia_242/index.html. 12 February 2008. Accessed July 7, 2010. |
| DRC (Zaire) III | MONUC | 1 | MB 1999 - 2009: Token |
| DRC (Zaire) III | Operation Artemis (EU) | 2 | MB 2003: 900 |
| DRC (Zaire) III | EUFOR RD Congo | 2 | MB 2007: Notes 450 troops with a mandate to end Nov 2006. But elsewhere I read that they sent 800 -- See "French troops to form largest part of European force to DR Congo," BBC Monitoring Africa, May 16, 2006. |
| Cote d'Ivoire | ECOMICI/ECOFORCE | 1 | France provided logistical / communications support for contingents from Senegal, Togo, and Niger (Kabia 2009 p.145). |
| Cote d'Ivoire | MINUCI | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Cote d'Ivoire | UNOCI | 2 | MB 2005: 186 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Operation Licorne (France) | 3 | According to Whiteman and Yates (2004 p.366), they had 2500 deployed by January 2003, later increased to 4000. |
| Rwanda | MOG/NMOG I, II (OAU) | | No evidence of involvement |
| Rwanda | UNOMUR | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Rwanda | UNAMIR | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Rwanda | Op. Turquoise (France) | 3 | Operation Turquoise involved about 2500 French troops (Seybolt 2008 p.75; see also Stern 1998 p.127). |
| Rwanda | Support Hope (US) | | No contribution |
| Sudan I / Civil War | UNMIS (2005) | 1 | UN vote / financing only |

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| Sudan II / Darfur | AMIS | 1 | I have not seen any references to bilateral French support for AMIS, but both the EU and NATO played significant roles, and France contributed through them (beginning in 2004 in the case of the EU). See, eg, Ekengard 2008, US GAO 2006. |
| Sudan II / Darfur | UNAMID | 1 | MB 2009: Token (2) |
| Sudan II / Darfur | EUFOR TCHAD/RCA | 3 | MB 2008: 1500; MB 2009: 1711 |
| Sudan II / Darfur | MINURCAT | 1 | UN vote / financing only (for '09, only relevant year) |
| Sudan III / Southern Violence | UNMIS | 1 | MB 2008: Token (1); MB 2009: None |
| Eritrea / War with Ethiopia | UNMEE | 2 | MB 2001: 180 |
| El Salvador | ONUSAL (1991) | 1 | MB 1993: Deployed civilian police (but not till '93), so deployed no military personnel and nothing until well after the end of the complex emergency |
| Iraq / Kurds II | Provide Comfort | 3 | According to Walker et al (1991), France's contribution to Provide Comfort in 1991 was about 1,000 troops.<br>MB 1992: in Turkey, 150 personnel and an air unit with 8 Mirage F-1CR, and 1 C-135;<br>MB 1993: 100 personnel in Turkey; 4 Mirage F1-CR, 4 Jaguar, 1 C-135 |
| Iraq / Kurds II | UNGCI | 1 | UN vote / financing only |
| Iraq / Shiites | Southern Watch | 2 | MB 1993: 130 + 9 Mirage 2000C, 4 Mirage FI-CR, 1 DHC6;<br>MB 1994: 170 + 9 Mirage 2000C, 1 C-135, 1 N-262;<br>MB 1995, MB 1996: 170 + 6 Mirage 2000C, 1 C-135, 1 N-262;<br>MB 1997: 170; 5 Mirage 2000C, 3 F-1CR, 1 C-135,1 N-262;<br>MB 1998: 170; 5 Mirage 2000C, 3 F-1CR, 1 C-135. |
| Lebanon I/ Civil War | MNF | 3 | In September 1982 France deployed about 1,500 troops (O'Balance 1998 p.120); Caligaris (1984 p.266) notes that the contingent, like those of the US and Italy, was "about 2,000" men. |
| Lebanon I/ Civil War | UNIFIL | 3 | MB 1978: 1244; MB 1979: 609; MB 1980: 668; MB 1981: 730; MB 1982: 1338; MB 1983: 911; MB 1984: 1386;<br>MB 1985: 1380; MB 1986: 1391; MB 1987: 1750; MB 1988: 1750; MB 1989: 530; MB 1990, 1991: 500; MB 1992: 800;<br>MB 1993: 441. I code it a 3 (since max was over 1000), though clearly varies over time. |
| Lebanon II/ Israeli air attacks | UNIFIL | 3 | MB 2007: UNIFIL, 208, plus UNIFIL II, 1445; The UN's Lebanon background webpage notes they arrived by 15 Sept 06 |

| Complex Emergency | Operation | Resources: Australia | Sources/Justification: Australia |
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| Cambodia | UNAMIC | 2 | According to Horner et al (2009), the Australian contribution was 65 |
| Cambodia | UNTAC (1992) | 2 | According to Horner et al (2009), the Australian contribution averaged about 600 at a time. MB 1992 cited 423. |
| East Timor | INTERFET | 3 | According to Horner et al (2009), the Australian contribution was 5500 |
| East Timor | UNTAET (2000) | 3 | According to Horner et al (2009), the Australian contribution averaged 1650. MB 2000 cites 1620. |
| Philippines II / Govt. vs. Muslim Insurgents | IMT | | No evidence of involvement |

# Part B: Ambitions

| Complex Emergency | Operation | Dates | Ambitions | Justification & Sources |
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| Afghanistan I / Soviets | UNGOMAP | May 1988 – March 1990 | 1 | UNGOMAP's purpose was to oversee the implementation of the 1988 Geneva Accords (more formally, the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan). These included, inter alia, a non-interference and non-intervention pact between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a plan for the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, and provisions for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to the UN's summary of the mission, "The mandate of UNGOMAP was derived from the Accords and included the monitoring of (1) non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other's affairs; (2) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and (3) the voluntary return of refugees." In this context, UNGOMAP monitors were tasked with investigating and reporting on any violations of the Accords, and observing the progress of refugee return to Afghanistan. They engaged in no civilian protection activities as defined in this project. See the UN's UNGOMAP mandate and background pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/mandate.html and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/background.html |
| Cambodia | UNAMIC | October 1991 – March 1992 | 1 | According to the UN, UNAMIC was established to "assist the Cambodian parties to maintain their ceasefire during the period prior to the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and to initiate mine-awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was enlarged to include training in mine-clearance and the initiation of a mine-clearance programme." The mission thus engaged in no civilian protection activities as defined here. See the UN's UNAMIC pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamic.htm. |
| Cambodia | UNTAC | February 1992 – September 1993 | 1 | UNTAC was established with the primary purpose of implementing the Paris Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. Its mandate included numerous civil and military tasks related to "human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period" (see the UN's UNTAC mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacmandate.html). According to the text of the mandate as laid out in the Paris Agreements, UNTAC's military functions were purely those of a traditional peacekeeping operation, emphasizing supervision, monitoring, verification, and liaison tasks, along with confiscating weapons and assistance with mine clearance and mine awareness. See also UN Security Council Resolution 745 and the text of the Paris Agreements, available from the United States Institutes of Peace's Peace Agreements Digital Collection at www.usip.org/files/file/...agreements/agree_comppol_10231991.pdf |

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| Indonesia II / East Timor | INTERFET | September 1999 – February 2000 | 3 | In September of 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a multinational force (which became INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, "to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET [the UN civilian mission] in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate." Although these tasks do not explicitly mention civilian protection, in the context of the resolution it is clear that this was the purpose of the goal to "restore peace and security in East Timor." Within the authorizing resolution, the Security Council emphasized the humanitarian nature of the security work to be done, including "the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian assistance and the importance of allowing full, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations and calls upon all parties to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the protection of civilians at risk, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid." What is more, this is how the Australian-led force interpreted the mission. For the text of the mandate see UN Security Council Resolution 1264. For further discussion, see the East Timor case study in Chapter 6. |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | UNTAET | October 1999 – May 2002 | 3 | Established by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII in October 1999, UNTAET was to take over from INTERFET once the latter had fulfilled its mandate of restoring peace and security in East Timor. This handover occurred in late February 2000. UNTAET was mandated to provide the main civilian administration in the territory, and in the security arena, "To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor." It was authorized to take all necessary measures to full its mandate. This mandate authorized it to provide the same level of security and protection as INTERFET before it, although in practice the security situation had improved sufficiently by UNTAET's deployment. For the text of the mandate see UN Security Council Resolution 1272. |
| Philippines II / Govt. vs. Muslim Insurgents | IMT | October 2004 – present | 1 | Though none of the potential interveners contributed to the IMT through 2009, its mandate is to observe and monitor the implementation of the Tripoli Peace Agreement of June 2001 between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Philippines. It is organized under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). According to Mays (2011, p.145), the mission consists of about 29 unarmed observers. In addition, the text of the Tripoli Agreement is available from the United States Institute of Peace's Peace Agreement Digital Collection at www.usip.org/.../peace_agreements/implement_guide_08072001.pdf |
| Sri Lanka I | IPKF | July 1987 – March 1990 | | None of the potential interveners contributed to the IPKF, which was conducted exclusively by India. Cursory research was insufficient to determine the ambitions coding that would have applied. A brief summary is available in Mays (2011, p.133). In addition, following the end of the complex emergency in 2001, from 2002 until 2008 a Scandinavian-led civilian mission known as the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) oversaw the ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). For more information see http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/negotiations/monitoring-mission or http://www.norway.lk/Embassy/Peace-Process/Sri-Lanka-Monitoring-Mission/ (accessed February 22, 2012). |

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| Tajikistan | CIS/PKF | September 1993 – September 2000 | 2 | The CIS/PKF is another force to which none of the potential interveners contributed. It was composed of soldiers from Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. It engaged in at least some civilian protection as defined here, by protecting humanitarian convoys (as well as strategic installations, foreign diplomats, and the personnel of international organizations). For information on the mission see Goryayev (2001) and Mays (2011 p.82).<br>At the same time, Russia was also directly involved in the war on the side of the Tajik government, with troops deployed in the country and border guards stationed to oppose cross-border raids by Tajik opposition forces encamped in Afghanistan. Indeed, it was in considerable part the heavy casualties suffered by Russian forces in 1993 that prompted Moscow to pursue the possibility of a regional peacekeeping force. Even once the CIS force was deployed, Russian border guards continued to act against the opposition forces, in defiance of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. This led the Tajik opposition forces to perceive the CIS peacekeepers as hostile as well (see Dubnov (1996), and MB: 1994 p.118, and 1995 p. 106, 151).<br>One might argue that these realities disqualify the mission as a peace operation. On the other hand, it was separate from the other Russian forces. I code it a 2, although this has no bearing on the results presented in the chapter given the non-participation of the potential interveners in the mission. |
| Tajikistan | UNMOT | December 1994 – May 2000 | 1 | UNMOT's purpose was to monitor the temporary ceasefire agreement (aka the Tehran Agreement) signed by the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition in September 1994, and its subsequent extension. The main tasks laid out in UNMOT's mandate involved assisting the Joint Ceasefire Commission in monitoring the implementation of the agreement and investigating and reporting on ceasefire violations. In November 1997, after the signing of a general peace agreement in June, UNMOT's mandate was expanded, and its size increased, to allow it to help oversee implementation of this new accord. Its responsibilities, however, remained limited to monitoring and investigation, providing advice and facilitating coordination among the parties, and coordination of UN assistance to Tajikistan. Thus, at no time did UNMOT monitors engage in any civilian protection activities as defined in this project. See the UN's UNMOT mandate and background pages at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/UnmotM.htm and at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/UnmotB.htm. |

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| Bosnia | UNPROFOR | February 1992 – March 1995 | 2 | While UNPROFOR was initially established in Croatia in February 1992, it first began to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a sustained fashion that summer, with a primary role of helping to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief at Sarajevo airport. In September, its primary goal became the protection of humanitarian relief operations, and it was also authorized to protect convoys of released civilian detainees under the care of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (see the UN's UNPROFOR background page at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm and Security Council Resolution 776). In 1993, the Security Council also asked it to protect and oversee a number of 'safe areas' for Bosnian civilians (see UN Security Council Resolutions 819 and 824).<br>But despite its orientation toward civilian protection, UNPROFOR's rules of engagement and traditional peacekeeping authorization under Chapter VI of the UN Charter effectively undermined the basic goals for which it was ostensibly authorized. As Seybolt explains, "while the resolution [776] enlarged UNPROFOR's mandate and authorized an increase in the number of troops to protect aid operations, it severely hobbled the UN force by maintaining a consensual peacekeeping approach. The central assumption of the operation was that the mere presence of UN troops would constitute a sufficient deterrent. Aid convoys were to be escorted in a 'benign way' and force was to be used only in self-defence. In effect this meant that aid only got through when the warring parties agreed to let it through" (2008 p.160-61). In addition, he notes, national contingents differed in their willingness to use force, but "all were constrained by their peacekeeping mandate to use minimal force and only use it in self-defence. The rules of engagement did not allow them to pursue hostile militiamen or permanently dismantle roadblocks" (Seybolt 2008 p.161). These same restrictions applied even under Resolutions 819 and 824, which authorized troops only to threaten force in defense of the safe areas, rather than to actually use it. As Seybolt (2008 p.198) points out, "Self-defence, of course, was not the same thing as defending civilians or defending territory."<br>In sum, UNPROFOR was on the one hand asked to protect civilians directly, primarily through the use of safe areas, but on the other hand, this objective was effectively negated because it was not allowed to use force to do so. As a result, I code the mission's ambitions a 2 due to the use of inappropriate military strategies. |
| Bosnia | NATO Support to UNPROFOR | 1992 – 1995 | 2 | During the war in Bosnia, NATO undertook a series of coordinated operations – Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Sharp Guard – whose primary roles were to provide support to the UN mission. Because of their shared basic purpose and coordination in support of another mission I treat them as one operation. Beginning in 1992, Operation Provide Promise helped to deliver relief aid (by airdrop), while Sharp Guard was a naval operation to help enforce UN sanctions. Neither contributed directly to civilian protection as defined here, and both would be coded a 1. Beginning in 1993, however, and until the deployment of IFOR in 1995, the aerial mission Operation Deny Flight played a three-fold role: "1. To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816, which bans flights by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the "No-Fly Zone" (NFZ); 2. To provide close air support (CAS) to UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, United Nations forces; 3. To conduct, after request by and in coordination with the UN, approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas" (see NATO, "AFSOUTH Factsheets: Operation Deny Flight," at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/archives/operations/DenyFlight/DenyFlightFactSheet.htm. Accessed July 10, 2010). Through Operation Deny Flight, then, NATO support to UNPROFOR helped contribute directly to UNPROFOR's civilian protection goals beginning in 1993. Still, because it acted from the air in an environment involving ethnic cleansing on the ground, and in coordination with a ground force whose own rules of engagement left it unfit to effectively protect civilians, the mission's ambitions are best coded as a 2. As Seybolt (2008 p.198) put it, in this context air power "could be used for punishment but was inadequate by itself for defence [of civilians]." |

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| Bosnia | Operation Deliberate Force | August 1995 – September 1995 | 2 | Operation Deliberate Force was a NATO bombing campaign intended to coerce Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to end the war in Bosnia. Although it was intended primarily to protect civilians from continued Serb aggression, I code it as a 2 because the military strategies used – the exclusive use of an aerial bombing campaign in the face of mass killing and genocide on the ground – were not well suited to providing for civilians' security and protection needs (for discussion see eg, Seybolt 2008 p.238-39). |
| Bosnia | IFOR | December 1995 – December 1996 | 2 | IFOR was a large ground-based peacekeeping operation that followed Operation Deliberate Force and the signing of the Dayton Agreement, or General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in December 1995. Although authorized under UN Chapter VII, IFOR's mandate made clear that its primary role would be that of a traditional peacekeeping force, above all involving monitoring and enforcing compliance with the terms of the agreement. In addition, though, it would be authorized to pursue supporting tasks within its available capabilities, to include helping to create secure conditions for the activities of humanitarian relief operations and "to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person" (See UN Security Council Resolution 1031 and, for the quote, Annex 1-A of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Clearly this authorized the force to provide some civilian protection as the term is used here, but relative to the needs generated by a war that involved mass killing and genocide, it can at most be coded a 2. |
| Croatia | UNPROFOR | February 1992 – March 1995 | 3 | UNPROFOR in Croatia is a difficult mission to code. The force was initially authorized in February 1992 following six months of war and then a November 1991 cease-fire – affirmed in January 1992 – between the military representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). In this context the force was "to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis." In practice, it deployed in a series of regions known as United Nations Protected Areas (and later, some additional areas), "in which the United Nations Security Council judged that special interim arrangements were required to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained." Specifically, these were areas in which Serbs comprised a significant portion of the population and inter-communal tensions had led to conflict that, the Security Council feared, might flare up again. The mission's mandate was "to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all persons residing in them are protected from fear of armed attack. To this end, UNPROFOR is authorized to control access to the UNPAs, to ensure that the UNPAs remain demilitarized, and to monitor the functioning of the local police there to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human rights. Outside the UNPAs, UNPROFOR military observers are to verify the withdrawal of all the JNA and irregular forces from Croatia, other than those disbanded and demobilized there. In support of the work of the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, UNPROFOR is also to facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs." As in Bosnia later on, it was authorized under UN Chapter VI and could use force only in self-defense. (For all of the above quotes see the UN's UNPROFOR background page at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm).<br>The difficult question here is whether UNPROFOR's ambitions made only 'some' or 'adequate' provision for civilian protection given the circumstances of the war. On one hand, there were clear ethnic aspects to the conflict, which on the government's side had involved "brutal military and police actions against Serbs living in Croatia" (Seybolt 2008 p.62). On the other, overall, ethnic cleansing and other large-scale rights abuses were a smaller problem than in the other complex emergencies where I judge a similar commitment to civilian protection as inadequate given the threat to civilian life. The threat of attacks against protected areas for the purpose of harming civilians seems legitimately to have been lower. As a result, it is far more difficult to argue here that the conduct or conditions of the war clearly required more robust protection than UNPROFOR was asked to undertake. Thus, I code the mission a 3, but there may also be an argument for a 2. |

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| Croatia | UNCRO | March 1995 – January 1996 | 1 | UNCRO was deployed to replace UNPROFOR in Croatia, although the two forces are often considered together. Its mandate involved "(a) performing the functions envisaged in the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994; (b) facilitating implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994; (c) facilitating implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions; (d) assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons, over the international borders between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at the border crossings; (e) facilitating the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of Croatia; and (f) monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula" (see the UN's UNCRO page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/uncro.htm). It does not appear to have engaged in any civilian protection activities. |
| Croatia | UNTAES | January 1996 – January 1998 | 1 | UNTAES was established as a transitional administration to govern the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, beginning in January 1996. The mission had both military and civilian components, the former of which was authorized to "supervise and facilitate the demilitarization of the Region; monitor the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin in cooperation with UNHCR; contribute, by its presence, to the maintenance of peace and security in the region; and otherwise assist in implementation of the Basic Agreement" (which provided for the peaceful integration of the region into Croatia). It engaged in no civilian protection tasks. See the UN page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untaes_p.htm. |
| Croatia | UNMOP | February 1996 – December 2002 | 1 | As the UN's website states, "In accordance with its mandate, the Mission monitored the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and of the neighbouring areas in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and held regular meetings with the local authorities in order to strengthen liaison, reduce tensions, improve safety and security and promote confidence between the parties. The Chief Military Observer also maintained contact with the authorities in Zagreb and Belgrade." Thus, it was a traditional monitoring mission, and pursued no civilian protection tasks. See the UN's mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmop/mandate.html. |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | Operation Allied Force | March 1999 – June 1999 | 2 | Like Deliberate Force before it, Operation Allied Force was a NATO bombing campaign intended to coerce Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to halt violent attacks against civilians – this time, in the majority-Albanian province of Kosovo. As British Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson described in March 1999, "The military objective of these operations is absolutely clear cut. It is to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe by disrupting violent attacks" (quoted in Seybolt 2008 p.249; see also p.246 for the full list of NATO's publicly articulated objectives). But although the mission's primary purpose was to protect civilians, I code it as a 2 because the military strategies used – the exclusive use of an aerial bombing campaign in the face of an ethnic cleansing campaign on the ground – remained, as it had been in Bosnia, poorly suited to providing for civilians' security and protection needs. What is more, explicit efforts to limit risks to NATO pilots and crew made this situation worse. In particular, the requirement that all NATO flights be conducted above 15,000 feet made the bombing campaign not only "less effective against military targets, but it also endangered civilians on the ground more than low-altitude operations would have done" (Seybolt 2008 p.248). What is more, in practice the campaign helped encourage Serb forces to intensify their attacks, leading to a mass exodus of Kosovar civilians and the subsequent deployment of KFOR in order to ensure their safe return (see eg, Seybolt 2008 p.249). |

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| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | KFOR | June 1999 – present | 3 | KFOR was a large NATO ground operation that followed Operation Allied Force. As Seybolt describes, it was "designed to protect civilians and aid operations" (2008 p.215) and was "intended as a deterrent to protect the safe zone that had just come into being" (p.216). Its mandate was "to deter renewed hostilities, enforce the ceasefire, demilitarize the KLA and establish a secure environment for the implantation of the four pillars" of humanitarian assistance, democratization and institution building, economic development, and civil administration (Seybolt 2008 p.216). On the ground, KFOR soldiers "helped in the transport of relief material through unsafe areas, guarded warehouses and provided a general security umbrella for the repatriation of refugees. The presence of NATO troops made Kosovar Albanians feel safe" (Seybolt 2008 p.217). In sum, the mission's main purpose was civilian protection, and in effect it turned the entire province into one large safe zone in the aftermath of Allied Force (though with some initial difficulty protecting ethnic Serb residents). I code its ambitions as a 3. |
| Sierra Leone | ECOMOG | May 1997 – May 2000 | 2 | In 1991, rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war to overthrow the government of Sierra Leone. Initially, under the guise of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria deployed troops in a force known as the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to help Sierra Leone's army defend the government. Although the army then overthrew the government the following year, the RUF continued to fight. At this time the force cannot be considered a peace operation as defined here.<br>Other international involvement in the conflict was slow to develop. With other diplomats, a UN special envoy helped mediate a November 1996 peace agreement – the Abidjan Accord – between the government and the RUF. Another coup in May 1997, however, destroyed the agreement: the army and the RUF joined to form a ruling junta, while the democratically elected president – Ahmad Kabbah, who came to power following February 1996 elections marred by widespread RUF abuses against civilians – was forced into exile.<br>According to John Kabia (2009 p.110), after this coup "Hundreds of [Nigerian] ECOMOG troops stationed in Liberia were moved to bolster the skeletal ECOMOG force based in Freetown's Lungi Airport," where they began operations against the junta (see also MB 1997 p.230; Berman and Labonte 2006 p.154). Following these events, in August 1997 ECOWAS foreign ministers formally imposed sanctions and an oil and weapons embargo on the junta and mandated ECOMOG to "monitor the ceasefire, enforce sanctions and embargo and secure the peace in Sierra Leone" (quoted in Kabia 2009 p.111). As Berman and Labonte put it, "ECOMOG's principal focus was to stabilize the country. The force was to deploy throughout Sierra Leone, control select entry points into Sierra Leone in connection with the embargo, and monitor roadblocks and the movement of arms and ammunition. ECOMOG was to oversee the disarmament of ex-combatants at designated areas, and to conduct patrols with an eye toward establishing freedom of movement and governmental authority. The peacekeeping mission was to provide security for key individuals, including UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) personnel, and to assist in protecting refugees and internally displaced persons" (2006 p.150). In October, the Security Council also imposed sanctions, and authorized ECOMOG to enforce them (see Resolution 1132). To do so, it used "regular naval patrols off the shores of Freetown and reconnaissance flights of Nigerian alpha jets" (Kabia 1999 p.112), but was also criticized for shelling ships carrying relief supplies to the region (Kabia 2009 p.113). Although it is difficult to decide when the mission transformed to a peace operation, I designate May 1997, since at this point it began defending a government that lacked the means to defend itself. Alternatively, one could argue that its role as a peace operation began in August, when a clear mandate was authorized.<br>Also in October 1997, at Conakry, Guinea, ECOWAS helped to negotiate another ceasefire with the junta (known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, or AFRC), which ECOMOG would theoretically monitor. In practice, it was never actually implemented, but allowed the junta to remain in power for several more months while completely ignoring the agreement (see Kabia 2009 p.111-12). Then, in February 1998, after being attacked by the RUF/AFRC, ECOMOG drove them from the capital, Freetown, and reinstated President |

Kabbah in March. After this, with the RUF and AFRC running amok in the countryside and attacking civilians at will, the force began to engage in substantial civilian protection activities. During this time, as Kabia describes, it "was forced to deploy in major towns and cities across the country to protect civilians from AFRC/RUF violence. In these difficult circumstances, ECOMOG was able to provide military deterrence to the RUF and use robust action to bring a semblance of security and stability to the traumatised civilians. This achievement earned them the respect and admiration of Sierra Leoneans which is evident to this day. Just like they did in Liberia, the troops facilitated the resumption of normal services in their areas of deployment like schools and hospitals…the troops have also been credited for evacuating 'to safety and medical facilities some of the hundreds of victims of amputations and other injuries" (2009 p.118). The mission also attempted to develop and protect safe havens, but again as in Liberia (see below), faced a severe lack of the resources and support to deploy across the entire country and reach less populated areas (Kabia 2009 p.119). As in Liberia as well, the troops "were reported to have shared their rations and even assisted with the reconstruction of key infrastructure like roads, schools and bridges" but these activities were primarily ad hoc and unplanned, again largely due to inadequate resources (Kabia 2009 p.118-19).

Partly because of ECOMOG's insufficient resources, the RUF/AFRC rebels were able to launch a major offensive in December 1998 that allowed them to retake Freetown in January 1999. This offensive was terrible for the city's civilian population, involving "massive loss of life and unspeakable human rights abuses" (Kabia 2009 p.120), including some 5,000 civilian deaths (Berman and Labonte 2006 p.155). The same month, ECOMOG retook the city and reinstalled the Kabbah government, but Berman and Labonte (2006 p.155) note that human rights advocates criticized this campaign for excessive use of force and human rights abuses.

After this, international pressure for new negotiations led to the July 1999 Lomé agreement which, among other things, provided for the establishment of a new, larger UN peacekeeping mission to replace ECOMOG. The new force, UNAMSIL, was authorized in October 1999 (see discussion below). ECOMOG continued to operate alongside UNAMSIL until May 2000 (Kabia 2009 p.127). As Berman and Labonte note, during this period, "ECOMOG continued to play the lead role on the ground. It was responsible for the security of government officials, UN staff, and humanitarian agency and NGO personnel, as well as cantoned ex-combatants awaiting demobilization...The West African force also established safe corridors and suitable locations for refugee and IDP resettlement, conducted security patrols, and guarded strategic locations, including weapon storage sites associated with the DDR process" (2006 p.163).

I code ECOMOG a 2 for ambitions, although a case might be made for either 2 or 3. On the one hand, the force engaged in ambitious civilian protection activities that were appropriate to the needs civilians faced (even if it lacked the resources to do so more thoroughly). On the other, it had additional duties related to overseeing the sanctions and to participating in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. But while these duties are not sufficient to code it a 2 rather than a 3, the force also faced serious allegations that some of its activities undermined humanitarian outcomes (more so than in Liberia, as discussed below). In addition to shelling the relief ships and the excessive use of force already mentioned, it was also accused of "summary torture and execution of suspected RUF combatants and their sympathizers and the harassment of civilians at check points," and was also criticized for "its inability or unwillingness to stop the reprisal killings of rebels and their sympathisers by civilians after the restoration of democracy in February 1998" (Kabia p.121). For these reasons, I code it a 2. [In practice, however, this has no effect on the results reported in the chapter, as no potential intervener contributed more than financial support].

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| Sierra Leone | UNOMSIL | July 1998 – October 1999 | 1 | UNOMSIL was authorized "to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. It was also asked to assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law." All of its tasks were monitoring-related, and it engaged in no civilian protection. See the UN's UNOMSIL pages at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/Unomsil.htm and http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/UnomsilM.htm. |

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| Sierra Leone | UNAMSIL | October 1999 – December 2005 | 1 | As noted above, after the signing of the Lomé Agreement, in October 1999 the Security Council authorized a new force, UNAMSIL, to help implement its provisions. The mission's mandate consisted of traditional peacekeeping tasks, primarily focusing on facilitating disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants and monitoring of the ceasefire, as well as facilitating humanitarian assistance and elections, and providing support to UN officials (See UN Security Council Resolution 1270). In February 2000, the Security Council asked the mission to engage in a series of additional related tasks (see Security Council Resolution 1289). Finally, in March 2001 (Security Council Resolution 1346), it again revised the concept of operations. According to paragraph 58 of the relevant report of the Secretary General [S/201/228 of 14 March 2001], "The main objectives of UNAMSIL…remain to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections."<br>Beginning with Resolution 1270, the UN Security Council also decided, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, "that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action…within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG." However, this was not accompanied by clear instructions to engage in direct physical protection activities and does not convey an *expectation* that troops treat such protection of civilians or aid operations as a core part of their mission. Thus, despite this language, I code UNAMSIL's ambitions as a 1. |
| Sierra Leone | Operation Palliser/ UK intervention | May 2000 – 2003 | 1 | In May 2000, UNAMSIL came under attack from the RUF and was unable to protect itself, let alone carry out its other duties (see eg, Seybolt p.182). The UK swiftly deployed troops to evacuate noncombatants, but as Berman and Labonte describe, soon decided "to formally extend its deployment and assist the government of Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL in shoring up security until troops from other countries arrived to reinforce the mission…" (2006 p.181). According to MB (2000 p.254), "By July 2000, this effort had helped to obtain the release of the UN hostages and to stem the RUF offensive." After this, the UK maintained a presence in the country to help train Sierra Leone's armed forces and as a deterrent to the RUF. This included an offshore, over-the-horizon force, which came ashore periodically to engage in visible patrols, at least through 2003 (see Berman and Labonte 2006 p.181 and UK National Archives, "The UK's Strategy Toward Sierra Leone," at http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1063633917725).<br>This is a difficult mission to code. The UK force participated directly in improving security, but its main purpose was to support UNAMSIL, and I have found no evidence of extensive direct civilian protection activity or intent. On this basis, I code its ambitions the same as those of UNAMSIL itself, as a 1. |
| Liberia I | ECOMOG | August 1990 – at least 1999* | 3 | ECOMOG's name, the ECOWAS Military Observer Group, is a misnomer, as the force in fact engaged in extensive civilian protection activity, which appears to have comprised its main role in Liberia.<br>As Kabia describes, "ECOMOG landed in Liberia on 24 August 1990 with the stated mandate of 'keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the cease fire is respected'" (2009 p.74). The operation coincided with a series of diplomatic efforts to initiate a successful peace process and bring about a negotiated end to the fighting. In practice, however, "this mandate was very ambitious as there was no peace to keep neither was there any cease-fire to observe" (Kabia 2009 p.74). For the first two years the |

* I have not found a source that clearly dates the departure of the last ECOMOG troops, but MB 1998 (p.236) notes that ECOWAS retained a residual force and MB 1999 (p.246) notes that there was still a small ECOMOG training mission in place. Clearly by this time, however, ECOMOG was no longer engaging in the extensive civilian protection efforts of earlier years.

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| Liberia I | UNOMIL | September 1993 – September 1997 | 1 | UNOMIL was initially established to support ECOMOG in implementing the 1993 Cotonou peace agreement, and subsequently, a series of supplementary ones. More specifically, according to the UN it was "to exercise good offices in support of the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States and the Liberian National Transitional Government to implement peace agreements; investigate alleged ceasefire violations; assist in maintenance of assembly sites and demobilization of combatants; support humanitarian assistance; investigate human rights violations and assist local human rights groups; observe and verify elections" (See the UN's UNOMIL page http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomil.htm). Consistent with a monitoring mission, its tasks revolved around monitoring, investigation, observation, and verification, as well as providing technical assistance and training in humanitarian fields (See the UN's UNOMIL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomilM.htm). It engaged in no civilian protection activities as the term is defined here. |

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| Liberia II | ECOMIL | August 2003 – October 2003 | 2 | Over the first half of 2003, the second war in Liberia deteriorated badly, with devastating effects for civilians. International pressure led to a ceasefire in June and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August. In addition, on August 1 the UN authorized a Multinational Force – together comprised of ECOMIL and JTF Liberia (see below) – to deploy to "support the implementation of the 17 June 2003 ceasefire agreement, including establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, to help establish and maintain security in the period after the departure of the current President and the installation of a successor authority, taking into account the agreements to be reached by the Liberian parties, and to secure the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to prepare for the introduction of a longer-term United Nations stabilization force to relieve the Multinational Force" (see UN Security Council Resolution 1497). This mandate clearly allowed the force to provide at least some civilian protection, in particular by ensuring a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. At the same time, it is not totally clear about the relative emphasis the force might place on the other aspects that could be interpreted as authorizing civilian protection, including 'establishing and maintaining security.' In practice, moreover, it is difficult to distinguish the extent to which such protection was either seen as the mission's primary purpose or to which the activities it undertook were adequate to the needs raised by the war in Liberia. On the one hand, according to the *Military Balance* (2004 p.202), the main idea was for ECOWAS "to provide troops to bring about a separation of forces" to prepare the way for President Charles Taylor to leave the country. On the other, as Kabia points out (2009 p.159), the force was able despite limited numbers "to stabilise the fluid security situation in Monrovia, provide protection for hundreds of thousands of civilians and establish safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian aid. ECOWAS foot patrols and visible presence also resulted in the decline of general lawlessness and restored public confidence. Besides its policing role, the mission also established a weapons-free zone in and around Monrovia." While the force's failure to deploy outside Monrovia meant that "rebels continued to terrorise defenceless civilians" (Kabia 2009 p.159), this was a problem of resources rather than ambitions.<br>I code the mission's ambitions a 2 given the war's severity and combatants' blatant disregard for civilian life (for more see the Complex Emergency Coding Notes), as these conditions might reasonably have justified an even more protection-focused mission. Still, there may also be an argument for coding a 3. [As with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone above, this would not affect the coding of all of the states' contributions as promoting an ambitions-resources gap]. |
| Liberia II | JTF Liberia | August 2003 – October 2003 | 2 | JTF Liberia's UN authorization was the same as for ECOMIL, as discussed above. Statements by U.S. officials about the force's primary goals and tasks – which mainly involved support to ECOMIL, and mainly emphasized the mission's role in helping promote a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief -- suggest that it should be coded a 2. For example, President Bush pointed out that the job of the small contingent of the U.S. force that actually went onshore was "to help secure an airport and a port so food can be off-loaded and the delivery process begun to help people in Monrovia…our mission there is to help ECOWAS, help ECOMIL provide humanitarian aid" (see Africa News, August 18, 2003). Likewise, Pentagon director of operations General Norton Schwartz told reporters in mid-August that JTF Liberia "is in place to assist (West African) forces to achieve a stable environment so that humanitarian assistance can be provided to the people of Liberia, and also to facilitate the transition to a U.N.-led international peacekeeping operation" (Tom Squitieri, USA Today, August 14, 2003). |

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| Liberia II | UNMIL | September 2003 – present | 1 | UNMIL was established in Security Council Resolution 1509 of September 2003, under UN Chapter VII, as the follow-on UN mission to ECOMIL and JTF Liberia. UNMIL's primary tasks involved various observation, monitoring, and liaison activities in support of implementing the June ceasefire agreement. It was also authorized, "without prejudice to the efforts of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities" and also "to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions." A variety of other goals focused on support for security sector reform and implementation of the longer-term peace process (see Resolution 1509 and the UNMIL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/mandate.shtml). In 2005, it was also authorized to apprehend and detain former president Charles Taylor should he return to Liberia (Resolution 1638).<br>As in a number of other cases, though, the authorization to protect civilians was not accompanied by a clear expectation for troops to focus on associated protection related-tasks, and the same applies to the environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Perhaps most significantly, however, UNMIL was first authorized *not only* in the aftermath of a ceasefire agreement and a peace process that was already underway, but on the heels of two other peace operations that had already begun to help restore a secure environment (ECOMOG and JTF Liberia). Thus, it deployed after a period of relative calm and in the expectation that the worst violence was over. Under the circumstances, I code ambitions as a 1, since it is difficult to argue that the restrictive protection language in the mandate could help provide for more than at most minimal protection relative to the needs created by the complex emergency. The war in Liberia – though not coded as involving mass killing – was very severe and involved civilians as the clear and intended targets of violence, along with blatant disregard for civilian life by the combatant parties. |
| Burundi | OMIB | February 1994 – July 1996 | 1 | I did not use OMIB for coding for any of the observations associated with this complex emergency because none of the potential interveners participated or contributed directly. The mission was deployed in early 1994 in response to OAU concern that civil war in Rwanda could spread to Burundi. The organization sent about 47 observers (originally envisaged as about 400) to monitor the situation and help prevent conflict spillover. They engaged in no civilian protection tasks. See eg, Mays (2011, p.204-5). |
| Burundi | SAPSD | October 2001 – 2003 | 1 | Like OMIB, the SAPSD was not relevant to my coding of any of the observations associated with this complex emergency because none of the potential interveners participated. Nevertheless, according to Svensson (2008 p.11), it was "to act as a protection force for politicians, mainly Hutus, returning to the country to take part in the peace process." Thus, because it did not attempt to provide civilian protection as defined here, its ambitions would be coded 1. |
| Burundi | AMIB | March 2003 – May 2004 | 1 | AMIB's OAU-approved objectives and mandated tasks focused on traditional peacekeeping activities related to monitoring implementation of a series of ceasefire agreements signed in 2002 and 2003 (African Union 2003, p2-3). In addition, although quite restrictive, the rules of engagement allowed troops to "protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" (See Svensson 2008 p.11-12; Boshoff and Francis 2003 p.41-44). However, providing such protection was neither a goal nor an expectation of the force. As a result, I code ambitions as a 1. |

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| Burundi | ONUB | May 2004 – December 2006 | 1 | Like AMIB, ONUB's mandate primarily focused on traditional peacekeeping activities related to the implementation of a series of recent ceasefire agreements and to assist the government in restoring security to the country and in completing political reforms (see UN Security Council Resolution 1545). Still, it also allowed the force to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence and to help create the security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. In some respects this is a challenging case to code, as it is difficult to determine the extent to which troops were expected to engage in the kinds of specific protection activities discussed in Chapter 1. Still, as in a number of other cases, the authorization to protect civilians was not accompanied by a clear directive for troops to carry out associated protection related-tasks. What is more, like UNMIL above, ONUB deployed during a peace process that was already well underway AND in the aftermath of another mission that had already begun to help stabilize the security environment – and thus in the expectation that the worst violence was over. I take a cautious approach and code the case as a 1, but arguably it might alternatively be coded a 2. The full text of the mandate is also available at the UN's ONUB mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/mandate.html |
| Mozambique | ONUMOZ | December 1992 – December 1994 | 1 | ONUMOZ's purpose was to help implement the October 1992 General Peace Agreement ending the Mozambican civil war. Its responsibilities were limited to monitoring, investigation, and other general forms of assistance that did not include any civilian protection activities. Full text of the mandate and additional information are available at the UN's ONUMOZ mandate and overview pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozM.htm and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozF.html |
| Angola I | UNAVEM I | January 1989 – May 1991 | 1 | UNAVEM I's purpose was to monitor and verify the departure of some 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. It engaged in no civilian protection activities. See the UN's UNAVEM I pages at http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem1/UnavemIB.htm and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unavemi.htm. |
| Angola I | UNAVEM II | May 1991 – February 1995 | 1 | UNAVEM II's mandate underwent several iterations over the course of its deployment. Initially, and for the period applicable to this complex emergency, it was "to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the ceasefire and for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the ceasefire period." This refers to the Peace Accords for Angola (also known as the Bicesse Accords), signed in May 1991 between the government of Angola and Jonas Savimbi, leader of the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Like UNAVEM I, it engaged in no civilian protection activities. See the UN's UNAVEM II page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIM.htm. |
| Angola II | UNAVEM II | May 1991 – February 1995 | 1 | In March 1992, before the outbreak of renewed war, UNAVEM II's mandate was expanded to include oversight of Angola's upcoming presidential and legislative elections. Once fighting resumed in October, the mission's size was reduced and its mandate was adjusted "in order to help the two sides reach agreement on modalities for completing the peace process and, at the same time, to broker and help implement ceasefires at the national or local level." Finally, in December 1994 it was authorized to verify the first stages of a new peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol, signed in November. As before, it engaged in no civilian protection tasks. Again, see the UN's UNAVEM II page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIM.htm. |

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| Angola II | UNAVEM III | February 1995 – June 1997 | 1 | In February 1995, the Security Council set up a new mission – UNAVEM III – to monitor and verify the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. This new mission was assigned a long list of monitoring, verification, and good offices tasks, none of which constitute contributing to civilian protection. See the UN's UNAVEM background page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unavem_p.htm. |
| Angola III | MONUA | June 1997 – February 1999 | 1 | MONUA was originally established in 1997 to follow on and help consolidate the progress in the peace process made under UNAVEM III. Its overall mandate was "to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country." Civilian personnel carrying out political and humanitarian tasks were a key part of the mission. They were assigned a variety of monitoring, verification, and coordination tasks. In addition, the military component of MONUA was assigned various monitoring and investigative tasks. (See the UN's mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monua/monuam.htm).<br>Thus, the mission was assigned no civilian protection activities, and in the context of the relatively peaceful state in the country when it took over from UNAVEM III, this made sense. Beginning in mid-1998, however, UNITA violence resumed, and soon spread across much of the country. The humanitarian and human rights situation deteriorated dramatically and the progress made in the peace process was severely threatened. By this time, a year into the mission, the UN had already begun a gradual draw-down of the force. This was temporarily suspended over the summer in response to the renewed violence, while the UN began to consider terminating the mission if the security situation did not improve. Still, the Security Council extended the mandate for several weeks at a time in August, September, and October. Another extension was granted on December 3, 1998, through February 26, 1999. After this, however, as fighting continued to intensify and UNITA repeated assaulted UN personnel – six UN-chartered aircraft were lost or shot down over UNITA territory between late 1998 and January 1999 – it became clear that there was no longer any place for a monitoring mission in Angola. The mission was terminated when the mandated expired in February. In sum, MONUA was purely a monitoring and verification mission, which never engaged in any civilian protection tasks. This reflected the context of its initial deployment, but not the violence and complex emergency situation it faced in late 1998. Because the UN did extend its mandate on several occasions during this time in the hope of resuming the peace process, however, it counts as a response to the new complex emergency and is coded as a 1. See the UN's background page on MONUA, at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monua/monuab.htm. |

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| Somalia | UNOSOM I | April 1992 – March 1993 | 2 | Following a March 1992 ceasefire between the leaders of the two main parties to the violence in Somalia, Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, in April the UN Security Council authorized UNOSOM I. Its intended purpose was twofold: to monitor the ceasefire and – as laid out in Resolution 775 from August 28 – to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance by protecting convoys and aid distribution centers throughout the country. In practice, however, the force "did not become operational until September because member states were reluctant to commit troops and equipment" (Seybolt 2008 p.149).<br>As in Bosnia, "The operation's mandate itself prevented effective protection of aid operations. Under Chapter VI of the UN charter, soldiers were allowed to fire their weapons only in self-defence. The UN force interpreted the self-defence rule of engagement narrowly, rendering soldiers helpless onlookers when bandits threatened to shoot but did not actually do so" (Seybolt p.151). In addition, because Aidid opposed UNOSOM's presence, the Secretary General's Special Representative Mohamed Sahnoun negotiated an agreed with him that "severely limited what the soldiers were permitted to do and where they were allowed to go" (Seybolt 2008 p.150). As a result of these restrictions, the force's military strategies were poorly suited to its announced protection goals. It can at best be considered to have aimed to provide some of the protection needed, and I code it a 2. For more information on UNOSOM I see the UN's background and mandate pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1mandate.html, and Seybolt 2008 p.149-51. |
| Somalia | Provide Relief | July 1992 – February 1993 | 1 | As Seybolt describes Operation Provide Relief, "On 27 July 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 767, authorizing member states to use military assets to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid by UN agencies and international NGOs in Somalia. The US military and its allies interpreted their mission to be an airlift of food and other supplies to Somalia from neighbouring Kenya…Once it was up and running, the operation flew supplies daily to…towns…in the hard-hit interior of southern Somalia" (2008 p.112). In practice, the mission was a purely logistical operation to provide humanitarian relief and engaged in no civilian protection activities. I code it a 1 for ambitions. |
| Somalia | UNITAF / Restore Hope | December 1992 – May 1993 | 3 | The humanitarian situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate through October and November 1992 despite UNOSOM I's presence. UN troops and humanitarian relief workers came under fire from various armed groups, with the result that, "while relief supplies were ready and in the pipeline, only a trickle was reaching those in need" (see the UN's UNOSOM I background page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html). On December 3, under UN Chapter VII, the Security Council authorized Member States to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which would be mandated to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia" (see Security Council Resolution 794). In practice, UNITAF coordinated with UNOSOM I to secure major population centers and ensure the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance. But although the two missions shared the same primary purpose, a key difference was that UNITAF's rules of engagement and military strategies were actually suited to creating a secure environment for humanitarian assistance operations. As Seybolt describes, "UNITAF successfully deterred attacks on aid operations because it communicated with the warlords, had military capability far in excess of anything the Somalis possessed, and demonstrated a willingness and an ability to use its power when deterrence was challenged" (2008 p.153; for more details on the tasks the force carried out see p.151-53). The rules of engagement reflected a delicate balance between using force too liberally, and using it when necessary to demonstrate the force's resolve and ensure its effectiveness. As Seybolt describes, they "emphasized the non-combat nature of the operation and the importance of two fundamental principles of |

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| | | | | international and humanitarian law with regard to war: proportionality and minimal use of force. At the same time, the rules allowed soldiers to take the initiative in challenging individuals and groups whom they considered threatening and to use deadly force when they or their commanders deemed it appropriate" (2008 p.154). Within the context of the security environment in Somalia at the time, the goal of creating a secure environment for the delivery of relief aid was an adequate and appropriate response to civilians' primary security needs, since the population was not being threatened by direct attacks on a significant scale. For these reasons, I code the mission a 3. |
| Somalia | UNOSOM II | March 1993 – March 1995 | 3 | In March 1993, the UN Security Council authorized the considerable expansion of UNOSOM (referred to as UNOSOM II) in preparation for the departure of UNITAF. Concluding that the security environment in Somalia was not yet stable, the Council authorized the new UN force under Chapter VII of the UN charter, giving it broad powers to use force in pursuit of its mandate "to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance." To this end, the force was authorized to monitor the continued cessation of hostilities, take appropriate action to prevent the resumption of violence, maintain control of the militias' heavy weapons, seize unauthorized small arms, secure "all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance," protect UN and humanitarian agency personnel, engage in mine-clearance action, and assist in the repatriation of refugees and the displaced (see UN Security Council Resolution 814).<br>As with UNITAF, given the prevailing circumstances in Somalia the goal of restoring a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid seems to have been adequate. At the same time, however, Seybolt criticizes the mission for being too aggressive. In practice, UNOSOM II commanders interpreted their mandate as a license to attack and defeat Aidid. Yet as Seybolt points out, from a humanitarian perspective this strategy "favours violence over peace in the short term. Since the potential cost in civilian lives is high, offensive action can be justified on humanitarian grounds only when the civilian mortality rate due to violence is already very high. Aidid was not a mass killer, so that going after him with force did not meet the criterion of proportionate response" (2008 p.236).<br>In some sense, then, the military strategies UNOSOM II employed were not appropriate given the mission's goal of providing a secure environment for humanitarian relief and the circumstances of the complex emergency. Yet, this was not for the typical reasons: rather than being too weak, they were too strong. In this sense, the mission is difficult to fit into the coding scheme used here. Because of the similarity of its mandate to UNITAF's, I code it a 3 for ambitions. Still, it is worth noting that given these complicating factors, neither of the possible options (2 or 3) fully capture this unusual mission.<br>Finally, in February 1994, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. Nevertheless, its responsibilities still included, among others, "Protecting major ports and airports and essential infrastructure and safeguarding the lines of communications vital to the provision of humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance" and "Providing protection for the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, as well as of non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance" (See Security Council Resolution 897). This change in mandate, then, returned the force to essentially to the same objectives of UNOSOM I. After this point, it should be coded a 2. |

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| Somalia | AMISOM | January 2007 – present | 3 | In 2006, Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) faced a serious threat from hardline Islamist groups who wanted to run the country under Sharia law. Two rounds of peace talks in Khartoum mediated by the Arab League were unsuccessful in resolving the political tensions. In December 2006, Ethiopian troops launched a major offensive against the Islamist forces and in support of the TFG. While this offensive was able to break up the Islamist forces, some of the fighters undertook guerrilla actions against the Ethiopians until they withdrew from the country. According to the AU, "Concurrently, as the international community called on Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from Somalia it also recognized the fact that Somalia will relapse into a state of anarchy without a strong force replacing the Ethiopians to assist the TFG consolidate its position" (see the African Union's page on "Background and Political Developments" related to AMISOM at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM_Background.htm).<br>In response to this situation, in January 2007 the AU's Peace and Security Council mandated AMISOM to "conduct Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations (UN)" (see the AU's AMISOM mandate page at http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/, accessed 02/23/2012). In practice, the force helped protect humanitarian assistance, such as by providing escorts to humanitarian convoys, and also provided it directly, such as by offering medical treatment to those in need (see "Burundi Deploys Third Battalion," http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/AMISOM_PRESS_WEEKLY.htm and "Amisom Partners Supports," http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM_PARTNERS_SUPPORTS.htm).<br>As I am unaware of any restrictions on the rules of engagement that might limit the force's ability to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and as this role seems appropriate to the security conditions in Somalia, which did not involve civilians as the targets of a large-scale campaign of rights abuses, but instead primarily threatened their access to much-needed humanitarian relief, I code the mission a 3. |

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| Somalia | Various Anti-Piracy operations | November 2007 – present | 3 |

In the latter half of the 2000s, piracy off the coast of Somalia represented a major threat to the delivery of humanitarian relief – in particular, to shipments from the World Food Programme (WFP). This phenomenon was therefore relevant to international efforts to respond to the ongoing complex emergency in Somalia.

Beginning in November 2007, several NATO countries (including France) began independently providing naval escorts for WFP ships in the region. At this time, these escorts were not coordinated in a single mission by NATO, the EU, or any other entity. To harmonize these efforts, two formal missions were launched in 2008: first, in response to a request from the UN Secretary General, NATO's Operation Allied Provider deployed from October to December; then the EU's NAVFOR Somalia (aka, Operation Atalanta); and then two more NATO operations, Allied Protector (March – August 2009) and Ocean Shield (August 2009 – present).

NATO's first mission, Operation Allied Provider, escorted and provided protection for WFP vessels delivering aid to Somalia. By patrolling the waters off the Somali coast, it also helped to deter attacks against merchant ships. Similarly, Operation Allied Protector "helped to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa" (NATO, "Counter-Piracy Operations"). Operation Ocean Shield built on these missions, also expanding NATO's anti-piracy approach by offering assistance to other states in the region in order to help them develop their own anti-piracy capabilities.

The EU mission Operation Atalanta primary tasks include "the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia" and "the protection of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping." It also helps deter and prevent piracy off the Somali coast more broadly, to protect vulnerable shipping in the area on an ad hoc basis, and to monitor fishing activities (See the EU's Atalanta "About Us" page at http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/).

Given the inter-related efforts and coordination amongst these missions, for coding purposes I treat them all as a single operation, as with the various NATO support operations for UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. Because these missions engaged in providing protection for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, they clearly qualify as providing civilian protection as defined here. In addition, because the security situation in Somalia did not involve large-scale attacks against civilians, but instead remained primarily a problem of insecure access to relief aid (as evidenced by the growing piracy problem), protecting aid operations was a reasonable way to address this threat. Thus I code the missions a 3.

For further information, see eg, NATO's background and overview pages for Operation Allied Provider at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/CC_MAR_Naples/operations/allied_provider/background.html and http://www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/CC_MAR_Naples/operations/allied_provider/index.htm, as well as its page on "Counter-Piracy Operations," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm.

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| DRC (Zaire) III | MONUC I | February 2000 – December 2008[+] | 2 | MONUC's initial mandate was laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 1291 of February 2000. At this time, its primary functions were those associated with traditional peacekeeping, emphasizing monitoring, liaison, and verification tasks. In addition, it had the authority, under Chapter VII, to "take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence." At this stage, consistent with coding decisions for a number of similar operations, MONUC would properly be coded a 1 for ambitions. Over the ensuing years, however, the mandate was revised several times in ways that put greater emphasis on the role of civilian protection and made clear that it was a goal soldiers were supposed to focus on. In October 2004, the Security Council clearly moved toward greater emphasis on responding to civilians' needs, listing the goals of deploying and maintaining "a presence in the key areas of potential volatility in order to promote the re-establishment of confidence, to discourage violence, in particular by deterring the use of force to threaten the political process, and to allow United Nations personnel to operate freely, particularly in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo" and of ensuring "the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence" as the mission's first two tasks (See Security Council Resolution 1565). Another, minor revision was made in January 2008 (Resolution 1797). Then, in December 2008, the Security Council clearly made civilian protection the mission's top priority and after this point it should clearly be coded a 3 (see below). From 2004, though, the mandate should be coded a 2, since it authorized the force to provide some protection during a campaign of mass killing but does not yet clearly meet the standard for a 3 laid out in Chapter 2, that in the face of mass killing peace operations should have a primary goal of civilian protection. |
| DRC (Zaire) III | MONUC II | December 2008 – present[#] | 3 | As noted above, in December 2008, the Security Council made another significant revision to MONUC's mandate, which remained under Chapter VII of the UN charter. This time, while civilian protection remained one aspect of a mission with several additional tasks, it was clearly and explicitly made the top priority. From this point forward, to pursue this goal the mission's primary tasks were to "1. Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict; 2. Contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided, and assist in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons; 3. Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment; 4. Ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; [and] 5. Carry out joint patrols with the national police and security forces to improve security in the event of civil disturbance." (The mission would also continue to contribute to the goals of "disarmament, demobilization, and monitoring of foreign and Congolese armed groups," as well as "training and mentoring of the FARDC in support for security sector reform"). Thus, from this point forward I code the mission's ambitions as 3. See UN Security Council Resolution 1856. |

[+] Though note that a civil and military liaison mission including up to 90 military liaison officers was authorized under the name MONUC in Resolution 1258 of August 1999. Its functions did not meet those of a peace operation as defined here, however, until the Security Council authorized the deployment of troops with tasks directly related to the promotion and provision of security.

[#] Since July 2010 the force has operated under the new name, MONUSCO. Its mandate, like MONUC's, makes civilian protection its top priority.

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| DRC (Zaire) III | Operation Artemis | June 2003 – September 2003 | 3 | Operation Artemis was authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII to deploy to the town of Bunia in the DRC and to "take all necessary measures" in order to "contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation…to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town" (See UN Security Council Resolution 1484). Although the mission's area of deployment was very small relative to the scale of the violence in the DRC, the mission was deployed in order to support MONUC, which had a much wider area of operations. Within Artemis' area of operations, however, this mandate gave it wide leeway to protect civilians. Here, the meaning of the goal of contributing to the 'stabilization of the security conditions' is comparable to the phrase used in the authorizing mandate for INTERFET in East Timor, in both cases indicating a responsibility to respond to a chaotic and insecure situation in which civilians were being intentionally targeted with violence. |
| DRC (Zaire) III | EUFOR RD Congo | April 2006 – November 2006 | 2 | EUFOR RD Congo deployed to the DRC for a brief period in 2006 to support MONUC in providing security for national elections. While this was its primary goal and purpose, it was also authorized under UN Chapter VII "to take all necessary means" in order to "contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (see Security Council Resolution 1671). I code it a 2. |
| Cote d'Ivoire | ECOMICI/ECOFORCE | October 2002 – February 2004 | 3 | ECOWAS organized an initial ceasefire on October 17, 2002. In an October 26 meeting, it established ECOMICI "to monitor the cessation of hostilities; facilitate the return of normal public administrative services and the free movement of goods and services; contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement; and guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers, and humanitarian staff" (Kabia 2009 p.145). In addition, retrospectively (after both ECOMICI and Operation Licorne had been deployed in Côte d'Ivoire for several months), on February 4, 2003, the UN Security Council authorized a single Chapter VII mandate for both ECOMICI and Operation Licorne. Together, they were "to take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and to ensure, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of National Reconciliation, the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zones of operation, using the means available to them" (See the UN's mandate page for MINUCI at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minuci/mandate.html).<br>Thus, these missions were authorized to protect civilians, but not as a primary goal, and not through any of the more ambitious protection tasks discussed in Chapter 2. In the context of many complex emergencies this would result in coding ambitions as 2. Yet, as discussed in both Chapter 2 and in the body of this chapter, there are some complex emergencies in which such tasks may be sufficient given the protection needs on the ground (such as Somalia, as discussed above). The civil war in Cote d'Ivoire (at least during the period when it was identified as a complex emergency in the early 2000s) appears to have been such a case, involving no sustained or major campaign of violence directed intentionally against civilians. See the Complex Emergency Coding Notes for further discussion. Thus I code ambitions a 3 for both missions. |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Operation Licorne | October 2002 – present | 3 | See discussion of ECOMICI above. The justification for coding ambitions as 3 is the same. |

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| Cote d'Ivoire | MINUCI | May 2003 – April 2004 | 1 | MINUCI was a UN political mission with a small military component (which reached a maximum of 76 observers) whose purpose was to complement the operations of the French and ECOWAS forces and facilitate the implementation of the January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The tasks assigned to the military component were exclusively limited to monitoring, advice, and liaison, with no civilian protection activities. See the UN's mandate page for MINUCI at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minuci/mandate.html. |
| Cote d'Ivoire | UNOCI | February 2004 - present | 3 | UNOCI was designed to take over the responsibilities of MINUCI and ECOMICI/ECOFORCE. Like the French Operation Licorne, ECOMICI, and MINUCI before it, it was intended to monitor the ceasefire and engage in a series of disarmament and demobilization tasks. Like them, it was also authorized "without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of National Reconciliation, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment" (See UN Security Council Resolution 1528). Though these tasks are not primarily civilian-protection oriented, I code the mission's ambitions as 3 for the same reasons discussed above for ECOMICI and Operation Licorne. |
| Rwanda | MOG/NMOG I, II | April 1991 – late 1991; July 1992 – Feb. 1993; August 1993 – Dec. 1993 | 1 | None of the potential interveners made any contributions to any of these three small Military Observer Group missions, which were run by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). I have seen no evidence that any of the three engaged in anything more than standard monitoring and verification tasks. For an overview see Mays (2011, p.166, 178-9). |
| Rwanda | UNOMUR | June 1993 – September 1994 | 1 | UNOMUR was deployed along the Uganda-Rwanda border in 1993 to monitor the border in order "to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda, focus being put primarily in this regard on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use." It was, then, a small traditional observer mission that engaged in no civilian protection tasks. See the UN's UNOMUR mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomurmandate.html |
| Rwanda | UNAMIR I | October 1993 – May 1994 | 1 | UNAMIR's initial purpose was to help implement the August 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement, which was supposed to bring an end to the Rwandan civil war. Its mandate was "to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations." Thus, at first, it played no civilian protection role. During the initial weeks of the Rwandan genocide, it took some actions to try to shield civilians from violence that exceeded its official mandate at the time. Since there was a clear mandate whose guidance did not include civilian protection, however, I use the mandate rather than the troops' actions during the last few weeks of this period as evidence of the intent of the Security Council and the potential interveners. See the UN's UNAMIR mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirM.htm |

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| Rwanda | UNAMIR II | May 1994 – April 1996 | 2 | UNAMIR's mandate was adjusted on numerous occasions between April 1994 and December 1995 (specifics are available at the UN's webpage dedicated to UNAMIR's mandate). Most importantly, Security Council Resolution 918 of May 17 1994 expanded its scope to allow the force to engage in at least some civilian protection tasks, to include the establishment and maintenance of "secure humanitarian areas" and the provision of security for relief operations (to the extent possible within its capabilities). Although the mandate was subsequently adjusted, it was still allowed to contribute, at least, to providing security and protection for humanitarian relief operations. Overall, the new terms of the mandate authorized the force to provide some civilian protection, but still an amount that was clearly insufficient given the prevailing conditions of ongoing genocide and mass killing in the country. The mission remained under UN Chapter VI, and thus retained traditional peacekeeping rules of engagement. See the UN's UNAMIR mandate and background pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirM.htm and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirB.htm |
| Rwanda | Operation Turquoise | June 1994 – August 1994 | 2 | Operation Turquoise is an example of a mission whose mandate would have been sufficient for effective protection, but where inappropriate military strategies effectively limited its ambitions relative to what might be inferred from the mandate alone. First, France obtained Chapter VII UN authorization for the mission to contribute "in an impartial way to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda…" and to use "all necessary means to achieve [these] humanitarian objectives" (See UN Security Council Resolution 929). Yet France made decisions that limited the force's ability to carry out this mandate, either in the safe zone it set up (covering about 20% of the country) or more broadly. First, Turquoise was initially based entirely in Zaire and then subsequently left about half of its soldiers there. Second, it brought equipment with extensive capacity for firepower, but it "was not prepared to police the safe zone to prevent small-scale attacks" against civilians (Seybolt 2008 p.166). This was in part because it left so many troops in Zaire and in part because it did not bring the trucks and other small vehicles needed to rescue people under threat in the area (see Seybolt 2008 p.166-67; Melvern 2009 p.237-41; Prunier 1995 p.292-93). On top of this, it engaged in haphazard efforts to disarm perpetrators of the genocide, which meant that they could often continue their attacks, even in the safe zone. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, both of these last two issues were related to the French authorities' insistence on the mission's neutrality, which excluded aggressive action against the perpetrators of the genocide.<br>Thus, the coding for Operation Turquoise's ambitions, as based on the combination of its goals and its military strategies, is most appropriately labeled as a 2. |
| Rwanda | Support Hope | July 1994 – September 1994 | 1 | Operation Support Hope's purpose was to save lives by delivering aid and providing critical logistical assistance to UN and international relief agencies seeking to combat the outbreak of disease among Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire in the summer of 1994. Although the mission saved lives by pursuing these tasks, it did not make any effort to address the serious security deficit that persisted, with Hutu genocidaires continuing to use violence to control the refugees for political ends. It engaged in no civilian protection activities and is thus coded a 1. See discussion in Seybolt (2008 p.76-77). |

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| Sudan I / North-South civil war | UNMIS | March 2005 - July 2011 | 1 | UNMIS was established following the January 2005 signing by the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), an accord intended to end more than two decades of war between north and south Sudan. Its primary role as foreseen at the time would be to support the implementation of the agreement. For this purpose, it was mandated to pursue a variety of monitoring and verification tasks and to provide various forms of assistance to the formerly warring parties. In addition, it was authorized to help facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs and to help establish the necessary security conditions for the distribution of humanitarian assistance; and to contribute to and coordinate international efforts to protect civilians and human rights in Sudan. Finally, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS was also authorized, "in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, joint assessment mechanism and assessment and evaluation commission personnel, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" (see UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and UNMIS' mandate at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/mandate.shtml). Like ONUB above, this case is somewhat difficult to code and could arguably be labeled a 1 or 2 for ambitions. On one hand, these tasks do include some emphasis on civilians' security needs. On the other, though, they reflected a very minor part of the mandate in comparison with the traditional peacekeeping tasks. Notably, while a variety of specific tasks related to the implementation of the CPA are spelled out in the mandate, there is no such specificity with respect to establishing secure conditions for humanitarian assistance. Critically, moreover, UNMIS was deployed in the aftermath of three years' worth of peace negotiations and with a credible and "comprehensive" peace agreement, after the worst violence and the most pressing threats created by the war. Thus, while its limited civilian protection responsibilities may have been adequate for the needs foreseen on the ground at the time, they barely scratched the surface of the greatest protection needs produced by the war itself, which involved mass killing and genocide. For all of these reasons, I code ambitions a 1. See also the UNMIS background page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml |
| Sudan II/ Darfur | AMIS | May 2004 – December 2007 | 2 | As discussed in Chapter 7, AMIS was not initially envisaged as a force to provide civilian protection at all. At its initial authorization in May 2004, it was mandated to observe the implementation of the so-called Darfur humanitarian ceasefire, and to protect itself (See the 10th communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council, May 25, 2004). In October, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized AMIS to protect aid operations and civilians encountered "under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity" and to conduct patrols and establish outposts for the purpose of deterring attacks against civilians (See the 17th communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council, October 20, 2004). From this point forward, AMIS had the authority to provide at least some civilian protection, though still less than the circumstances warranted given the mass killing that occurred in Darfur. Thus, I code it a 2. |
| Sudan II/ Darfur | UNAMID | July 2007 – present | 2 | According to the UN, the core mandate and primary purpose of UNAMID is to protect civilians. Authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is also tasked with "contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)" (see the UN's UNAMID background page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.html. The full text of the mandate is also available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/mandate.html).<br>But despite its emphasis on civilian protection and Chapter VII authorization, the specific conditions under which soldiers were allowed to use force were highly restrictive: in self-defense and to protect civilians |

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| | | | | "under imminent threat of physical violence" within its physical vicinity. These limitations undermine the announced goal of making civilian protection its core purpose. As a report from the Geneva-based Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre puts it, UNAMID's mandate – in part because of its breadth – "was designed in a manner that dilutes and diminishes the peacekeepers' presumed basic role and primary objective of providing physical protection to the civilian victims of violence and military action in Darfur" (Jibril 2010 p.15; see also Flint and de Waal 2008 p.269-70). As a result, I code civilian ambitions a 2. |
| Sudan II / Darfur | EUFOR TCHAD/RCA | October 2007 – March 2009 | 3 | EUFOR Tchad/RCA was deployed in response to the spread of the war in Darfur across the border into neighboring Chad. By 2006, both Darfuri residents of refugee camps in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic as well as Chadian residents of the border region were seriously threatened by violence carried out by Sudanese Janjaweed militia and Chadian rebels. Meanwhile, the presence of some 250,000 Darfuri refugees in Eastern Chad contributed to regional tensions (MB 2009 p.278). In response to this situation, the European Union deployed EUFOR Tchad/RCA to the border region in Chad and the Central African Republic. The force was authorized in October 2007, and deployment began in January 2008. Its objectives were "to contribute to the protection of refugees and displaced persons, to facilitate aid delivery by improving the overall security situation, and to help protect UN personnel and facilities" (MB 2008 p.104; see also MB 2009 p.278) until a UN force could deploy to take over these tasks. To my knowledge, the mission took no decisions about military strategy that would call into question the conclusion that its ambitions were adequate to allow it to address the most extensive protection needs. Thus I code it a 3. |
| Sudan II / Darfur | MINURCAT | September 2007 – December 2010 | 3 | MINURCAT was the UN force that took over the role of protecting civilians and refugees in Eastern Chad and the Central African Republic from EUFOR Tchad/RCA. At the time of EUFOR's authorization, the UN Security Council also authorized a small MINURCAT force to deploy alongside it. This force was to be composed of at most 300 police, 50 military liaison officers and associated civilian personnel. At that time, in September 2007, it was authorized to engage in liaison and training tasks related to civilian protection and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law (See UN Security Council Resolution 1778). Before EUFOR's withdrawal, in January 2009, the Security Council expanded MINURCAT's size and mandate, authorizing a military component that would allow it to take over from the EU force. In its area of operations in Eastern Chad the force was authorized – in coordination with the Government of Chad – "to take all necessary measures… To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons" and "To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations." In its area of operations in the CAR, in coordination with the government, it was authorized "To contribute to the creation of a more secure environment" and "To execute operations of a limited character in order to extract civilians and humanitarian workers in danger" (See UN Security Council Resolution 1861). Given its primary orientation toward civilian protection, authorization to use "all necessary means" to pursue this goal, and that I have seen no other evidence to call into question the military strategies employed, I code the mission a 3 for ambitions (based on the 2009 mandate). |
| Sudan III / Southern Violence | UNMIS | March 2005 – July 2011 | 1 | As discussed above, UNMIS was deployed following the north-south civil war in Sudan. It was permitted to protect civilians encountered in imminent danger of violence and to help ensure a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (again see UN Resolution 1590). As noted above, though, the mandate left it unclear how much emphasis soldiers were expected to place on these aspects of the operation. What is more, according to Human Rights Watch in a 2009 report, "to date, UNMIS has primarily focused on its "good offices" and CPA monitoring functions" and took only limited actions to investigate or respond to the outbreak of communal violence in southern Sudan around that time (Human Rights Watch |

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| | | | | 2009, p.13). Thus, as above, and also because it is the same mission as already coded for the first complex emergency in Sudan, I code it a 1 with respect to this new outbreak of violence as well. |
| Eritrea / War with Ethiopia | UNMEE | July 2000 – July 2008 | 1 | UNMEE was deployed in order to help implement the June 18, 2000 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. On July 31, the Security Council initially established UNMEE as a small observer mission with up to 100 military observers, with the intention of expanding to a full-scale peacekeeping operation thereafter. Initially, the mandate primarily involved a series of liaison tasks that would serve to prepare the way for the establishment of the full-scale peacekeeping operation to come. On September 15, the Security Council authorized the mission's expansion to some 4,300 troops and gave it a traditional peacekeeping mandate involving a series of monitoring, verification, and coordination tasks. The mission was at no time authorized to engage in any civilian protection activities. See the UN's UNMEE background and mandate pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/background.html and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/mandate.html. (The mission's mandate was further adjusted on August 14, 2002, but this adjustment is irrelevant here because it occurred more than a year after the end of the complex emergency.) |
| El Salvador | ONUSAL | July 1991 – April 1995 | 1 | ONUSAL's purpose was to verify the implementation of a series of agreements aimed at ending the civil war between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). These included "a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues." Although the war was not formally ended until December 1992, the associated complex emergency ended in 1990 because of the considerable reduction in hostilities thereafter. Thus, ONUSAL was deployed in the aftermath of (but within the first year after) the complex emergency. On initial authorization in 1991, ONUSAL was to verify compliance with the July 1990 Agreement on Human Rights. In this context, "the tasks of the Mission included actively monitoring the human rights situation in El Salvador; investigating specific cases of alleged human rights violations; promoting human rights in the country; making recommendations for the elimination of violations; and reporting on these matters to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council." Thus, the mission was at no time authorized to engage in any civilian protection activities. (See the UN's ONUSAL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusalmandate.html). |
| Iraq / Kurds II | Provide Comfort | April 1991 – December 1996 | 3 | As Seybolt (2008 p.49; see also p.50) describes, Operation Provide Comfort "addressed the immediate and proximate causes of death by bringing assistance to displaced people along the Iraq-Turkey border and pushing the Iraqi military out of Kurdish territory so that people felt secure enough to return home." The mission's primary purpose was to address the threat to civilians from the Iraqi Army, and by deploying a large ground force in the initial phase to establish a safe zone for Kurdish civilians it employed appropriate military strategies to do so. Thus I code it a 3. In addition, this ground phase was followed by a second, aerial phase known as Operation Northern Watch (following the official end of Operation Provide Comfort, a restructured US-UK version of Northern Watch continued to operate in the area – see Seybolt p.148). |

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| Iraq / Kurds II | UNGCI | May 1991 – November 2003 | 2 | According to Seybolt (2008 p.49; see also p.51-52), UNGCI "was a small unit of UN troops intended to protect aid organizations operating in northern Iraq. Its ability to deter small-scale banditry was only limited." See also description in Mays (2011, p.286). Note: the two sources disagree on the month of initial deployment -- Mays cites May and Seybolt cites June of 1991. In either case, since it was authorized to protect aid operations in an environment of large-scale violence intentionally targeted against civilians, it is coded as a 2. |
| Iraq / Shiites | Southern Watch | August 1992 – March 2003 | 2 | Operation Southern Watch consisted of enforcing a no-fly zone over Southern Iraq in order to protect the Shi'a community from brutal attacks by the Iraqi army. Although its primary purpose was to provide civilian protection, the decision to rely on the no-fly zone alone was a military strategy that reduced the mission's ambitions relative to what could be inferred simply from the basic intention of protecting civilians. Thus, I code it as a 2. See eg, Byman and Waxman (2000 p.48). |
| Lebanon I/ Civil War | UNIFIL I | March 1978 – August 2006 | 1 | UNIFIL was established in 1978 on the heels of Israel's March invasion of southern Lebanon. Its initial threefold mandate was to "Confirm Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; Restore international peace and security; and Assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area" (see the UN's UNIFIL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml).<br>This mission was adjusted after UNIFIL positions were effectively overrun in the course of Israel's subsequent, June 1982 invasion of Lebanon. From this point forward, UNIFIL was no longer able to pursue the tasks for which it had initially been mandated and soldiers found themselves "endeavoring, to the extent possible in the circumstances, to extend their protection and humanitarian assistance to the population of the area" (see UN Security Council Resolution 511). In October, the Security Council formalized these efforts by authorizing it "to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the security of all inhabitants of the area" (UN Security Council Resolution 523). Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how this constitutes civilian protection as defined here, as the troops remained able to use force only in self-defense and were given no civilian protection tasks. Thus I code the mission a 1. |
| Lebanon I/ Civil War | MNF | September 1982 – March 1984 | 3 | The Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF) is a difficult mission to code, and it requires a somewhat lengthy discussion to explain how I do so. In June 1982, in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in response to provocations by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian guerrillas who had made the area their base of operations. Following this invasion, the United States sought to help restore peace in the region by negotiating a plan for the PLO's departure from Beirut. The plan included provisions for a multinational peacekeeping force to assist in and oversee this process, in part by providing a buffer for the safe departure of the Palestinians. This force deployed in late August, and has sometimes been known as MNF I. It lasted several weeks and withdrew by mid-September (see eg, Weinberger 1983 p.356; O'Ballance 1998 p.117; Kelly 1996).<br>Within days, however – from September 16-18th – some 700-800 Palestinian civilians were brutally massacred by Lebanese Christian militia at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut (see eg, Kelly 1996). Immediately thereafter, as Edgar O'Ballance describes, "On 20 September 1982 the Lebanese government suggested that a US, French and Italian peacekeeping force should be deployed in Beirut to maintain order" (1998 p.120). The governments agreed and the MNF was formed. A smaller UK contingent joined later.<br>The MNF lacked a single, coherent mandate we can look to in order to judge its ambitions, and this necessarily complicates the task of coding them. Instead, each member negotiated a different status-of-forces agreement with the Lebanese government. What is more, these agreements referred to the mission in |

different ways, and were themselves not always clear about what the mandate entailed. For example, Kelly quotes the September 25 American-Lebanese exchange of diplomatic notes: "'The *mandate of the MNF will be to provide an* interposition force (emphasis Kelly's) at agreed locations and thereby provide the Multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area'" (1996). Yet the idea of an interposition force is vague to say the least. As Richard Nelson points out, it does not clearly spell out what the force would do or how it would assist the Lebanese government (1991 p.34 (note 19)). According to Nelson's own reading of the same diplomatic notes, the mandate was "to 'provide an interposition force' which would establish ' an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities'; assist the efforts of the Lebanese government to 'assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence'; and 'facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area'" (1991 p.12). This is also consistent with the interpretation of Luigi Caligaris, who describes the MNF's initial purpose as "to prevent further massacres and to assist the Lebanese Government in restoring law and order" (1984 p.262) *by* providing a buffer between the Israelis in southern Lebanon and other forces. In contrast, the French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson took issue with the word 'interposition' and declared, "this is rather a mission of maintaining peace and protecting the civil population" (quoted in Kelly 1996). Despite the confusion, based on all of this the MNF's initial purpose and framing appears to have been consistent with other civilian protection operations I identify as robust. The contributors used the language of providing security in an environment that was threatening to civilians to indicate an intention to shield them from violence.

Thus, it seems reasonable to infer that the mission's primary purpose, at least initially, was to help provide security for the civilian population by deterring attacks and supporting the Lebanese government's ability to meet its responsibilities toward its citizens. At the same time, the mandate's vagueness proved problematic. As Kelly puts it, "In many respects there was no clear policy – nothing but immediate tactical objectives and a mission never clearly enunciated for the troops who went ashore" (1996). Thus, to code ambitions I also examine the activities the force actually engaged in.

Initially, it appears that the MNF did primarily strive to provide security in and around Beirut, although the different national contingents played somewhat different roles and – again complicating the task of coding – were under separate national command. As Nelson describes, "At the beginning, the MNF troops encountered few obstacles and seemed to be a welcome addition to Lebanon's complex political landscape, providing the presence assigned them. The two French battalions were deployed in and near the port of Beirut; two Italian battalions in the southwest sector of the city; the U.S. marine amphibious unit at the international airport; and later, the British company east of the airport. Among the functions they began to perform were clearing the thousands of pieces of unexploded ordnance buried and strewn about; protecting civilians…; guarding certain installations, including the airport; and operating routine patrols and security posts. In February 1983, the MNF conducted emergency rescue operations beyond Syrian lines during a severe blizzard" (1991 p.13; see also O'Ballance 1998 p.123, Kelly 1996). With respect to the contingents' different roles, Caligaris adds, "The Americans, for instance…remained in an essentially static but tactical profile, designed to deter direct attacks against the airport. By contrast, the French, British and Italians tended to operate according to internal security requirements, patrolling both by vehicle and on foot, not only their own areas but also in other parts of the city" (1984 p.263). What's more, as O'Ballance points out, shortly after their arrival, "A joint French-Italian detachment entered the Shatila and Sabra camps to assume responsibility for security" (1998 p.120).

Over time, however, the MNF became more and more involved in the politics driving the war. This shift was driven by the perception that the force's effectiveness at helping the Lebanese army to reassert its authority and provide security in Beirut would depend on securing the departure of Israeli and Syrian troops from Lebanon (Nelson 1991 p.13-14). Thus, the U.S. contingent began in the late fall of 1982 to provide training and equipment for the Lebanese army. Then in the spring of 1983, it became explicit Reagan

Administration policy that the Marines would not depart before the foreign forces from Israel, Syria, and the PLO left Lebanon (see Kelly 1996). These actions damaged perceptions of the MNF as a neutral party, and led to attacks against the force from Lebanese factions opposed to the government.

These attacks grew over the course of 1983. Nelson (1991 p.14) describes some security incidents during the first half of the year, but it appears that the force basically pursued the same tasks and roles during this period. Its first combat casualties in the end of August, however, prompted it to begin using force more liberally. In particular, whereas previously they had been authorized to use force only in self-defense, in mid-September the rules of engagement for the U.S. contingent were adjusted to allow the Marines to fire both in self-defense and in support of the Lebanese army. U.S. warships subsequently fired on the mainland in response to attacks by Lebanese militias against both government and U.S. installations, although the Reagan Administration insisted there had been no change to the mission (Nelson 1991 p.15-16). As Kelly put it, though, U.S. actions increasingly took the form of intervention "on the side of the Christians and the government" (1996; for a detailed discussion see also O'Ballance 1998 p.129-38). Following the October 23rd attacks on the U.S. and French contingents' barracks that killed 241 American and 58 French soldiers, this process only accelerated until the force's departure in early 1984 (see eg, Nelson 1991 p.16-17; Kelly 1996).

Given the complexity of the war in Lebanon and the MNF itself, deciding on a single value for the mission's ambitions is perhaps more challenging than for any other operation in the dataset. It seems very clear that the force engaged in at least some civilian protection as I define it, but also that it is possible to make an argument for coding it either 2 or 3. As with UNPROFOR in Croatia, I code it a 3 despite the initial authorization to use force only in self-defense. As discussed above, it seems clear that the basic purpose was to prevent future attacks against civilians, partly *through the means* of supporting the Lebanese government and army in providing order and security. What is more, although the Sabra and Shatila massacres represented one terrible incident, the war in Lebanon is not coded as involving mass killing or genocide. Typically I have sought to make these coding decisions based on the most extensive protection needs generated by a particular complex emergency, but given the war's long time-frame, major shifts over time, and lack of sustained campaigns of severe rights abuses directed intentionally against civilians, to make such an argument for the entire complex emergency here seems impossible (for more see the Complex Emergency Coding Notes). If we focus on the needs in southern Lebanon at the time of the Israeli invasion, however, the MNF's rules of engagement and strategies for helping to provide protection – at least initially – do not seem unreasonable. The force was deployed to support a government that wanted to provide a secure environment for its citizens and had specifically requested this international help in order to do so, and in an environment in which the Muslim opposition factions also approved because they "thought the main objective of the MNF would be to protect civilians" (Nelson 1991 p.24). What is more, none of the sources I have consulted suggested that the ROE were inappropriate to the situation on the ground.

Finally, one might argue that by 1984 the U.S. contingent, due to its more extensive role in using force to support the Lebanese government, had become merely a participant in the conflict and could no longer be considered a contributor to a peace operation. On the other hand, it is also possible to see the developments in the force's activities – however poorly they turned out – as a move toward enforcement action that still qualifies the mission as a peace operation as long as it also continued to try to contribute to peace and security in the country. And as Nelson points out, although the MNF's activities changed over time, "some continued to be helpful for much of the duration of the operation" (1991 p.24). Thus, it seems reasonable to consider the MNF a peace operation certainly through 1983, and possibly for its entire deployment.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lebanon II/ Israeli air attacks | UNIFIL II | August 2006 – present | 2 | In response to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Security Council increased UNIFIL's mandated size and made a number of significant adjustments to its tasks and objectives (Resolution 1701, of August 11, 2006). In addition to its preexisting monitoring and coordination role, it was also authorized "in |

support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory…to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities… to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence." The force was also newly authorized to "Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons" (see also the UN's UNIFIL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml).

In order to interpret the import of these changes to UNIFIL's mandate, is important to point out the context in which they occurred. Unlike with a number of the other missions discussed above that use similar language, these changes took place during the war that prompted them and thus applied both to the period of active hostilities and its immediate aftermath. In addition, because they reflect two of only a few changes in an existing mandate and respond to an explicit request for assistance from the Lebanese government, the implication that the troops are expected to actively work to ensure access to humanitarian assistance and to take civilian protection seriously seems quite clear. Indeed, under the circumstances prevailing in Lebanon, one might reasonably argue that this could be coded as either a 2or a 3. While the Israeli bombing campaign in certain respects did not resemble most severe campaigns of rights abuses intentionally directed against civilians, on the other hand civilians were its primary victims and elsewhere in the book (in creating the list of complex emergencies) I have treated evidence of governments inflicting intentional violence on heavily populated urban areas as a knowing failure of the responsibility to shield civilians from violence. Given the similarities to that scenario here, I code ambitions as a 2, rather than a 3.

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## Part 3: *CE News Coverage*

This part of the appendix offers a more detailed account of the construction of one of the two core independent variables used in the analysis in Chapter 3, *CE News Coverage.* As discussed there, *CE News Coverage* aims to isolate real societal and governmental concern and pressure to respond to complex emergencies from a series of other forces that might influence the volume of media references to these conflicts – in particular, an executive's efforts to sell an intervention that he has already decided on; coverage of ongoing peace operations; and a conflict's geostrategic importance. For the interested reader, I provide further details about the variable's construction and how it helps minimize these sources of influence. In particular, *CE News Coverage* reflects the ratio of annual average media coverage during a complex emergency to average coverage during the preceding years. This helps eliminate possible contamination by country or region-specific characteristics (such as geostrategic importance) that could affect the media's propensity to cover one conflict more than another. In addition, for each observation involving a commitment to a peace operation, the numerator of *CE News Coverage* is based only on the period *before* the decision to participate, and to the extent possible, excludes coverage in the immediate lead-up to this decision. This helps to avoid capturing a government's efforts to sell pro-intervention policies and reporting on ongoing missions. Below, I discuss the news sources used and other key decisions related to the construction of the ratio, including the periods covered in the numerator and denominator and the specific search terms used to measure the volume of coverage of each complex emergency.

Before addressing these issues, however, Figure W1 below helps bolster the information presented in Chapter 3 to show that *CE News Coverage* indeed appears to do a good job of reflecting the forces it is intended to capture while excluding those it is not. Figure W1 presents

the distribution of values for all observations where the U.S., UK, or France is the potential intervener, based on the main version of *CE News Coverage* (used in Models 1 – 4 in Chapter 3). Notably, several of the complex emergencies known for attracting extensive interest and generating pressure within great power democracies for intervention – including in Darfur, Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, and Northern Iraq in 1991 (labeled *Iraq – Kurds II*) – take on some of the highest values. The pattern is similar for slightly different search terms and other similar, alternate ways of constructing the variable. This suggests that the patterns shown here are robust to a variety of reasonable alternative specifications, as discussed below.

***Constructing the Ratio: Sources & Dates of Coverage***

*Sources*

As sources I relied on one elite newspaper for each potential intervener country: the *New York Times* for the U.S., the *London Times* for the UK, *Le Monde* for France, and *The Sydney Morning Herald* for Australia. I conducted most searches in LexisNexis, except for *Le Monde*, for which I used the newspaper's online archive (at http://www.lemonde.fr/recherche/) because coverage for *Le Monde* was not available on LexisNexis until 1990.[1] The primary version of *CE News Coverage* relies on full-text news coverage, but a secondary version used for robustness checks relies on headline coverage (that is, where the relevant search term must be present in the title or headline of an article). Each has its advantages, but due to larger volume the full-text version is generally less sensitive to very minor changes in coverage.

[1] I also made further exceptions where necessary to avoid what would otherwise be missing values for complex emergencies that started in the 1970s or 1980s. Thus, I used Google News to conduct searches in the *Sydney Morning Herald* before 1986; ProQuest's *Historical New York Times* for searches involving complex emergencies that began before 1980 for the *New York Times*; and the *London Times Digital Archive 1785-1985* for *London Times* searches before 1985 (each of these represents the earliest year of full-text LexisNexis coverage for the respective paper).

**Figure W1:** ***CE News Coverage***

**A) U.S. Observations**



**B) UK Observations**



## C) French Observations



*Denominator*

As noted above, *CE News Coverage* reflects the ratio of coverage of a place that experiences a complex emergency *during* the conflict to coverage beforehand. There are two key aspects of the denominator – which represents the pre-complex emergency period – to note.

First, the denominator is based on coverage over the five years directly before the complex emergency, but there are some exceptions to this rule. In a few cases, due to limited full-text search coverage for some complex emergencies starting before 1980, the pre-complex emergency coverage is based on as few as three years. In a few others, dramatic events shortly before the start of a complex emergency – typically related to an immediately preceding complex emergency or conflict – temporarily caused skyrocketing coverage of a place during a key year or two. For these conflicts I either based the denominator on coverage of a reduced number of years or used a slightly earlier period in order to more accurately capture the steady-state level of attention to the place before the complex emergency. For instance, for Afghanistan's civil war beginning in 1992, I used an average of coverage between 1985-87 and 1990-1991 (not 1987-1991), because the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-1989 temporarily led to a dramatic and otherwise unrepresentative increase of news coverage during those two years. Such adjustments applied both to conflicts that experienced peace operations and those that did not, and a precise account is available from the author on request.

Second, while the variable's ratio format is necessary both to avoid simply reflecting differences in the geostrategic importance of various conflicts and to facilitate comparison across different newspapers and the use of different search engines, it also has a downside. Significantly, ratios eliminate the distinction between places that attract large and small volumes of coverage: a place that sees an increase from an average of 1 to an average of 3 hits during a

complex emergency appears the same as one that sees an increase from 100 to 300. In reality, however, it is unrealistic to think that a small increase from a very low number indicates a comparable level of concern about a complex emergency as a much larger (but proportionately similar) increase from a larger number. In particular, countries or regions that already receive considerable news coverage might experience a ceiling effect: conflict-related coverage may replace coverage of other subjects so that it could take more attention and pressure to substantially increase the total volume of news coverage from a higher base than from a lower one.[2] For these reasons, it is important to adjust the ratio format to avoid recording unrealistically large increases in concern about places that received little coverage either before or during a complex emergency. To do so, I added a constant to the annual average number of hits in the denominator. This has little effect where the denominator is already relatively large or where the increase from a low base is unusually high, but depresses the impact of small changes from a low base. For the primary full-text version of *CE News Coverage* I added 15 (slightly above the 10$^{th}$ percentile for all observations) and for the main headline version I added 10. Of course, since this addition can have a significant effect on some observations, it is important to verify that the results of my analysis hold up to the use of somewhat different numbers, and I tried several other versions adding anything from 2 to 15 to the denominator for both full-text and headline searches. I discuss the results of using some of these other versions of CE News Coverage in the section of this web appendix on robustness checks.

*Numerator*

As noted above and in Chapter 3, for each observation involving a commitment to a peace operation, the numerator of *CE News Coverage* is based only on the period *before* the

[2] I thank Ben Valentino for pointing this out.

decision to participate in the mission, and to the extent possible, excludes coverage in the immediate lead-up to this decision. Thus, the dates of coverage vary by complex emergency, which required great care in construction. This section deals with the specific decisions involved in identifying the periods covered by the numerator of *CE News Coverage*. I took a cautious approach, eliminating coverage as far in advance as was reasonable before each intervention decision, while trying to include key dates and events.

For this purpose, there are three basic categories of observations: those involving no commitment to a peace operation; those where a commitment occurs well into a complex emergency but where there is no significant change in the nature or course of the conflict in the immediate lead-up to the operation; and those involving an early commitment to a peace operation, or where major changes in the complex emergency shortly beforehand may affect societal attention, concern, and news coverage. These categories require increasing degrees of care in determining the periods that can reasonably be used to construct *CE News Coverage*.

First, for observations involving no commitment to a peace operation, there is little reason for concern about the possibility that news coverage reflects official efforts to drum up support for a contribution to which a leader is committed. Nor does such coverage reflect an already-ongoing commitment. Thus, I use the entire complex emergency for these observations.

Second, for observations in which the complex emergency persists for an extended period before a state contributes to a peace operation, it is relatively easy to construct the numerator of *CE News Coverage* from a significant chunk of the conflict while still avoiding a sizeable period prior to the commitment itself. For example, the complex emergency in Mozambique began in 1982 and ONUMOZ was authorized in December 1992. I use coverage from 1982 - 1991 for all three observations involving this complex emergency. Similarly, the complex emergency in

Tajikistan ended in 1993 and UNMOT was authorized in December 1994. I use coverage from 1992 – 1993 for the numerator for all observations involving this complex emergency.

Finally, due to some combination of three complicating circumstances, a third set of observations require considerable care in selecting the periods used for the numerator of *CE News Coverage* without creating significant threats to inference. These circumstances include: 1) there is only a short period of time during the complex emergency before the commitment to a peace operation; 2) there is a major change in the complex emergency that could affect news coverage in the period shortly before a commitment to a peace operation; and 3) the primary peace operation I use to code *Contribution Type* follows another one, so that the first might affect news coverage during the period before the second (see the discussion of *Contribution Type* in Chapter 3).

These cases raise two distinct challenges. The first is that they require greater care and finesse in balancing the need to avoid coverage of efforts to 'sell' a contribution or of decisions that have already been made against the need to include coverage of key periods that might affect news coverage and decisions about peace operations. In particular, these cases typically required that I include partial-year coverage from the year during which the contribution to a peace operation begins, up until a reasonable amount of time before it is decided upon and announced. I aim to stop measuring coverage as far in advance of these decisions as possible while still capturing reactions to key developments in the conflict. Detailed explanations for the periods used for each case (and indeed, for all observations involving any contribution to a peace operation) are available from the author on request. In addition, to minimize any threats to inference, for each of these cases I extrapolated what coverage *would* have been for the entire year if it had occurred at the same rate as before the decision to contribute and then compared the

estimate with the true volume of coverage for the whole year and used whichever was smaller. Where coverage is greater during the estimated period than the rest of the year, this limits the volume of news coverage estimated.

To provide just one example of how this worked, consider the NATO response to the Serb army's campaign of violence against Kosovar Albanians beginning in 1998. Initial public discussion of the use of force by NATO began in September 1998, while NATO's air campaign to evict the Serbs began in March 1999. Although extensive coverage of the humanitarian crisis continued throughout 1998, I use coverage from January – August 1998 as the basis for an annual estimate of coverage that *would* have occurred during the entire year, had coverage continued at the same rate. This eliminates the possibility that the measure reflects increased coverage generated by the discussion of force after August, but ensures that the ratio compares two measures of 'annual' coverage, since the denominator reflects annual average coverage of "Kosovo" from 1993-97. As this example attests, in some instances *CE News Coverage's* estimate of the coverage a complex emergency receives ends *before* the emergence of much of the attention it eventually attracts, and thus may under-estimate societal concern about it.

The second challenge, which is especially relevant for some of these observations, relates to the at-times short time horizon between the start of a complex emergency and the decision to intervene or act to protect civilians. When this occurs, news coverage that does not reflect the intervention itself is necessarily concentrated in the initial weeks or months of a complex emergency. The risk, in turn, is that conflicts may generally tend to receive more attention early on than in later months or years (although certainly this is not always the case). If so, interventions that occur very early may see higher average news coverage during the period before the intervention than those that occur later, simply because this period is shorter. To

guard against this possibility, I base the numerator for *CE News Coverage* on the period beginning January 1 of the initial year of a complex emergency, regardless of the day or month the violence begins. Except where this is in early January, the result is to include coverage from before the conflict. As a result, this strategy avoids the potential problem of measuring media attention only during intense periods of initial violence for observations that see an early peace operation, while measuring it as an average of both more and less intense periods for observations where these missions take longer or never occur.[3]

Again, an example is useful to illustrate. In mid-July 2006, Israeli air attacks in response to provocation by Hezbollah led to a complex emergency in Lebanon. On August 11, the UN Security Council adjusted the mandate of UNIFIL, the peacekeeping operation already in place in southern Lebanon, to include some protection of civilians. France soon sent nearly 1,500 troops to participate. To capture the media response to this complex emergency before these decisions, I include coverage from January 1 through August 7, 2006. While this includes a few weeks of intense media coverage in response to the outbreak of violence, this is offset by more than 6 months during which coverage of Lebanon was otherwise comparable to the previous few years. While it is conceivable that this practice may occasionally under-estimate the true amount of societal concern among observations that involve such quick responses, it also helps to avoid the greater threat to inference that would follow from over-estimating this concern.

[3] This has little practical effect for complex emergencies that involve no peace operations or a peace operation only after considerable time has gone by, but can have a non-negligible impact in the more complicated observations discussed here. There were also two exceptions to this pattern, both of which involved no peace operations: the start of Afghanistan II in 1992 and the start of DRC (Zaire) II in 1996. Both of these complex emergencies began mid-year (April and October, respectively), and followed immediately on previous complex emergencies in the same country earlier in the year. Thus, for these two conflicts I began recording news coverage during the month the new complex emergency began in order to exclude earlier coverage that applied to the previous conflict.

***Search Terms***

The final key aspect of *CE News Coverage* that requires attention is the selection of the particular search terms used to capture attention to the places where each complex emergency occurred. Wherever reasonable, I searched simply for the name of the relevant country or sub-national region. Typically this was straightforward, but occasionally not. What is more, certain differences were necessary for the full-text and headline news searches, and for the English-language papers vs. *Le Monde*. Tables W3 (for the English-language papers) and W4 (for *Le Monde*) present the search terms for each complex emergency, noting and justifying necessary exceptions to this guiding pattern in the footnotes.

**Table W3: English-Language Search Terms**

| Complex Emergency | Full-text Search Terms | Headline Search Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan I / Soviets | "Afghanistan" | "Afghanistan" |
| Afghanistan II / Civil war | "Afghanistan" | "Afghanistan" |
| Cambodia | "Cambodia" OR "Kampuchea" | "Cambodia" OR "Kampuchea" |
| India I / Kashmir[1] | "Kashmir" AND "India" | "Kashmir" in the title AND "India" anywhere |
| India II / Northeast | "India" AND ("Assam" OR "Manipur" OR "Tripura" OR "Bodo" OR "Mizoram" OR "Nagaland" OR "Northeast India") | "India" in the title AND ("Assam" OR "Manipur" OR "Tripura" OR "Bodo" OR "Mizoram" OR "Nagaland" anywhere) |
| Indonesia I / Aceh | "Aceh" | "Aceh" |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | "Timor" | "Timor" |
| Indonesia III / Moluccas and Sulawesi | "Moluccas" OR "Sulawesi" OR "Maluku" OR "Malacca" | ("Moluccas" OR "Sulawesi" OR "Maluku" OR "Malacca" in the title) AND "Indonesia" anywhere[2] |
| Myanmar / Burma | "Myanmar" OR "Burma" | "Myanmar" OR "Burma" |
| Pakistan | "Waziristan" or "Northwest Frontier" | "Pakistan" in the title AND ("Northwest Frontier" OR "Waziristan" anywhere)[3] |
| Philippines I / Govt. vs. NPA | "Philippines" | "Philippines" |
| Philippines II / Govt. vs. Muslim insurgents | "Philippines" AND ("Southern Philippines" OR "South Philippines" OR "Muslim" OR "Mindanao") | "Philippines" in the title AND ("Mindanao" OR "Muslim" OR "Southern Philippines" anywhere)[4] |
| Sri Lanka I | "Sri Lanka" | "Sri Lanka" |
| Sri Lanka II | "Sri Lanka" | "Sri Lanka" |
| Azerbaijan-Armenia (USSR) | "Azerbaijan" OR "Armenia" | "Azerbaijan" OR "Armenia"[5] |

[1] I required a reference to India in articles here in order to avoid capturing articles just about the Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir.
[2] This is a difficult complex emergency to label. I use multiple terms because Moluccas is the plural of the various Indonesian provinces ending in "Maluku" (North Maluku, Maluku, etc.), and because the complex emergency also encompassed the nearby province of Sulawesi.
[3] The war between the Pakistani government and the Taliban occurred primarily in these two regions, the Northwest Frontier Province and South Waziristan.
[4] This war, unlike the earlier civil war in the Philippines, was localized in the south of the country (the violence was centered on the island of Mindanao, but spanned a number of other areas). Over time it involved several different Muslim rebel groups. Together these characteristics account for the specific, localized nature of the search terms.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh | "Azerbaijan" | "Azerbaijan" |
| Bosnia | "Bosnia" | "Bosnia" |
| Croatia | "Croatia" | "Croatia" |
| Russia / Chechnya I | "Chechnya" | "Chechnya" |
| Russia / Chechnya II | "Chechnya" | "Chechnya" |
| Tajikistan | "Tajikistan" | "Tajikistan" |
| Turkey | "Turkey" AND "Kurd" | "Turkey" AND "Kurd"[6] |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | "Kosovo" | "Kosovo" |
| Algeria | "Algeria" | "Algeria" |
| Angola I | "Angola" | "Angola" |
| Angola II | "Angola" | "Angola" |
| Angola III | "Angola" | "Angola" |
| Burundi | "Burundi" | "Burundi" |
| Congo-Brazzaville | "Brazzaville" AND "Congo" | "Brazzaville" anywhere AND "Congo" in the title[7] |
| Côte d'Ivoire | "Ivory Coast" | "Ivory Coast" |
| DRC (Zaire) I | "Zaire" | "Zaire" OR "Kinshasa" |
| DRC (Zaire) II & III | "Zaire" OR "Democratic Republic of Congo" OR "Democratic Republic of the Congo" OR ("Congo" AND NOT "Brazzaville") | Through 1996: "Zaire" OR "Kinshasa"<br>1997 onward: ("Zaire" OR "DRC" or "Congo" or "Kinshasa" in the title) AND NOT ("Brazzaville" anywhere)[8] |
| Eritrea / War w/ Ethiopia | "Eritrea" | "Eritrea" |
| Ethiopia / Civil war | "Ethiopia" | "Ethiopia" |
| Kenya | "Kenya" | "Kenya" |
| Liberia I | "Liberia" | "Liberia" |

[5] Because this was a war between these two regions that occurred while they were still part of the USSR, using the name of either region is the best way to capture attention paid to them at this time.

[6] I include both Turkey and Kurd to distinguish Turkey's Kurdish population from that of Iraq.

[7] Analogous to above for the DRC, this helps to distinguish events in Congo-Brazzaville from events in DRC/Congo-Kinshasa.

[8] When Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997, this complicated designing a search term that would capture articles about the DRC but not about Congo-Brazzaville (the two countries are now often referred to as Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville according to their respective capitals – hence the use of the capital names in the searches here). Beginning in 1997 I require a reference to the country name, either former or current, and exclude articles that refer to 'Brazzaville' anywhere. Since many articles about DRC now refer to "Congo" in the title, this captured these articles but not those just about Congo-Brazzaville.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Liberia II | “Liberia” | “Liberia” |
| Mozambique | “Mozambique” | “Mozambique” |
| Nigeria | “Nigeria” | “Nigeria” |
| Rwanda | “Rwanda” | “Rwanda” |
| Sierra Leone | “Sierra Leone” | “Sierra Leone” |
| Somalia | “Somalia” | “Somalia” |
| South Africa | “South Africa” | “South Africa” |
| Sudan I / North-South civil war | "Southern Sudan" OR "Sudan's South" OR "South of Sudan" | “Sudan” in the title and (“South” or “Southern” anywhere) |
| Sudan II / Darfur | “Darfur” | “Darfur” |
| Sudan III / Southern violence | "Southern Sudan" OR "Sudan's South" OR "South of Sudan" | “Sudan” in the title and (“South” or “Southern” anywhere) |
| Uganda I | “Uganda” | “Uganda” |
| Uganda II / LRA | “Uganda” | “Uganda” |
| Zimbabwe | “Zimbabwe” | “Zimbabwe” |
| Colombia | “Colombia” | “Colombia” |
| El Salvador | “Salvador” | “Salvador” |
| Peru | “Peru” | “Peru” |
| Iraq / Kurds I | “Iraq” AND “Kurd” | “Kurd” in the title and “Iraq” anywhere[9] |
| Iraq / Kurds II | “Iraq” AND “Kurd” | “Kurd” in the title and “Iraq” anywhere |
| Iraq / Shiites | “Iraq” AND (“Shiite” OR “Shia”) | (“Shiite” OR “Shia”) in the title and “Iraq” anywhere |
| Kuwait | “Kuwait” | “Kuwait” |
| Lebanon I / Civil war | “Lebanon” | “Lebanon” |
| Lebanon II / Israeli air attacks | “Lebanon” | “Lebanon” |

[9] For all complex emergencies in Iraq involving either the Kurds or the Shiites, I include both the community in the title and “Iraq” anywhere in the text. Because neither Kurds nor Shiites live only in Iraq, this focuses the search (insofar as possible) on these communities *in* Iraq.

**Table W4: French-Language Search Terms**[10]

| Complex Emergency | Full-text Search Terms | Headline Search Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan I / Soviets | "Afghanistan" | "Afghanistan" |
| Afghanistan II / Civil war | "Afghanistan" | "Afghanistan" |
| Cambodia | "Cambodge" | "Cambodge" |
| India I / Kashmir | "Inde" and "Cachemire" | "Inde" and "Cachemire" |
| India II / Northeast | "Assam" OR "Manipur" OR "Nagaland" OR "Mizoram" OR "Bodos" OR "Tripura"[11] | Inde AND ("Assam" OR "Tripura" OR "Nagaland" OR "Mizoram" OR "Manipur" OR "Bodos" OR "Nord-est") |
| Indonesia I / Aceh | "Aceh" | "Aceh" |
| Indonesia II / East Timor | "Timor" | "Timor" |
| Indonesia III / Moluccas and Sulawesi | "Moluques" OR "Sulawesi" OR "Maluku" OR "Malacca" | "Moluques" OR "Sulawesi" OR "Maluku" OR "Malacca" |
| Myanmar / Burma | "Birmanie" | "Birmanie" |
| Pakistan | ("Pakistan" AND "Province frontière nord-ouest") OR "Waziristan" | ("Pakistan" and "Nord-ouest") OR "Waziristan"[12] |
| Philippines I / Govt. vs. NPA | "Philippines" | "Philippines" |
| Philippines II / Govt. vs. Muslim insurgents | ("Philippines" AND "Musulman") OR Mindanao | ("Philippines" AND ("Musulman" OR "Sud")) OR "Mindanao" |
| Sri Lanka I | "Sri Lanka" | "Sri Lanka" |
| Sri Lanka II | "Sri Lanka" | "Sri Lanka" |
| Azerbaijan-Armenia (USSR) | "Azerbaïdjan" OR "Arménie" | "Azerbaïdjan" OR "Arménie" |

[10] Most exceptions to the basic search rule are as for the English-language sources, but there are some differences due in part to variation in the search engines (in particular, less flexibility with that of *Le Monde*). Notably, for the headline searches, searches including one word/term in the headline and one in the entire document for the English-language papers could not be replicated for the French observations. Instead, all words searched had to be included either in the title OR the entire document because of the structure of *Le Monde's* search engine.

[11] The *Le Monde* website does not allow the same flexibility with And/Or operators as LexisNexis, and I could not easily include 'Inde' AND 'Nord-est' in the search as well as the various other regional terms. In order to include results unrelated to India (since 'Inde' was nowhere in the search), I also excluded the words 'Maroc' (Morocco) and 'Hassan' from the searches (which, strangely, otherwise showed up a number of times).

[12] For the full-text searches I include "frontière nord-ouest" in order to more narrowly focus the search, but for the headline ones very few articles use the entire name of the province, so I use "Nord-ouest" and "Pakistan" instead.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh | "Azerbaïdjan" | "Azerbaïdjan" |
| Bosnia | "Bosnie" | "Bosnie" |
| Croatia | "Croatie" | "Croatie" |
| Russia / Chechnya I | "Tchétchénie" | "Tchétchénie" |
| Russia / Chechnya II | "Tchétchénie" | "Tchétchénie" |
| Tajikistan | "Tadjikistan" | "Tadjikistan" |
| Turkey | "Turquie" and "Kurd" | "Turquie" and "Kurd" |
| Yugoslavia / Kosovo | "Kosovo" | "Kosovo" |
| Algeria | "Algérie" | "Algérie" |
| Angola I | "Angola" | "Angola" |
| Angola II | "Angola" | "Angola" |
| Angola III | "Angola" | "Angola" |
| Burundi | "Burundi" | "Burundi" |
| Congo-Brazzaville | "Congo" AND "Brazzaville" | ("Congo" or "Brazzaville") AND NOT "Kinshasa" |
| Côte d'Ivoire | "Côte d'Ivoire" | "Côte d'Ivoire" |
| DRC (Zaire) I | "Zaire" | "Zaire" or "Kinshasa" |
| DRC (Zaire) II & III | Through 1996: "Zaire"<br>1997 onward: ("Zaire" OR "Congo") AND NOT "Brazzaville" | Through 1996: "Zaire" or "Kinshasa"<br>1997 onward: ("Zaire" or "Congo" or "RDC" or "Kinshasa") AND NOT ("Brazzaville" anywhere) |
| Eritrea / War w/ Ethiopia | "Érythrée" | "Érythrée" |
| Ethiopia / Civil war | "Ethiopie" | "Ethiopie" |
| Kenya | "Kenya" | "Kenya" |
| Liberia I | "Libéria" | "Libéria" |
| Liberia II | "Libéria" | "Libéria" |
| Mozambique | "Mozambique" | "Mozambique" |
| Nigeria | "Nigeria" | "Nigeria" |
| Rwanda | "Rwanda" | "Rwanda" |
| Sierra Leone | "Sierra Leone" | "Sierra Leone" |
| Somalia | "Somalie" | "Somalie" |
| South Africa | "Afrique du Sud" | "Afrique du Sud" |
| Sudan I / North-South civil war | "Soudan" & "Sud" | "Soudan" & "Sud" |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Sudan II / Darfur | “Darfour” | “Darfour” |
| Sudan III / Southern violence | “Soudan” & “Sud” | “Soudan” & “Sud” |
| Uganda I | “Ouganda” | “Ouganda” |
| Uganda II / LRA | “Ouganda” | “Ouganda” |
| Zimbabwe | “Zimbabwe” | “Zimbabwe” |
| Colombia | “Colombie” | “Colombie” |
| El Salvador | “Pérou” | “Pérou” |
| Peru | “El Salvador” | “El Salvador” |
| Iraq / Kurds I | “Irak” and “Kurd” | “Irak” and “Kurd” |
| Iraq / Kurds II | “Irak” and “Kurd” | “Irak” and “Kurd” |
| Iraq / Shiites | “Irak” and “Chiite” | “Irak” and “Chiite” |
| Iraq / US-led coalition | “Irak” | “Irak” |
| Kuwait | “Koweit” | “Koweit” |
| Lebanon I / Civil war | “Liban” | “Liban” |
| Lebanon II / Israeli air attacks | “Liban” | “Liban” |

## Part 4: Quantitative Results – Robustness Checks

As mentioned in Chapter 3, I conducted numerous robustness checks to assess how well my quantitative findings hold up to alterations in model specification. This final part of the web appendix provides added discussion and presents the results from some of these additional tests. I proceed in the same order as I discussed them in Chapter 3, first looking at changes to *CE News Coverage* and *Operational Environment*, then moving to the models that include each control individually, and finally examining the models containing different subsets of the observations.

### A. CHANGING *CE NEWS COVERAGE* AND *OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT*

As noted in Chapter 3 I repeated Model 2 with four additional versions of *CE News Coverage* on top of the main one used there. Two of these iterations use the same full-text news searches as in the main results, while the other two use searches based on headline news coverage as discussed in Part 3 of this appendix, above. The other difference in these models is the size of the constant added to the denominator of *CE News Coverage* to correct for the ratio's failure to distinguish between small and large overall volumes of news coverage (see discussion on p.W83 –W84 above, and note 19 in Chapter 3). In addition to the main full-text version of *CE News Coverage* where this constant is 15, I also used 10 and 5. For the headline news version, I also ran models using constants of 10 and 5. Below, in Tables W5 and W6, I present predicted probabilities from running Model 2 from Chapter 3 using two of these variations: the full-text version of *CE News Coverage* with a smaller constant of 5 added to the denominator (Model W1), and the headline version of *CE News Coverage* with a constant of 10 added to the denominator (Model W2). Coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table W8 below.[1]

[1] Again I use the Clarify software to produce these predictions from the models.

As noted in Chapter 3, the results are very similar to those obtained using the base version of *CE News Coverage*. In each case there are sizeable and statistically significant drops in the probability of no contribution or a limited contribution as *CE News Coverage* moves from 0 to 1, both when *Operational Environment* is at its 10th percentile and its 50th percentile (though when *Operational Environment* is at its 50th percentile the drop in limited contributions is not significant). As I expect, the probability of a gap contribution is greatest when *CE News Coverage* is at its 50th percentile and relatively inhospitable, but it also sees a smaller increase when *Operational Environment* is at its 10th percentile. Thus, again, when *CE News Coverage* equals 1, gap contributions are much more likely when *Operational Environment* is at its 50th than its 10th percentile. In Model W1 the difference is .75, and this is significant at the 5% level. In Model W2 the difference is .44, and is significant at the 10% level. In addition, we again see a large increase in the probability of robust contributions over the range of *CE News Coverage* when *Operational Environment* is at its 10th percentile, such that these policies become much more likely than gap contributions. This does not occur when *Operational Environment* is at its 50th percentile. Also of interest and something of a contrast to the main results in Chapter 3, in these models there is only a small (.05 to .06) probability of robust contributions when *Operational Environment* is at its 90th percentile and *CE News Coverage* equals 0.

**Table W5: Effect of a Change in *CE News Coverage*, Model W1 (Full-text coverage)**

| | **Operational Environment** | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **10th percentile** | | | **50th percentile** | | | **90th percentile** | | |
| | **CE News Coverage** | | | **CE News Coverage** | | | **CE News Coverage** | | |
| | **0** | **1** | **Change** | **0** | **1** | **Change** | **0** | **1** | **Change** |
| **No Contribution** | 0.37 | 0.00 | -0.37** | 0.79 | 0.04 | -0.75** | 0.88 | 0.43 | -0.44 |
| **Limited** | 0.62 | 0.00 | -0.62** | 0.19 | 0.03 | -0.16 | 0.02 | 0.35 | 0.33 |
| **Gap** | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.16* | 0.00 | 0.89 | 0.89** | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0.17 |
| **Robust** | 0.00 | 0.83 | 0.83** | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.00 | -.06** |
| ** p < .05, * p < .10 | | | | | | | | | |

Note: For *CE News Coverage*, constant added to denominator = 5

**Table W6: Effect of a Change in *CE News Coverage*, Model W2 (Headline coverage)**

| | Operational Environment | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 10th percentile | | | 50th percentile | | | 90th percentile | | |
| | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | |
| | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change |
| **No Contribution** | 0.34 | 0.00 | -0.34** | 0.88 | 0.15 | -0.73** | 0.92 | 0.64 | -0.28 |
| **Limited** | 0.66 | 0.01 | -0.65** | 0.11 | 0.08 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.27 |
| **Gap** | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.30** | 0.00 | 0.74 | 0.74** | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.06 |
| **Robust** | 0.00 | 0.69 | 0.69** | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.00 | -.05** |
| ** p < .05, * p < .10 | | | | | | | | | |

Note: For *CE News Coverage*, constant added to denominator = 10

Next, as also noted in Chapter 3, I ran a series of models that use different versions of *Operational Environment*. On top of the main version with all nine equally weighted components and the version used in Model 3 that excludes the number of violent parties and the indicator for revolutionary or guerrilla war, I ran nine additional models that separately dropped each component. I also ran a tenth model that includes all nine components but weights some more heavily than others. As discussed in Chapter 3 there are reasons to think that the size of the army, contiguity to Russia/China, the presence of a strong and motivated rebellion, the number of violent parties, and the difficulty of the terrain more directly affect the risk of confrontation and casualties for foreign interveners than the state of the local infrastructure, area and population affected by the complex emergency, and the distance from the potential intervener. Leaders contemplating intervention might thus care more about the first five factors than the last four. To account for this possibility I constructed a version of *Operational Environment* that weights these five factors twice as heavily as the others. Table W7 presents predicted probabilities from running Chapter 3's Model 2 with this version of *Operational Environment*. Coefficients and standard errors are in Table W8 along with those from Models W1 and W2.

**Table W7: Effect of a Change in *CE News Coverage*, Model W3 (Weighted *Op. Enviro.*)**

| | Operational Environment | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 10th percentile | | | 50th percentile | | | 90th percentile | | |
| | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | |
| | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change |
| **No Contribution** | 0.50 | 0.00 | -0.50* | 0.90 | 0.09 | -0.81** | 0.68 | 0.70 | 0.02 |
| **Limited** | 0.50 | 0.00 | -0.50* | 0.09 | 0.04 | -0.05 | 0.01 | 0.21 | 0.20 |
| **Gap** | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.14** | 0.00 | 0.83 | 0.83** | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.06 |
| **Robust** | 0.00 | 0.85 | 0.85** | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.29 | 0.00 | -.29* |
| ** p < .05, * p < .10 | | | | | | | | | |

As above, all of the key patterns we saw in Chapter 3 persist here as well. Notably, robust contributions remain much more likely than gap contributions when *CE News Coverage* equals 1 and *Operational Environment* is quite hospitable (by .71). Likewise, when *CE News Coverage* equals 1, gap contributions are far more likely (by .69) when *Operational Environment* is at its 50th rather than its 10th percentile, and this difference is significant at the 10% level.

**Table W8: Supplementary Results, Changes in *CE News Coverage* & *Op. Enviro.***

| | Model W1 (Full-text *CE News Coverage*, denominator constant = 5) | | | Model W2 (Headline *CE News Coverage*, denominator constant = 10) | | | Model W3 (Weighted *Operational Environment*) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Limited | Gap | Robust | Limited | Gap | Robust | Limited | Gap | Robust |
| CE News Coverage | -4.828 | 15.716** | 33.061** | -3.766 | 17.651*** | 27.431*** | -1.282 | 23.070*** | 44.083*** |
| | (9.494) | (6.172) | (13.146) | (5.004) | (6.702) | (5.668) | (10.011) | (7.267) | (16.527) |
| Operational Environment | -10.492 | -2.954 | 7.209 | -12.523** | 2.688 | 10.486** | -10.377 | 3.413 | 23.833* |
| | (6.565) | (7.707) | (6.994) | (5.596) | (7.401) | (4.617) | (9.872) | (8.625) | (14.042) |
| CE News Coverage*Operational Environment | 11.763 | -11.559 | -54.035** | 10.876 | -17.008* | -45.759*** | 7.272 | -21.329* | -70.159** |
| | (14.806) | (11.512) | (21.550) | (9.346) | (10.295) | (9.530) | (15.583) | (12.633) | (27.539) |
| Former Colony | -0.705 | 1.317 | -1.152 | -0.688 | 1.659 | -1.159 | -0.610 | 1.446 | -0.553 |
| | (0.617) | (0.888) | (1.806) | (0.601) | (1.023) | (1.161) | (0.616) | (0.895) | (1.410) |
| Contiguous Ally | -1.528* | -0.836 | -1.221 | -1.590* | -1.402 | -1.673 | -1.228 | -0.686 | -1.229 |
| | (0.783) | (1.042) | (1.253) | (0.830) | (1.250) | (1.495) | (0.790) | (1.053) | (1.357) |
| Region | -2.066 | 0.497 | -3.260** | -1.947 | 0.041 | -3.286*** | -1.577 | 0.358 | -2.842* |
| | (1.273) | (0.896) | (1.395) | (1.223) | (1.247) | (1.177) | (1.202) | (1.123) | (1.494) |
| Trade | -0.607*** | -0.973*** | -0.491 | -0.648*** | -0.967*** | -0.272 | -0.675*** | -1.053*** | -0.537* |
| | (0.224) | (0.251) | (0.323) | (0.250) | (0.322) | (0.318) | (0.251) | (0.272) | (0.326) |
| Affinity | 0.354 | -0.913 | 1.913** | 0.406 | -0.517 | 1.652* | 0.453 | -0.658 | 1.731* |
| | (0.626) | (0.946) | (0.913) | (0.671) | (1.024) | (0.846) | (0.598) | (0.985) | (0.989) |
| Democracy | 0.146 | 0.017 | -0.359 | 0.154 | -0.259 | -0.985* | 0.128 | -0.058 | -0.477 |
| | (0.341) | (0.391) | (0.486) | (0.334) | (0.457) | (0.507) | (0.327) | (0.419) | (0.445) |
| Pre-1989 Complex Emergency | -0.348 | -0.175 | 3.879* | -0.330 | -1.178 | 3.260* | -0.070 | 0.032 | 5.114** |
| | (0.895) | (1.209) | (2.357) | (0.849) | (1.237) | (1.765) | (0.852) | (1.149) | (2.460) |
| Mass Killing | 3.876*** | 1.257 | 1.797* | 3.989*** | 2.099** | 2.464** | 3.996*** | 1.610 | 1.527 |
| | (0.883) | (1.065) | (0.992) | (0.845) | (1.039) | (1.141) | (0.912) | (1.101) | (1.110) |
| Constant | 1.739 | -6.594** | -10.830* | 2.092 | -9.767** | -10.173*** | 0.283 | -13.093*** | -22.446** |
| | (3.935) | (2.894) | (6.007) | (2.703) | (4.747) | (3.283) | (5.564) | (4.135) | (10.279) |
| Observations | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.473 | 0.473 | 0.473 | 0.484 | 0.484 | 0.484 | 0.503 | 0.503 | 0.503 |

Robust standard errors clustered on the complex emergency in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

## B. ONE CONTROL PER MODEL

As mentioned in Chapter 3, I also ran a series of nine models that include *CE News Coverage*, *Operational Environment*, their interaction, and each control variable individually (with one model focusing only on the indicators of the type of complex emergency). In most cases the results were essentially the same as presented in the chapter, but for *Former Colony* and *Contiguous Ally* these models resulted in additional statistically significant results that further confirm my general conclusion that such strategic and political ties to states experiencing complex emergencies do not promote contributions to peace operations, including ambitions-resources gaps. I present the results of these two models here. Respectively, Tables W9 and W10 show predicted probabilities for models W4, with *Former Colony*, and W5, with *Contiguous Ally*. In each case *CE News Coverage* and *Operational Environment* are set at their mean values as *Former Colony* and *Contiguous Ally* move from 0 to 1. To calculate the predicted probabilities for *CE News Coverage*, *Former Colony* and *Contiguous Ally* are set at their modes (0 in both cases). Table W11 shows the coefficients and standard errors.

**Table W9: Effect of Changes in *Former Colony* and *CE News Coverage*, Model W4**

| | Change in Former Colony ( 0 to 1) | Operational Environment | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 10th percentile | | | 50th percentile | | | 90th percentile | | |
| | | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | |
| | | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change |
| **No Contribution** | 0.09 | 0.21 | 0.01 | -0.20 | 0.55 | 0.12 | -0.43 | 0.50 | 0.28 | -0.22 |
| **Limited** | -0.16* | 0.78 | 0.00 | -0.78** | 0.42 | 0.07 | -0.35 | 0.05 | 0.47 | 0.42 |
| **Gap** | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.34 | 0.34** | 0.00 | 0.74 | 0.74** | 0.00 | 0.24 | 0.24** |
| **Robust** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.64 | 0.64** | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.45 | 0.00 | -.45** |
| ** p < .05, * p < .10 | | | | | | | | | | |

**Table W10: Effect of Changes in *Contiguous Ally* and *CE News Coverage*, Model W5**

| | Change in Contiguous Ally ( 0 to 1) | Operational Environment | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 10th percentile | | | 50th percentile | | | 90th percentile | | |
| | | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | |
| | | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change |
| **No Contribution** | 0.30** | 0.33 | 0.00 | -0.33* | 0.66 | 0.04 | -0.62** | 0.46 | 0.24 | -0.22 |
| **Limited** | -0.18** | 0.66 | 0.01 | -0.65** | 0.31 | 0.06 | -0.25 | 0.04 | 0.47 | 0.42 |
| **Gap** | -0.11** | 0.01 | 0.45 | 0.44** | 0.00 | 0.84 | 0.84** | 0.01 | 0.27 | 0.26* |
| **Robust** | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.54 | 0.54** | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.48 | 0.00 | -.48** |
| ** p < .05, * p < .10 | | | | | | | | | | |

Considering first the effects of the controls, the results show that when a state experiencing a complex emergency is the former colony of a potential intervener, the probability of a limited contribution to a peace operation falls by .16, and this is significant at the 10% level. In addition, when a potential intervener has an ally that is contiguous to a state experiencing a complex emergency, the probability of making no contribution to a peace operation increases by .30. Meanwhile, the probability of making a limited contribution decreases by .18 and of making a gap contribution decreases by .11. All of these effects are significant at the 5% level.

Next, the key trends for the relationship between *CE News Coverage* and *Operational Environment* continue to hold in these models, though with some variations. Notably, in Model W5, when *Operational Environment* is at its 10$^{th}$ percentile an increase from 0 to 1 in *CE News Coverage* leads to a larger increase in the probability of a gap contribution than in the other models. Still, robust contributions remain more likely here (by .10) when *CE News Coverage* equals 1. Yet while gap contributions remain much more likely for the middle value of *Operational Environment* than the low one when *CE News Coverage* equals 1 (by .40), this is one of the few models I ran where this difference is not statistically significant. In addition, in both Models W4 and W5 there is a significant increase in the probability of a gap contribution as *CE News Coverage* increases when *Operational Environment* is at its 90$^{th}$ percentile, along with a sizeable drop in the probability of robust contributions. Still, robust contributions remain *most* likely when the operational environment is quite hospitable. Likewise, when *CE News Coverage* equals 1, gap contributions remain much more likely when *Operational Environment* is fairly inhospitable (50$^{th}$ percentile), and still considerably more likely when it is quite hospitable (10$^{th}$ percentile), than when it is most inhospitable (90$^{th}$ percentile).

**Table W11: Supplementary Results, One Control Per Model**

| | Model W4 | | | Model W5 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Limited | Gap | Robust | Limited | Gap | Robust |
| CE News Coverage | -6.966 | 9.846** | 20.191*** | -3.438 | 13.213** | 23.188*** |
| | (5.750) | (4.458) | (5.828) | (6.293) | (5.320) | (6.705) |
| Operational Environment | -9.603* | -2.376 | 12.050** | -7.927 | -1.624 | 13.524** |
| | (5.212) | (5.596) | (4.982) | (5.855) | (6.778) | (5.635) |
| CE News Coverage*Operational Environment | 13.654 | -4.221 | -35.043*** | 9.694 | -7.764 | -38.733*** |
| | (9.911) | (7.469) | (10.404) | (11.184) | (9.303) | (11.390) |
| Former Colony | -0.969* | 0.276 | -0.260 | | | |
| | (0.518) | (0.575) | (0.970) | | | |
| Contiguous Ally | | | | -1.336** | -1.897** | -1.227 |
| | | | | (0.564) | (0.877) | (1.094) |
| Constant | 4.320 | -4.481 | -10.201*** | 2.953 | -5.139 | -11.192*** |
| | (3.017) | (3.022) | (3.683) | (3.286) | (3.605) | (4.046) |
| Observations | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.222 | 0.222 | 0.222 | 0.245 | 0.245 | 0.245 |

Robust standard errors clustered on the complex emergency in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

## C. DROPPING OBSERVATIONS

The third and final set of robustness checks look at how well my results hold up while dropping various groups of observations. As noted in Chapter 3, I separately dropped all of the observations for each potential intervener in order to check that the results were not driven by any particular great power democracy. Except for Australia, these models exclude the control variables due to the substantially reduced number of observations, and are thus otherwise comparable to Model 1 from Chapter 3.

In addition, as also discussed in Chapter 3, for a small number of observations there was some uncertainty as to how I should code *Contribution Type.* In particular, there were two relevant issues. First, there were three observations for which both resources and ambitions were coded as '2.' In the main analysis I treated these observations as limited contributions, but it would also be reasonable to argue that they are not really a good fit for any of the three categories of contributions, since they involve greater effort to protect civilians than the other limited contributions and less than the robust ones, but do not involve ambitions-resources gaps.

Since there are so few of these observations this is unlikely to matter much, but to verify this I ran a version of Model 2 from Chapter 3, without these observations. Second, there were eight observations that would otherwise have been coded as ambitions-resources gaps but where a state's contribution to a peace operation was in support of a robust contribution by another great power democracy. As discussed in the chapter, it does not make sense to code these as gap contributions and I instead coded them as either limited or robust depending on the scope of the resources committed. Nevertheless, to ensure that these observations are not driving my results I also ran a version of Model 2 without these observations.

As discussed in Chapter 3 and at greater length in Part 1 of this web appendix, each complex emergency is coded on a scale of 1 to 3 according to my certainty (from low to high) that it meets a series of quantitative and qualitative criteria that I use to define and identify these conflicts. I also ran a version of Model 2 that dropped all observations where there was any doubt about whether the conflict met the definition and full set of operational criteria for a complex emergency – that is, where the complex emergency was not coded as level 3 on this certainty scale. This led to the loss of 27 observations. Finally, I further ran a model that excluded all complex emergencies that had not yet ended by the end of 2009, which could have received peace operations after the period covered by my data. Here I lost 22 observations.

Tables W12 through W14 show predicted probabilities for three of these models, focusing on the relationship between *CE News Coverage* and *Operational Environment*, while Table W15 shows the coefficients and standard errors. Models W6 and W7 show the results of Model 1 from Chapter 3 without, respectively, the U.S. and French observations (results for the UK are substantively consistent with these). Model W8 shows a version of Model 2 without the

complex emergencies that were still ongoing at the end of 2009. As elsewhere, for Model W8 predicted probabilities are calculated with the controls set at their means and modes.

**Table W12: Effect of a Change in *CE News Coverage*, Model W6 (No U.S. Observations)**

| | Operational Environment | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 10th percentile | | | 50th percentile | | | 90th percentile | | |
| | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | |
| | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change |
| **No Contribution** | 0.31 | 0.01 | -0.30 | 0.66 | 0.09 | -0.57** | 0.43 | 0.26 | -0.17 |
| **Limited** | 0.69 | 0.01 | -0.68** | 0.31 | 0.06 | -0.25 | 0.04 | 0.41 | 0.37 |
| **Gap** | 0.00 | 0.43 | 0.43** | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.80** | 0.01 | 0.33 | 0.32** |
| **Robust** | 0.00 | 0.54 | 0.54** | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.53 | 0.01 | -.52** |
| ** p < .05, * p < .10 | | | | | | | | | |

**Table W13: Effect of a Change in *CE News Coverage*, Model W7 (No French Observations)**

| | Operational Environment | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 10th percentile | | | 50th percentile | | | 90th percentile | | |
| | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | | CE News Coverage | | |
| | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change | 0 | 1 | Change |
| **No Contribution** | 0.34 | 0.01 | -0.33 | 0.64 | 0.10 | -0.54** | 0.62 | 0.27 | -0.34 |
| **Limited** | 0.65 | 0.01 | -0.64* | 0.34 | 0.07 | -0.27 | 0.06 | 0.40 | 0.34 |
| **Gap** | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.31** | 0.00 | 0.75 | 0.75** | 0.01 | 0.32 | 0.31** |
| **Robust** | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.67** | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.31 | 0.01 | -.30** |
| ** p < .05, * p < .10 | | | | | | | | | |

The results from Models W6 and W7 are very comparable to those from Model 1. The same trends toward a reduced probability of no or limited contributions as *CE News Coverage* increases persist. In both models these are significant as *CE News Coverage* moves from 0 to 1 for limited contributions when *Operational Environment* is at its 10th percentile, and for no contribution when it is at its 50th percentile. As in Model 1, moreover, examining the effect of a change in *CE News Coverage* from .5 to 1 instead yields additional statistically significant results for no contribution when *Operational Environment* is at its 10th percentile and 90th percentile, and for limited contributions when it is at its 50th percentile.

Here also, an increase in *CE News Coverage* yields a significant increase in the probability of gap contributions at each value of *Operational Environment*, which remains much larger when it is at its 50th percentile than at the other values. In addition, when *CE News*

*Coverage* equals 1 the difference in the probability of a gap contribution between low and mid-level values of *Operational Environment* remains large (.37 in Model W6 and .44 in Model W7) and statistically significant at the 10% level. Robust contributions also remain more likely than ambitions-resources gaps when *CE News Coverage* equals 1 and *Operational Environment* is at its 10th percentile in both models, and in Model W7 they are much more likely here than in other circumstances. In Model W6 robust contributions are about as likely when *CE News Coverage* equals 1 whether *Operational Environment* is quite hospitable or very inhospitable.

Finally, the key patterns I expect to observe are also evident in Model W8. Gap contributions are still notably more likely when *CE News Coverage* equals 1 and *Operational Environment* is at its 50th percentile than elsewhere. Still, while the difference in the probability of these policies compared to when the operational environment is most hospitable remains sizeable at .35, in this model as in Model W5 this difference is not statistically significant. Robust contributions remain by far most likely when *CE News Coverage* equals 1 and *Operational Environment* is at its 10th percentile. Finally, there is only one statistically significant effect as *CE News Coverage* increases from 0 to 1 when *Operational Environment* is at its 90th percentile (for robust contributions), and it is much smaller.

**Table W14: Effect of a Change in *CE News Coverage*, Model W8 (No CEs Ongoing in 2009)**

| | **Operational Environment** | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **10th percentile** | | | **50th percentile** | | | **90th percentile** | | |
| | **CE News Coverage** | | | **CE News Coverage** | | | **CE News Coverage** | | |
| | **0** | **1** | **Change** | **0** | **1** | **Change** | **0** | **1** | **Change** |
| **No Contribution** | 0.56 | 0.00 | -0.56* | 0.92 | 0.16 | -0.76* | 0.82 | 0.69 | -0.13 |
| **Limited** | 0.43 | 0.01 | -0.42 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.27 | 0.26 |
| **Gap** | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.23** | 0.00 | 0.58 | 0.58** | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| **Robust** | 0.00 | 0.76 | 0.76** | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.07** | 0.13 | 0.00 | -.13* |
| ** p < .05, * p < .10 | | | | | | | | | |

## Table W15: Supplementary Results, Reduced Observations

| | Model W6 (No U.S. Observations) | | | Model W7 (No French Observations) | | | Model W8 (No CEs ongoing at end of 2009) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Limited | Gap | Robust | Limited | Gap | Robust | Limited | Gap | Robust |
| CE News Coverage | -4.680 | 11.156** | 20.502*** | -4.799 | 10.620** | 22.016*** | 0.627 | 27.200** | 46.419*** |
| | (5.761) | (4.994) | (5.678) | (6.763) | (5.220) | (6.934) | (11.471) | (11.612) | (16.647) |
| Operational Environment | -8.275 | -1.550 | 12.928*** | -7.750 | -1.836 | 12.626** | -12.057 | -2.549 | 24.308* |
| | (5.439) | (6.439) | (4.998) | (5.624) | (5.925) | (6.085) | (10.994) | (15.821) | (14.412) |
| CE News Coverage*Operational Environment | 10.793 | -4.922 | -37.294*** | 10.366 | -4.705 | -35.416*** | 7.018 | -26.475 | -74.502** |
| | (10.493) | (8.536) | (11.143) | (10.779) | (8.075) | (11.037) | (17.388) | (24.121) | (28.931) |
| Former Colony | | | | | | | -1.352* | 1.922* | 0.096 |
| | | | | | | | (0.789) | (1.128) | (1.511) |
| Contiguous Ally | | | | | | | -2.028** | -1.678 | -1.686 |
| | | | | | | | (0.888) | (1.440) | (1.770) |
| Region | | | | | | | -2.858* | -0.512 | -7.124*** |
| | | | | | | | (1.540) | (1.446) | (1.992) |
| Trade | | | | | | | -0.645** | -1.396*** | 0.464 |
| | | | | | | | (0.258) | (0.366) | (0.402) |
| Affinity | | | | | | | 0.429 | -1.911* | 3.678*** |
| | | | | | | | (0.679) | (1.086) | (0.812) |
| Democracy | | | | | | | 0.142 | 0.379 | 0.336 |
| | | | | | | | (0.388) | (0.432) | (0.504) |
| Pre-1989 Complex Emergency | | | | | | | -0.128 | 0.804 | 2.195 |
| | | | | | | | (0.929) | (1.378) | (1.643) |
| Mass Killing | | | | | | | 4.948*** | 2.378 | 2.594 |
| | | | | | | | (1.166) | (1.607) | (1.625) |
| Constant | 3.096 | -5.430 | -10.408*** | 3.042 | -4.937 | -11.398** | 0.384 | -14.711** | -23.460** |
| | (2.993) | (3.448) | (3.570) | (3.527) | (3.568) | (4.673) | (6.437) | (7.243) | (11.467) |
| Observations | 124 | 124 | 124 | 122 | 122 | 122 | 159 | 159 | 159 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.220 | 0.220 | 0.220 | 0.222 | 0.222 | 0.222 | 0.584 | 0.584 | 0.584 |

Robust standard errors clustered on the complex emergency in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1