

Online Appendix

Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Introducing A New Dataset

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Part III: Complex Emergency Coding Notes

This document contains Part III of the supplementary online appendix, the *Complex Emergency Coding Notes*. As discussed in the article it contains the information used to make both overall and annual coding decisions for the *Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies Dataset*. As of July 2015, it includes entries for 30 of the 61 complex emergencies. The remaining entries are a work in progress and will be posted as they are completed. If you are interested in a particular conflict, please do not hesitate to contact me and I will aim to complete and post the notes for it.

Each record contains the name of the complex emergency; an overview of the conflict that generated it; the information used to make the decision to include the event in the dataset and an assessment of the overall certainty that it belongs there; and the information used to determine which years were part of each complex emergency and my certainty that each year reflects the full set of operational guidelines. I also record the basic *type* of each complex emergency: whether primarily generated by an international conflict, internal conflict, internationalized internal conflict, one-sided violence against a civilian population outside of war, or communal violence. Sources are cited throughout and listed in a bibliography at the end.

For research assistance on these coding notes I thank Megan White, John Willingham, Karen Jazayeri, and Kara Fambrough.

Key Acronyms & Abbreviations

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières

UNOCHA / OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

USCR: United States Committee for Refugees

(*Note: for the USCR's World Refugee Survey reports through 1989, the year in the title of the report reflects the year of the events described. Beginning in 1991, the year in the title of the report reflects events that occurred during the previous calendar year. Thus, USCR 1989 covers events from 1989 and USCR 1991 covers events from 1990.)

WFP: World Food Program

List of Completed Entries (July 2015)

1. Afghanistan I / Soviets (1978 – 1992)
2. Afghanistan II / Civil War (1992 – 2001)
3. Afghanistan III / OEF & After (2001 – Ongoing 2009)
4. Cambodia (1979 – 1990)
7. Indonesia I/ Aceh (1999 – 2004)
9. Indonesia II / Moluccas and Sulawesi (1999 – 2002)
12. Philippines I / Government vs. NPA (1986 – 1992)
13. Philippines II / Government vs. Muslim Insurgents (1996 – 2009)
15. Sri Lanka II (2006 – 2009)
16. Azerbaijan - Armenia (USSR) (1988 – 1991)
17. Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh (1992 – 1994)
18. Bosnia (1992 – 1995)
20. Russia / Chechnya I (1995 – 1996)
21. Russia / Chechnya II (1999 – 2004)
25. Algeria (1992 – 2003)
26. Angola I (1975 – 1991)
27. Angola II (1992 – 1994)
28. Angola III (1998 – 2002)
29. Burundi (1993 – 2004)
30. Congo-Brazzaville (1997-1999)
31. Côte d'Ivoire (2002 – 2004)
36. Ethiopia / Civil War (1988-1992)
37. Kenya (2008)
38. Liberia I (1990 – 1996)
39. Liberia II (1999 – 2003)
40. Mozambique (1982 – 1992)
41. Nigeria (1997 – 2006)
59. Kuwait (1990)
60. Lebanon I / Civil War (1975 – 1991)
61. Lebanon II / Israeli Air Attacks (2006)

1. Afghanistan I / Soviets (1978 – 1992)

Overall Certainty: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internationalized Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity:

In April 1978, a military coup installed a new Marxist government under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The new regime's revolutionary political programs prompted widespread popular resistance, in turn leading to a brutal government crackdown and civil war. The Afghan government's inability to control the chaos led the USSR to invade on December 24th, 1979 in an effort to restore stability in what it considered a key client state. After the initial invasion over 80,000 Soviet forces remained in Afghanistan and participated in counterinsurgency operations on the ground and by air.

Over the next ten years the USSR supported the pro-Soviet Afghan government and participated in waging a brutal war against the Afghan resistance, the mujahideen. Aerial bombings as well as reprisal massacres by ground troops against villages supporting the mujahideen resistance destroyed tens of thousands of homes and whole villages. A scorched-earth policy including the use of napalm and defoliants destroyed agricultural production in many areas. The war was devastating for the civilian population, millions of whom died, fled across the border into Pakistan, or became displaced within Afghanistan itself. Much of the displacement occurred as a result of Soviet and Afghan army efforts to deprive guerrilla forces of support from the civilian population.

Soviet troops withdrew from Afghan territory in February 1989, but the mujahideen continued fighting against the Soviet – backed government of Mohammad Najibullah. In 1992 they defeated Najibullah's forces and subsequent violence reflected a new fight between the mujahideen for control of the state.¹ By this time war-related casualties amounted to an estimated 1.5 million deaths, 2 million injured, over 6 million refugees, and 2 million internally displaced out of a total pre-war population of 15 million.²

Annual Data

1978 (Certainty: 5)

As noted above, the PDPA's revolutionary political programs prompted widespread resistance, in turn leading to a brutal government crackdown and civil war. In 1978, PDPA violence resulted in the "capture of the state, assassination of previous leaders and political, ethnic, and religious elites (up to 100,000 people)," as well as mujahideen uprisings against those actions.³

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The PDPA was complicit in the violence. The campaign was accompanied by mass repression in the countryside that resulted in the arrest and summary execution of tens of thousands.⁴ Those targeted included political figures, religious leaders, teachers, students, other professionals, members of ethnic minorities, particularly Hazaras, and

¹ I code a new complex emergency in 1992, "Afghanistan II," that reflects this subsequent violence.

² United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.94.

³ Sambanis 2004, p.2. See also Roy 1990, p.95-97.

⁴ U.S. Department of State 1980a, p.708.

members of Islamic organizations.⁵ Government-detained political prisoners fluctuated from 14,000 to 4,000.⁶

1979 (Certainty: 3)

The Afghan government's inability to control the chaos led the USSR to invade on December 24th, 1979 in an effort to restore stability in what it considered a key client state. By this time there were already more than 400,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and people were crossing the border at the rate of about 1,000 per day.⁷ After the invasion civilian deaths and numbers of refugees and IDPs began to increase at alarming rates. Clear information on the number of deaths and refugees during 1979 specifically is not available. However, during President Hafizullah Amin's time in office (September 1979 until his death during the Soviet invasion) an estimated "tens of thousands" of prisoners of conscience were reportedly executed.⁸

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The large number of government executions were accompanied by high rates of political imprisonment and arbitrary arrests, and together represent the government's unwillingness to protect civilians.
- b) Conditions of Life for displaced: Little information on conditions for the displaced is available. However, the UN High Commission for Refugees began working with the Pakistani government to aid Afghan refugees there in April 1979, and other UN programs were active in the Pakistani camps during the year as well.⁹

1980 (Certainty: 5)

War raged between the mujahideen, Soviet forces, and the Soviet-backed central government in Kabul. As a result, refugees poured over the border into Pakistan at a rate of tens of thousands per month.¹⁰ More specifically, according to the UNHCR, between the Soviet invasion at the end of 1979 and the start of 1981 the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan grew from less than half a million to some 1.4 million (and perhaps 1.5 million by other estimates). Another 100,000 – 300,000 Afghan refugees were in Iran by the end of 1980.¹¹

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Regular, systematic Soviet ground and air offensives contributed to the deliberate large-scale devastation of the agricultural infrastructure, decimated livestock, and depopulated rural areas.

⁵ Human Rights Watch 2001, p.3.

⁶ Amnesty International 1979, p.81.

⁷ On the first point see United States Committee for Refugees 1982, p.14. For the second statistic see United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.17.

⁸ U.S. Department of State 1980a, p.708.

⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1981, p.17.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State 1981, p.929. The exact number entering in 1980 is not specified but the "rate of tens of thousands of refugees every month" implies that at least 120,000 refugees entered during the year.

¹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1981, p.15.

1981 (Certainty: 5)

Refugee flows from Pakistan to Afghanistan peaked between January and June 1981, reaching a estimated 4,700 persons crossing the border on a daily basis.¹² This implies that some 850,000 people left for Pakistan alone in the first half of the year. Past this period, continued fighting resulted in thousands of refugees fleeing to Pakistan each week. The USCR estimated that some 500,000 Afghans had died so far in the conflict.¹³

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for displaced: There was little information on conditions of life for IDPS. For refugees in the Pakistani camps, however, USCR notes that conditions had improved by 1981 – whereas hunger and disease had been common initially, now “most refugees [were] receiving basic subsistence services.”¹⁴

1982 (Certainty: 4)

A combination of repressive Afghan government practices, the government’s secret police force, and Soviet military offenses caused the civilian population intensified instability. In areas of high mujahideen activity government forces and Soviet troops targeted and killed civilians. Residential neighborhoods in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, were heavily bombed in early 1982, resulting in large numbers of casualties.¹⁵ Later in the year the towns and villages of the Panjsher Valley, Paghman, and the villages of the Shomali region were bombed. While no sure estimate of casualties is available, “survivors speak of thousands killed and wounded.”¹⁶

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness:* Survivors of Soviet bombing campaigns report “savagery and lack of regard for human life shown by Soviet troops searching for resistance fighters and loot. Numerous accounts of rape, butchery, and looting are reported after the Soviet bombing of Kandahar in January.”¹⁷ Soviet use of chemical weapons on the civilian population has been reported.¹⁸ The Afghan regime acquiesced in these activities.
- b) Conditions of Life for displaced:* In areas under Afghan regime control, some social services exist but are frequently disrupted by fighting between the Soviet/regime forces and the mujahideen. In 1982, large numbers of IDPs severely strained already inadequate services.¹⁹

1983 (Certainty: 5)

It was not clear how many civilians were newly displaced or killed this year. However, according to USCR, “In mid-1983 alone, a wave of 400,000 crossed into Iran as Soviet forces battled rebels.”²⁰ Moreover, by November 1983 a total of 2.8 million Afghan refugees had been registered in Pakistan

¹² United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.17.

¹³ United States Committee for Refugees 1981, p.16.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.1073.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.1074.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.1076.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.1081.

²⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.55.

since the beginning of the war. With an additional 1.5 million Afghans in Iran, some 20% - 25% of Afghanistan's population was living in exile.²¹

1984 (Certainty: 3)

Approximately 115,000 Soviet troops plus regime forces continue fighting against the mujahideen in 1984. Human rights conditions remained essentially unchanged.²² Soviet troops stepped up the policy of harsh reprisals against the civilian populace in militarily strategic regions and areas of greatest resistance. According to the U.S. State Department, the "strategic Panjshir Valley was subjected to large-scale carpet bombing as a prelude to a largely Soviet military thrust. In the countryside, it was standard practice to bombard villages suspected of harboring resistance fighters."²³ This devastation forced many civilians to seek refuge in Kabul, whose prewar population of one million had now doubled.²⁴ The official estimate of Afghan in refugees in Pakistan climbed by 100,000 to 2.9 million by the end of the year, although it is not clear if this reflects new refugee flows of this magnitude during the year.²⁵

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: While the number of refugees appeared to have largely stabilized, Soviet attacks against civilians kept the number high and prevented hopes for repatriation in the near future.²⁶

1985 (Certainty: 5)

Large-scale military operations continued with scant regard for death and injury to civilians. Urban centers were repeatedly bombed and strafed by aircraft and subjected to mortar and artillery bombardment. In 1985, 45,000 to 50,000 additional refugees fled to Pakistan.²⁷

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Conditions of Life for displaced*: Despite relief efforts, refugees were in poor health. UNHCR "found infant mortality among Afghan refugees to be among the highest in the world and the rate of birth-related deaths among mothers to be the world's highest. The high death rates were attributed to diseases that could be avoided with proper medical care."²⁸

1986 (Certainty: 3)

In May 1986 the Soviets replaced Karmal with former secret police chief Najibullah, due to "frustration over Karmal's failure to subdue armed opposition to his regime despite the support of 120,000 Soviet troops."²⁹ Arbitrary killing and other acts of violence against the civilian population in areas related to suspected regime opponents were common throughout 1986. Soviet aircraft

²¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.5.

²² U.S. Department of State 1985a, p.1159.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ U.S. Department of State 1985a, p.1160.

²⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.55.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1985, p.65.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ U.S. Department of State 1988a, p.1090.

bombing raids were carried out against cities throughout Afghanistan resulting in an unknown number of civilian deaths. (Each raid, on average resulted in the death of approximately 20 – 50 civilians.)³⁰ Also during 1986, scorched earth tactics by Soviet and regime forces continued to be a major factor contributing to the mass exodus of refugees, according to the U.S. State Department.³¹ An estimated 15,000 new arrivals entered Pakistan from Afghanistan in the last six months of 1986.³² Meanwhile, according to USCR some reports suggested that new arrivals in Iran continued at the rate of some 2,000 per day during the year.³³ If accurate this would suggest over 700,000 new refugees arriving in Iran, but the veracity of this information was unclear.

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Government inability/unwillingness is apparent in the intentional bombardment of civilian areas, especially in provinces bordering Iran and Pakistan. In November 1986, the UN issued a report saying that the “pattern of aerial bombardment indicates an intention to clear out the Afghan population from the provinces bordering Iran and Pakistan.”³⁴

1987 (Certainty: 5)

Under the Najibullah regime, fighting increased and civil administration was ineffective. Throughout the year reprisal attacks against the civilian population suspected of supporting the mujahideen included the use of antipersonnel mines, grenades, and lethal chemical weapons. According to USCR, in 1987 some 72,000 – 96,000 refugees fled Afghanistan, based on an estimated average of between 6,000 and 8,000 each month.³⁵ In addition, over a third of the pre-coup population of 15 million lived outside the state borders, and of the world’s 12 million refugees nearly half were Afghans.³⁶

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Government unwillingness to protect the civilian population is demonstrated by restricting domestic travel, particularly in combat zones. According to the U.S. State Department, Soviet and Afghan government forces attempted to block the movement of refugees out of areas of combat during Soviet military operations in March in Kunduz and Takhar provinces, and in August in northern Kabul province.³⁷
- b) Conditions of Life for displaced: According to USCR, refugee assistance programs in Pakistan were not plagued by many of the negative factors frequently found in refugee situations. By the end of 1987 “there had been no major disruptions of the assistance distribution network, no epidemics, no starvation, little acute malnutrition, and no serious outbreaks of violence.”³⁸ Nevertheless, indications of inadequate care still persisted in high rates of child/maternal mortality. In addition, the relative stability of the refugee population offers little insight into conditions for the even more vulnerable IDP population.

³⁰ U.S. Department of State 1987a, p.1095.

³¹ U.S. Department of State 1987a, p.1099.

³² United States Committee for Refugees 1986, p.69.

³³ United States Committee for Refugees 1986, p.65.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.17.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ U.S. Department of State 1988a, p.1096.

³⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.18.

1988 (Certainty: 5)

Soviet resolve to continue the war in Afghanistan began to weaken in late 1987. On April 14, 1988, after negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw all troops by February 15, 1989. As the Soviet drawdown began mujahideen pressure on the Afghan regime increased. Facing increased mujahideen military success, the Soviets stopped troop withdrawals in order to support the Afghan government. According to USCR, about 40,000 new arrivals crossed into Pakistan during 1988. Most of those who entered the North West Frontier Province were fleeing fighting in the Nangarhar and Konar areas. Thousands of others are believed to have entered during the course of the year to Baluchistan, mostly fleeing fighting in and around Qandahar.³⁹

1989 (Certainty: 5)

Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in February, but their departure did not end the war. Fighting continued between the mujahidin and Afghan government forces. According to USCR, few refugees returned to their homes, while significant numbers became newly displaced. For example, “fighting for control of Jalalabad, in the east, caused some 70,000 additional refugees to flee to Pakistan. Intense rocket attacks virtually emptied the city of women and children, many of whom fled to safer areas within Afghanistan.”⁴⁰

Confirming Evidence:

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* Conditions of life for the displaced, and more broadly for the Afghan civilian population, remained severe in 1989. Food access was a serious problem. According to USCR, “Food shortages were exacerbated by the rural to urban migration of most of those displaced by the fighting, by war-damage to irrigation, devastation of farms and livestock, abandonment of fields for years, and continuing fighting.”⁴¹ As a result, international relief agencies predicted that without significant food aid, up to an additional half million people could be displaced during the winter of 1989-1990. In addition, child mortality rates among the displaced were extraordinarily high. According to the USCR, “The mortality rate for Afghan refugee children under the age of five is 130/1000. But the mortality rate for children within Afghanistan is even worse—a staggering 300/1000.”⁴²

1990 (Certainty: 3)

Fighting continued in 1990 and, along with persistent food shortages, caused new displacement.⁴³ According to USCR, new refugees were believed to have fled to Pakistan, but their numbers are unclear. Mujahideen sources claimed they numbered 83,000, but this was disputed by the Pakistani government, which did not report any new influxes.⁴⁴

³⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.80.

⁴⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.76.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.85.

⁴³ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.90.

⁴⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.100.

Confirming Evidence:

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Security conditions in Afghanistan in 1990 contribute to the impression that the Afghan government was unable and/or unwilling to address the threats the ongoing fighting represented for the civilian population. UN food distribution teams were harassed, US food relief was hijacked, and a nurse with the French doctors' organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was killed. As USCR summarized, "UN and western aid workers were clearly the objects of threats, prompting other western agencies periodically to suspend projects inside the country."⁴⁵

1991 (Certainty: 5)

The USSR and United States continued to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1991. The conflict transitioned from a proxy war between the superpower to a civil war with regional powers -- Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia -- competing for influence with the various factions. Ethnic based conflict became more common. The split between the dominant Pushtuns and the Tajiks—who claim to outnumber them—became more pronounced.⁴⁶

Fighting during the year centered around cities and towns controlled by Najibullah, formerly the head of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, who had now proclaimed himself leader of a renamed 'Watan' (homeland) Party. In April, at least 1,000 families reportedly fled to Pakistan to escape fighting near Khost. In May and June, heavy fighting in Herat Province forced 30,000 to 40,000 civilians to flee toward the Iranian border.⁴⁷ After this, despite calls for a transition period and political settlement to end the hostilities, the war continued. In August, Ahmed Shah Massoud, who controlled most of northeastern Afghanistan, threatened to cut a highway to Kabul, "unless the government halted air strikes that he alleged were causing hundreds of casualties in civilian areas of the northeast."⁴⁸ More broadly, new refugees continued to arrive in Pakistan throughout the year.⁴⁹

Confirming Evidence:

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: As in the previous year, security conditions continued to restrict international aid agencies' ability to provide relief to the civilian population. Western aid workers were abducted on multiple occasions, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) pulled out of some areas after 2 employees were killed.⁵⁰

1992 (Certainty: 2)

Soviet aid to the Najibullah regime ended in January, and in April the mujahideen succeeded in overthrowing Najibullah and seized Kabul, triggering a massive repatriation of some 1.5 million Afghan refugees.⁵¹ This brought to an end the complex emergency triggered by the installation of the Marxist regime in 1978, but not the fighting in Afghanistan. Subsequently, a new civil war between rival Afghan mujahideen factions emerged and displaced over half a million people –

⁴⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.90.

⁴⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.94.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.105.

⁵⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.94.

⁵¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.87, 90.

mostly around Kabul – later in the year.⁵² This is coded as a new complex emergency, however, and the fighting and displacement later in the year are attributed to it. Estimates of the effects of the assault on Kabul early in the year that represented the end of the original complex emergency are unfortunately unclear, but should be properly attributed to the original conflict.

⁵² United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.91.

2. Afghanistan II / Civil War (1992 – 2001)

Overall Certainty: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

The political situation in Afghanistan changed dramatically when the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime was overthrown in April 1992: the Afghan resistance splintered and groups that had banded together to oppose the Soviet occupation began to fight one another. For the next decade, war in Afghanistan involved Afghans against Afghans.

In March of 1993 the first of two peace initiatives, the Islamabad Accord, failed. A second attempt followed in May with an initiative that included clauses to restructure the cabinet and allow for power-sharing among the major Afghan factions. Ultimately, however, heavy fighting continued and this accord was never implemented, either.

After several more years the Taliban wrested control over most of the country in 1996, but the fighting was still far from over. Civil war continued, pitting the Taliban against a coalition of opposition groups known as the Northern Alliance and causing extensive suffering and upheaval for the civilian population. In addition, the Taliban engaged in deliberate violence against various ethnic groups in the central and northern regions – including the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks – and this led to further civilian displacement from 1996-2001. Meanwhile, Taliban-supported Pashtun communities sought to recapture land lost during the early 1990s and expand into non-Pashtun areas. By September 11, 2001, the UN's OCHA estimated that as many as 1,000,000 people were internally displaced either as a result of conflict, human rights violations or drought. Of that figure, some 500,000 were displaced in Mazar-I-Sharif and the north, 200,000 in Kandahar and other southern provinces, 200,000 in the west near Herat, and 100,000 in Kabul.⁵³

Circumstances in Afghanistan changed dramatically following the September 11, 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks in the United States. As discussed below (Afghanistan III/OEF & After), I code a new complex emergency beginning with the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan that October.

Annual Data

1992 (Certainty: 5)

When Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, refugees and IDPs began to return home. This movement intensified in 1992 following the defeat of the PDPA. An estimated 1.2 million refugees and IDPs returned in a six month period, many assisted by UNHCR. No comprehensive figures are available to show how many returned to their places of origin or integrated elsewhere.⁵⁴

At the same time, fighting among Afghan factions for control of Kabul resulted in many civilian casualties. In June and July, intense fighting between Sunni and Shia groups provoked reprisal attacks against citizens, resulting in more than 100 dead and 400 wounded. In August, the Hezb-i-Islami group of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar began a “rocket and artillery attack on Kabul that killed as many as 2,000 people. Thousands more fled the capital to the countryside or to Pakistan.”⁵⁵

⁵³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011a, p.13-14.

⁵⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011a, p.13.

⁵⁵ U.S. Department of State 1993, p.1117; see also United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.91.

According to USCR, more than “500,000 of the city’s residents fled and tens of thousands were displaced as a result of fighting in other areas of Afghanistan.”⁵⁶

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness:* The absence of any effective central authority was central to the human rights problems that plagued the country in 1992. According to the U.S. State Department, reports of “torture, ill-treatment, and extrajudicial execution of prisoners were widespread during the fighting following Najibullah’s ouster.”⁵⁷
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* As international relief efforts moved inside Afghanistan after the fall of the Najibullah regime in response to the mass repatriation of Afghan refugees, those still in Pakistan received fewer services (including no food distribution for several months), and camp security deteriorated.⁵⁸

1993 (Certainty: 5)

In March of 1993, leaders from nine major political groups met in Islamabad, Pakistan and agreed to participate in a transitional grand coalition until elections could be held. Fighting continued, however, and despite the drafting of interim constitutional principles and discussions about elections, the transition was not implemented.

Instead, according to USCR, forces loyal to various factions rocketed and “shelled the capital, Kabul, in battles that left an estimated 18,000 people, mostly civilians, dead or wounded. In mid-May more than 1,000 people died in Kabul during a nine day period.”⁵⁹ Warring factions reportedly engaged in looting, rape, and murder of civilians in their ongoing struggle for control.⁶⁰

Internal displacement during 1993, which was mostly from Kabul, was both temporary and long term. During periods of intense fighting citizens fled the city, shifting encampments while waiting for fighting to subside. Others left altogether, heading toward Jalalabad, the Pakistani border or Mazar –I-Sharif. In addition, despite repatriation of large numbers of Afghan refugees, the outbreak of new fighting in Kabul early in the year prompted as many as 80,000 Afghans to flee the country for Pakistan.⁶¹

Confirming Evidence

- b) *Conditions of Life for displaced:* During the year UNHCR provided emergency assistance to some 300,000 IDPs in Mazar-I-Sharif, but their efforts “were hampered by cold and inadequate financial support. A number of children and elderly died from exposure to cold.”⁶²

1994 (Coding: 5)

Continued civil war and widespread lawlessness intensified on January 1 when two allied factions attempted a coup d’état against then-President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The attack was foiled but fighting caused heavy casualties and destruction in Kabul. According to USCR, “In January heavy

⁵⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.89, 91.

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State 1993, p.1115.

⁵⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.91.

⁵⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.90.

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State 1994a.

⁶¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.89; U.S. Department of State 1994b.

⁶² United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.92.

fighting resulted in more than 1,000 casualties and another 12,000 serious injuries.”⁶³ The U.S. State Department estimated that “34,000 were killed or wounded during the year in Kabul alone.”⁶⁴

New displacement was also extensive in 1994. According to USCR, in January and February “more than 500,000 people – including those previously left homeless – fled Kabul and another 400,000 were displaced in Kabul itself.”⁶⁵ In Kunduz province (north) the UNHCR assisted another 100,000 IDPs.⁶⁶ Furthermore, in January Pakistan closed its border to new refugees from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, “thousands of undocumented refugees crossed the border. An estimated 70,000 new refugees arrived in Pakistan in the first half of the year.”⁶⁷ Meanwhile, many fewer Afghans repatriated from Pakistan and Iran than in 1993.

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: In 1994 the warring factions not only failed to protect the human rights of civilians, but often wantonly violated those rights by specifically targeting noncombatants. Gunmen affiliated with the ten armed factions were often responsible for assassinations, looting, rapes, and kidnappings for ransom.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, given the lack of an effective central government the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan concluded that it would be problematic to attribute state responsibility for these crimes.

b) Conditions of Life for displaced: Combatants from several factions blocked food and medical supplies desperately needed by displaced people in the Kabul, Kunduz, and Taloqan areas.⁶⁹

1995 (Coding: 5)

President Rabbani remained in power in 1995, although his mandate had expired in 1994. Only four to five of Afghanistan's 32 provinces were under Rabbani's control, with the rest controlled by various religious factions: Taliban, National Islamic Movement, and the Council of the Eastern Provinces. By the second half of the year, the Taliban controlled almost two-thirds of the territory.

During the year fighting between Afghan factions resulted in “thousands of civilian casualties. Tens of thousands became newly displaced, joining nearly three million already uprooted.”⁷⁰ According to USCR, an “estimated 1,500 civilians died during fighting in Kabul in March.”⁷¹ Also, an estimated 180,000 IDPs fled the Taliban in southern areas of the country.⁷²

A total of 144,000 Afghan refugees were repatriated in the first 10 months of 1995, 75,000 of them assisted by the UNHCR.⁷³ However, many of the returnees, particularly those from Iran, came back to find themselves “in war zones, and some who returned to Kabul were likely among the 58,400 persons who fled the city as fighting resumed later in the year.”⁷⁴

⁶³ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.90.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State 1995b.

⁶⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.99.

⁶⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.100.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State 1995b.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.94.

⁷¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.95; see also U.S. Department of State 1995b.

⁷² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.19-20.

⁷³ U.S. Department of State 1996c.

⁷⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.94.

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Intra-factional fighting often resulted in the homes and businesses of civilians being invaded by the opposing forces. Armed gunmen acted with impunity given the absence of any legal protection from the law or a responsive police force.⁷⁵

1996 (Coding: 5)

In September of 1996 Taliban forces captured Kabul. The Taliban killed approximately 325 civilians in Kabul in 1996 by indiscriminately firing rockets into the city. They reportedly conducted aerial bombing raids in October around Kalakan, approximately 12 miles north of Kabul, and caused the deaths of 16 to 20 civilians, including women and children. From October to December, sporadic bombing and rocket attacks occurred in Kabul. Several persons, including children, were killed and injured in separate attacks.⁷⁶ Abductions, kidnappings, and hostage taking for ransom or political reasons occurred in non-Taliban areas.

According to UNHCR, some 86,000 people fled Kabul in the first half of the year due to a combination of fighting, rocket attacks, and “intolerable” living conditions. Another 50,000 were estimated to have fled the city after the Taliban captured it, between September and December.⁷⁷ Elsewhere, in November “40,000 to 50,000 fled fighting in the northwest province of Badghiz.”⁷⁸ In addition, “From October to December, UNHCR estimated that about 40,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan due to the intensified civil war. By year's end, the UNHCR and NGOs were assisting more than 1,600 newly arrived families (11,200 persons) in Nasir Bagh camp in Pakistan.”⁷⁹

According to UNHCR, 127,500 Afghans repatriated in 1996, 120,000 from Pakistan and 7,500 from Iran. The repatriation from Iran was much lower than in previous years, partly because of the Iranian Government's decision not to encourage repatriation while the Taliban controlled western Afghanistan and to postpone use of a new repatriation route through Turkmenistan.⁸⁰

1997 (Coding: 5)

In 1997 a Taliban edict renamed the country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, with Taliban leader Mullah Omar as Head of State. Fighting with the Northern Alliance continued to rage. According to international observers, “600,000 people were displaced from Mazar-I-Sharif and surrounding provinces during 1997.”⁸¹ Use of excessive force between warring factions against civilians also resulted in the massacre of villagers. Estimates from each attack range from several civilian casualties to 70. The Afghan countryside remained plagued with an estimated 10 million land mines sown during the Soviet invasion.⁸²

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The year saw various reported instances of the Taliban engaging in forcible expulsion of individuals on ethnic grounds. These included expelling the inhabitants of the town of Charikar in January, forcing villagers from the Shomali valley in June, and reportedly

⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State 1996b.

⁷⁶ U.S. Department of State 1997b.

⁷⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.125.

⁷⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.124.

⁷⁹ U.S. Department of State 1997b.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011a, p.13.

⁸² U.S. Department of State 1998b.

ordering the removal of 1,500 Hazara villagers near Ghazni in December. According to the U.S. State Department, “Some observers expressed fear about persecution of northern Pashtun in retaliation for northern Pashtun commanders allying themselves with the Taliban.”⁸³ In addition, “Both Taliban and anti-Taliban forces were responsible for the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas” during the year, in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and other areas.⁸⁴ These attacks reportedly resulted in hundreds of casualties. Finally, according to UN sources, in November “a Taliban-imposed blockade on the Hazarajat region ruled by Hezb-i-Wahdat...pushed the population (of about 1 million) to the ‘verge of starvation.’”⁸⁵ The looting of UN food stocks presented further challenges to providing assistance to those in need.

1998 (Coding: 5)

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, and others estimated that the Taliban may have killed between 2,000 and 8,000 persons when they took over Mazar-I-Sharif on August 8: “In the hours after the takeover, the Taliban allegedly fired at anything that moved on the streets of Mazar-I-Sharif or on the roads leading out of the city; many civilians reportedly were killed as they tried to flee the fighting or seek shelter. There were reports that during the days following the capture of the city, Taliban fighters systematically searched for weapons and for ethnic Hazara men and boys, many of whom were beaten, killed on the spot, or arrested by the Taliban. Tajik and Uzbek males were also allegedly targeted, but to a lesser extent.”⁸⁶ More broadly, throughout the country various Taliban attacks on civilians left additional hundreds dead and wounded. Fighting in and around Mazar-I-Sharif resulted in 50,000 IDPs displaced, mostly Uzbeks and Hazaras. These groups relocated to the mountainous areas in the north.⁸⁷

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness:* As noted above, the Taliban was accused of engaging in widespread violence against civilians.

b) *Conditions of Life for displaced:* An estimated 600,000 Afghans living in Kabul relied on foreign aid for survival and as the Taliban’s relationship with foreign aid organizations deteriorated during the year, this threatened the future supply of international relief.⁸⁸

1999 (Coding: 5)

In 1999 there were a minimum of 200,000 newly displaced IDPs due to continued fighting. In the summer fighting in the north of Kabul, in the Shomali Plain, resulted in 100,000 displaced to the Panjshir valley. In the fall, fighting resulted in the following displacement: In the Shomali Plain, 12,995 were displaced and relocated to the ex-Soviet embassy compound in Kabul; in the Panjshir Valley, 100,000 civilians were displaced and relocated to the Northern provinces; and in Talaqan, in Takhar Province, 16,000 were displaced and relocated near Faizabad.⁸⁹

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ U.S. Department of State 1999b.

⁸⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.19-20.

⁸⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.123.

⁸⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.19-20.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Taliban forces reportedly were responsible for political and other extrajudicial killings, including targeted killings, mass killings, summary executions and deaths in custody. The United Nations reported that the Taliban used a scorched earth policy during its summer offensive, including burning of homes, killing of livestock, uprooting of orchards, and destruction of irrigation systems. Many civilians were uprooted forcibly by the Taliban during these offensives.⁹⁰

b) *Conditions of Life for displaced*: Access to medical facilities remained poor. Health care was hampered by the Taliban's ban on images of humans, making the dissemination of health information in a region with high rates of illiteracy more difficult. In Afghanistan, infant mortality was 250 out of 1,000 births and Medicins Sans Frontières reported that 250,000 children died per year of malnutrition. One quarter of children died before age 5. On the other hand, most Pakistani refugee villages (camps) were well-established and living conditions resembled conditions in neighboring Pakistani villages, although assistance to the refugee villages had dropped off considerably since the early 1990's.⁹¹

2000 (Coding: 5)

Internal displacement continued in the winter of 2000 with 60,000 Hazaras and Tajiks newly displaced from the Bamiyan area. In the summer an estimated 65,000 Tajiks were displaced from the Shomali Plain, the Panjshir valley, and the Talaqan area.⁹² According to the Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan, at the end of the year over 100,000 IDPs who had been displaced by drought and/or conflict were congregated in the northern region, including Mazar-I-Sharif. This included at least 8,900 families (over 53,000 people) displaced by conflict in Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces.⁹³

A new Afghan refugee influx into Pakistan also began in June 2000 and grew rapidly after heavy fighting in northern Afghanistan. The UNHCR reported that more than "172,000 Afghans entered Pakistan during 2000 with a vast majority occurring in the last several months of the year."⁹⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Direct targeting and forced displacement of ethnic minorities by the Taliban continued to demonstrate the government's unwillingness to protect the population.

b) *Conditions of Life for displaced*: In January 2000, the Taliban's capture of Sang Charak and the Valley of Gosfandi in Sara-e-Pol province resulted in 20,000 IDPs, who "had to rely on local food charity with sub-zero temperatures."⁹⁵ More broadly, with few public buildings large numbers of Afghan IDPs lacked adequate shelter and assessments indicated that coping mechanisms in some districts were exhausted. Child mortality in Faryab was measured at 5.2 per 10,000.⁹⁶ Finally, a severe drought exacerbated harsh conditions for Afghan civilians. According to the IDMC, in June three to four million Afghans were severely affected by the drought.⁹⁷

⁹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.158; see also U.S. Department of State 2000a.

⁹¹ U.S. Department of State 2000a.

⁹² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.19-20.

⁹³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.21.

⁹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.154.

⁹⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.20.

⁹⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.21.

⁹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.153.

2001 (Coding: 5)

Hostilities between the Northern alliance and the Taliban continued throughout the year and UN resolutions attempting to achieve a peaceful outcome were not successful. In the first three months of 2001, displacement occurred from parts of Ragh and Shar-i-Buzurg to North Takhar, Kunduz, and Pakistan. Approximately 60,000 people were displaced in March by conflict in Yakawlang District, in the Hazarajat area.⁹⁸ Overall, USCR reported that more than 200,000 refugees fled to Pakistan during the year (thousands also fled to Iran, but there are no reliable estimates for the number).⁹⁹ It was unclear how much of this new displacement occurred before the new complex emergency related to the U.S.-led intervention that began in October, however.

Finally, significant fighting between the Taliban and Northern Alliance continued after the initiation of U.S. air strikes in October. Indeed, together this fighting, continued drought, the airstrikes, and anti-Pashtun violence in the north and west of the country displaced hundreds of thousands of people late in the year. The UK Department for International Development cited an estimate of 300,000 people displaced in October – November, while UNOCHA estimated that there were 200,000 new IDPs between September and December 2001.¹⁰⁰ Given that the Taliban-Northern Alliance conflict became entangled with U.S.-led military action in the country at this time, however, I count this violence as part of the subsequent complex emergency.

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to USCR, “Taliban authorities did little to meet displaced Afghans’ humanitarian needs.”¹⁰¹ Indeed, in some areas the Taliban actively obstructed international relief efforts. According to OCHA, for example, in early 2001 they barred aid agencies from assisting residents in the Hazarajat region, despite the 60,000 displaced people.¹⁰²

b) Conditions of Life for displaced: Even before the threat of U.S. military action late in the year, there were an estimated 1 million internally displaced Afghans. Of these, some 400,000 were living in IDP camps outside major cities, “in squalid conditions with little water, shelter or sanitation. In August, Medecins Sans Frontières estimated that already 20-40 people were dying each day.”¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.21-22.

⁹⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.142.

¹⁰⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011a, p.14.

¹⁰¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.143.

¹⁰² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.21; United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.144.

¹⁰³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.29.

3. Afghanistan III / OEF & After (2001 – Ongoing 2009)

Overall Certainty: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internationalized Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S.-led military campaign known as Operation Enduring Freedom – directed against Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan’s Taliban regime – began in October. By late November the Taliban regime collapsed and in December Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun leader from one of the largest tribes in southern Afghanistan, assumed leadership of a six month interim government. In June 2002, Afghanistan’s grand assembly elected Karzai as interim head of the new transitional government.

Unfortunately, the fall of the Taliban, the arrival of international troops, and the establishment of a new government failed to bring peace to Afghanistan. Despite the hope represented by the return of millions of refugees from Pakistan, Iran, and other countries in the wake of the U.S. invasion, for the next decade and more the country experienced persistent conflict and instability, with devastating effects for civilians. The main cleavage was between the U.S., coalition forces, and the newly established Afghan government on the one hand, and the Taliban and related anti-government groups on the other. At the same time, regional warlords allied with the government but operating personal militias for the pursuit of private gain and in the context of local conflicts further complicated the security situation. Still, the integral role of the U.S. and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in shaping the security landscape in Afghanistan as well as the West’s broader goals of eliminating the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and fostering stable democratic governance distinguish this conflict from the strictly intra-Afghan power struggle of the previous decade and justify coding a new complex emergency.

In terms of its severity and consequences for the civilian population, the violence varied over time. Early on, in late 2001 and 2002, U.S. and allied military action combined with ongoing fighting between various Afghan clans to displace hundreds of thousands of people. Many returned in relatively short order, but humanitarian conditions in many areas remained precarious and access to international assistance limited. What is more, after its fall from power, the Taliban regrouped and initiated a formidable insurgency that took off in 2003 and gradually gained strength. By 2006 the conflict intensified significantly, with growing numbers of insurgent attacks and the increased use of suicide bombings. Together, the Taliban resurgence and conflict between it, entrenched warlords, the Karzai government, and international troops resulted in new waves of displacement and civilian deaths. These trends and the security situation continued to worsen through 2009.

Annual Data

2001 (Certainty: 5)

There were numerous sources of new displacement in Afghanistan in the final months of 2001. After September 11 but before the start of U.S. military action on October 7, the threat of attack prompted hundreds of thousands of people to leave their homes, particularly in Kabul and other cities likely to be targeted by U.S. and allied forces. According to the IDMC, it was estimated that half the population of Kandahar province, location of the Taliban’s headquarters, fled.¹⁰⁴ Then,

¹⁰⁴ Ibid; United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.144.

according to USCR, “once military action began hundreds of thousands of Afghans fled their homes, including an estimated 40 to 70 percent of the residents of Afghanistan’s larger cities.”¹⁰⁵ Finally, as noted above, the UN and other sources estimated that the combination of U.S. airstrikes, fighting between the Taliban and Northern Alliance in the north, anti-Pashtun violence in the north and west, and drought displaced an additional 200,000 to 300,000 people.¹⁰⁶

While many of these people began returning home within a matter of weeks or a few months, many others did not. At the start of 2002, the IDMC estimated that some 1.2 million people were internally displaced within Afghanistan, and that half of these had been newly displaced since September 11, 2001, mainly in the north and west of the country.

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Before the Taliban collapsed, according to the IDMC, it reportedly prevented fleeing citizens from leaving the country.¹⁰⁷ Taliban gangs also seized two UN food warehouses and looted international relief supplies, hampering relief efforts.¹⁰⁸

b) Conditions of Life for displaced: All international UN and NGO personnel working in Afghanistan left the country between September 11 and October 6. According to USCR, the resulting curtailment of relief assistance added to “the dramatic deterioration of food supplies for the more than six million Afghans reliant on international aid.”¹⁰⁹

2002 (Coding: 3)

Continued military operations and persistent insecurity throughout the country caused further displacement and hampered humanitarian assistance in 2002. In particular, after the fall of the Taliban the Pashtun population in northern Afghanistan (where Pashtuns are a minority) became subject to violence – including murder, beatings, looting, and land seizures – often in reprisal for real or perceived association with the Taliban. An estimated 20,000 were displaced in March.¹¹⁰ Similar abuse combined with lack of food and emergency assistance contributed to new displacement in western Afghanistan as well.¹¹¹ For this stage in the conflict data on civilian casualties, which were believed to be relatively low compared to later years, is sparse. According to the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, however, estimates of civilian casualties for 2001 – 2002 range from 1,000 to 3,767.¹¹²

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to the IDMC, aid workers were increasingly targeted by unidentified armed groups in 2002. This occurred mostly in the south of the country where most displaced were located and most aid was urgently needed. Indeed, large areas of the southeast were effectively off-limits for aid workers and other international staff, which impeded not only the delivery of assistance but also future planning and project development.¹¹³

¹⁰⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.144.

¹⁰⁶ See e.g., Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011a, p.14.

¹⁰⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.29.

¹⁰⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.145.

¹⁰⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.143.

¹¹⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.30-31.

¹¹¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.32.

¹¹² Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict 2009, p.8.

¹¹³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.9.

b) Conditions of Life for displaced: According to the IDMC, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan remained “extremely precarious” in 2002, exacerbated not only by ongoing violence but by lack of infrastructure due to decades of conflict and the sudden return of millions of Afghan refugees from neighboring countries.¹¹⁴ What is more, the circumstances reduced the assistance and protection provided to the displaced: the absence of any national or international force capable of enforcing the rule of law outside of Kabul remained a major impediment for the return of the remaining IDPs, the protection of human rights, agency activities and humanitarian access.¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, according to Human Rights Watch, local militia committed “widespread abuses against IDPs in camps in the north, including forcible relocations, compulsory performance of military support functions, and sexual violence.”¹¹⁶

2003 (Coding: 3)

The security environment in Afghanistan deteriorated markedly in 2003. While the growing Taliban insurgency intensified, with more attacks on U.S.-led forces, there was also an upsurge in fighting between regional warlords driven by local rivalries. The persistent violence undermined President Karzai’s hold on power and deterred Afghan refugees from returning to the country.¹¹⁷ The year also saw the continued arrival of Pashtun IDPs in the south as a result of the factional fighting, forced recruitment, and continued harassment and rights abuses in the north, although it was not clear exactly how many might have arrived in 2003 rather than earlier. As of the middle of the year, UNHCR estimated that some 60,000 Pashtuns had fled the north since the end of 2001.¹¹⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Neither the government nor international forces were able to protect civilians and aid workers from targeted violence in 2003. According to the IDMC, unidentified armed groups increasingly attacked aid workers during the year. This occurred mostly in the south, where most displaced were located and most aid was urgently needed (there were an estimated 350,000 displaced in the south as of April, most congregated in six IDP camps). Indeed, large areas of the southeast were effectively off-limits for aid workers and other international staff, which impeded the delivery of assistance but also future planning and project development.¹¹⁹ In June Amnesty International suggested that this phenomenon was even more widespread: “Growing insecurity over the last months has meant that up to two thirds of the country is not readily accessible to international aid agencies to conduct relief and monitoring exercises.”¹²⁰

b) Conditions of Life for displaced: According to Amnesty International, Afghanistan was considered too unstable for refugee and IDP returns due to insecurity, absence of the rule of law, and related shortages of shelter, water and employment.¹²¹ Moreover, according to the IDMC, the national food-security crisis caused by a combination of conflict and drought helped worsen the IDP crisis by creating “widespread levels of acute vulnerability where the only survival strategy [was] to become ‘local’ IDPs at or near internationally assisted IDP camps.”¹²²

¹¹⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.74.

¹¹⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.9.

¹¹⁶ Cited in Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.11.

¹¹⁷ E.g., Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.37; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006a, p.17.

¹¹⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.10.

¹¹⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.9. For the figure of 350,000 displaced in the south see p.35. Numbers were inconsistent, however, and should therefore be treated cautiously.

¹²⁰ Cited in Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.37.

¹²¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.36-37.

¹²² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003a, p.48.

2004 (Coding: 3)

The security situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate in 2004, largely due to the continued resurgence in Taliban activity. In addition, although large-scale displacement of Pashtuns in the north largely ended by 2004, fighting between local warlords and factional commanders continued to create pressing security issues and new displacement. According to the IDMC, for instance, intense factional fighting in the west in August forced thousands of civilians from their homes. In addition, attacks by anti-government insurgents killed 179 Afghans during the first half of the year compared with 119 in all of 2003.¹²³ Meanwhile, according to Human Rights Watch, in some areas where U.S. and Afghan forces were engaged in heavy fighting against the Taliban and other anti-government insurgents, such as in Zabul and Kunar province, “Hundreds of Afghan civilians were killed in 2004 during these operations—in some cases because of violations of the laws of war by insurgents or by coalition or Afghan forces.”¹²⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Perhaps the most significant consequence of the worsening security environment in 2004 was an increase in threats to humanitarian workers that the government was unable to stop. This, in turn, had significant consequences for public health through the withdrawal of aid organizations. Seventeen aid workers were killed in the first half of 2004, compared to 14 in the whole of 2003. This included five employees of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, Doctors Without Borders), which halted operations in the country in July after fourteen years. Many other agencies scaled back the scope of their operations. As of July, the UN had suspended all activities in Uruzgan, Zabul and northern Helmand provinces and placed restrictions on movements in southern Helmand and parts of Kandahar province.¹²⁵ Overall, almost fifty aid workers and election officials were killed in 2004.¹²⁶

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Due to the withdrawal of staff and the difficulties of accessing the displaced and other vulnerable populations, aid programs were not able to provide for their needs. Partly as a result, for instance, in the south and southeast “the vast majority of people have little or no access to essential health services,” and people were not receiving basic emergency aid in these areas.¹²⁷ The health situation in the country, not just for IDPs, remained “dramatic,” with high rates of maternal, infant, and child mortality, and chronic malnutrition rates of around 50%.¹²⁸

2005 (Coding: 3)

Violence continued in Afghanistan in 2005, but at lower levels than in subsequent years. According to the U.S. State Department, “Taliban and other antigovernment forces threatened, robbed, attacked, and occasionally killed local villagers, political opponents, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers. Increased Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and other antigovernment activity, particularly in the south and southeast, compounded security challenges faced by the government.”¹²⁹ The State Department reported that there were no reliable estimates of the number of bombings, illegal killings, or civilian deaths in 2005, but that “Terrorists and insurgents, including

¹²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005a, p.28-29.

¹²⁴ Quoted in Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005a, p.68.

¹²⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004a, p.131-134.

¹²⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005a, p.68.

¹²⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004a, p.133.

¹²⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004a, p.59.

¹²⁹ U.S. Department of State 2006b.

Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, killed numerous civilians during their attacks.”¹³⁰ Similarly, “During the year battles between rival tribes and local commanders resulted in numerous civilian casualties.”¹³¹ Violence also contributed to the continued displacement of civilians, but accurate estimates of new displacement for the year were elusive. According to UNHCR, land problems persisted in causing new displacement, “With houses attacked and property looted by local commanders.”¹³² In addition, according to USCR, Afghans continued “to enter Pakistan, at times as many as 10,000 per day.”¹³³ To what extent these people were fleeing conflict-related insecurity vs. drought and a lack of drinking water was difficult to determine, however.¹³⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to Human Rights Watch, violence by local authorities and warlords officially supported by the government was a major barrier to the protection of human rights and the population’s well-being throughout the country: “Local military and police forces, even in Kabul, have been involved in arbitrary arrests, kidnapping, extortion, torture, and extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects. Outside Kabul, commanders and their troops in many areas have been implicated in widespread rape of women, girls, and boys, murder, illegal detention, forced displacement, and other specific abuses against women and children, including human trafficking and forced marriage.”¹³⁵

b) Conditions of Life for displaced: IDPs were similarly vulnerable as the rest of the population with regard to human rights abuses, but they faced particular difficulties with respect to land and property, women's rights and documentation. The nutrition situation was precarious in northern Shamali and southern Panjshir. In the provinces of Nimroz, Kandahar, Paktika, Zabul, Kunar, Logar and Faryab, over 50 percent of the population could not meet their basic food needs in winter and spring 2005.¹³⁶

2006 (Coding: 5)

Conflict continued between entrenched warlords, the Taliban, the Karzai government, and international forces continued in 2006, as did the Taliban’s revival. Taliban attacks became more lethal during the year, and the use of suicide bombings and improved explosive devices (IEDs) as a strategy took off. In the spring, Taliban forces attacked civilians and Afghan and U.S. troops throughout the southern part of the country. The second half of the year saw major coalition and Afghan government offensives in response. As a result of all of this, the year became the deadliest of the conflict since 2001.¹³⁷ What is more, according to Human Rights Watch, the Taliban and other anti-government groups gained public support “due to the Afghan government’s failure to provide essential security and development,” and “used the presence of warlords in the government to discredit President Karzai's administration and its international backers.”¹³⁸

¹³⁰ Ibid. The UN, however, reported a total of 17 suicide attacks during the year, as compared with 65 between January and August 2006. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006a, p.18.

¹³¹ U.S. Department of State 2006b.

¹³² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006a, p.30.

¹³³ United States Committee for Refugees 2006, p.82.

¹³⁴ See e.g., Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005a, p.34-35.

¹³⁵ Quoted in Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005a, p.68.

¹³⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005a, p.77-78.

¹³⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006a, p.17.

¹³⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006a, p.35.

With the intensification of the conflict in 2006 civilian casualties began to mount, and as they did so the quality of data on them also began to improve. Several sources published their own annual estimates of civilian casualties for each of the following years. For 2006 there is no overall UN estimate of civilian casualties, but the Afghan NGO Security Office (a reliable independent monitor) estimated 1,315.¹³⁹ Several human rights organizations also estimated smaller numbers: 1,000 by Amnesty International, 929 by Human Rights Watch, and 670 by the ICRC.¹⁴⁰ Finally, Human Rights Watch also estimated that in August and September approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Afghan families – or about 90,000 to 120,000 people – fled their homes in the southern provinces of Helmand, Uruzgan and Kandahar due to the armed conflict and ongoing violence. This brought the total displaced population in these three provinces to at least 200,000.¹⁴¹

2007 (Coding: 5)

In 2007 continued violence caused numerous civilian deaths and substantial new displacement, in addition to other abuses and rights violations. The Taliban's use of suicide bombings and IEDs continued during the year, with civilians as the primary victims, and the Taliban also used civilians as human shields during military engagements with pro-government forces.¹⁴² Overall estimates of violent civilian deaths during the year included 1500 from UNAMA, 2026 from the Afghan NGO Security Office, and 1633 from Human Rights Watch.¹⁴³ In addition, by August 2007 the UN estimated that approximately 80,000 people had been displaced in Afghanistan's south, southwest, and east due to insecurity, with 44,000 new IDPs from the southern provinces in the first half of the year.¹⁴⁴ In October, fighting between the Taliban and Afghan National Security Forces in Uruzgan Province displaced some 1,600 families (conservatively, probably at least 5,000 people).¹⁴⁵ In November, the Brookings Institution noted that “the number of people displaced by conflict grows by the day, predominantly in the south and east portions of the country.”¹⁴⁶

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Insecurity and violence continued to plague efforts to assist the civilian population and monitor their needs in various parts of the country, with many volatile areas cut off from relief. Indeed, the UN considered more than a third of the country inaccessible during the year. The U.S. State Department also reported that insurgents began attacking civilians who accepted foreign assistance during the year, leading some to begin refusing aid.¹⁴⁷

2008 (Coding: 5)

Violence instigated by Taliban, other anti-government resistance groups, and criminal gangs persisted at a high level during 2008 and expanded to include areas once considered relatively safe in the center and the north. As the U.S. State Department put it, these groups “continued to threaten, rob, attack, and kill villagers, government officials, foreigners, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers.” As a result, the year again saw an increase in civilian deaths, with several organizations reporting their own distinct figures. The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan

¹³⁹ Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict 2009, p.8.

¹⁴⁰ See Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict 2009, p.79.

¹⁴¹ Cited in Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008a, p.51.

¹⁴² U.S. Department of State 2008b.

¹⁴³ Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict 2009, p.79.

¹⁴⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008a, p.51.

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State 2008b.

¹⁴⁶ Quoted in Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008a, p.51.

¹⁴⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008a, p.51-52; U.S. Department of State 2008b.

(UNAMA) claimed there were 2,118 civilian casualties for 2008, an increase of 39% over its estimate for the previous year. Of these, anti-government forces were responsible for 1,160 deaths and pro-government or coalition forces for 828. Suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices killed some 725 civilians (34% of the total according to UNAMA).¹⁴⁸ Citing the Afghan NGO Security Office, Amnesty International similarly reported that increased military attacks between anti-government groups, the U.S., and NATO troops resulted in some 2,000 civilian deaths.¹⁴⁹ Other estimates included 1,445 from the Brookings Institute and 1070 from ISAF.¹⁵⁰

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to UNAMA, large parts of the south, southwest, southeast, and central regions of Afghanistan were classified by the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) as an ‘extreme risk’ and ‘hostile environment.’ As in previous years, personnel of international organizations and NGOs as well as local authorities were regularly targeted for attack, and this violence continued to disrupt relief and reconstruction work. According to the U.S. State Department, one study of 25 provinces by the NGO Safety Office reported “117 security incidents involving NGOs and aid workers between January 1 and August 31.” According to Amnesty International, seventy-eight employees of various NGOs were abducted and another 31 killed in 2008.¹⁵¹ For millions of people living in southern and eastern Afghanistan – terrorized by the Taliban, other insurgent groups and local militias – this insecurity further restricted their already limited access to food, health care, and schooling.

2009 (Coding: 5)

The security situation deteriorated significantly yet again in 2009, with civilians bearing the brunt of the growing violence. Mostly this was caused by increased insurgent attacks, as the Taliban continued to threaten, rob, attack, and kill villagers, foreigners, and NGO workers. According to the U.S. State Department, “armed conflict spread to almost one-third of the country, including previously unaffected areas in the north and northeast.”¹⁵² This was also the deadliest year for civilians since 2001. According to UNAMA’s Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict there were 2,412 civilian casualties, of which the Taliban was directly responsible for 1,630 and pro-government coalition forces responsible for 596 (mostly during ISAF airstrikes). According to a similar estimate from the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs, there were 2,590 civilian deaths as well as 3,646 civilian injuries in violence during the year, with suicide and improved explosive device (IED) attacks the single most common type of incident. In addition, an estimated 45,000 individuals became newly internally displaced during the year due to insecurity and violence linked to armed conflict.¹⁵³

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to the U.S. State Department, the marked deterioration of the security situation limited the government’s ability to govern effectively and to deliver services, and again seriously interfered with the work of humanitarian agencies.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ U.S. Department of State 2009.

¹⁴⁹ Amnesty International 2009.

¹⁵⁰ For an overview of all of these various estimates see Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict 2009, p.79.

¹⁵¹ Amnesty International 2009.

¹⁵² U.S. Department of State 2010.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

4. Cambodia (1979 – 1990)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internationalized Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

During the 1970s a secession of coup d'états led to the fall of the Cambodian monarchy led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk (in 1970) and then its replacement, a pro-U.S. regime led by Marshal Lon Nol (in 1975). After the overthrow of Lon Nol, power devolved to the Kampuchean Communist party, Prime Minister Pol Pot, and the army – the Khmer Rouge. In 1975 the Khmer Rouge sealed Cambodia off from the outside world and began instituting reform policies that included the closure of schools, the abolishment of money, and the destruction of most aspects of traditional Khmer culture. The most destabilizing policy was the forced evacuations of all cities and towns and the forced movement of the entire population onto rural agricultural collectives where masses of the civilian population lived in unsanitary housing conditions. These policies ultimately decimated the population through starvation and disease. In addition, the Communists purged hundreds of thousands of members of the former Lon Nol government as well as businessmen, intellectuals, and many non-communist members of their own recent wartime coalition.¹⁵⁵

Throughout their rule the Khmer Rouge feared a growing threat from the communist leadership in Vietnam, and to preempt this threat they initiated war against Vietnam in May 1975. Small-scale fighting continued until 1978 when Vietnam decided to remove the Khmer Rouge leadership and occupy the country. On December 25, 1978 the Vietnamese army and anti-Khmer Rouge forces under the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation invaded, and quickly took most of the country. The Pol Pot government fled into the jungles of the mountainous western region and began a guerilla war.¹⁵⁶ Thus began a ten-year Vietnamese occupation of the country.

On January 8, 1979 a pro-Vietnamese government, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (KPRK) led by Heng Samrin, was established in Phnom Penh. The KPRK relaxed many of the worst requirements of the Pol Pot regime. Still, stability was hampered by continued warfare, widespread starvation, disease, and the movement of hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled to the Thai border region.¹⁵⁷ Several anti-Samrin armed resistance groups, including remnants of the Khmer Rouge regime, disrupted plans for a comprehensive peace. The repressive nature of the Vietnamese and their allies further stimulated opposition to the occupation. One tactic used by the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin regime to fight the resistance was the withholding of international food aid from areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge. In combination with disruptions to farming during the Pol Pot regime, the mass movement of people combined with these policies to create devastating famine conditions in the country.

Throughout the 1980s the Vietnamese remained as an occupying force, propping up the puppet government of Heng Samrin. During most of this period four opposition groups competed for control of the central government, with the Khmer Rouge remaining the most violent and using guerilla and terrorist tactics to create instability and terrorize the population. Continued conflict between resistance fighters and Vietnamese counteroffensives hampered civilian recovery. According to Clodfelter, approximately 100,000 people died as a result of the Vietnamese invasion and the Khmer Rouge retreat (1978-1979), with another 100,000 deaths due to guerilla warfare after 1979 and through 1991. These figures do not include deaths attributed to sickness and starvation

¹⁵⁵ See e.g., United States Committee for Refugees 1980, p.25.

¹⁵⁶ See e.g., United States Committee for Refugees 1980, p.26.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

within numerous refugee camps.¹⁵⁸

Due to international pressure the Vietnamese agreed to draw down their troops beginning in 1988, despite evidence of Khmer Rouge stockpiling of weaponry. With their final departure in 1989 war once again erupted between the Khmer Rouge, anti-regime resistance groups and the Samrin government. Violence dissipated in 1991, when the four contending factions in Cambodia's 13-year civil war agreed to an ambitious plan for peace. The UN assumed responsibility for administration of the country pending national elections in 1993.

Although the situation remained tenuous through 1993 with some continued violence and civilian displacement, by 1991 these fell below the threshold for a continued complex emergency. Violence erupted again later in the decade but did not reach the scale of a new complex emergency.

Annual Data

1979 (Certainty: 5)

In early January the Vietnamese took control of Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge fled to the mountainous regions of Cambodia. On January 8, 1979, Heng Samrin was named chairman of the new government now called the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge put up a formidable resistance through counterattacks and guerilla tactics such that Vietnam had to send additional troops by early February. Eventually the Vietnamese invasion overpowered the Khmer Rouge until they were reduced to a few holdout units in the southwest and along the Thai border.

Cambodian refugees fled the fighting and moved to camps on both the Thailand and Cambodian sides of the border. Camps in Thailand held 100,000 Cambodians a few months after the invasion.¹⁵⁹ According to Clodfelter, the refugee population swelled over the course of the year to 300,000 Cambodians, plus 80,000 Laotians and 15,000 Vietnamese.¹⁶⁰ According to USCR, "it was estimated that 50,000 refugees were in Thailand by the summer. By mid-November the population in Thailand swelled to about 380,000. By the year's end an estimated 900,000 Cambodians were amassed at the Thai border."¹⁶¹ The Thais attempted to carry out mass forced evacuations back across the border. In June, for example, over 40,000 refugees were driven back across the frontier at Preah Vihear.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness:* According to the U.S. State Department, Vietnamese forces and the Heng Samrin government systematically denied food to any civilians they feared might aid the resistance movement, leading to the starvation of 'scores of thousands' and severe suffering among many others. They also interfered with international humanitarian relief efforts, allowing no international medical personnel into the country and imposing other draconian restrictions on the work of international aid agencies.¹⁶²
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* Thanks to the fighting and massive displacement in Cambodia, almost no food was being grown, which combined with the combatants' efforts to control the population led to widespread starvation. According to USCR some "80-90 percent of children

¹⁵⁸ Clodfelter 1995, p.284.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1980, p.30.

¹⁶² U.S. Department of State 1980b, p.464-465.

were suffering from extreme malnutrition; malaria, dysentery, intestinal parasites and respiratory diseases were epidemic.”¹⁶³ In the early summer, relief agencies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Catholic Relief Services and OXFAM International began to deliver food and supplies to Cambodians along the Thai border. By late summer, these relief agencies were able to provide aid to Phnom Penh. Large-scale aid relief from western countries began in mid-October.

1980 (Certainty: 5)

In 1980 Pol Pot’s guerillas were primarily confined to the border area near Thailand. An estimated 200,000 Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia to assist Heng Samrin in consolidating control.¹⁶⁴ Fighting was less intense for most of the year, although conflict continued along the border regions, with the Thai frontier witnessing the most action. According to USCR the volatile nature of the situation was evident in the sudden deterioration of military and economic conditions in the late summer and fall, “which displaced millions of Khmer from their homes and increased immeasurably the pressures on Thailand.”¹⁶⁵ In November, the Vietnamese military launched one of the largest offensives to date in an effort to eradicate the remaining vestiges of the Khmer Rouge. This indeed had a devastating impact on the Khmer Rouge, but also on the civilian population: more than 100,000 Cambodian civilians were displaced by the attacks and many fled to Thailand.¹⁶⁶

Confirming Evidence

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* Fighting during the year led to continued disruption of the rice harvest and production of other crops, and thus to persistent widespread starvation.¹⁶⁷ International relief agencies attempted to organize and provide aid. By the end of 1980 a sizeable food supply was available. According to USCR, “initial aid efforts were slowed by inefficiency, inexperience and bureaucratic competition, as the authorities in Cambodia started work. However, by the end of 1980 agencies showed that most distribution troubles had been ironed out.”¹⁶⁸

1981 (Certainty: 2)

Most of the Khmer population remained close to survival standards because of the devastation of the Pol Pot years and the conflict, famine, and meager crops resulting from the Vietnamese invasion and occupation, as well as continued conflict with the Khmer Rouge. In the first six months of 1981 small-scale conflict increased throughout most of the central and western regions. About 180,000 Vietnamese troops remained as an occupying force in an effort to support the fledgling government of Heng Samrin. In the regions controlled by the Samrin government there were improvements in education, cultural and religious activities.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ United States Committee for Refugees 1980, p.26.

¹⁶⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1980, p.24.

¹⁶⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1980, p.16.

¹⁶⁶ Clodfelter 1995, p.285.

¹⁶⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1980, p.16.

¹⁶⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1980, p.29.

¹⁶⁹ U.S. Department of State 1982b, p.611; United States Committee for Refugees 1981, p.21-26.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Unwillingness/Inability*: According to the U.S. State Department there was convincing “evidence that the regime may have employed lethal chemical/biological agents against groups along the Thai border who resisted its authority.”¹⁷⁰ Additionally, the “continuing failure of the regime to provide for basic human rights...led to a small, but steady flow of refugees to the Thai border.”¹⁷¹

1982 (Certainty: 2)

In 1982 a coalition opposing Vietnamese domination of Cambodia and contesting the authority of the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin regime was formed when two non-communist resistance groups (The Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, KPNLF, and the National United Front for an Independent Neutral Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, FUNCINPEC) joined the remnants of the Khmer Rouge. During the year the Vietnamese began launching attacks on Khmer Rouge bases at Pom Melai in the Cardamom Mountains. Initially the impact on the civilian population was relatively minor, but civilian casualties and displacement increased in subsequent years.¹⁷²

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Unwillingness/Inability*: According to the U.S. State Department there was new evidence in the form “of organic samples that lends weight to the charges that the Vietnamese allies of the regime employed lethal chemical/biological agents against the Khmer resistance groups along the Thai border.”¹⁷³ In addition, international relief agencies faced continuous resistance from government authorities, in their efforts to provide food and aid to the most vulnerable and underprivileged groups within the country.¹⁷⁴

1983 (Certainty: 5)

The Vietnamese occupation continued with a force of approximately 150,000 to 170,000 military troops. According to the U.S. State Department, the Samrin regime received minimal support from the Khmer people.¹⁷⁵ During the year the Vietnamese continued their bombardment of civilian camps near the Thai border. The camps belonged to all three resistance groups. Hundreds of civilian casualties resulted and more than 80,000 refugees fled to Thailand.¹⁷⁶ In the spring, for example, the Vietnamese destroyed a refugee camp near Nog Chan housing more than 40,000 Cambodians. Many were moved by Thai troops to a camp further inside the Thai border.¹⁷⁷

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Unwillingness/Inability*: During 1983 the human rights situation in Cambodia worsened. The Vietnamese and Samrin regime allowed military and security forces to “increase repressive actions against civilians in an effort to eliminate support for the resistance forces near

¹⁷⁰ U.S. Department of State 1982b, p.611.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² DeRouen and Heo 2007 p.227.

¹⁷³ U.S. Department of State 1983b, p.727.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State 1983b, p.733.

¹⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State 1984b, p.795.

¹⁷⁶ DeRouen and Heo 2007 p.227.

¹⁷⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.48.

areas of resistance activity. These actions led to reports of brutality, summary killings, and rape of civilians by Vietnamese troops.”¹⁷⁸

1984 (Certainty: 3)

In 1984 the Vietnamese occupation forces maintained control over most of the country. During the 1984-1985 dry seasons the Vietnamese again attacked the camps of all resistance groups, swept them out of Cambodia, and drove them into Thailand. Subsequently the Vietnamese “consolidated their gains by sealing the guerrilla route into the country, constructing trenches, erecting wire fences, and laying mines along the entire Thai-Cambodia border, using Cambodian forced labor.”¹⁷⁹ According to USCR a total of 230,000 displaced Cambodians were living at the Thai/Cambodian border in the aftermath of fighting between Khmer resistance forces and the Samrin government. This represents a count of total refugees, however, and it is unclear how many were newly displaced during 1984.¹⁸⁰

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Unwillingness/Inability: Civilians continued to be the targets of a concerted campaign of violent attacks. According to USCR, the Cambodian resistance employed “terrorist tactics against civilians, including murder and destruction of economic forces.”¹⁸¹
- b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: According to USCR, “Thai authorities limited resettlement opportunities for the 47,000 in holding camps.”¹⁸² International efforts for mediating voluntary repatriation of the refugee population broke down.

1985 (Certainty: 5)

During 1985 systematic violations of human rights continued. The Vietnamese and Samrin regime expanded forced labor defensive work projects in support of combat operations in western Cambodia in an attempt to prevent infiltration by the resistance. As a result, “there were heavy casualties due to mines and disease.”¹⁸³ In mid-January 1985, Vietnamese tanks and infantry had overrun all of the KPNLF’s camps and forced the 150,000 Cambodian civilians inhabiting them to flee into Thailand.¹⁸⁴ Subsequently, the resistance initiated a guerrilla campaign involving operations throughout Cambodia.¹⁸⁵ The Khmer Rouge continued to employ terrorist tactics including “murder and destruction of economic resources, against civilians.”¹⁸⁶

According to USCR, Cambodians in Thailand—both those trapped amidst fighting on the border with Cambodia and those still waiting in Khao I Dang camp—faced uncertainty. More than “230,000 Cambodians lived at the border of Thailand and Cambodia, after fleeing clashes between Vietnamese soldiers and Cambodian resistance forces in late 1984 and early 1985.”¹⁸⁷

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Department of State 1984b, p.796.

¹⁷⁹ DeRouen and Heo 2007 p.227.

¹⁸⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.48.

¹⁸¹ U.S. Department of State 1985b, p.722.

¹⁸² United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.48.

¹⁸³ U.S. Department of State 1986a, p.727.

¹⁸⁴ Clodfelter 1995, p.285.

¹⁸⁵ U.S. Department of State 1987b, p.672.

¹⁸⁶ U.S. Department of State 1986a, p.727.

¹⁸⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1985, p.54.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Unwillingness/ Inability*: The Samrin regime severely restricted the ability for refugees to return to Cambodia from Thailand. Thousands of Khmer returned informally but an official agreement on repatriation was not established.¹⁸⁸
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: The Thai government officially closed its border with Cambodia to new arrivals in 1980, but it allowed the U.N. Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) to move the border refugees inside Thai territory when Vietnamese military offensives threatened them. According to USCR, UNBRO administered the “border encampments in Thailand, but could not provide protection from fighting near the sites. A second encampment in Thailand only two kilometers from Vietnamese artillery installations across the border in Cambodia held 135,000 Cambodians.”¹⁸⁹ Humanitarian agencies argued that the camp was prone to attack and that its inhabitants should have been moved further into Thailand.

1986 (Certainty: 5)

In 1986 the ongoing struggle for political control continued. Throughout the year the Samrin regime and Vietnamese systematically violated human rights in an attempt to cut off infiltration by the resistance. According to the U.S. State Department, there were “heavy civilian casualties due to mines and disease, with an estimated 5,000 deaths from disease alone.”¹⁹⁰ In addition, Khmer civilians continued to flee to the Thai border to enter UN supported refugee camps in Thailand. The Samrin regime routinely imprisoned those caught fleeing to the border as well as those seeking return from camps affiliated with the resistance.

1987 (Certainty: 2)

During the first half of 1987 the political situation remained virtually unchanged from the previous year. In October the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. The Vietnamese would comply with international pressure the following year. Still, in the meantime according to USCR, the continued “military and political stalemate trapped 270,000 refugees along the Thai-Cambodian border, and isolated the country from Western and regional aid and diplomatic contacts.”¹⁹¹

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Unwillingness/ Inability*: According to USCR, “government persecution, economic hardship, and food shortages brought on by a severe drought compelled more than three thousand Cambodians to flee into Thailand in the first eight months of 1987.”¹⁹² According to the U.S. State Department, “attacks resulting in civilian casualties were frequently mounted by the Khmer Rouge, particularly on trains and highways.”¹⁹³

1988 (Certainty: 2)

¹⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State 1986a, p.731.

¹⁸⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1985, p.54.

¹⁹⁰ U.S. Department of State 1987b, p.763.

¹⁹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.46.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ U.S. Department of State 1988b, p.655.

Despite evidence that the Khmer Rouge was stockpiling weapons in the Cambodian interior in preparation for a comeback, Vietnam announced that it would withdraw 50,000 troops in 1988, out of an estimated 120,000.¹⁹⁴ In December, the Vietnamese withdrew another 18,000 troops from Cambodia, leaving 50,000 troops behind.¹⁹⁵

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Unwillingness/Inability*: According to USCR, Cambodia remained in international isolation, with the highest infant mortality rate and the lowest life expectancy in Asia.¹⁹⁶
- b) *Conditions for Life of displaced*: Between July 1988 and the end of 1989, Khmer Rouge leaders were believed to have moved more than 25,000 people from UN-assisted camps in Thailand to sites along to satellite villages and military camps beyond the reach of international relief agencies.¹⁹⁷

1989 (Certainty: 3)

In the wake of a final Vietnamese troop withdrawal and failure to achieve a political settlement, civil war spread throughout the country. The violence spoiled any real hope of a safe, internationally monitored return home for the Cambodians on the border.¹⁹⁸ The Thai government agreed to create UN-assisted camps for civilians under Khmer Rouge control in the northern and southern sectors of the border. This decision resulted in “the number of Khmer Rouge civilians in UN-assisted camps to rise to around 73,000 in October, up from 51,500 at the end of 1988.”¹⁹⁹ According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports, “civilians continued to be killed during attacks by the Khmer Rouge on towns, lines of communication, and economic targets within Cambodia.”²⁰⁰

Confirming Evidence

- b) *Conditions for Life of displaced*: According to the U.S. State Department, the Khmer Rouge tightly controlled movements within areas under its control. During 1989, some Khmer Rouge refugee camps, unassisted by the international community, were relocated. Refugees within these camps were not allowed to leave.²⁰¹

1990 (Certainty: 5)

The civil war intensified following Vietnamese withdrawal of its last major contingent of troops from Cambodia in September. Refugees lived in some 30 camps in 9 different provinces, with only limited aid coming from the Cambodian Red Cross, the WFP, and nongovernmental organizations. In most of these settlements food, water, and medical supplies were inadequate. According to USCR, more than “170,000 Cambodians were displaced from their homes by civil war, hunger, and disease in 1990. An estimated 140,000 were displaced internally and about 30,000 fled west and

¹⁹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.50.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.52.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.799.

²⁰⁰ U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.794.

²⁰¹ U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.799.

entered refugee camps in Thailand.”²⁰² Most moved spontaneously to avoid conflict, but an estimated 20 percent were relocated by the government to deprive the resistance forces of food, porters, and potential recruits.²⁰³ In addition, according to DeRouen and Heo, “resistance forces raided villages and planted antipersonnel mines along paths and in rice fields, which killed unwary people or blew off their arms or legs. Eighty or ninety casualties caused by these mines came into Cambodia’s hospitals and clinics every week, and presumably hundreds of other victims were untreated or had been killed.”²⁰⁴

²⁰² United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.60-61.

²⁰³ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.61.

²⁰⁴ DeRouen and Heo 2007 p.284.

7. Indonesia I / Aceh (1999 – 2004)

Overall Certainty: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

Civil war in the province of Aceh, Indonesia from 1999 – 2004 was driven by a secessionist conflict between the rebel Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government. The roots of GAM's rebellion were decades old and lay in "the impoverishment of the local population and their perception of being exploited by elites closely linked to the central government," as well as resentment at the government-sanctioned arrival of up to 160,000 Javanese settlers in the region in the 1970s and 1980s.²⁰⁵ Indeed, GAM had been active since the 1970s and even fought an earlier and smaller war against the Indonesian government from 1990 – 1991, after which it lay largely dormant for the rest of the decade.²⁰⁶

When renewed conflict erupted again in 1999, however, it was fierce. Within a year GAM grew from 800 to 15,000 men.²⁰⁷ Human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances and torture were frequent during the war, and perpetrated by both sides. By the end of 2002 USCR estimated that over 10,000 people, mostly civilians, had died since the beginning of the conflict.²⁰⁸ Although government security forces were by far the worst offenders in terms of rights abuses, GAM directed attacks against ethnic Javanese civilians and orchestrated forced displacement in order to call attention to the conflict. The government also displaced large numbers as part of its counter-insurgency operations. Thus, over the course of six years the conflict also generated large-scale displacement, directly affecting a majority of the region's population and forcing some one-third to two-thirds of people from their homes in the hardest-hit areas. According to the IDMC, the most credible estimate for those displaced *within* Aceh between 1999 and 2004 was 600,000. The scale of displacement to areas outside of Aceh remains less certain, but Indonesia's Department of Labor and Transmigration reported that over 200,000 people had fled for other regions (especially neighboring North Sumatra) by the end of 2002 and subsequent reports from the following summer suggested a figure of closer to 115,000.²⁰⁹

The circumstances that finally brought the war to an end were both unusual and tragic. In December 2004 an earthquake and tsunami devastated the country, leaving some 160,000 persons dead in Aceh and North Sumatra provinces and overwhelming the government's capacity to handle the humanitarian situation. In its aftermath and under international pressure, the government and GAM engaged in negotiations and signed an August 15, 2005 Memorandum of Understanding that ended the almost three-decade long conflict.²¹⁰

Annual Data

1999 (Coding: 5)

²⁰⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2010a, p.3.

²⁰⁶ On the earlier war see e.g., the discussion in Sambanis 2004, p.111-112.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.122.

²⁰⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2010a, p.3-5.

²¹⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2010a, p.3.

The first year of renewed conflict in Aceh saw the displacement of over 100,000 Acehnese as well as an estimated 15,000 Javanese residents of Aceh.²¹¹ As USCR points out, however, the number who were displaced at any given time varied considerably over the course of the year, peaking at an estimated 130,000 to 140,000 Acehnese as of July but falling to some 25,000 to 30,000 by August-September and only a few hundred by the end of the year.²¹² Also according to USCR, displacement resulted from several factors, “possibly including some manipulation by GAM in an effort to draw international attention to Aceh’s political and humanitarian problems.”²¹³ Still, many NGOs believed Acehnese civilians had genuine fears of persecution and human rights abuse given the military’s use of killings, torture, and rape, and its widespread burning of homes and shops. Finally, an estimated 393 conflict-related deaths occurred in 1999.²¹⁴

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability / Unwillingness: A number of NGOs, including the ICRC, sought to provide protection and assistance to the conflict-affected population during the year, but their efforts were hampered by attacks and harassment from both the military and GAM. According to USCR, “detailed reports of violence, intimidation, torture, and disappearances indicated that humanitarian workers were in frequent danger.”²¹⁵

2000 (Coding: 5)

Despite a formal humanitarian pause in June 2000 (agreed upon by Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid and GAM), violence continued and even intensified at year’s end, thanks to the Indonesian military’s opposition to the agreement.²¹⁶ USCR estimated that at least 8,000 (Acehnese and Javanese) were displaced within Aceh at the end of the year, but again with wide fluctuation over time, “from approximately 4,000 in January to some 80,000 in August.”²¹⁷ In addition, thousands continued to flee to North Sumatra, where there were an estimated 30,000 displaced from Aceh at the end of the year.²¹⁸ Although the length of much of the displacement was unclear and may have been relatively short in many cases, this information suggests that over 76,000 people were newly displaced within Aceh at some point during the year, and that an additional 15,000 residents of Aceh may have fled to Sumatra since the previous year. In addition, according to at least one estimate, there were some 1,041 conflict-related deaths in Aceh in 2000.²¹⁹

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability / Unwillingness: According to USCR, “the Acehnese claim widespread human rights abuses by the Indonesian military and police—including killings, torture, rape, and the burning of homes and shops.”²²⁰ The number of deaths and disappearances of human rights

²¹¹ Sambanis 2004, p.112.

²¹² United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.143. USCR also cited the estimate of an additional 15,000 Javanese displaced outside of Aceh, noting that “an unknown number of persons fled Aceh for Medan, a city just south of Aceh in the province of North Sumatra. One source put the number of displaced persons from Aceh in North Sumatra at more than 15,000.”

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Sambanis 2004, p.112.

²¹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.144.

²¹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.137.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Cited in Sambanis 2004, p.112.

²²⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.137.

activists increased during 2000. Moreover, “as a result of increased violence, including attacks on their local staff, international NGOs had to scale back or suspend their work in Aceh during the year.”²²¹

- b) *Conditions of Life for displaced*: Partly as a result of the limitations on the work of aid organizations during the year, displaced persons – especially in the Pidie area – often lived in poor conditions, with shortages of food and numerous health problems.²²²

2001 (Coding: 3)

The formal humanitarian pause in the fighting instituted in June 2000 was followed by a “moratorium on violence” in January 2001 and a “Peace Through Dialogue” process from February to June 2001. None of these measures, however, were effective in stemming the violence.²²³ On August 11, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri signed a law granting Aceh “special autonomy” but not independence.

According to USCR the number of IDPs in Aceh again fluctuated significantly during the year, “from a high of more than 33,000 in June [an estimated 25,000 more than six months earlier] to fewer than 10,000 by mid-September,” and again up to 12,300 by the end of the year.²²⁴ Thousands also fled to North Sumatra during the year. USCR also cites a Human Rights Watch estimate of 1,700 conflict-related deaths in 2001, most of which were civilians killed during military action.²²⁵

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to USCR, the Indonesian army attacked villages and settlements that it suspected of harboring GAM members. Both the “military and GAM often wore civilian clothing and blamed the opposition for attacks.”²²⁶ The work of NGOs in Aceh was also limited by the violence, especially outside the regional capital of Banda Aceh.

2002 (Coding: 3)

According to USCR, as in earlier years in 2002 “the level of displacement in Aceh was difficult to determine both because the conflict frequently produced short-term displacement and because the displaced often received no organized assistance.”²²⁷ At year’s end USCR estimated that 15,000 people were displaced within Aceh and that an additional 120,000 people who had fled violence both in 2002 and earlier remained displaced in North Sumatra. Of these, about 90,000 appear to have fled in 2001-2002, since USCR’s estimate of displaced people in North Sumatra at the end of 2001 was only 30,000, for an average of some 45,000 per year over this time. In addition, Amnesty International estimated that there were at least 1,300 deaths during the year. It was not clear how many were civilians, even though most conflict-related deaths overall were civilians.²²⁸

On December 9, GAM and the Indonesian government signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, which laid out a timetable for GAM to disarm and for the military to move to a defensive rather than offensive posture. According to USCR the agreement led to a significant

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.124.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid; on the estimate of 1700 deaths see also Sambanis 2004, p.112.

²²⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.124.

²²⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.122.

²²⁸ Ibid.

decrease in violence, although “at least 14 new conflict-related deaths were recorded, approximately 2,000 persons were newly displaced, and numerous violations of the cease-fire were reported by year’s end.”²²⁹

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to the U.S. State Department, the government’s soldiers and police “murdered, tortured, raped, beat and arbitrarily detained both civilians and members of separatist movements.”²³⁰

2003 (Coding: 5)

In May, the Indonesian government reinstated martial law in Aceh and began a series of large-scale anti-GAM military operations. According to USCR, authorities severely restricted access by foreign aid agencies, but local human rights groups reported cases of extrajudicial execution and torture in the province. After the start of the new offensives in May, according to USCR, “120,000 Acehnese were newly internally displaced, many to ill-equipped government camps as a counterinsurgency tactic.”²³¹ While it appears that most of these people were probably displaced in 2003, very similar later figures that incorporate displacement in 2003-04 as part of this same series of offensives create uncertainty about precisely how many were actually uprooted in 2003 (see below). Still, according to IDMC, already in July 2003 and only a month into the offensive, “a peak was reached with some 90,000 displaced people in camps. Fear of being interrogated by the military in the camps and of losing their property and livestock prompted many displaced to avoid joining the lists of officially displaced. Instead they have sought refuge in the forests, unregistered camps and with relatives.”²³² Thus, the official figures likely understate the true scope of displacement. Similarly, information about civilian casualties was uncertain, but local police sources estimated that 500 civilians were killed during the first six months of renewed fighting.²³³

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Unwillingness/Inability*: According to Human Rights Watch, testimony from Acehnese refugees in Malaysia during the Indonesian offensives starting in May provided “substantial evidence documenting the role of Indonesian security forces in extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, beatings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and drastic limits on freedom of movement in Aceh. There is also a clear pattern of security forces singling out and persecuting young men, who the military claim to be members or supporters of GAM.”²³⁴

- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: The official camps for the displaced suffered from inadequate drinking water, food, sanitation, and medical services. According to the IDMC, local NGOs reported that “during the first five months of the offensive at least 54 IDPs died in the camps and hundreds have suffered from illnesses.”²³⁵

2004 (Coding: 3)

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ U.S. Department of State 2003.

²³¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2004, p.26.

²³² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004c, p.13.

²³³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004c, p.14.

²³⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004c, p.39.

²³⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004c, p.14.

The Indonesian government continued its anti-GAM operations in 2004, but after a year of martial law in Aceh, in May it downgraded the province to a state of civil emergency.²³⁶ Information about how these events affected the civilian population was difficult to obtain, however, as the government prevented most foreigners, including media and aid agencies, from entering or working in the province.²³⁷ Still, according to USCR, from April 2003 through December 2004 some 125,000 people became newly displaced, and the IDMC cited the same figure for the period from May 2003 through June 2004, based on official Indonesian government estimates.²³⁸ As above, however, it was unclear how many of these were displaced during 2004 rather than 2003. More broadly, it is likely that these estimates may significantly undercount the true scope of displacement, since they exclude people who sought shelter with relatives, in the forest, in camps not managed by the martial law administration, as well as those who fled to other parts of Indonesia or other countries.²³⁹

According to the U.S. State Department, accurate and independent information on the number of civilians and insurgents killed in Aceh was also difficult to obtain. A coalition of NGOs in Aceh claimed that between January and October, “at least 57 civilians, 251 GAM members, and 21 security personnel were killed.”²⁴⁰

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Unwillingness/Inability: As in 2003, Indonesian security forces continued to commit a wide array of rights abuses that dramatically interfered with normal civilian life in Aceh. According to the U.S. State Department, they “murdered, tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements, particularly in Aceh.”²⁴¹

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: The official camps for the displaced continued to suffer from inadequate drinking water, food, sanitation, and medical services, as well as outbreaks of contagious diseases.²⁴²

Post-2004

The December 26, 2004 Asian tsunami caused a catastrophic humanitarian emergency in Aceh and surrounding areas. Between the provinces of Aceh and North Sumatra, approximately 160,000 people were killed and half a million displaced.²⁴³ Perhaps surprisingly, however, the tsunami and the subsequent assistance efforts had a positive effect on the separatist conflict in Aceh. Unable to manage the humanitarian situation on its own, the Indonesian government was forced to admit foreign humanitarian groups into the province after largely excluding them for two years. At the same time, both the government and GAM also came under significant and increased international pressure to resolve their differences, and on August 15, 2005, eight months after the tsunami, they signed the Helsinki Agreement to end the conflict.²⁴⁴ Despite continued tensions, peace effectively held thereafter and IDPs began returning home.

²³⁶ Moore, Matthew. “Aceh Downgraded to State of Emergency.” The Sydney Morning Herald. 14 May 2004

²³⁷ See e.g., United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.82.

²³⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.81; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004c, p.72-73.

²³⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004c, p.73.

²⁴⁰ U.S. Department of State 2005a.

²⁴¹ Ibid; see also Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004c, p.39.

²⁴² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004c, p.14.

²⁴³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2010a, p.3.

²⁴⁴ See e.g., *ibid*.

9. Indonesia II / Moluccas and Sulawesi (1999 – 2002)

Overall Certainty: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Communal Violence

General Information and Overall Severity

Large-scale inter-communal conflict between Christians and Muslims erupted in the Indonesian provinces of Maluku, North Maluku, and Sulawesi following the fall of President Suharto in 1998. Tensions had been growing in the largely-Christian provinces thanks to the arrival of large numbers of Javanese Muslims through the Indonesian government's policy of 'transmigration,' designed to reduce population pressures on Java. Although the violence began in 1998 (in Sulawesi) and continued sporadically through 2004, the most intense period – and the part that qualifies as a complex emergency – was between 1999 and 2002.

Large-scale conflict in Maluku began in January 1999, "when a dispute between a Christian and a Muslim in the capital Ambon triggered two months of inter-communal violence that claimed the lives of an estimated 1,000 people. In the following months the fighting intensified and rapidly spread to other regions of the province."²⁴⁵ It was the worst religious violence Indonesia had seen in 15 years.²⁴⁶ In North Maluku, an August 1999 incident "sparked off a wave of inter-communal violence between Christians and Muslims across the province. As a result, an estimated 200,000 people were displaced, a third of the province population."²⁴⁷ In Sulawesi, the first major incident occurred in late December 1998, but most violence and displacement took place from 2000 – 2001. According to the USCR, in Sulawesi, "The clashes, though linked to local issues, were also related to the sectarian violence in the Moluccas."²⁴⁸ From 2000, the conflict in all three provinces was complicated with the emergence of a Muslim militant group called Laskar Jihad, which attacked Christian civilians and whose members largely hailed from elsewhere in Indonesia, particularly Java.

Beginning in 1999, the Indonesian government sent thousands of troops to both the Moluccas and Sulawesi to combat the violence and, according to the IDMC, "drastically increased military and police presence to re-establish law and order and also assist with the evacuation, shelter, food and medical needs of the victims of violence."²⁴⁹ The government also sponsored the December 2001 Malino peace accord, which largely ended the violence in Sulawesi, and the February 2002 Malino II peace agreement, which did the same for the Moluccas. Nevertheless, as described below these actions were insufficient to quickly quell the violence, or to provide for the basic needs of much of the conflict-affected population.

Overall, more than 10,000 people are believed to have died due to the fighting in the Moluccas. USCR estimated that the violence killed some 5,000 to 10,000 Moluccans from 1999 to 2002, and some 2,500 residents of Sulawesi since the end of 1998.²⁵⁰ The IDMC has estimated, moreover, that in the Moluccas, "Fighting between Christian and Muslim communities displaced nearly one million in both provinces between 1999 and 2002."²⁵¹ And according to the UNDP, in Maluku province alone, "between 1999 and 2002, the conflict... claimed 4,800 lives and displaced an

²⁴⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009d.

²⁴⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.110.

²⁴⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009d.

²⁴⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.123.

²⁴⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009d.

²⁵⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.120-121. See also Sambanis 2004, p.108.

²⁵¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008e.

estimated 500,000 people, or half of the province population.²⁵² In Sulawesi, meanwhile, “In total, between 100,000 and 150,000 people were displaced by three years of violence.”²⁵³

Annual Data

1999 (Certainty: 5)

As noted above, large-scale violence began in both Maluku and North Maluku in 1999, so this is the first year of the complex emergency.²⁵⁴ By the end of the year, “more than 1,000 people had been killed in Ambon and other Moluccas islands. An estimated 369,000 persons were internally displaced.”²⁵⁵

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: The Indonesian government’s efforts to quell the fighting were clearly inadequate to do so. According to the USCR, “In January, the government sent 1,000 troops to quell the violence. Nearly a year later, in December, the military announced it was taking charge of security in Maluku. The troops’ presence failed to deter the fighting.”²⁵⁶

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Despite assistance from government and some international aid agencies, conditions of life for the displaced were extremely poor and contributed to frequent disease-related deaths. According to the USCR, “In May [1999], the official Indonesian news agency reported that 25 Ambonese living in makeshift centers in southeast Sulawesi had died of cholera in recent weeks, while 400 others were hospitalized with various diseases. Officials blamed dirty water and poor living conditions for their deaths.”²⁵⁷

2000 (Certainty: 5)

Violence continued in both Moluccas provinces through 2000, and by the end of the year, over 400,000 people were displaced (including 215,000 to 285,000 persons in Maluku and 207,000 in North Maluku) and 5,000 Moluccans were believed to have died since the conflict began.²⁵⁸ The activities of the new Muslim militant organization, Laskar Jihad, took a heavy toll, killing an estimated 2700 to 3500 Christian Moluccans during the first half of the year.²⁵⁹ In addition, in 2000 the violence spread to Sulawesi, where several incidents prompted waves of violence in April and again in May – June. According to the IDMC, “By July the violence had spread beyond Poso [the capital] and affected many villages across the district. Between 300 and 800 people died, most of them Muslims.”²⁶⁰

²⁵² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009d.

²⁵³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009b.

²⁵⁴ According to the IDMC, a December 1998 incident in Sulawesi led to “a week of rioting which resulted in hundreds of Christian and Muslim homes and shops destroyed and thousands of people displaced” (See *ibid.*) Given that the violence was limited to the final week of the year and that there is no information to indicate that the magnitude of the displacement meets the 50,000 threshold for the beginning of a CE, I do not code 1998 as the beginning of the CE.

²⁵⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.145.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.133, 136.

²⁵⁹ Sambanis 2004, p.108.

²⁶⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009b.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Serious threats to aid workers both inhibited civilians' access to relief and reflected the government's inability or unwillingness to provide security for aid operations. According to USCR, "A small number of international NGOs, UN agencies, and local NGOs assisted the displaced in the Moluccas. Throughout the year, these agencies struggles to maintain operations in the midst of difficult security conditions, with most of those in Ambon at least temporarily suspending operations."²⁶¹ According to Sambanis, aid organizations were forced to flee Ambon due to the threat caused by Laskar Jihad, with the last aid workers departing by May 2000.²⁶²
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: According to the USCR, conditions for the displaced in the Moluccas often remained "critical, with reports of serious malnutrition and disease," especially in camps located in mountainous jungle regions.²⁶³

2001 (Certainty: 5)

Violence continued throughout 2001, and by the end of the year there were some 542,000 IDPs between Maluku (approximately 336,000 IDPs) and North Maluku (approximately 206,000 IDPs), while many thousands of others had fled to other provinces in Indonesia.²⁶⁴ North Maluku was mostly calm in 2001, with little new displacement, and many people were able to return home. On the other hand, "numerous outbreaks of deadly violence" continued to occur in Maluku province, "particularly in and around the port city of Ambon and on the island of Buru," preventing repatriation to central Maluku.²⁶⁵ According to the USCR, "By year's end, between 5,000 and 9,000 Moluccans were believed to have died since the conflict began."²⁶⁶ In Sulawesi in 2001, the conflict "sent both Christians and Muslims fleeing...Several thousand members of Laskar Jihad were reported to have arrived in the Poso region around mid-year, some having come from Maluku. Laskar Jihad attacks intensified in June and continued throughout the year."²⁶⁷ By the end of the year, over 2,500 people were dead in the province as a result of the violence since the end of 1998.²⁶⁸

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Throughout 2001, the scale of the government response remained too weak to seriously address the security deficit. According to the USCR, "The state of civil emergency imposed by the government in June 2000 remained in effect at the close of 2001, but had done little to stem the violence."²⁶⁹ In Sulawesi, the arrival of thousands of soldiers following the initial outbreak of violence in 2000 stabilized the situation somewhat, "but violent attacks by militias, including by Muslim militias coming from outside the province, continued during 2001 resulting in widespread destruction and displacement throughout the province."²⁷⁰ Some

²⁶¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.136.

²⁶² Sambanis 2004, p.108.

²⁶³ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.135-136.

²⁶⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.121-122.

²⁶⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.123.

²⁶⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.122.

²⁶⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.123.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.122.

²⁷⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009b.

378,000 people were displaced in Sulawesi at year's end,²⁷¹ but it was unclear from available reports how many originated from the Moluccas, and how many from Sulawesi itself.

2002 (Certainty: 2)

In 2002, violence in the Moluccas was much reduced, "largely because of the increased religious segregation."²⁷² Despite continued attacks by Laskar Jihad, overall, "Little new internal displacement occurred, and security steadily improved, generally ensuring better delivery of humanitarian aid."²⁷³ At the end of the year, USCR estimated there were still some 300,000 people displaced in the two provinces.²⁷⁴ Return of IDPs began shortly after the end of the conflict, and most of the displaced have since been able to return home.²⁷⁵ In subsequent years, there were sporadic incidents of violence. In the largest such incident, 10,000 people were displaced in Maluku in renewed Christian-Muslim violence in 2004.²⁷⁶

In Sulawesi, the December 2001 Malino Accord represented an effort to achieve peace. After this, according to the USCR, "The level of violence fell and the region was relatively peaceful in the first several months of 2002. By June, however, bombings and shootings in the Poso area had resumed, causing numerous fatalities...The violence prompted some new displacement and caused international NGOs to temporarily halt activities and withdraw staff."²⁷⁷ Violence continued, "and by September more than 5,000 security officers were enforcing an uneasy peace."²⁷⁸ In Central Sulawesi, at least 55,000 people were able to return home during the year, but up to 200,000 people remained displaced (it was unclear from available reports how many of these people were displaced from the Moluccas, versus from Sulawesi itself).²⁷⁹ In later years, "violence and insecurity continued to prevent many people from returning but it did no longer result in any large-scale displacement."²⁸⁰ Thus, 2002 was the last year of substantial violence generating new displacement, and thus the last year of the complex emergency.

²⁷¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.123.

²⁷² United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.120.

²⁷³ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.121.

²⁷⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.120.

²⁷⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009d. See also Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008e.

²⁷⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.81.

²⁷⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.121.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009b.

12. Philippines I / Government vs. NPA (1986 – 1992)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was founded in December 1968 in opposition to what it saw as the “semicolonial” and “semifeudal” character of Philippine society. The military branch of the CPP, the New People’s Army (NPA), was established in 1969 in order to carry out an armed socialist revolution, and soon launched a protracted “people’s war” along the lines of Mao Zedong’s guerrilla campaign in China.²⁸¹

During the 1970s and 1980s the movement expanded nationwide. Already in 1972, Philippine President Marcos declared martial law, “citing anarchy, lawlessness, urban terrorism, and open rebellion” by both the NPA and Muslim separatists.²⁸² In 1973 the CPP’s political wing became known as the National Democratic Front (NDF). Meanwhile, the NPA continued to increase in size and capabilities. By 1985, according to the U.S. State Department, some observers believed that it had as many as 16,000 armed guerillas and an equal number of part-time fighters, as well as a large political and logistical support structure.²⁸³ Still, through the late 1970s and early 1980s violence associated with the NPA was relatively limited as the CPP and NPA worked to build mass support at the local level, and does not appear to have approached the levels of a complex emergency.²⁸⁴

During the mid-1980s, however, the armed struggle intensified significantly. In particular, in 1986 President Marcos was ousted from power and the new President, Corazon Aquino, intensified operations against the NPA. At the same time, throughout the second half of the decade the NPA pursued a ‘strategic counter-offensive’ that involved large-scale military operations in the countryside.²⁸⁵ Together this and the government’s counter-insurgency efforts (which significantly weakened the NPA over time) dramatically increased the scale of violence, thus justifying the start of the complex emergency. Indeed, according to USCR, between 1986 and 1990 alone, “fighting between the Philippine armed forces and the NPA displaced more than 900,000 people.”²⁸⁶

In 1992 a new government under President Fidel Ramos pursued a policy of negotiation and offered amnesty for former combatants and legalization of the CPP, leading to a reduction in conflict intensity. Threats to civilians and displacement continued, but at levels below the threshold of a complex emergency.

Annual data

1986 (Certainty: 2)

In February of 1986 leadership of the Philippine government transitioned from the authoritarian regime of President Marcos to a democratic government led by President Corazon Aquino, who moved quickly on completion of a constitution and guarantees for the protection of civil rights.

²⁸¹ For a brief history of the NPA see e.g., Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.16.

²⁸² U.S. Department of State 1986b, p.848.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ See e.g., Sambanis 2004, p.183-184.

²⁸⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.16.

²⁸⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.66.

Nevertheless, large-scale violence between NPA and government forces plagued the country during the year. Confrontations were frequent and although estimates of fatalities were difficult to obtain, there were regular political killings in areas where the NPA and government forces were actively engaged.²⁸⁷ According to one estimate, during the first 10 months of 1986 the NPA “was involved in 2,382 violent activities including raids, ambushes, liquidations, kidnappings, bombings and arson,” which resulted in the deaths of 756 civilians and 842 military, police and paramilitary personnel.²⁸⁸ In addition, the fighting “resulted in widespread displacement of civilians.”²⁸⁹

As noted above, USCR reported that some 900,000 people were displaced by the conflict from 1986 to 1990.²⁹⁰ More specifically, over 450,000 were displaced by government counter-insurgency operations between January 1988 and August 1989.²⁹¹ Although more precise annual data are not available for 1986, the average total amount displaced during these years is well above the minimum threshold of 30,000 and suggests that the year can be coded a two even without more information about the scale of displacement.

1987 (Certainty: 3)

The communist insurgency infiltrated all 73 of the country’s provinces and continued to threaten the government during 1987. A 60-day ceasefire ended in February after the NDF abandoned political talks. During the year communist rebels increased their killing of soldiers and police in Manila and other urban centers while launching offensives aimed at destroying bridges, power facilities, and other economic infrastructure in rural areas.²⁹²

According to the Department of National Defense, some 2,914 violent incidents involving the communist rebels and government forces through December 17 led to the deaths of 946 civilians and over 2,500 fighters on both sides. In addition, according to the U.S. State Department, military engagements between government forces and insurgents occasionally resulted in the displacement of civilians and disruption of access to food supplies during the year, but such incidents were usually brief. Both the Philippine Red Cross and ICRC had programs to assist those who evacuated combat zones.²⁹³

As above, although clear information on the scope of new displacement in 1987 is lacking, the average total from 1986-1990 is well above the minimum annual threshold of 30,000. Thus 1987 can also be coded a two without more information about displacement during the year. Added to the additional confirming evidence, a three is appropriate.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to the U.S. State Department, “Human rights groups report that military units have sought to isolate insurgents from their support base by imposing food blockades and forcibly resettling...entire communities against their will.”²⁹⁴

1988 (Certainty: 3)

²⁸⁷ U.S. Department of State 1987c, p.793.

²⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State 1987c, p.795.

²⁸⁹ U.S. Department of State 1987c, p.799.

²⁹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.66.

²⁹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.56.

²⁹² U.S. Department of State 1988c, p.782.

²⁹³ U.S. Department of State 1988c, p.788-789.

²⁹⁴ U.S. Department of State 1988c, p.789.

According to the U.S. State Department the human rights situation in the Philippines worsened in 1988, partly due to fighting between the government and NPA and to the latter's continued campaigns of violence and terrorism in many areas of the country, which were linked with a number of disappearances.²⁹⁵ Overall, "The Armed Forces of the Philippines recorded an estimated 1,100 civilians killed in insurgency-related incidents in 1988."²⁹⁶

As noted above, USCR reports that between January 1988 and August 1989 over 450,000 people were displaced due to government counterinsurgency efforts.²⁹⁷ Thus, again, although there is no figure for 1988 specifically, it is possible to code the year a two on the basis of the average over this period alone (or on the basis of the 900,000 total from 1986-1990, also cited above). Added to this, the scope of the campaigns of rights abuses directed against civilians is enough to code a three.

1989 (Certainty: 3)

According to the U.S. State Department, in 1989 the CPP and NPA "escalated campaigns of urban terrorism, political assassination, kidnapping, and extortion, resulting in widespread human rights abuses."²⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the State Department also reported that although still high and difficult to measure with certainty, political killings dropped in 1989. It also cited an estimate of more than 1,000 people who lost their lives during the year due to the insurgency and counterinsurgency during the year.²⁹⁹ In addition, President Corazon Aquino's "total war policy...led to bombings and massive forced relocations of civilians in contested areas."³⁰⁰ Most of the people fleeing military operations and NPA harassment were peasants from Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.

As noted above, fighting from January 1988 to August 1989 internally displaced more than 450,000 people.³⁰¹ This alone is enough to code the year a two, and added to this, the campaigns of rights abuses directed against civilians and additional qualitative evidence (see below) are enough to code a three. Indeed, both the NPA and government perpetrated continued abuse of the civilian population. On the government side, Human Rights Watch states that "according to both the government's Commission on Human Rights and nongovernmental human rights groups, violations declined on all fronts, but reports of abuses, including disappearances, extrajudicial killings, incommunicado detention and warrantless arrests, continued."³⁰² Meanwhile, the NPA continued to kill members of the military, police, paramilitary forces and civilians even in non-combat situations.³⁰³

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions for Life of Displaced: An international and ecumenical fact-finding mission that visited the Philippines in late 1989 to investigate the conditions of IDPs concluded that the "deaths of more than 300 children as a result of measles and gastroenteritis epidemics at makeshift reception centers

²⁹⁵ U.S. Department of State 1989, p.899-903.

²⁹⁶ U.S. Department of State 1989, p.901.

²⁹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.56.

²⁹⁸ U.S. Department of State 1990b, p.950.

²⁹⁹ U.S. Department of State 1990b, p.951.

³⁰⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.56.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Human Rights Watch World Report 1992, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-11.htm#P740_276403.

³⁰³ Human Rights Watch World Report 1992, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-11.htm#P740_276403.

in Negros could have been prevented by government authorities.”³⁰⁴

1990 (Certainty: 3)

According to the U.S. State Department, armed conflict between government forces and the NPA as well as Muslim separatists “continued to have a major impact on the civilian population” and to produce new displacement “in a number of locations.”³⁰⁵ The Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development reported that 34,000 families were affected during the year, and the private Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and Communities claimed to confirm 48 cases of displacement affecting 19,000 families between January and September.³⁰⁶ Unfortunately it is unclear from these reports how much of this new displacement reflected conflict with the NPA, as opposed to other conflicts with Muslim separatists. About 5,000 civilians were forced to flee their homes near the southern city of Dipolog in February, for example, when the army began shelling it as part of an offensive against NPA strongholds in the area.³⁰⁷ In addition, associated with the conflict the CPP and NPA also continued to commit widespread rights abuses, while government forces were also responsible for various abuses during the year, together accounting for hundreds of extrajudicial killings.³⁰⁸

As noted above, although precise data on new displacement during the year associated with this conflict is not available, the total of 900,000 displaced in counter-insurgency operations against the NPA from 1986-1990 suggests at least a coding of two. Added to the confirming qualitative evidence (below), a coding of three is appropriate.

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Although the government and various private groups tried to provide food, shelter, and medical assistance to displaced persons, this was “in most cases not sufficient to prevent severe hardships among the affected population; moreover, sanitation conditions in evacuation areas were often poor, and the dislocations compounded already severe health problems among poverty-stricken civilians.”³⁰⁹

1991 (Certainty: 5)

In 1991 continued fighting between the government and the NPA generated substantial new displacement. According to USCR, “in February, up to 35,000 people were displaced by military combing operations against communist rebels in the Baguio region.”³¹⁰ More broadly, during the year the Philippine army penetrated remote areas of the country that had previously been undisputed guerrilla territory. According to the U.S. State Department, army activity in these areas “resulted in civilian casualties from aerial bombardment and indirect artillery fire and in sickness and death of the young and old from the destruction of housing and granaries and the imposition of food and

³⁰⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.66.

³⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State 1991c, p.1009.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.66.

³⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State 1991c, p.999-1002.

³⁰⁹ U.S. Department of State 1991c, p.1009.

³¹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.65. In addition, from January to May armed conflict in Mindanao displaced a further 5,700 families, but it was not clear whether this was associated with the government-vs.-NPA conflict.

medicine blockades.”³¹¹ Overall, the Philippines Department of Social Welfare “listed 4,200 families or 22,000 people for assistance as internal refugees from fighting in their localities during the first half of 1991.”³¹² They also stated that out of a total of one million displaced persons at the end of the year, some 43,400 qualified for first-time assistance as displaced persons in all of 1991.³¹³

1992 (Certainty: 2)

Fighting between the NPA and the Philippine government continued during the year, but was less intense than in previous years. The Philippines Department of Social Welfare stated that in the first half of 1992 some 17,400 people qualified for first-time assistance as displaced.³¹⁴

As noted above, a new government under Fidel Ramos offered amnesty for former combatants and legalization of the CPP. After this, subsequent reports from USCR stress that periodic fighting continued between the NPA and Philippine government, but at low levels. Some reports suggest that internal displacement at high volumes continued in subsequent years, but these reports are contested.³¹⁵ Moreover, by 1994 USCR estimated that the number who remained displaced did not exceed 15,000.³¹⁶ In 1998 USCR noted that the conflict “largely ended in the early 1990s.”³¹⁷ This provides justification for the termination in coding of this complex emergency.

³¹¹ U.S. Department of State 1992b, p.969.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.84.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.85.

³¹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.93.

³¹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.113.

13. Philippines II / Government vs. Muslim Insurgents (1996 – 2009)

Overall Certainty: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Civil Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

Armed conflict has displaced millions of people in the Philippines in recent decades. Much of this violence and displacement has centered on the island group of Mindanao, where the government and the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) began fighting Muslim separatist insurgent groups in the 1970s. In the years between the end of the Cold War and the mid-1990s this violence fell below the threshold of a complex emergency, but starting in 1996 the level of violence and displacement intensified and prompted the coding of a new complex emergency. Ironically, this happened even as the government signed a ceasefire with the dominant Muslim separatist group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Subsequently another – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – emerged as the country’s main insurgent organization.

The roots of the conflict lie in programs initiated by the central government a century ago. Starting in 1912, “the government initiated resettlement programs that brought Christian immigration to Mindanao.”³¹⁸ The “Quirino-Recto Colonization Act” of 1935 paved the way for “the massive and uncontrolled entry” of mostly Christian settlers creating massive displacement of the native Muslim population, the Moro, of Mindanao.³¹⁹ According to the IDMC, underdevelopment of the region, “unequal distribution of wealth, and lack of sufficient effort by the central government to integrate the Muslim (Moro) minority into the political and institutional fabric of the overwhelmingly Catholic country, have fomented the Muslim secessionist movements.”³²⁰ Fighting and displacement has been mainly concentrated in the Muslim areas of central and southwestern Mindanao, where “rich reserves of untapped natural resources and raw materials have been an added factor in the government’s fight against Muslim secessionist movements.”³²¹

From the 1930s to the 1970s the Moro formed several rebel groups, including the MNLF, which initiated sporadic independence movements. Fighting became fierce in the early 1970s and the government declared martial law in 1972 as “casualties quickly reached tens of thousands.”³²² Violence continued sporadically and a rift in MNLF leadership led to the formation of the MILF, which distinguished itself from MNLF by advocating an Islamic character of the Moro struggle.

Following a burst of violence in 1996, the government and MNLF signed an agreement providing for a ceasefire and prioritizing development in the poorest regions of the country. It was hoped that this agreement would put an end to the conflict, but the more radical MILF did not sign. In 1997 the MILF signed a separate ceasefire agreement, which they then repeatedly violated. Over the next few years many former MNLF militants joined the MILF and the conflict continued to escalate. In March of 2000 Philippine President Joseph Estrada declared ‘all out’ war on the MILF and fighting spread to most regions of Mindanao, displacing nearly a million people during the year.³²³ A 2001 ceasefire between the MILF and government established guidelines providing for the return and rehabilitation of the evacuees. Both sides repeatedly violated the agreement

³¹⁸ The East West Center 2004 p.8.

³¹⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007c, p.22.

³²⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007c, p.8-9.

³²¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007c, p.9.

³²² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007c, p.23.

³²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011b, p.36.

throughout 2001 and 2002, however, further increasing instability in Mindanao and hampering the return of IDPs.

According to the IDMC, “between 2003 and 2007, dialogue and confidence-building measures prevented the continuing sporadic skirmishes and army operations against criminal gangs from turning into large-scale confrontations involving the MILF.”³²⁴ Nevertheless, despite ongoing peace talks, the ceasefire agreement, and international monitors from Malaysia, “regular armed encounters between the army, its paramilitary allies and the MILF continued to displace tens of thousands of people each year” during this period, including more than 400,000 people during government offensives in 2003 alone.³²⁵ In addition, in September 2006, the peace negotiations broke down over the issue of which areas in the southern region of Mindanao would be included in an expanded Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

In 2008 a failed effort to arrange a Memorandum of Understanding between the government and MILF led to renewed large-scale fighting that again displaced hundreds of thousands. Then in April 2009 the government dropped demands for the surrender of three MILF commanders as a precondition for the resumption of talks while also increasing military operations in Maguindanao Province to find them. This led to more large-scale displacement that only ended with a new ceasefire agreement in July. In September 2009 the two sides agreed to resume formal peace talks with the assistance of an international contact group (ICG).³²⁶

According to the IDMC, after September 2009 the ensuing peace talks “had positive results,” but with little progress on key issues “of territory, jurisdiction and governance.”³²⁷ Still, through 2010 the peace agreement held and violence declined substantially, justifying the end of coding for this complex emergency. Overall from 2000 to 2009 an estimated three million people were displaced by conflict in the Philippines, most by government-MILF violence and most from Mindanao’s majority-Muslim provinces.³²⁸

Annual Data

1996 (Certainty: 5)

The ongoing conflict both intensified and changed significantly in 1996. A new round of fighting in April between government and MNLF forces left “34 dead and displaced more than 6,000 families.”³²⁹ Philippine NGOs estimated that more than 90,000 Filipinos were displaced due to fighting for some period of time during 1996.³³⁰ Meanwhile, in a formal peace agreement Philippine authorities agreed to establish a semi-autonomous region comprised of four predominantly Muslim communities in Mindanao. This resulted in thousands of MNLF laying down their weapons in September 1996, but the MILF was not a party to this agreement and continued fighting.

³²⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.14.

³²⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.15; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011b, p.36.

³²⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.18.

³²⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011b, p.20.

³²⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011b, p.36.

³²⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.119.

³³⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.113.

1997 (Certainty: 5)

Despite seeming progress towards a peace agreement in September 1996, violence and displacement resumed in 1997, caused by counter-insurgency operations and by encounters between the armed forces and rebels. During the first half of 1997, Philippine NGOs estimated that over 175,000 people became newly displaced, although most were able to return home by the end of the year.³³¹

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: In an August 1997 report USCR noted that, “even during the brief time they remain away from their homes, the displaced receive little assistance. When they return home, they often find their houses looted or destroyed, their crops lost or animals dead, and they received little if any assistance.”³³² Indeed, although the Philippine government officially accepted responsibility for the displaced, in practice it offered little real aid and NGOs and religious organizations provided some help but were unable to fill in the gap.

1998 (Certainty: 5)

According to USCR up to 41,000 people were newly displaced during 1998 by armed conflict.³³³ In addition, at the end of the year some “122,820 persons were internally displaced due to armed conflict between the Philippine government and insurgent forces,” but it was not clear how many had been newly displaced during the year itself.³³⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Unwillingness/Inability: As in previous years the Philippine government officially accepted responsibility for the displaced, and national and local government agencies were charged with assisting them; however, “the government provided little real assistance to the uprooted” and NGOs lacked the resources to fill the gap.³³⁵

1999 (Certainty: 5)

Throughout 1999 peace talks between the government and Muslim insurgent groups continued but did not result in an agreement. Ceasefires took hold and were broken, and the fighting resulted in more deaths and displacement. According to the private Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and Communities, at least 330,000 people were forced to leave their homes during 1999, mostly to escape government counterinsurgency operations.³³⁶ Numerous Muslims fled as refugees to Malaysia, where some 45,000 remained at the end of the year.³³⁷

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ As noted below at least 330,000 were forced to leave their homes during 1999, mostly to escape government counterinsurgency operations against the Muslim insurgents, and USCR noted that was more than 8 times the figure for the previous year. This suggests that up to 41,000 people were newly displaced in 1998. See United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.151.

³³⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.115.

³³⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.116.

³³⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.151.

³³⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.152.

Confirming Evidence

b) Government Unwillingness/Inability: According to USCR, the assistance provided by the Philippine government and other aid agencies was again insufficient to meet displaced civilians' needs.³³⁸

2000 (Certainty: 5)

The year 2000 proved to be among the bloodiest and most tumultuous in the three-decade long conflict. The AFP launched two major offensives against the MILF and a new Muslim insurgent group led by Abu Sayyaf (ASG), which left "500 civilians dead (200 others died of various diseases in unsanitary evacuation centers for displaced persons), more than 6,600 homes destroyed, and an estimated 800,000 Filipinos displaced."³³⁹ According to the IDMC, the figure of newly displaced was even greater – at up to 1,000,000 – since the figure reported by USCR reflected only people the Philippine government claimed to help.³⁴⁰ According to USCR, some 150,000 remained displaced at the end of the year.³⁴¹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to USCR, "An international human rights group reported that in Jolo the government denied access to the displaced to medical and other relief workers," while NGOs and others claimed that government efforts to provide for the needs of the displaced were inadequate and that the relevant government institutions lacked the necessary capacity to deal with the scope of the emergency.³⁴²

2001 (Certainty: 5)

The government and MILF signed a cease-fire agreement in June and reinforced it in August, providing guidelines for the return of IDPs. Fighting continued, however, and the year saw an "estimated 158,000 newly displaced by the conflict," of which some 53,000 were still displaced at year's end.³⁴³ Moreover, the government also had to contend with a break-off faction known as Pentagon. Fighting between the government and Pentagon resulted in the displacement of "25,000 persons, some of whom reported that the violence worsened when local MILF members reinforced the Pentagon."³⁴⁴

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Conditions in Mindanao during the year limited the return of 135,000 to 150,000 IDPs, including those displaced during the year and an additional 80,000-100,000 displaced in 2000. Returnees were hampered not only by violence, but also problems with housing reconstruction, land mines, and rebel presence. Many stayed in shelters with inadequate or nonexistent health facilities.³⁴⁵

³³⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.151.

³³⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.146.

³⁴⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.14.

³⁴¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.145.

³⁴² United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.147.

³⁴³ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.134.

³⁴⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.135.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

2002 (Certainty: 5)

Cease-fire negotiations continued between the government and MILF during 2002, but were punctuated by periodic episodes of violence that continued to prompt new displacement during the year. After September 11, 2001, reported links between Filipino Islamist rebel leader Abu Sayyaf and international terrorists, combined with the long history of cooperation between the Philippines and the United States, contributed to a U.S. decision to support Philippine President Arroyo's efforts in defeating ASG. In February of 2002, 660 U.S. troops, including 160 Special Forces, joined the AFP as advisors on the island of Basilan. The U.S. military conducted surveillance flights and provided hardware to the AFP and the Philippine police for use against Abu Sayyaf and the MILF.³⁴⁶

According to USCR, an "estimated 90,000 persons became newly displaced by continued fighting during the year. Most fled in fear of cross fire, were ordered by the military to vacate, or were afraid of being accused of supporting the MILF or Abu Sayyaf."³⁴⁷ At year's end approximately half of these newly displaced refugees were able to return to their homes. The remainder were unable to do so because of ongoing military operations, the presence of land mines, and the destruction of their homes.

2003 (Certainty: 5)

Large-scale government operations against MILF in central Mindanao resumed in February 2003 with intense bombardments and burning of homes, displacing over 400,000 people by May. A July ceasefire ended the renewed fighting and allowed most of the displaced to return home, but an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 remained in evacuation centers as of the end of July while an additional unknown number were still staying with friends and relatives. In practice, conditions were often not conducive to sustainable return.³⁴⁸

2004 (Certainty: 5)

Improved dialogue between the government and MILF reduced the number of large armed confrontations and the scale of new displacement during 2004. The decline in violence also allowed the gradual return of the majority of the displaced to their homes.³⁴⁹ Still, it seems clear that the scale of new displacement due to clashes during the year met the threshold for a continued complex emergency. IDMC cites two different estimates of new displacement for 2004, initially claiming that it amounted to 63,000 people but later citing a lower estimate of approximately 44,000.³⁵⁰

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Unwillingness/Inability: According to the IDMC, "most returnees struggle for daily survival in an environment of economic depression where there are few opportunities for earning a living."³⁵¹ The Philippine government acknowledged its responsibility to assist IDPs,

³⁴⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.132-133.

³⁴⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.133. Similarly, the IDMC cited some 70,000 displaced in a series of incidents between February and August, mostly in February – March. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2002, p.12.

³⁴⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005c, p.7; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003c, p.6-7. See also Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.14, 16.

³⁴⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004d, p.7-8.

³⁵⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005c, p.44; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007c, p.9.

³⁵¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004d, p.7.

but serious gaps between intentions and implementation persisted. These shortcomings resulted from a lack of “capacity of national and local institutions to effectively deal with the scale of displacement and from lack of funding.”³⁵²

2005 (Certainty: 5)

Regular clashes between government forces and rebel groups resumed in 2005, with the largest concentrated early in the year between February and April. Overall the IDMC estimated that approximately 178,000 people were newly displaced due to fighting during the year. While many were able to return home within weeks, a civil society organization in Sulu reported that as of early September thousands of families still remained displaced due to these operations.³⁵³

2006 (Certainty: 5)

According to the IDMC, an estimated “100,000 people were displaced from their homes in the Philippines during 2006 as a result of armed conflict and human right abuses. The main displacement movements occurred in the southernmost island of Mindanao where, in two separate incidents, close to 70,000 people were forced from their homes in Maguindanao province following clashes between Muslim separatist rebels and security forces.”³⁵⁴ While most of these people were displaced for a relatively short period, tens of thousands in Mindanao remained displaced due to a combination of this and previous violence. For example, more than six months after the displacement of some 40,000 people in Maguindanao in mid-2006, the IDMC reported that some 20% still could not return home.³⁵⁵

2007 (Certainty: 5)

Peace negotiations faltered in 2006, leading to an increase in armed clashes in 2007. According to the IDMC, an estimated total of 170,000 people were displaced by armed conflict during the year, most in majority-Muslim areas including Maguindanao, Sulu and Basilan and Provinces. More specifically, “In Midsayap, North Cotabato Province, some 25,000 people fled intermittent clashes between MILF rebels and government forces between January and March 2007. In Basilan, fighting between the army and the MILF led to the displacement of over 24,000 people between July and September 2007. In Datu Piang, Maguindanao Province, clan fighting broke out in December 2007 alongside conflict between the MILF and the army.”³⁵⁶ In addition, in the traditional MNLF stronghold of Sulu, government operations against the ASG have often dragged MNLF fighters into the mix, as they did again in 2007. In April-May, army-MNLF conflict in the area resumed and displaced an estimated 80,000 people.³⁵⁷

³⁵² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005c, p.10.

³⁵³ E.g., Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005c, p.7-8; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007c, p.57.

³⁵⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007c, p.8.

³⁵⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007c, p.12.

³⁵⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008b, p.11.

³⁵⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008b, p.12.

2008 (Certainty: 5)

According to IDMC, “In July 2008, the government and the MILF announced a breakthrough in negotiations with a memorandum of agreement (MoA) on the issue of an autonomous Moro homeland known as the ‘Bangsamoro Judicial Entity’ reflecting the Moro peoples’ ‘ancestral domain.’ Under the agreement, more than 700 villages in Mindanao would vote in 2009 on whether to become part of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).” However, the agreement attracted strong criticism from Christian communities, and the Supreme Court first suspended it and then declared it unconstitutional. Reacting to these events, in August 2008 MILF combatants initiated another round of intense fighting by launching attacks on Christian communities in Cotabato and Lanao del Norte Provinces. Ensuing clashes with the AFP led to the displacement in the following weeks of hundreds of thousands of people in several provinces of Mindanao. By the end of the year it was estimated that more than 600,000 people had been displaced; at least half remained displaced at the end of the year.³⁵⁸

2009 (Certainty: 5)

According to the IDMC, “low-intensity conflict continued in the first months of 2009, causing displacement on a smaller scale. Peace talks remained stalled with neither side conceding ground toward a compromise. In April, the government dropped demands for the surrender of three MILF commanders held responsible for the 2008 attacks as a precondition for the resumption of talks,” but also intensified military operations aimed at finding them.³⁵⁹ This escalation once again led to new large-scale displacement, ending with yet another ceasefire agreement in July. In May the government acknowledged that fighting had displaced more than 750,000 people over the previous nine months, and according to the IDMC some 150,000 to 200,000 people were then displaced between May and July, “which would put the total number of people displaced since August 2008 at up to 950,000.”³⁶⁰ In September the government and MILF agreed to invite an international contact group (ICG) to facilitate the resumption of formal peace talks.

Post-2009

As noted above, the July 2009 ceasefire held, although the ensuing peace talks failed to make any major progress on several of the major substantive issues between the parties. Despite continued low-level displacement reflecting the government’s campaign against the ASG over the next couple of years, therefore, 2009 qualifies as the last year of the complex emergency. As IDMC notes, after the ceasefire, “security improved significantly as armed confrontations between the warring parties came to a near end.”³⁶¹

According to the IDMC, by mid-2011 a majority of the people displaced between August 2008 and July 2009 were able to return home or resettle elsewhere, although “many remain[ed] in need of humanitarian assistance and support to help them rebuild their homes and lives.”³⁶² Most returnees faced limited access to agricultural assets, education, health care services and water and

³⁵⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.18; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008b, p.9.

³⁵⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.18.

³⁶⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009c, p.23.

³⁶¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011b, p.26.

³⁶² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011b, p.7.

sanitation facilities. Not all could regain access to their land or homes, many of which were severely damaged or destroyed. In some places, unexploded ordinances and a volatile security situation proved further obstacles. Still, most of the displaced were now “in need of recovery rather than emergency assistance,” and the government initiated several new programs to assist them.³⁶³

Low-level violence in the conflict between the government and Muslim militants did continue in 2010-2011, mainly associated with the government’s fight against ASG, but fell below the level of a complex emergency. Notably, in February 2010, violence in Sulu and Basilan provinces “forced thousands of people to flee their homes,” and in January 2011, violence in Basilan displaced over 7,000 people.³⁶⁴

Finally, as violence between the insurgent groups and the government abated in the aftermath of the 2009 ceasefire, communal conflict – specifically, clan violence known as *rido* – emerged as a new primary source of displacement in Mindanao. While the scale of rido- related displacement was significant – at least 70,000 people were displaced in 2010, and an estimated 20,000 people plus a further 2,000 families were displaced in the first half of 2011 – the nature of the conflict was sufficiently distinct from the main government-insurgent conflict of the previous decades so as not to qualify as part of the complex emergency. In particular, rido violence was mainly triggered by land disputes and political and economic rivalries at the local level, and within the Muslim community.³⁶⁵

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011b, p.9, 28.

³⁶⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2011b, p.7, 9, 26-27.

15. Sri Lanka II (2006 – 2009)

Overall Coding: 2

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

After four years, Sri Lanka's 2002 ceasefire collapsed in 2006 and the country erupted in a second full-scale civil war.³⁶⁶ As described above, the conflict originally stemmed from historical divisions between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. After the end of Britain's colonial rule of Sri Lanka in 1948, a series of government policies led Tamils to fear marginalization in an increasingly Sinhalese-dominated society. From 1956 onward, there were outbreaks of communal violence and growing radicalization of some members of the Tamil community. By the mid-1970s, Tamil political leaders were increasingly calling for their own independent state in the Tamil-dominated north and east of Sri Lanka. The Tamils formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 1976. Fighting erupted between the government and LTTE in 1983 and continued for two decades, despite numerous attempts at negotiations and a peacekeeping force sent by India from 1987-1989.

Finally, in early 2002 the Sri Lankan government and LTTE formalized a ceasefire agreement that led to several rounds of peace talks between September 2002 and March 2003. The government agreed to lift its ban on the LTTE, while the LTTE gave up their demands for a separate state. International monitors under the auspices of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) deployed to oversee the ceasefire.

Over the next several years Sri Lanka observed a period of 'no war and no peace.' One year into the ceasefire the LTTE abandoned peace talks, but overt conflict remained limited. Both sides, but especially the LTTE, periodically breached the ceasefire and there were sporadic episodes of violence. In 2006 the European Union banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization, and the SLMM was reduced by half when the LTTE responded by ordering monitors from EU member states to leave the mission.

The catalyst for resumption of full-scale war was a July 2006 incident concerning control of water for irrigation. Afterwards, according to the IDMC, "Intense fighting erupted in the north and east, with widespread violations of human rights, including the use of civilians as human shields, attacks on places of worship and refuge, retaliatory killings, abductions and disappearances, targeted assassinations, widespread displacement and forced returns, all contributing to create an enormous humanitarian crisis."³⁶⁷ The war lasted for three years, with both sides engaging in intentional targeting of civilians and indiscriminate attacks. These accelerated sharply after the Sri Lankan government officially pulled out of the 2002 ceasefire in January 2008, prompting the SLMM to withdraw from the country entirely.³⁶⁸

By July 2007 the government was able to announce the 'liberation' of eastern Sri Lanka from the LTTE and turned its attention toward the rebel stronghold in the north, known as the Vanni.³⁶⁹ Over the next two years it progressively took back LTTE territory, and together its assaults on the region combined with the LTTE's population control efforts to create enormous civilian suffering. In 2008 government bombing forced civilians from their homes – an estimated 200,000 by October, according to aid agencies – but most remained trapped (at least for a time) in the conflict region

³⁶⁶ The summary presented here is based on background information provided in Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.28-29.

³⁶⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.29.

³⁶⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.27-28.

³⁶⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.23.

when the LTTE would not allow them to cross into government territory.³⁷⁰ Despite the risk of LTTE retaliation, however, numerous civilians sought to escape the danger in the Vanni by fleeing to government-held areas. According to the IDMC, between October 2008 and June 2009, over 280,000 people fled to government territory. Suspected by the government as LTTE sympathizers and fighters, most ended up in overcrowded military-run camps from which they were not permitted to leave, often for months.³⁷¹

The war finally ended in May 2009 with government victory when the LTTE surrendered after its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed and the remnants of its army defeated. The months leading up to the government's triumph, however, were the most devastating of the war for the civilian population. The LTTE used tens of thousands of civilians who were unable to escape its shrinking territory as human shields, while the government's shelling and bombing of the area led to an estimated 7,500 civilian deaths and an additional 15,000 injuries between mid-January and early May, and potentially thousands more civilians were killed during the final offensive in mid-May.³⁷²

Annual Data

2006 (Coding: 5)

In 2006 internal displacement occurred primarily from actual or feared conflict-related violence and devastation of people's livelihoods. In July, heavy fighting in Trincomalee district killed hundreds of people and displaced an estimated 50,000. According to the IDMC, "Thousands of civilians, including women and children, were forced to walk for nearly two days without food and water in search of safety."³⁷³ On August 11 the combat spread to the Tamil-majority Jaffna Peninsula in the north, and according to the UN the fighting there displaced some 60,000 people over the next six weeks, nearly half of them children.³⁷⁴ More broadly, by late summer several sources suggested that nationwide approximately 200,000 people had been displaced due to fighting during the year so far.³⁷⁵

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The escalation of conflict during the year involved extensive human rights violations by both government and LTTE, including "deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, hundreds of enforced disappearances, unlawful killings of aid workers, arbitrary arrests, torture and the use of child soldiers."³⁷⁶

³⁷⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.37-38.

³⁷¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.13.

³⁷² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.20-21. These estimates of civilian casualties and injuries are from the UN. Amnesty International cited similar figures of 7,000 and 13,000, respectively. See p.21. Estimates of the number of civilians trapped in the conflict zone in the final weeks of the conflict also varied. According to the UN, some 100,000 fled in mid-April, leaving 50,000 to 100,000 civilians still trapped. By contrast, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense estimated only 15,000 to 20,000 civilians in the area as of late April. See Fuller 2009.

³⁷³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.41.

³⁷⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.147.

³⁷⁵ For example, UNHCR and government sources suggested that the number of new IDPs had grown to approximately 200,000 in September, mainly from conflict-affected areas in Jaffna, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa. Likewise, according to Reuters (30 August 2006), "Hundreds of troops, Tamil Tiger rebels and civilians have been killed in the fighting in the past month, and more than 200,000 civilians have been displaced from their homes and are living in tent cities, churches and mosques across the island." See Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.85 and 113 respectively.

³⁷⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.21. See also p.68-69.

b) Conditions for Life of Displaced: According to UNICEF, there were severe shortages of food and other items in areas where newly displaced persons congregated in 2006. Many IDP sites also offered inadequate shelter and were prone to flooding.³⁷⁷

2007 (Coding: 5)

In May 2007, the government announced that it intended to eliminate the LTTE leadership and eradicate the group, a process it expected to take two to three years. By July, it had taken control of the entire eastern province for the first time in 13 years.³⁷⁸ As noted above, after this the army turned its attention to the rebels' stronghold in the north. In September, government-LTTE hostilities forced 22,000 people to flee their homes in northwestern Sri Lanka in Mannar and Jaffna districts.³⁷⁹ Thereafter, fighting intensified late in the year as the military sought to retake LTTE-controlled territory in the north. The government's military strategy relied on "massive artillery and aerial bombing of LTTE forward defence lines...to weaken defences sufficiently for measured ground assaults."³⁸⁰ As of December 31, government figures published by UNHCR showed over 148,000 people displaced by the renewed fighting in the north. Approximately half of these were in the LTTE-controlled Vanni, which was becoming increasingly difficult for aid groups to access. Hundreds of thousands more remained vulnerable to continued government assaults in the area.³⁸¹

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: In March 2007 the World Food Program (WFP) reported that the recent near-doubling of the IDP population had strained its resources and forced it to curtail nutrition and feeding programs in some districts in order to be able to provide some help to the newly displaced. By summer, meanwhile, "Nutrition surveys by the government and international agencies showed rising levels of acute malnutrition in the northern Jaffna district as a result of conflict-related disruption of livelihoods and markets, the closure of the A9 highway, and security-related restrictions on farming and fishing. Food assistance for the internally displaced and other vulnerable groups was in short supply for months after the A9 closure, since WFP was only able to transport 20 per cent of the required rations to Jaffna."³⁸²

2008 (Coding: 5)

In 2008 hundreds of thousands of Tamil civilians remained trapped by fighting between the Sri Lankan armed forces and LTTE in the north of the country. The LTTE banned civilians from leaving areas under their control. As government forces attacked rebel-controlled territory, however, many thousands were displaced as they fled the shifting frontlines and sought to stay out of shelling range. As they did so, they were forced into a progressively smaller area. According to Amnesty International, government shelling and aerial bombardments between May and mid-August "forced more than 70,000 people to flee their homes, primarily in Kilinochchi and Mulaitivu districts."³⁸³ In October, the ICRC reported that large numbers of people were still fleeing the Kilinochchi district. At that time aid agencies estimated approximately 200,000 people had been

³⁷⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.141-142.

³⁷⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.29.

³⁷⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.39.

³⁸⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.39-40.

³⁸¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.40.

³⁸² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.152.

³⁸³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.37.

displaced by the fighting. Similarly, that same month the LTTE reported that some 113,000 people had been uprooted in August and an additional 52,000 in recent weeks.³⁸⁴

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Humanitarian relief was ‘extremely limited’ for those trapped in the conflict zone as aid agencies struggled to meet the needs of the growing displaced population in the face of escalating conflict.³⁸⁵

2009 (Coding: 5)

As noted above, the war ended in mid-May when the Sri Lankan government overran the final territory under LTTE control and killed the rebel group’s leadership.³⁸⁶ During the final months of fighting, civilians and IDPs faced terrible violence and grave human rights abuses by both sides that led to an escalation of the already serious humanitarian crisis. UN agencies estimated more than 7,500 civilians killed and over 15,000 wounded between mid-January and early May, and the final offensive in mid-May may have killed thousands more.³⁸⁷ Some 280,000 people are thought to have fled the conflict zone for government territory between October 2008 and June 2009.³⁸⁸ According to the UN, approximately 100,000 fled in mid-April alone, leaving 50,000 to 100,000 civilians still trapped on the sandy spit of land that represented the LTTE’s remaining territory.³⁸⁹

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: In the first few months of 2009 civilians who fled the LTTE zone for government territory mainly ended up in government-controlled camps where, according to the BBC, officials struggled “with the mammoth task of feeding, clothing and sheltering them.”³⁹⁰ Indeed, camp life posed numerous hazards including a lack of shelter, overcrowding, and inadequate access to water, sanitation, and health facilities.

³⁸⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.37-38.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.21.

³⁸⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.20-21.

³⁸⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.13.

³⁸⁹ Fuller 2009; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.140.

³⁹⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009h, p.140. By late April, according to UNHCR, this included some “160,000 people...displaced by fighting into the Government controlled areas, of which more than 140,000 are being accommodated in 32 sites in Vavuniya, another 11,000 in Jaffna and some 5,000 in Trincomalee.” See p.141.

16. Azerbaijan - Armenia (USSR) (1988 – 1991)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Communal Violence

General Information & Overall Severity

A dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory in the South Caucasus traces its roots to more than a century of tension between Christian Armenians and Muslim Turkic Azeris in the region. In the early 19th century, the region became part of the Russian empire and its population lived in relative peace, although both sides partook in acts of brutality against the other in the early 20th century. Following the Bolshevik revolution, the new Soviet rulers established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Though located within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, the majority of Nagorno-Karabakh's population was ethnically Armenian.

As the Soviet Union began to loosen control over its territories during the late 1980s, 80,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh signed a petition in January 1988 asking that the territory be transferred to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. On February 20, 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Soviet passed a resolution formally requesting that the territory be incorporated into Armenia, which was rejected by both Moscow and Baku. Tensions in the region erupted into turmoil, which took the form of demonstrations, strikes, and political quarreling. Violence exploded on February 28 when a pogrom in the Armenian quarter of the Azeri city of Sumgait left 26 Armenians and six Azeris dead.³⁹¹ Continued demonstrations in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Yerevan prompted Soviet intervention and triggered waves of violent deportations of Armenians from Azerbaijan and Azeris from Armenia. The presence of Soviet troops not only failed to end the violence, but at times contributed to making it worse. By the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the conflict had produced more than 1,000 deaths and more than half a million refugees.³⁹²

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent countries. In September 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Soviet announced the establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a declaration that was annulled by the Azeri parliament in November. In January 1992, the Nagorno-Karabakh parliament declared independence from Azerbaijan, requesting and failing to receive international recognition.

At this point the conflict entered a second stage that justifies the coding of a new complex emergency. First, Azerbaijan and Armenia were now independent, with separate governments responsible for their own civilian populations. In addition, the conflict changed dramatically. Between 1988 and 1991, it primarily took the form of inter-communal violence between Azeris and Armenians. Displacement was mostly cross-border, with ethnic Armenians fleeing Azerbaijan and ethnic Azeris fleeing Armenia. By contrast, between 1992 and 1994 the violence morphed into a civil war for political control of Nagorno-Karabakh that was mostly limited to the territory of Azerbaijan. It was fought primarily between organized military units, and displacement was primarily within Azerbaijan.³⁹³

³⁹¹ De Waal 2005.

³⁹² United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.78.

³⁹³ On the change in the pattern of displacement in 1991-92, see Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003b, p.9-11.

Annual Data

1988 (Certainty: 5)

USCR reported that in 1988, some 230,000 Armenians and 160,000 Azeris were displaced by pogroms and inter-ethnic violence in Armenia and Azerbaijan.³⁹⁴ In the wake of the February demonstrations in Stepanakert and Yerevan, Armenians and Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh engaged in communal violence, characterized by individual attacks in the form of hostage taking, destroying livestock, and stoning passing cars.

1989 – 1990 (Certainty: Both 2)

Pogroms and forced population exchanges continued in 1989 and 1990, with gangs of Armenians and Azeris attacking each other and both sides engaging in hostage taking and other human rights abuses. Violence intensified in late 1989 and the first half of 1990 as Armenians protested Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. By the end of January 1990 USCR estimated that the number of displaced Armenians had climbed to 300,000.³⁹⁵ Based on displacement figures from 1988, this suggests that an additional 70,000 Armenians were displaced between 1989 and January 1990. In addition, USCR later reported that 173,000 to 195,000 ethnic Azeris fled to Azerbaijan from Armenia between 1988-1989.³⁹⁶ Based on the 1988 figures cited above, this implies that approximately 13,000 to 35,000 Azeris entered Azerbaijan in 1989. On the other hand, Human Rights Watch gives slightly different figures, claiming that the 1988-1990 period saw the flight of 300,000-350,000 Armenians and about 167,000 Azeris.³⁹⁷

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The conflict prompted Moscow to deploy troops and place Nagorno-Karabakh under its direct control in early 1989. According to USCR, violence nevertheless continued, and arms flowed freely to both sides.³⁹⁸ In November, the Soviet direct command was abolished and Nagorno-Karabakh was returned to Azeri control. In December 1989, the Armenian Supreme Soviet moved to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh into the Armenian Republic. This led to anti-Armenian riots and pogroms in Azerbaijan, which killed about 68 Armenians in January 1990. In the course of repressing these demonstrations, Soviet troops killed about 100 mostly unarmed Azeris. During the spring, Soviet troops used force at least twice to end Armenian demonstrations. In addition, although it received aid from UNHCR, Armenia struggled to care for its population and refugees thanks to the Azeri blockade.³⁹⁹

1991 (Certainty: 2)

By the end of 1991, USCR estimated that there were over half a million refugees and that the entire Azeri population of Armenia had fled the country.⁴⁰⁰ Given the uncertainty surrounding the scale of

³⁹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.65.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Different USCR reports cite different numbers. In 1991 (p.76-7), USCR reported that 173,000 had fled in 1988-89, while in its 1993 report (p.112) it cited a figure of 195,000 for the same time period).

³⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch 1994a, p.1.

³⁹⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.112.

³⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch 1994a, p.2-3. See also Cornell 1999.

⁴⁰⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.77-79.

new displacement in 1989-1990, however, it is unclear how many of these may have been displaced in 1991 (though see ‘Confirming Evidence’ below for confirmation of at least some new displacement). Still, the year saw the growing formation of Armenian paramilitary groups as well as regular raids on villages, clashes between armed bands of Armenians and Azeris, and attacks on law enforcement officials and military outposts (an estimated 115 between January and May).⁴⁰¹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: During the spring and summer of 1991, a joint Soviet and Azeri military and police operation known as “Operation Ring” led to the clearing of as many as 24 Armenian-populated villages on the northern periphery of Nagorno-Karabakh and the deportation of thousands. The operation was reportedly carried out with an unprecedented degree of violence and a systematic violation of human rights.⁴⁰² Thereafter, according to Human Rights Watch, “skirmishes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces became more frequent in Nagorno-Karabakh and bordering districts. In the late summer and early autumn 1991 Armenians fought to retake their villages, and Azeris used force to counter Nagorno-Karabakh’s declaration of independence. The number of casualties and hostages began to mount rapidly.”⁴⁰³

⁴⁰¹ Human Rights Watch 1994a, p.3-4.

⁴⁰² Human Rights Watch 1994a, p.5.

⁴⁰³ Human Rights Watch 1994a, p.6.

17. Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh (1992 – 1994)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

Following more than a century of ethnic tension, violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted in 1988. At that time, both Armenia and Azerbaijan were republics of the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders had planted the seeds of turmoil early in the 20th century when they created the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, placing an ethnically Armenian Christian population under the control of Muslim Azeris. Until 1988, however, the populations had lived in relative peace, though acts of brutality on both sides in the early 20th century marked popular memory.

As Soviet control loosened in the late 1980s, ethnic frictions between Armenia and Azerbaijan turned violent. The first stage of the conflict, which took place between 1988 and 1991, began when the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Soviet formally requested incorporation into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. This stage was marked primarily by inter-communal violence between Azeris and Armenians, and displacement was mostly cross-border, with ethnic Armenians fleeing Azerbaijan and ethnic Azeris fleeing Armenia. By the end of this stage in 1991, over 1,000 people had been killed and more than half a million had been displaced.⁴⁰⁴

In January 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself an independent republic, and the conflict entered a new stage. The period between the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the end of the violence in 1994 is coded as a separate complex emergency for several reasons. Before this, the responsible government with respect to both populations was the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted the establishment of Armenia and Azerbaijan as two separate countries, each with its own government responsible to the citizens of its respective territory. Additionally, beginning in 1992, the violence was limited to the territory of Azerbaijan (including Nagorno-Karabakh), and so coding a complex emergency in Armenia from this point forward would not be consistent with the basic requirement of ongoing political violence necessary for a complex emergency. Finally, violence that had formerly been primarily inter-communal took the form of a conflict between organized military units. This new stage of the conflict was relatively brutal, as both sides were able to pilfer weaponry from former Soviet armories following the fall of the USSR. The Council of Europe estimates that between 1988 and 1994, the conflict produced almost 20,000 deaths and more than one million refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan and Armenia.⁴⁰⁵

In May 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a Russian-brokered ceasefire and the *de facto* partition of Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving most of the territory and swathes of surrounding land in Armenian hands. Though the armies stood down, the region's sovereignty was still contested, and both sides have had soldiers killed in sporadic breeches of the ceasefire. USCR reported no new displacement or deaths in 1995 or 1996, but conditions were critical for many of the displaced. As of 1995, some 10-15% of Azerbaijan's population remained displaced.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.78.

⁴⁰⁵ Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1995.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

Annual Data

1992 (Certainty: 5)

In January 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan. During the year, 152,000 ethnic Azeris were newly displaced, primarily from the towns of Shusha and Khojaly (both within Nagorno-Karabakh), and from Lachin, a town on the road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.⁴⁰⁷ During the invasion of Khojaly in February, Armenian forces killed as many as 2,000 fleeing civilians, a massacre that led to the resignation of Azeri President Ayza Moutalibov.⁴⁰⁸ In June and July, following the Armenian attacks on the territory situated between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Azeris launched a counter-offensive, recapturing a quarter of the disputed territory and displacing about 40,000 ethnic Armenians.⁴⁰⁹

1993 (Certainty: 5)

In 1993 the number of refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan reached at least 800,000, half a million of whom were newly displaced during the year. As ethnic Armenians widened their area of control in all directions, displacement began to occur outside Nagorno-Karabakh in areas such as Kelbajar to the north and west, where about 60,000 were displaced in April and May, and Agdam to the east, where another 150,000 were forcibly removed. Southeast of Nagorno-Karabakh, 150,000 were displaced from the towns of Jibrail and Fizuli and their surrounding areas. In October, ethnic Armenian forces captured the remaining territory to the southwest, forcibly removing some 50,000 to 100,000 people from the Zangelan district. Because they had no direct escape from Azerbaijan, many first had to cross into Iran before later being transported to safer areas in Azerbaijan. Armenian offensives throughout the year as well as renewed fighting in December have prompted some, including the Azeri government, to add an additional 100,000 to their estimates of the total persons displaced in 1993.⁴¹⁰

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: As waves of people fled the fighting, the government of Azerbaijan prevented newly displaced persons from traveling to the capital, Baku, or other cities. Roadblocks kept them close to the front lines and prevented them from dispersing throughout the country.⁴¹¹
- b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: In September, USCR visited the area along the Iranian border and found that most of the displaced were not yet registered and had received little to no aid, lacking the most basic human necessities in terms of shelter, food, sanitation, medicine, and clothing. Lack of shelter became a particular problem with the onset of winter, and many were forced to live in makeshift dwellings made from sticks, parts of farm vehicles, and other scavenged materials. People fleeing in 1993 were generally in good health because their departure had been sudden rather than the product of a long period of attrition, but the poor state of cleanliness and sanitation in camps left many with diarrhea and other stomach problems. Assistance from NGOs such as the World Food Program and UNICEF proved

⁴⁰⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.117.

⁴⁰⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.112.

⁴⁰⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007a, p.14.

⁴¹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.117; see also Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007a, p.14.

⁴¹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.118.

inadequate; many refugees saw no aid deliveries whatsoever and were forced to rely on their own resources.⁴¹²

1994 (Certainty: 5)

Due to heavy fighting near Adgam and Mardakert, an additional 50,000 Azeris fled in April 1994.⁴¹³ A May 1994 cease-fire established a *de facto* partition of Nagorno-Karabakh, but occasional skirmishes continued.

Confirming Evidence

- b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: USCR reported that though many found shelter in public buildings such as schools and dormitories, some internally displaced persons lived in tent camps, shelters dug out of the ground, and abandoned railway cars. In addition, because the question of Nagorno-Karabakh's sovereignty was never officially resolved, discussion of returning internally displaced persons to their places of residence remained at a standstill. In May 1994, Azerbaijan accused ethnic Armenian forces of launching a scorched-earth campaign and therefore preventing internally displaced Azeris from returning to their homes in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.126; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007a, p.14-15.

⁴¹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.126.

18. Bosnia (1992 – 1995)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

From 1945-1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was made up of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Rising ethnic nationalism in the 1980s led to the break-up of the federation beginning in 1991 with the secession of Croatia and Slovenia. Bosnia – the most ethnically diverse of the republics, with a population composed of Serbs, Croats, and a plurality of Bosniaks (also known as Bosnian Muslims) – was soon torn over whether or not to secede as well. In October 1991 Bosnia's Muslim-dominated government declared the territory's sovereignty. A public referendum (Feb. 29-March 1 1992) and an official declaration of independence (March 3) soon followed. Many Bosnian Croats, however, wanted to join Croatia, while many Serbs preferred to set up a separate Serbian state rather than remain a minority in an independent Bosnia. In April 1992, therefore, and supported by the FRY and its Yugoslav National Army (YNA), Bosnian Serbs declared the creation of an independent Serb republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be known as Republika Srpska. Bosnian Croats soon declared their own republic with Croatian support.⁴¹⁵

The next 3.5 years of war were characterized by extreme brutality, with forces from each ethnic group fighting each of the others and victimizing civilians in their efforts to gain territory for their own ethnic brethren. While all sides engaged in human rights violations and ethnic cleansing, Serb forces perpetrated the majority of these offenses, especially against Bosnian Muslims. Serb forces beat, captured and killed civilians, and destroyed many homes, especially in areas of eastern Bosnia adjacent to FRY territory that were to be part of Republika Srpska. Men were interned in camps where they were abused and murdered, and women and children were kept in unsanitary detention centers where they suffered from a lack of food and water and recurrent rapes. On a smaller scale, Bosniaks also created prison camps where they committed abuse, murder and rape.⁴¹⁶

Following a July 1995 massacre by Serb forces of more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in the UN safe zone of Srebrenica, a NATO bombing campaign and an allied Croatian and Bosniak ground assault turned the tide of the war against the Serbs. In November, leaders of all three groups signed the Dayton Agreement ending the war. The agreement divided Bosnia into a Muslim-Croat federation and a separate Bosnian Serb entity, and NATO peacekeepers soon deployed to enforce it. Relatively small-scale new displacement continued into 1996-97, but fell below the threshold for continuation of a complex emergency.⁴¹⁷

At the end of 1995, the UNHCR estimated that 1.3 million people were internally displaced and an additional 1.4 million were 'war affected.' Around 2.2 million were refugees in other regions.⁴¹⁸ Estimates of the death toll in Bosnia, however, have been fraught with controversy. Although conventional wisdom at the time estimated that Serb forces killed 200,000 – 250,000 Bosniaks, Bosnian officials intentionally inflated these numbers for political purposes.⁴¹⁹ Later, more

⁴¹⁵ See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, "The Conflicts," at <http://www.icty.org/sid/322>. See also Human Rights Watch 1993.

⁴¹⁶ See, e.g., United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.114; United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.120; United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.128; United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.129.

⁴¹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.170, 174; United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.166.

⁴¹⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.129.

⁴¹⁹ Seybolt 2013, p.13-14.

reliable estimates placed the numbers considerably lower. A 2010 estimate collected for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) placed the total death toll from the war at 104,732, of which 42,106 are thought to have been civilians.⁴²⁰ Another reputable 2007 estimate published by the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo (known as the Bosnian Book of the Dead) identified 39,684 civilian deaths due directly to military activity.⁴²¹ These figures, however, do not account for an unknown number of deaths among refugees that would not have occurred except for the war. Such deaths would be relevant as part of the complex emergency, but are not needed to determine that the war meets the designated thresholds.

Annual Data:

1992 (Certainty: 5)

Beginning in April 1992, Bosnian Serb forces and Serb troops from the YNA launched large-scale attacks in eastern and northern Bosnia, killing and forcibly removing non-Serb civilians. The first several months were the worst of the war in terms of population displacement. According to the UNHCR, by mid-June Serb forces had taken control of two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and already 1 million people had fled from their homes.⁴²² Also during 1992, the Bosnian government killed an unknown number of Serb civilians in the town of Gorazde and Croats forced Serbs from their homes in western Hercegovina and killed Muslims in Prozor.⁴²³ By November the UNHCR estimated that over 1.8 million people had been displaced, of which some 810,000 remained in Bosnia and just over 1 million had fled to other republics or outside of the former Yugoslavia.⁴²⁴

It is difficult to arrive at a precise estimate of civilian deaths for 1992. The Bosnian government reported over the summer that 250,000 Bosnians were dead, but as noted above its estimates are unreliable because it inflated them for political purposes.⁴²⁵ On the other hand, USCR reported on a number of specific incidents of large-scale massacres and various post-war reports prepared for the ICTY provide estimates of deaths in certain areas during the year. While not comprehensive, together the estimates from these sources alone clearly exceed the threshold for establishing the start of a complex emergency. According to USCR, Serb troops killed approximately 3,000 civilians in northern Bosnia in May and June, and some 200 Muslim civilian men near the town of Travnik in August.⁴²⁶ Investigators for the ICTY estimated that conflict in the autonomous Krajina region alone (which almost certainly overlaps with the above estimate, since the Krajina was located in northern Bosnia) claimed a minimum of 3000 and, more likely, about 6000 lives during 1992.⁴²⁷ In addition, according to another ICTY report, an estimated 1399 civilians were killed and 5093 were wounded in the Siege of Sarajevo between 10 September 1992 and 10 August 1994, of whom 420 died and 1370 were wounded during 1992. This report was based primarily on a

⁴²⁰ Zwierzchowski and Tabeau 2010, p.14-16.

⁴²¹ Seybolt 2013, p.14.

⁴²² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006b, p.16.

⁴²³ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.114-115.

⁴²⁴ Tabeau and Bijak 2005, p.210; United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.115.

⁴²⁵ Seybolt 2013, p.14. The USCR – citing the Bosnian government – suggested that over 100,000 people were killed and 60,000 people went missing during the year. Given the more recent estimates of deaths for the entire war cited above, these numbers are also certainly too high, though they may reflect some downward revision of the Bosnian government's public statements. See United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.114.

⁴²⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.114.

⁴²⁷ Tabeau and Bijak 2005, p.198.

household survey conducted in Sarajevo from April to September 1994, and according to the authors it reflects a minimum credible estimate of deaths and wounded in the city during this time.⁴²⁸

Confirming Evidence

Government Inability/Unwillingness: In addition to the fact that Bosnian government forces targeted non-Muslim civilians, relief organizations like the UNHCR were harassed and threatened. In the UN-led Sarajevo airlift, for example, an Italian cargo plane was shot down.⁴²⁹

1993 (Certainty: 5)

In 1993, conflict escalated between Bosnian Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia, resulting in a new round of ethnic cleansing. Croat forces deliberately killed, raped, and imprisoned Muslims. In mid-July, they began forcing Muslims from western Herzegovina into Bosnian-government held territory, deporting some 20,000 by late August.⁴³⁰

Serb forces also continued to kill or remove non-Serbs in areas under their control. According to USCR, “in northwest Bosnia, Serb militias continued to intimidate, harass, and kill non-Serbs in an effort to force those who remained in the area to leave...In 1993, at least 30,000 persons fled from Bosnia into sector west of the UN Protected Areas in Croatia.”⁴³¹ Conditions were also bleak in the Eastern government-controlled enclaves, Sarajevo, and other isolated communities to which Serb forces hindered or denied outside access. The USCR described these areas as “becoming more and more like detention centers administered by the UN and assisted by UNHCR.”⁴³² Nevertheless, Bosnians isolated in Eastern communities in Serb-controlled regions sought to reach UN or government-controlled areas. According to USCR, early February alone saw some 7,000 people walk from such areas to the government-controlled town of Tuzla.⁴³³

According to USCR, by the end of 1993 over 2 million people were displaced by the war, with an estimated 1.3 million as IDPs and at least 800,000 having fled to other countries.⁴³⁴ As above, accurate casualty numbers are unavailable. Investigators for the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office, however, estimated that 800 civilians were killed and 3259 injured in Sarajevo during the year.⁴³⁵

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Aid workers and UN forces charged with assisting them continued to face harassment and sometimes-deadly attacks during the year, making travel and delivery of relief aid difficult.⁴³⁶ Fighting between Croats and Muslims jeopardized humanitarian aid in Central Bosnia, and in the east Bosnian Serb forces repeatedly attacked UNHCR convoys

⁴²⁸ Tabeau, Żółtkowski and Bijak 2002, p.74 & 95.

⁴²⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.114-116.

⁴³⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.122.

⁴³¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.122-123.

⁴³² United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.124.

⁴³³ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.123.

⁴³⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.120.

⁴³⁵ Tabeau, Żółtkowski and Bijak 2002, p.74 & 95.

⁴³⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.121. For example, three Italian aid workers were killed in central Bosnia in late May.

and personnel throughout Serb-held areas.⁴³⁷ The airlift of relief supplies into the capital of Sarajevo also came under fire.

- b) *Conditions of Life for the displaced:* In January, UNICEF reported that “more than one million children were in need of winter clothing, shoes, and blankets, and that in Sarajevo, outbreaks of typhoid, hepatitis, and diarrheal diseases were increasing.” Due to the large number of IDPs and the approaching winter, the World Health Organizations advised the UNHCR to give top priority to the delivery of sleeping bags, blankets and fuel of any kind.⁴³⁸

1994 (Certainty: 5)

In March the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats signed an agreement to reconcile their differences and end the fighting between them that had rocked central Bosnia for the previous year. This led to a significant decrease in human rights abuses and allowed for a major improvement in the delivery of humanitarian relief to central and southwestern Bosnia.⁴³⁹

At the same time, however, fighting between Bosnian Serbs and the joint Muslim-Croat forces persisted in causing new displacement. In early August, for example, approximately 30,000 people who had been sheltering in the Bihac enclave were displaced. Most fled to nearby areas where the political and military situation limited the delivery of emergency relief.⁴⁴⁰

In addition, Serb-led ethnic cleansing and attacks on humanitarian aid and UN-designated safe areas (including in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde) continued to be serious problems.⁴⁴¹ In one widely criticized instance on February 5, for example, a mortar shell landed in Sarajevo’s central market place, killing 68 people and wounding 200.⁴⁴² Investigators for the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office estimated that a total of 179 civilians were killed and 461 were injured in the city by August 10.⁴⁴³ In addition, Human Rights Watch reported that Serb forces expelled 6,000 people (almost all Muslims) from the Bijeljina region and another 4,600 non-Serbs from northwestern and north-central Bosnia between July 17 and October 12, 1994.⁴⁴⁴ More broadly, rights abuses against non-Serbs continued to include forced labor, theft, beatings, and rapes.

Confirming Evidence

Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, despite the improvements in central Bosnia, “Bosnian Serb authorities continued to control all humanitarian access to Sarajevo (320,000 residents), Bihac (160,000 residents), and the eastern enclaves (120,000 residents),” and “chose to allow only minimal quantities of essential commodities...into the Muslim enclaves in their territory.”⁴⁴⁵ In Sarajevo, the airport was closed due to intense attacks.

⁴³⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.121-122.

⁴³⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.120.

⁴³⁹ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 1994, p.43; Human Rights Watch 1995b.

⁴⁴⁰ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 1994, p.43.

⁴⁴¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.128-130.

⁴⁴² Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 1994, p.43. After this, a NATO threat to use airstrikes against Serb targets in the event of future heavy weapons attacks on the capital led to an increased flow of aid to the city.

⁴⁴³ Tabeau, Żółtkowski and Bijak 2002, p.74 & 95.

⁴⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch 1994b, p.7.

⁴⁴⁵ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 1994, p.43.

1995 (Certainty: 5)

In mid-July, Serb forces attacked the UN designated safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, leading to the worst single atrocity of the war. Some 28,000 women and children who had been taking refuge in Srebrenica fled to nearby Potocari, while some 12,000 to 15,000 men and teenage boys tried to flee through the woods to Bosnian Government lines. These men and boys were subjected to ambushes, hunger, cold, and execution at the hands of Serb forces. An estimated 8,000 were killed or died trying to escape.⁴⁴⁶

Starting in late August, Bosnian government and Croat forces initiated a joint offensive directed against northwest and central Bosnia. This was accompanied by NATO airstrikes against Serb targets, and together these actions led to more new displacement. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that some 85,000-90,000 Serbs fled into the Prijedor and Banja Luka areas after September 13, and another 20,000 settled around Doboj.⁴⁴⁷ At the end of the year, the UNHCR estimated that 1.3 million people remained internally displaced and an additional 1.4 million were “war affected.” Around 2.2 million were refugees in other regions.⁴⁴⁸

Confirming Evidence

Conditions of Life for the displaced: Around half of the 323,000 displaced and war-affected in the Banja Luka region (who were mostly Serbs) were refugees or internally displaced people in need of fuel, shelter, food, clothing and shoes.⁴⁴⁹ Meanwhile, in Gorazde, around 65,000 persons were surviving on limited rations and lived in abandoned houses, schools and government buildings. Serb authorities continued to deny access to relief agencies in various places. In both Bihac and the country’s eastern enclaves, lack of access for UNHCR convoys left residents without adequate food and medical supplies. In addition, thousands in Sarajevo residents suffered shortages of food, medicine, water and fuel when the UNHCR airlift was halted between April 8 and September 16 after a U.S. transport plane was hit by small arms fire.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁶ Tabeau and Bijak 2005, p.198; United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.130.

⁴⁴⁷ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 1995, p.46.

⁴⁴⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.129.

⁴⁴⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.131.

⁴⁵⁰ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 1995, p.45; United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.133.

20. Russia / Chechnya I (1995 – 1996)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

In mid-December of 1994, Russian forces invaded the nation's breakaway republic of Chechnya, marking the start of a two-year war that would result in somewhere between 30,000 – 50,000 civilian deaths and the displacement of more than 600,000 people.⁴⁵¹ An initial wave of displacement in early 1995 following the New Year's Eve invasion of the Chechen capital of Grozny marks the beginning of the complex emergency. The war ended with an August 1996 ceasefire. This was followed by a formal peace treaty in May 1997 that gave Chechnya substantial autonomy within Russia, but not full independence. Displaced people began returning to their homes in large numbers, and while some still remained displaced by 1997, violence that year was limited to a few isolated incidents.⁴⁵²

Annual Data

1995 (Certainty: 5)

Russian forces invaded Chechnya in mid-December of 1994 and attacked the capital of Grozny on New Year's Eve, initiating weeks of fighting in early 1995 that led to the flight of an estimated 300,000 people from the capital and the displacement of up to 450,000 in the republic as a whole.⁴⁵³ By the end of March Russian forces had taken control of Grozny, but intense fighting continued and soon destroyed around 70% of the city's housing stock.⁴⁵⁴ Russian and Chechen negotiators agreed to a ceasefire on July 30, after which around 140,000 people slowly returned to Grozny. In December, however, fighting erupted in the city of Gudermes. When Chechen secessionists took over the city, Russian forces attacked and sealed it off, preventing evacuation of civilians and the entry of relief organizations.⁴⁵⁵

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In addition to initiating conflict in densely populated urban areas, the Russian government disrupted or impeded the work of international aid organizations by failing to issue visas for aid workers and blocking their access to areas that needed assistance. Surrounding communities and republics also complained about a lack of assistance from Moscow to deal with the influx of displaced Chechens. Officials in the neighboring republic of Dagestan and representatives of international relief organizations, for example, alleged that Russian officials tried to direct aid to the north and west of Chechnya, "where the population was deemed to be more pro-Russian than those Chechens who had fled to Dagestan."⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.266; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2000, p.22.

⁴⁵² United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.202-203.

⁴⁵³ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.162-163. These estimates, compiled by the UNHCR and the Russian authorities, may undercount the true numbers because many displaced persons did not register with aid organizations. See also: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003d.

⁴⁵⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.162-163.

⁴⁵⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.164-165.

⁴⁵⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.163.

- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: While the vast majority of those displaced by war in Chechnya in the early months of 1995 were able to find shelter with friends, relatives, or host families, those who did not face overcrowded camps and overburdened relief services. In one camp in neighboring Ingushetia, train wagons served as temporary housing for close to a thousand displaced people from Chechnya.⁴⁵⁷ What is more, although tens of thousands of these displaced were reported to have returned to Grozny by early May, once there they suffered the absence of electricity, running water, and gas.⁴⁵⁸

1996 (Certainty: 5)

According to USCR, in 1996 “The conduct of the war on both sides frequently appeared deliberately designed to maximize the suffering of noncombatants.” Russian forces indiscriminately bombed and shelled civilian areas, “often reducing entire towns to rubble,” and regularly detained and tortured men of combat age.⁴⁵⁹ Poorly disciplined Russian troops also robbed, raped, and killed unarmed civilians, while Chechen rebels “took hostages, intimidated civilians, and drew fire by hiding in population centers, thereby using noncombatants as human shields.”⁴⁶⁰

Nevertheless, clear estimates of civilian deaths and displacement are difficult to come by. In May, Russia’s Federal Migration Service (FMS) announced that more than 600,000 people had been forced from their homes by the war and were seeking the agency’s help, although it was unclear how many of these had been displaced during 1996.⁴⁶¹ The USCR reported that the FMS figures drastically understated the extent of displacement.⁴⁶²

Still, together a few specific incidents produced enough displacement to exceed the threshold for a continuing complex emergency. In March, Russian troops attacked the towns of Seranovdsk and Samashki, forcing the majority of their combined populations of over 31,000 to flee.⁴⁶³ In late April, an attack on the town of Shali displaced over 1,000 women and children (the men were not allowed to leave).⁴⁶⁴ Then in early August, Chechen rebels retook Grozny and renewed fighting led to the resumption of large-scale civilian displacement. On the 19th, Russian forces announced plans for a massive attack to re-take the city and instructed all remaining residents to leave before the 22nd. As a result of these events, on August 23 the UNHCR announced that some 25,000 Grozny residents had arrived in neighboring republics over the previous two weeks, and by the end of the month the FMS reported registering over 198,000 new displaced persons from Grozny in the several weeks since the rebels’ takeover of the capital.⁴⁶⁵

Before the planned assault on Grozny could take place, Russian and Chechen forces agreed on a new ceasefire. The agreement called for the removal of Russian troops from Chechnya, which began soon thereafter. As a result, “relative calm returned to Chechnya after August.”⁴⁶⁶ Approximately 200,000 people returned to their former homes over the following year, and while insecurity persisted and aid workers in particular were targeted throughout late 1996 and 1997, there

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.164.

⁴⁵⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.207.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

⁴⁶² United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.205.

⁴⁶³ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.207.

⁴⁶⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.208.

⁴⁶⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.209.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

were no reports of new displacement or significant fighting after the end of the year.⁴⁶⁷ For this reason, 1996 is the end of the first complex emergency in Chechnya.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: International aid workers were attacked, harassed, and frequently blocked from providing assistance where it was needed during the year, including after the August ceasefire. The murders of six ICRC workers in December prompted most aid agencies to suspend their activities in the area.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.202-203.

⁴⁶⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.209.

21. Russia / Chechnya II (1999 – 2004)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

In 1999, a second and longer war began in Chechnya, which qualifies as a separate complex emergency. In August and early September, Chechen-based Islamic guerrillas seized several villages in Dagestan, a neighboring republic. The Russian government also blamed these fighters for several bombings in Moscow. In response to these provocations, Russian forces conducted a month-long air assault against Chechnya beginning September 5. Ground troops, deployed in October, quickly took over the northern third of the republic and captured Grozny by February 2000.⁴⁶⁹ By mid-year, the Russian government clearly had the upper hand and the Chechen rebels turned to guerrilla warfare. While the conflict became less intense, the federal government ignored the rule of law and human rights protections, engaging in widespread indiscriminate violence against civilians as it searched for Chechen rebels. Meanwhile, the rebels victimized civilians as well.

The war in Chechnya spread to other North Caucasus republics beginning in 2003 despite the approval that year of a new constitution that granted the republic greater autonomy, and violence persisted through at least 2007.⁴⁷⁰ Annual and total estimates of civilian deaths and displacements vary widely due to Russia's restrictions on the outflow of information, the fact that many displaced failed to register with aid organizations, the frequent movement of people into and out of Chechnya and neighboring Ingushetia, and undocumented displacement to other areas of Russia. Indeed, there are no reliable estimates of war-related excess civilian mortality, although a USCR estimate that 600,000 people were displaced during the early months of the war in 1999 alone (see below) clearly suggests that the conflict meets the threshold for a complex emergency.

It is difficult to determine precisely when the war in Chechnya fell below the threshold of a continuing complex emergency as it tapered off in the mid-2000s. I code 2004 as the final year because it is the last year for which the available information about civilian deaths and displacement related to the conflict suggested there was a significant chance that it had met the annual threshold. After this, there were continued reports of rebel and government violence against civilians and government officials, abductions, torture, terrorist attacks, deaths from landmines, civilians living in inadequate temporary accommodation, and human rights abuses, but they declined significantly over the next several years and significant reconstruction began in 2006.⁴⁷¹

Annual Data

1999 (Certainty: 5)

When war erupted again in Chechnya in the late summer of 1999, Russian Prime Minister

⁴⁶⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.266; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2000, p.25.

⁴⁷⁰ The most recent version (3.0) of PRIO's data, which extends through 2008, records at least some battle deaths in Chechnya for every year through 2007. See Lacina and Gleditsch 2005. Data are available at <http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/>.

⁴⁷¹ See e.g., Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009f; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009g; U.S. Department of State 2006c; U.S. Department of State 2007b; U.S. Department of State 2008c.

Vladimir Putin declared that this time, there would be “no humanitarian catastrophe.” It soon became clear that this was not to be. According to USCR, the war displaced over 600,000 civilians by the end of the year. Russian troops prevented the vast majority from entering any neighboring republics besides Ingushetia, with the goal of corralling them there, achieving a quick victory in Chechnya, and then allowing those not suspected of supporting the insurgency to return home.⁴⁷² In practice, however, Russian conduct was brutal, both in and outside of the war zone. Though outside investigators were blocked from the region, according to USCR Russian troops committed atrocities that included “summary executions, torture, arbitrary detention of Chechen men in border ‘filtration camps’ (designed to separate fighters from civilians), rape, bribery and extortion, widespread looting and destruction of civilian homes, and violations of medical neutrality.”⁴⁷³ By the end of the year, some 250,000 civilians were displaced in neighboring republics (almost all in Ingushetia), hundreds of thousands were displaced within Chechnya itself, and “untold thousands” had died or been injured.⁴⁷⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In addition to the atrocities noted above, as in the previous war Russian forces once again attacked densely populated areas. For example, during intense bombardments of Grozny in November and December some 10,000-50,000 civilians were trapped in the capital with no means of escape.⁴⁷⁵ What is more, though the government issued warnings to evacuate conflict areas and suggested safe routes to escape, Russian forces attacked those same routes.⁴⁷⁶

Furthermore, according to USCR, Russia’s Emergencies Ministry and FMS “proved incapable of providing enough aid to assist the displaced in Ingushetia; most slept in the cold, without adequate health care, food, clean water, or shelter.”⁴⁷⁷ Despite this, the Russian government stymied international efforts to provide assistance to these people. International aid began to arrive only after two months, in early November, and due to severe insecurity and the failure of the Russian government to provide aid organizations with a plan for ensuring their security, even then it only went to areas outside of Chechnya itself. No outside aid entered Chechnya during the year.

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: See above.

2000 (Certainty: 4)

In 2000, Russia continued to exercise tight control over Chechnya’s borders and contained war-related displacement mostly within the republic and neighboring Ingushetia. Russian troops also again committed the majority of abuses against civilians, including indiscriminate aerial attacks, executions, rapes, tortures, looting and destruction of homes, and detentions.⁴⁷⁸

Precise estimates of civilian deaths and displacement were again hard to come by. According to USCR, estimates of the total number of Chechens newly displaced by the conflict since September 1999 varied widely, with some sources citing numbers between 600,000 and 800,000. By

⁴⁷² United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.266.

⁴⁷³ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.267.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2000, p.26.

⁴⁷⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2000, p.26.

⁴⁷⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.267.

⁴⁷⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.248.

the end of the year, an estimated 370,000 people remained displaced.⁴⁷⁹ Estimates of the number of deaths were also unclear, varying widely from several hundred to several thousand.⁴⁸⁰

The most intense fighting occurred early in the year. The USCR reported that two months of nonstop aerial bombardment of Grozny in December 1999 and January 2000 killed “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of civilians.”⁴⁸¹ Over 200 civilians died and some 20,000 fled in a Russian attack on the town of Katyr-Yurt on February 4. The next day, Russian troops executed at least 60 civilians in two Grozny suburbs. On March 4, at least 100 civilians died in a clash in the village of Komsomolskoye. The intensity of the fighting fell off after this, and its nature changed as well. With the rebel forces seriously weakened, the war devolved into an unrelenting guerrilla war (on April 15th the Russian government declared the main fighting stage of the war over). Still, continued shelling, government ‘sweep’ operations intended to search for Chechen rebels, and landmines killed an additional unknown number of civilians, prevented the displaced from returning home, and hindered the delivery of emergency relief.⁴⁸²

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In addition to the Russian forces’ abuse of civilians, insecurity continued to limit the flow of international relief by deterring UN agencies from operating directly in Chechnya (they instead provided assistance for NGOs to deliver).⁴⁸³
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Despite relief efforts, many of those who had been displaced to neighboring Ingushetia lacked adequate shelter and were forced to live in tents, abandoned railroad cars, and old buildings. Within Chechnya itself, humanitarian access improved somewhat during the year and UN agencies – although they did not operate themselves – provided assistance to be delivered by NGOs. Nevertheless, according to USCR most of those displaced within Chechnya still lacked adequate food, water, and medical care.⁴⁸⁴

2001 (Certainty: 4)

During 2001, Russian forces in Chechnya continued to rob, beat, detain, extort, terrorize and execute civilians, often during ‘sweep’ operations – regularly conducted in civilian areas – that were ostensibly intended to root out Chechen rebels.⁴⁸⁵ By the end of the year, full-scale war had subsided, but near-daily clashes between rebels and Russian military and police continued, as did the sweep operations. NGOs monitoring Chechnya’s main crossing point into Ingushetia reported that 10,000 to 12,000 people arrived in Ingushetia during the year, while other NGOs, like the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, estimated that there were 50,000 civilians newly displaced during the year.⁴⁸⁶ Approximately 160,000 persons remained displaced within Chechnya itself at the end of the year, and another 150,000 were in Ingushetia.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2000, p.27.

⁴⁸¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.248; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2001, p.21.

⁴⁸² United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.248-249.

⁴⁸³ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.249.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.240-241.

⁴⁸⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.241.

⁴⁸⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.240-241.

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: In addition to the Russian forces' continued abuses of civilians, the Russian government's efforts to provide for the displaced within Chechnya were inadequate. Government-constructed tent camps in Chechnya intended to promote return of the displaced from Ingushetia were reported to be "mostly rotten and barely habitable"; President Putin's own envoy described them as "absolutely unfit."⁴⁸⁸ In addition, humanitarian relief organizations were often unable to deliver aid during the year due to poor security, the abduction of aid personnel, and direct interference by the Russian government. As a result, at various times they suspended their operations.⁴⁸⁹
- b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Civilians in Grozny continued to live in damaged buildings, often without heat, clean water, electricity, or sewage. In Ingushetia, displaced persons lived in overcrowded tent camps, barns and stables without adequate water or sanitation facilities.⁴⁹⁰

2002 (Certainty: 4)

Rebels continued to clash intermittently with Russian military and police in 2002, and both sides committed widespread human rights violations against civilians. Russian forces continued to abuse civilians in their search for Chechen rebels, while the rebels committed a variety of violations. These included killing civilians (especially ethnic Russians), using noncombatants as human shields, taking hostages, and preventing displaced persons from leaving Chechnya.⁴⁹¹

The Russian government also continued to limit the flow of information from Chechnya by denying access to the UN and human rights organizations, forcing the closure of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, and harassing Chechen human rights advocates.⁴⁹² As a result, information about the scale of death and displacement in 2002 remained limited. Nevertheless, a leaked and unpublished Russian government report claimed that 1,132 civilians died in conflict-related criminal violence during the year.⁴⁹³ By the year's end, some 140,000 people remained internally displaced within Chechnya and an additional 103,000 remained in Ingushetia.⁴⁹⁴ UNHCR estimated that during the first half of the year some 3,300 displaced persons returned from Ingushetia to Chechnya, while about 2,950 became new arrivals in Ingushetia.⁴⁹⁵

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Violence, crime, and the abduction of aid workers continued to interfere with humanitarian work. Organizations including UN agencies and Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) suspended operations during the year.⁴⁹⁶
- b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: According to USCR, displaced persons in Ingushetia mostly received no assistance from the Russian government, instead relying on international agencies. Many suffered from "malnutrition, inadequate shelter, tuberculosis, Hepatitis A, and the constant risk of being evicted from their temporary shelters."⁴⁹⁷ Within Chechnya, residents of

⁴⁸⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.241.

⁴⁸⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.240-241.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.217-218.

⁴⁹² Human Rights Watch 2003a, p.3.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.217-218.

⁴⁹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.219.

⁴⁹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.218.

⁴⁹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.219.

Grozny mostly lived in unsafe, war-damaged buildings, and the Russian government engaged in virtually no reconstruction in the city despite promises to do so.⁴⁹⁸

2003 (Certainty: 4)

Both rebels and Russian forces continued to commit human rights violations in 2003, and according to the IDMC, Chechnya remained an active combat zone that showed no signs of stabilization despite federal authorities' claims to the contrary.⁴⁹⁹ Indeed, the war actually appeared to be spreading outside of Chechnya, with instances of violence in neighboring Ingushetia for the first time during the year. Information about the conflict and the extent of abuse against civilians remained limited, however, because the Russian government continued to restrict the activities of NGOs and international organizations, as well as foreign and domestic media access in Chechnya. While human rights groups still managed to release credible reports of abuses by both sides, it was impossible to verify the total number of civilians killed or newly displaced during they year, although there was significant evidence that the former, at least, were significant.⁵⁰⁰

According to the U.S. State Department, "A wide range of [NGO] reports indicated that federal military operations resulted in numerous civilian casualties and the massive destruction of property and infrastructure, despite claims by federal authorities that government forces utilized precision targeting when combating rebels." Disappearances and landmine victims represented a significant portion of these, although it is not clear exactly what portion may have been attributable to federal forces versus rebels. In any case, landmines led to 5,695 injuries, including 125 deaths, during the year. In addition, according to a local NGO named Memorial, there were 472 cases of disappearances during the year in the 25-30% of Chechnya the group was able to access, suggesting the true number may have been at least three times higher (approximately 1400-1500). There is good reason to believe that most of these people were killed. Of the 472 known cases, "269 disappeared without a trace, 48 were later found dead with marks of torture, and 155 were later released after a ransom was paid."⁵⁰¹ In addition to the Russian army's use of indiscriminate force, individual servicemen and units were responsible for many abuses of civilians, engaging in reprisals against noncombatants and looting property and food.

The State Department also reported that Chechen rebels killed many civilians during the year by engaging in numerous suicide bomb attacks, firing on Russian forces from populated areas, using children to plant explosives, and killing elderly residents of Russian origin simply because of their ethnicity. They were also reported to have "killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya."⁵⁰² While there are no clear estimates of the total number of deaths, on their own 5 bombings in Chechnya and Ingushetia killed 144 people (It was unclear how many of these were civilians, although it appeared to be the vast majority).

Finally, the UN reported a "small but regular" flow of new IDPs out of Chechnya and into neighboring Ingushetia during the year, as the result of continued insecurity related to fighting in their places of origin, and precarious living conditions.⁵⁰³

⁴⁹⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.217.

⁴⁹⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005d, p.23.

⁵⁰⁰ U.S. Department of State 2004c.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005d, p.24.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: During the year, the Russian government sought to force displaced persons from neighboring Ingushetia back into Chechnya despite insecurity, destruction of infrastructure, and a lack of electricity, water, and heating. Some of these efforts included the disruption of federal food aid and the forced closure of displacement camps. Aid workers reported that the government continued to obstruct their work.⁵⁰⁴ In addition, according to the U.S. State Department, “There were some reports that federal troops purposefully targeted some infrastructure essential to the survival of the civilian population, such as water facilities or hospitals,” and “Representatives of international organizations and NGOs who visited Chechnya reported little evidence of federal assistance for rebuilding war-torn areas.”⁵⁰⁵
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Displaced people continued to face widespread malnutrition, unsanitary conditions in shelters, and high levels of psychological stress.⁵⁰⁶

2004 (Certainty: 3)

Abuse of civilians by rebels and federal forces, as described above, continued throughout 2004. As in previous years, information on the precise scale of civilian deaths and new displacement was limited and there were no reliable estimates of total civilian deaths.

Given the limited information, it is difficult to make a determination about which year ends the complex emergency as the intensity of violence began to decline in the mid-2000s. On the one hand, there were certain indications of improving conditions during 2004. Despite continued abuses by federal forces, local NGO Memorial reported that compared to 2001-2002, government forces were now using less indiscriminate force in civilian areas during their searches for Chechen rebels.⁵⁰⁷ In addition, while Chechnya’s Minister of Internal affairs counted 120 ‘terrorist’ attacks by Chechen rebels during the year, he also noted that this figure was lower than in 2003.⁵⁰⁸

On the other hand, the conflict continued to spread outside of Chechnya during the year, with significant attacks in neighboring Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Moscow, and a clear escalation of violence over the summer within Chechnya itself. Significant events included the attempted assassination of the President of Ingushetia, the successful assassination of the President of Chechnya, “a large-scale attack against security forces and government offices in Ingushetia in June, intensified fighting in Chechnya in August, and...the disastrous hostage taking (including over 1100 children, teachers, and parents) at a school in North Ossetia-Alania in September.”⁵⁰⁹

Confirmed deaths associated with these events include 40 killed by a Chechen suicide bomber in Moscow on February 6, 7 people killed by Russian bombs and missiles in April, 90 people killed by rebel attacks in Ingushetia in June, 89 killed when Chechen suicide bombers took down two aircraft in August, 10 killed in a metro station bombing on August 31, and 338 hostages killed in the North Ossetia school standoff in September. This yields 574 deaths, in addition to those of the Chechen President Akhmed Kadyrov and an uncertain but “numerous” number of civilian officials who were also killed by Chechen rebels during the year.⁵¹⁰ Landmines also remained

⁵⁰⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003d, p.10-11; United States Committee for Refugees 2004, p.35.

⁵⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State 2004c.

⁵⁰⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2003d, p.9.

⁵⁰⁷ U.S. Department of State 2005b.

⁵⁰⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005d, p.28.

⁵⁰⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005d, p.25-26.

⁵¹⁰ U.S. Department of State 2005b, p.100; United States Committee for Refugees 2005.

a significant source of civilian death and injury during the year, but precise numbers were not available more recently than 2002.⁵¹¹

In addition, many people were kidnapped or disappeared during the year, although estimates – along with their fates – varied. The NGO Memorial reported that the number of disappearances for the year dropped to 396 in the 25-30% of Chechnya they were able to access, of which a higher share than in the past were left alive. Of these, 189 were eventually released, 173 disappeared without a trace, and 24 bodies were recovered. Scaled up to the whole republic, these figures are consistent with Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin's estimated that 1,700 people were kidnapped in Chechnya between January and November.⁵¹²

Given the government's continued involvement in abusing civilians, the sizeable number of confirmed deaths, and the considerable uncertainty surrounding how many more there may have been, I continue to code the complex emergency as ongoing during 2004, but at a lower level of certainty compared to previous years.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In addition to the other abuses they committed, reports persisted that federal troops sometimes intentionally targeted infrastructure that was essential to civilian survival, including water facilities and hospitals.⁵¹³
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Despite some improvement in food security in Chechnya during the year, IDPs faced severe shortages of non-food items and poor and unhygienic living conditions in temporary government accommodations in both Chechnya and Ingushetia. The government was also unable to meet the immense need for shelter for returnees to Chechnya, and many were forced back by its own closure of IDP camps in Ingushetia during the year.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹¹ U.S. Department of State 2005b.

⁵¹² Ibid.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005d, p.67-70.

25. Algeria (1992 – 2003)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

In January 1992, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win a clear victory in impending parliamentary elections, the Algerian military forced the president's resignation, canceled the elections, banned FIS, and launched a campaign of terror and persecution against its leadership and members.⁵¹⁵ In response the FIS' military wing – the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) – began an armed insurgency directed against the government, and violence grew throughout 1992. The ensuing civil war would eventually involve various Islamist insurgent groups and would last over a decade, with the civilian population as its primary victims. The years from 1993 through 1998 saw escalating fighting and 'endemic' terrorist action by rebels as well as the splintering of the rebellion into numerous Islamist movements. Thanks to a government amnesty in the fall of 1997, several insurgent groups – including the AIS, which remained the primary one – put down their arms and largely disbanded. By 1998 only the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) remained active.⁵¹⁶ According to IDMC, however, the GIA had emerged "as the most extreme and brutal movement, responsible for numerous killings of foreigners from late 1993 onwards and large-scale massacres of civilians in 1996-1998."⁵¹⁷ Thus, despite the amnesty and rebel disbandment, 1997 and 1998 were the peak years for attacks on the civilian population. Still, such attacks remained widespread for several years thereafter, and although rebels appear to have been responsible for most of the worst offenses, government forces also committed killings and other abuses, and were responsible for civilian displacement and for not protecting civilians from attacks.⁵¹⁸

In April 1999, the new Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika proposed another amnesty to rebel fighters who did not engage in subsequent acts of violence or civilian victimization (e.g. rape). The amnesty required rebels to surrender by January 13, 2000. AIS signed the peace agreement in June 1999, but GIA members rejected the plan. On January 19, 2000, the government began a vast counterinsurgency operation against those who did not surrender, but the GIA and GSPC continued to fight back.⁵¹⁹ The level of violence gradually diminished over the next several years, continuing at a much lower level into the mid-2000s. The last year for which there appears to be reasonable evidence of ongoing conflict at the level of a complex emergency is 2003.

Overall, although it is clear that the Algerian civil war involved large-scale, targeted anti-civilian violence by both government and rebel forces, consistent interference by the Algerian authorities made it virtually impossible to precisely estimate the scope of civilian deaths or displacement during the war, or even to accurately assess the living conditions of the displaced. Indeed, with the exception of United Nations visits to massacre sites in 1998, the Algerian government routinely blocked foreign efforts to investigate the effects of the violence or to care for those affected by it, discouraging international fact-finding missions, generally denying humanitarian personnel access to internally displaced persons, and at times prohibiting all major human rights

⁵¹⁵ E.g., Kepel 2002, p.254.

⁵¹⁶ Sambanis 2004, p. 14.

⁵¹⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009a, p.8.

⁵¹⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009a, p.9; International Crisis Group 2000.

⁵¹⁹ See e.g., Sambanis 2004, p.5.

monitoring organizations from visiting the country.⁵²⁰

Despite these challenges it seems clear that the war was utterly devastating for civilians and easily met the scale of a complex emergency. According to both IDMC and USCR it is estimated to have killed some 150,000 to 200,000 people, mostly civilians (there were an 17,000 estimated Islamist rebel deaths).⁵²¹ Official Algerian figures suggest that there were some 100,000 deaths during the first seven years from 1992 through 1998, for an average of 1200 per month during this time.⁵²²

Meanwhile, estimates of the scale of civilian displacement are wide, but large. Most reports of displacement in Algeria are drawn from Algerian press accounts or official statements. Several newspapers reported massive displacement from rural areas, of up to an estimated 1.5 million people as of late 2002, because of the security situation. This figure was also used by an independent researcher with the French Centre d'études et recherches internationales to describe the scope of displacement for the period from 1993-1997. Meanwhile, in 2004 Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyiahia cited a figure of 2 million displaced between 1992 and 1997, while President Bouteflika seemed to suggest that a total of 1.5 million people had fled their homes due to the conflict. One of the few international sources of numbers on internal displacement is the European Union, which in 2002 estimated that violence had displaced more than one million people over the course of the conflict.⁵²³ According to USCR, moreover, in addition to the internally displaced thousands of Algerians fled the country in search of official political asylum while hundreds of thousands more reportedly fled to Europe during the war without filing official asylum claims.⁵²⁴

Finally, patterns of displacement in Algeria reflected the nature and geography of the war, and profoundly affected the demographic make-up of the country. For much of the conflict urban areas were relatively safe, and the civilians most at risk were those living in rural areas. Thus, most displacement involved the movement of rural Algerians to urban or peri-urban areas – including in and around the capital, Algiers – where they lived with friends and relatives, in public buildings, in makeshift shelters, and in shanty neighborhoods.⁵²⁵

Annual Data

1992 (Coding: 1)

The start of the complex emergency associated with Algeria's civil war is challenging to code. Due to the difficulty of obtaining clear information about the scope of violence in some years, including 1992, I code this as the start year but with a low level of certainty reflecting the reality that it may well not have met the relevant thresholds. Indeed, several sources emphasize the lower level of violence in 1992 than in subsequent years. For example, according to Gilles Kepel, "throughout 1992 things stayed relatively calm, by comparison with the frenzy of violence that would characterize

⁵²⁰ See e.g., United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.49; United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.62; United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.58.

⁵²¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009a, p.9. For USCR citation of the same 150,000 to 200,000 figure, see United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.58.

⁵²² International Crisis Group 2000, p.i, 1.

⁵²³ For all of these figures, see Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009a, p.45-46. At about the same time the Interior Minister cited a figure of 500,000 displaced from rural areas and into the cities, but it was not clear whether this figure was intended to represent the total scope of conflict-related displacement to date.

⁵²⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.56.

⁵²⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p. 56.

the five years that followed.”⁵²⁶ Both Kepel and Stathis Kalyvas (1999) suggest that civilian victimization did not escalate dramatically until after 1995. What is more, in its report on Algeria for 1992, USCR cites reports that several hundred Islamic fundamentalists fled the country as refugees during the year, but had no further information on conflict-related displacement.⁵²⁷ Still, given that a number of years during the 1990s clearly and dramatically surpassed the minimum threshold for an ongoing complex emergency, this type of comparative information seems insufficient to indicate that 1992 did *not* reach the appropriate thresholds for a new complex emergency. What is more, as Kepel points out, there were armed confrontations every week during the year, with scores killed “in every part of the country,” and the civil war entered its “most active phase” that spring.⁵²⁸ In addition, as Kalyvas notes, “thousands of known or suspected FIS supporters were arrested and more than 10,000 were deported to internment camps in the desert.”⁵²⁹ Many of these people were at the time civilians with no active military role in the rebellion. Given the uncertainty in the available information about the scale of conflict during the year, I count this as the first year of the complex emergency but code it as a ‘1.’

1993 (Coding: 3)

According to USCR, by the end of 1993 approximately 2,000 persons had been killed during the previous two years of violence, although it was uncertain how many in each year or how many were civilians.⁵³⁰ Still, Kepel notes that rebels began to assassinate a “steady succession” of civilian elites in 1993.⁵³¹ There were also reports of increasing numbers of people fleeing the country during the year, but information remained far from clear.⁵³²

Confirming Evidence

a) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* In 1993, life for the displaced was precarious. During the year many Algerians began migrating to shantytowns in and around major urban areas, where they often lacked government assistance and basic services.⁵³³

1994 (Coding: 3)

The conflict between the Algerian government and the Islamist opposition intensified in 1994.⁵³⁴ USCR reported that 1994 marked the beginning of full-scale civil war and cited estimates that up to 30,000 people had been killed in the previous three years of conflict by the end of the year.⁵³⁵ If the prior year’s estimate of 2,000 killed in 1992-1993 were accurate, this would imply up to 28,000 deaths in 1994, but it is also possible that the earlier estimate was too low. Thus, although it seems clear that the overall level of violence escalated dramatically in 1994, considerable uncertainty about the total number of civilian dead or displaced that year remains.

⁵²⁶ Kepel 2002, p. 258.

⁵²⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p. 57.

⁵²⁸ Kepel 2002, p. 258-259.

⁵²⁹ Kalyvas 1999, p. 252.

⁵³⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p. 46-47.

⁵³¹ Kepel 2002, p. 262.

⁵³² United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p. 46-47.

⁵³³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009a, p.26-27.

⁵³⁴ Kepel 2002, p. 255.

⁵³⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p. 49.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Some observers (notably in the U.S.) believed the Algerian government had by 1994 lost any ability to control the country's escalating violence and insecurity.⁵³⁶

1995 (Coding: 3)

The four-year old insurgency reached unprecedented levels of violence in 1995, although it appeared to subside again somewhat by December. USCR indicated that thousands of Algerians were in exile in other countries, and by the end of the year its estimate for total deaths from the four years of conflict was between 30,000 – 50,000, including thousands of insurgents, an estimated 3,000 police and soldiers, and unknown thousands of civilians. The period from January through March of 1995 was the bloodiest of the conflict so far, with as many as 500 persons per week dying during this time (suggesting that perhaps 6,000 persons were killed in just these three months).⁵³⁷ Still, again it was unclear how many were civilians. USCR also indicated that at least 10,000 Algerians became newly displaced during the country's upsurge of violence in 1995-1996 (an average of 5,000 each year).⁵³⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: USCR reported that Algerian security forces responded to the Islamists' provocations with brutal tactics against civilians. It also charged the Algerian government with being incapable of protecting its civilian population from brutal attacks.⁵³⁹

1996 (Coding: 3)

By the end of 1996, according to USCR, the war had killed at least 50,000 and perhaps up to 100,000 people. During 1996, it estimated, an average of 150-200 people were killed monthly, for a total of approximately 1,800-2,400, with victims increasingly including civilians such as government officials, local journalists, women and foreigners. Partly this was due to attacks by government-backed militia known as "self-defense groups," who killed civilians with impunity.⁵⁴⁰ Partly, also, it was due to an increase in large-scale massacres of civilians by insurgents, accounting for at least 210 deaths between August and September.⁵⁴¹ These incidents included untold brutality in which entire families were killed, and corpses were found maimed. As noted above, moreover, USCR also recorded the presence of some 10,000 Algerians who became newly displaced in 1995-1996.⁵⁴²

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Evidence that the government failed to rein in its own self-defense militias or prevent them from regularly attacking civilians is suggestive of its inability and/or unwillingness to protect the population. In addition, during the year the government reportedly removed thousands of people from shantytowns surrounding the major cities for security reasons, and although it provided financial assistance for some, others "were reportedly left to fend for themselves, living in tents without sanitation facilities or running water."⁵⁴³

⁵³⁶ Kepel 2002, p. 255.

⁵³⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p. 37-38.

⁵³⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.56.

⁵³⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p. 37-38.

⁵⁴⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.57.

⁵⁴¹ Kalyvas 1999, p. 249.

⁵⁴² United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.57.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

1997 (Coding: 5)

According to USCR, thousands of civilians were displaced due to the ongoing war and many had fled the country entirely, but it was impossible to arrive at a clear estimate of their numbers. It also claimed that by 1997, “tens of thousands” of civilians had died in the war. In 1997 more specifically, USCR cited estimates that over 6,000 people died due to the violence, many in brutal anti-civilian massacres accompanied by the rape and/or abduction of women.⁵⁴⁴ According to detailed information recorded by Kalyvas, the summer was the most deadly part of the year and across all 12 months a total of 2,865 civilians were killed in 61 unique reported massacres.⁵⁴⁵

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to USCR, “Some Algerians criticized the Algerian military for not protecting civilians from...attacks; others questioned whether the military was complicit in some civilian massacres.”⁵⁴⁶

1998 (Coding: 3)

By 1998, estimates of the death toll in Algeria’s civil war varied dramatically. According to USCR, journalists and human rights workers cited a range of 60,000 to 120,000 while Algerian officials claimed a figure of 26,000 for the 1992-1998 period. USCR also guessed that there might be some 100,000-200,000 internally displaced people in addition to tens of thousands who had sought asylum outside the country and potentially hundreds of thousands of others who had fled without seeking asylum. Thanks to government restrictions on foreign access to conflict areas, however, the true extent of population displacement within Algeria was unknown.⁵⁴⁷

During 1998 there were numerous additional massacres. According to USCR some 1,200 persons were killed in January alone, including 400 who were slaughtered in a single night.⁵⁴⁸ In addition, Kalyvas found evidence of *at least* 600 confirmed civilian dead across 23 massacres during the year.⁵⁴⁹ One report indicated that for a period beginning in 1998 there were roughly 400 deaths each month, suggesting that the total number dead for the year may have been about 4,800.⁵⁵⁰ With the exception of the figure from Kalyvas, however, it remained unclear how many of these were civilians, thus justifying a cautious ‘certainty’ coding for the year.

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Algerian officials permitted a UN delegation to conduct a two-week visit to massacre sites in mid-1998. The delegation reported that both government and rebel forces were guilty of abuses, although insurgents committed the worst atrocities.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.48.

⁵⁴⁵ Kalyvas 1999, p. 249-250.

⁵⁴⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.48.

⁵⁴⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p. 46-47.

⁵⁴⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p. 46.

⁵⁴⁹ Kalyvas 1999, p.250.

⁵⁵⁰ Sambanis 2004, p. 5.

⁵⁵¹ Kalyvas 1999, p. 249.

1999 (Coding: 3)

Again USCR reported that hundreds of thousands had fled the fighting and chaos in Algeria but that ultimately their numbers were uncountable. Algeria's new president Abdelaziz Bouteflika also acknowledged during the year that the conflict's death toll was far higher than the government had previously claimed, estimating that some 100,000 had died.⁵⁵² According to some sources, approximately 3,000 civilians and combatants died in ongoing violence in 1999.⁵⁵³ As mentioned previously, the report estimating an average of 400 deaths per month during this time would suggest a higher count of approximately 4,800 deaths.⁵⁵⁴

2000 (Coding: 3)

As in 1999 USCR reported that hundreds of thousands had fled the fighting and chaos in Algeria but that ultimately their numbers were uncountable, and that over 100,000 had died in the conflict. As insurgent attacks and government counterinsurgency tactics continued in 2000, moreover, an estimated 100 to 200 killings occurred each month early in the year and then intensified to an estimated 300 or more each month by year's end. This resulted in roughly 2,500 civilian and combatant deaths during 2000, with the majority of victims being civilians in rural areas. In addition, violence reportedly spread into new locations of the country during the year, but the Algerian government continued to make it difficult for any outsiders to investigate the effects of the conflict, particularly in terms of its humanitarian effects.⁵⁵⁵

2001 (Coding: 4)

Bloodshed and anti-civilian atrocities continued during 2001, although the number of deaths and scope of new population displacement remained unknown because the government continued to block most outside access to conflict areas. Up to 800 persons were killed during the first four months of 2001 according to news reports, and according to Human Rights Watch, as many as 1,500 people were killed during the entire year.⁵⁵⁶ Again it was not clear how many were civilians.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: USCR indicated that the government's ruthless counterinsurgency tactics continued to worsen the civilian death toll.⁵⁵⁷

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Thousands of displaced civilians continued to live in makeshift shelters and shantytowns in and around urban areas.⁵⁵⁸ IDMC reported that displaced families live without clean water, proper sanitation or electricity.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵² United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p. 62-63.

⁵⁵³ U.S. Department of State 2000b, p.62; United States Committee for Refugees 2000.

⁵⁵⁴ Sambanis 2004, p. 5.

⁵⁵⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p. 56.

⁵⁵⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p. 52.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009a, p.59-60.

2002 (Coding: 4)

USCR reported that fighting continued during 2002 with an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 deaths due to insurgent attacks on rural villages and government counterinsurgency operations.⁵⁶⁰ Government officials claimed that Algeria's army had virtually defeated insurgent forces and that there were now no more than a thousand armed rebels left. The government continued to offer amnesty to insurgents who relinquished their weapons. The U.S. State Department reported that civilians continued to experience massive abuse from both armed groups and government forces in 2002.⁵⁶¹

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: As in previous years USCR indicated that the government's counterinsurgency tactics continued to worsen the civilian death toll. In addition, displaced persons complained about government inaction toward their plight, according to reports that trickled out of Algeria during 2002 despite government restrictions on information.⁵⁶² Government assistance to the displaced was reported to be minimal and in some instances government authorities were reported to have destroyed displaced persons' makeshift shelters.⁵⁶³

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: IMDC reported that thousands of Algerians continued to live in makeshift shelters and shantytowns, suffering from high unemployment and poor access to education.⁵⁶⁴ In addition, according to USCR, many lacked clean drinking water and health care.⁵⁶⁵

2003 (Coding: 2)

USCR estimated that as many as 1,200 persons were killed during ongoing conflict 2003, although it is impossible to verify what proportion of this total represent civilian deaths. Thereafter, however, violence dropped off dramatically, to an estimated 430 total deaths in 2004.⁵⁶⁶

Confirming Evidence

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: According to USCR, many displaced Algerians continued to live with family or friends or in shantytowns in and around major cities, but the government did not allow independent monitoring in order to assess their numbers or living conditions.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p. 47.

⁵⁶¹ U.S. Department of State 2003.

⁵⁶² United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p. 47.

⁵⁶³ Ibid; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009a, p.26-27.

⁵⁶⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p. 47; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009a, p.26-27.

⁵⁶⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p. 47.

⁵⁶⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p. 58.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

26. Angola I (1975 – 1991)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internationalized Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

Angola obtained independence from Portugal in 1975 and fighting between competing nationalist factions soon erupted into what would become one of Africa's longest and most destructive civil wars. In total Angola would be at war for almost thirty years, punctuated by periods of "failed peace accords and fragile power-sharing agreements."⁵⁶⁸ During this time, which I divide into three distinct complex emergencies, most estimates suggest that between 500,000 and 1 million Angolans died of conflict-related causes.⁵⁶⁹

Angola's first complex emergency lasted from 1975 to 1991 and was shaped by great power intervention, with the U.S. and Soviet Union using the country as a Cold War battleground. As a result, the fighting was heavily influenced by the presence of mercenaries and covert operation teams from Cuba, the U.S., South Africa, the Soviet Union, and Zaire.⁵⁷⁰ Still, the war was fought primarily between two local national liberation groups: the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) fought alongside UNITA against the MPLA between 1975 and 1976, but was decisively defeated by 1976, at which point the MPLA declared itself the government of Angola. Some fifteen years later, on May 31, 1991, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and the MPLA signed a peace settlement, the Angola Peace Accords. Sixteen months of peace followed before violence erupted anew, thus ending Angola's first complex emergency.

As would also be true later on in the 1990s and early 2000s, war in Angola between 1975 and 1991 was utterly devastating for the civilian population. USCR reported that between 1975 and 1986 nearly 40% of the nation's total population of 8.6 million was displaced by the conflict.⁵⁷¹ In 1989 the human rights group Africa Watch "estimated the total number of civil war victims at 200,000 Angolans killed, more than 20,000 children orphaned, and 20,000 to 50,000 Angolans left as amputees due to the widespread use of landmines by both sides."⁵⁷² By the mid-1990s, according to former UN official Margaret Anstee, years of persistent conflict had "ravaged the Angolan countryside, halted development, destroyed the fragmentary infrastructure, cost an estimated 350,000 lives, permanently maimed and disabled another 60,000 people and sent hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing across the borders into Zaire and Zambia."⁵⁷³ In addition, both rebel and government forces committed long-running campaigns of abuse against civilians, prompting the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) to include the conflict in its list of genocides and politicides (see note below for more on the PITF data). For example, according to the U.S. State Department, both government and UNITA "placed thousands of land mines in footpaths to agricultural fields during the civil war as part of a strategy to deny food to civilians in contested areas."⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁶⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p. 53.

⁵⁶⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p. 48.

⁵⁷⁰ See e.g., James 2011, p. 59.

⁵⁷¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p. 7.

⁵⁷² U.S. Department of State 1991a, p.2.

⁵⁷³ Anstee 1996, p. 9.

⁵⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.5.

Annual Data

Note: Precise numbers of civilian dead and displaced are difficult to come by on an annual basis for Angola. The annual 'Certainty' codings for the three Angolan complex emergencies (especially Angola I) rely heavily on estimates from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF)'s list of genocides and politicides, part of its 'Internal Wars and Failures of Government' dataset. PITF lists 1975 as the beginning of genocide in the country, and codes the magnitude of each genocide event annually on a scale from 0 – 5, using estimates of intentional civilian fatalities from a number of different sources. Still, there is also some uncertainty around them. According to the PITF, for a few genocides and politicides, "no annual variations in intensity of killing could be assessed, therefore total estimated deaths were pro-rated over the entire period."⁵⁷⁵ In the case of Angola, however, there is annual variation in the PITF codings and although they reflect a wide range of possible deaths on an annual basis, the codings for each year from 1975-1991 suggest a range that dramatically exceeds the minimum threshold for a complex emergency. Based on these combined with other supporting information, I code each year with a 'certainty' level of 5, although an argument could also be made for a more cautious interpretation of the PITF data.

1975 - 1977 (Certainty: 5 each)

According to USCR, an estimated 500,000 civilians fled Angola from 1975 to 1977, mostly to Zaire and Zambia, and around one million people (one-sixth of Angola's population) were internally displaced at the peak of the fighting during this period, although it was unclear how many were displaced in which year.⁵⁷⁶ The PITF (see note above) lists 1975 as the beginning of genocide in Angola and estimates that there were between 4,000 and 8,000 intentional civilian deaths in 1975, and between 8,000 and 16,000 in each of 1976 and 1977.⁵⁷⁷

1978 - 1979 (Certainty: 5 each)

According to the PITF, an estimated 16,000 to 32,000 intentional civilian deaths occurred in each of 1978 and 1979.⁵⁷⁸ USCR offers little new information on conditions during these years, but in 1978 it indicated that there remained hundreds of thousands of internally displaced, as well as some 500,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire and an additional 30,000 in Zambia.⁵⁷⁹ That year, however, Angola and Zaire signed a mutual cooperation agreement, which led to the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees, from both sides, to their homelands under the watch of UNHCR.⁵⁸⁰ In May of 1978, approximately 1,000 civilians were massacred in a single incident at Kassinga.⁵⁸¹

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: USCR reported that several relief organizations aided the displaced by providing food, shelter, and clothing, but that these efforts were severely hampered by war, lack of facilities and the remote location of refugee groups.⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁵ See the PITF codebook and variable descriptions at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-task-force-home/pitf-problem-set-codebook/#variables>.

⁵⁷⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1977, p. 15.

⁵⁷⁷ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1978, p. 7.

⁵⁸⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1980.

⁵⁸¹ James 2011, p. 147.

⁵⁸² United States Committee for Refugees 1978, p. 7.

1980 - 1983 (Certainty: 5 each)

For each year from 1980 to 1982, the PITF estimated that there were between 8,000 and 16,000 intentional civilian deaths. For 1983, this increased to a range of 16,000 to 32,000.⁵⁸³ USCR offered almost no new information on the ongoing fighting in Angola in 1980-83 or the scope of new displacement, asserting that little was known about its extent.⁵⁸⁴ The U.S. State Department also noted that information coming out of Angola was unreliable, but for 1980 cited estimates from relief agencies that anywhere from 250,000 to 800,000 people (over what period of time these people had been displaced was unclear) had left conflict-affected areas in the countryside in central and southern Angola in search of food and safety, and that most of these people were severely malnourished.⁵⁸⁵ In 1981, it claimed there were some 100,000 displaced persons in central and southern Angola and who were suffering from severe malnutrition. The implication appeared to be that these were citizens who had not managed to flee to more urban areas.⁵⁸⁶ Thereafter, again according to the State Department, “Intensified fighting between MPLA and UNITA forces during 1982 led to marked deterioration in the quality of life, and extensive loss of life.”⁵⁸⁷ For 1982 and 1983 it estimated that there were some 200,000-500,000 severely malnourished or starving displaced persons in central and southern Angola, and that because of the strain the war had put on the food supply, health for the Angolan population as a whole (including the non-displaced) had deteriorated as well.⁵⁸⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In 1981, the U.S. Department of State charged that the Angolan government lacked the capability to respond to the needs of the displaced, but noted that it had asked the UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) to assess relief needs. UNDRO determined that food and other supplies were required for over 500,000 people.⁵⁸⁹ The following year, again at the Angolan government’s request, UNDRO worked to administer relief “for an estimated 661,000 people displaced by fighting and drought in the southern section of the country.”⁵⁹⁰ Thus, despite its own limited capabilities the government did seek to ensure that the needs of the conflict-affected population were met. On the other hand, in 1982 the State Department noted that, “these efforts to ameliorate human suffering have been severely limited by the continuing hostilities. Malnutrition is widespread, and the quality of life continues to deteriorate.”⁵⁹¹ In addition, the MPLA was repeatedly accused of committing serious atrocities against civilians.⁵⁹²

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: See above regarding widespread malnutrition among the displaced. Deteriorating conditions due to increased fighting in central Angola in October 1982 (and at other times) forced the ICRC to suspend its food relief and medical programs.⁵⁹³

⁵⁸³ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁵⁸⁴ E.g., United States Committee for Refugees 1981, p.12; United States Committee for Refugees 1982, p.11; United States Committee for Refugees 1983, p.64.

⁵⁸⁵ U.S. Department of State 1981, p.12.

⁵⁸⁶ U.S. Department of State 1982a, p.19.

⁵⁸⁷ U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.19.

⁵⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.25; U.S. Department of State 1984a, p.30.

⁵⁸⁹ U.S. Department of State 1982a, p. 19.

⁵⁹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1982, p.11.

⁵⁹¹ U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.20; see also p.25. For a similar assessment for 1983 see U.S. Department of State 1984a, p.22.

⁵⁹² U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.19-20; U.S. Department of State 1984a, p.22-23. This is also evident in the conflict’s inclusion in the PITF genocide/politicide list.

⁵⁹³ E.g., U.S. Department of State 1983a, p.25.

1984 - 1985 (Certainty: 5 each)

According to the PITF, in each of 1984 and 1985 there were approximately 16,000 to 32,000 intentional civilian deaths associated with the ongoing conflict.⁵⁹⁴ In addition, according to the U.S. State Department, fighting in Angola intensified and spread in 1984 to most areas of the country, and then further intensified in 1985.⁵⁹⁵ The State Department also cited reports that “more than 2,000 persons on either side were killed in the fighting in 1985.”⁵⁹⁶ This intensified fighting continued to push large numbers of people from their homes, but precise estimates were difficult to ascertain amid shifting reports and wide estimates of the number who were displaced at any given time. According to USCR, however, tens of thousands flooded into southwestern Zaire in 1984-85, reaching an estimated 70,000 by mid-1985.⁵⁹⁷

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In addition to the PITF coding, there were continued allegations that both sides – including on the government side both the MPLA and the Cuban troops supporting it – attacked and targeted civilians.⁵⁹⁸

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: The U.S. State Department continued to estimate that there were approximately 200,000-500,000 displaced civilians in central, southern, and eastern Angola facing malnutrition and starvation due to conflict and exacerbated by ongoing drought. There were also severe food shortages in urban areas.⁵⁹⁹ Refugees arriving in Zambia in 1984 were in a similarly ‘catastrophic’ state, according to local authorities.⁶⁰⁰ Despite the need, however, relief efforts continued to be hampered by the conflict. Government efforts to arrange food assistance from international sources continued in 1984-85, but also remained inadequate in the face of the population’s needs.⁶⁰¹

1986 - 1987 (Certainty: 5 each)

For 1986, the PITF estimated between 16,000 and 32,000 intentional civilian deaths, and for 1987 it increased the range to 32,000 - 64,000.⁶⁰² Even more alarmingly, USCR cited a UN estimate claiming that 55,000 Angolan children under the age of five died from violence-related causes in 1986 alone.⁶⁰³

Accurate estimates of the displaced population – both those newly displaced and those who had been displaced for an extended period of time – remained elusive, at least partly due to the government’s method for tracking them. As USCR explained, in 1987 “the number of Angolans internally displaced because of the continuing civil war in Angola increased by more than 40 percent to an official total of 690,000. Official totals of displaced persons in Angola, however, include only

⁵⁹⁴ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁵⁹⁵ U.S. Department of State 1985a, p.11; U.S. Department of State 1986a, p.5.

⁵⁹⁶ U.S. Department of State 1986a, p.5.

⁵⁹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1985, p.51.

⁵⁹⁸ U.S. Department of State 1985a, p.12; U.S. Department of State 1986a, p.6.

⁵⁹⁹ U.S. Department of State 1985a.

⁶⁰⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p. 48.

⁶⁰¹ U.S. Department of State 1985a, p.18; U.S. Department of State 1986a, p.10-11. See also, e.g., United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p. 42.

⁶⁰² Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶⁰³ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p. 7.

those uprooted by conflict within the past two years and receiving assistance from government or international relief agencies. Since Angolan independence in 1975, as many as three-and-a-half million civilians – roughly 40 percent of the entire population” have fled their homes.”⁶⁰⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) Conditions of Life for Displaced: USCR reported that fighting and insecurity continued to severely hamper delivery of relief aid to the displaced and other affected populations, who continued to suffer from severe food shortages and malnutrition.⁶⁰⁵

1988 - 1990 (Certainty: 5 each)

For each year from 1988 to 1990 the PITF estimated that the intentional number of civilian deaths in Angola was between 32,000 and 64,000.⁶⁰⁶ USCR offered little detailed information on new displacement for these years, but a 1989 report did indicate that there were some 638,000 IDPs who had been displaced in rural areas since 1985 in addition to some 440,000 who had been displaced to urban centers (those displaced earlier were no longer being counted).⁶⁰⁷ A major government offensive that began in December 1989 led to intense fighting in early 1990, and then stalled in April. According to the U.S. State Department, many civilians died of starvation during these months as both sides prevented food aid from reaching people in need.⁶⁰⁸ Later in the year the parties engaged in peace talks, but did not reach any agreement.

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: USCR reported that the Angolan government was unable to provide sanitary facilities or medical care, and that camps lacked access to food and clean water for weeks or months at a time.⁶⁰⁹ The U.S. State Department reported in 1988 that Angolan government forces both inadvertently and deliberately killed civilians.⁶¹⁰ For much of 1990, moreover, the Angolan government blocked international efforts to deliver aid to the displaced in UNITA-controlled areas, and UNITA engaged in the same practice in government areas.⁶¹¹ Africa Watch also reported that in 1990, government forces forcibly displaced thousands of civilians in order to deny UNITA their support and assistance.⁶¹²

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: In 1988, USCR reported that large numbers of urban IDP’s “live in sprawling neighborhoods with no water and inadequate sanitary facilities.”⁶¹³ The health situation in the country, especially in IDP camps, was in crisis. In northern Angola, many displaced in remote areas were forced to live a “nomadic existence” with no outside relief.⁶¹⁴ By 1990, the Angolan government warned that some 2.6 million people were threatened by famine created by disruption of food supplies due to the ongoing conflict and drought.⁶¹⁵

⁶⁰⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.35. See also e.g., U.S. Department of State 1988a, p. 7.

⁶⁰⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1986, p. 41; United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.7-8.

⁶⁰⁶ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶⁰⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p. 35.

⁶⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State 1991a, p.2.

⁶⁰⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p. 38.

⁶¹⁰ U.S. Department of State 1990a, p. 7.

⁶¹¹ U.S. Department of State 1991a, p.2, 4.

⁶¹² U.S. Department of State 1991a, p.4.

⁶¹³ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p. 38.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

⁶¹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p. 38.

1991 (Certainty: 5)

On May 31 the government and UNITA signed the Angola Peace Accords, which brought an end to the conflict for the next sixteen months. According to the U.S. State Department, the peace deal led to significant improvements in security and human rights, with no serious violations of the agreement through the end of the year.⁶¹⁶

Before this, however, war continued in early 1991, with fighting in many parts of the country and especially heavy fighting around the eastern provincial capital of Luena in April and through May up until the ceasefire. According to the State Department, this resulted “in heavy civilian casualties and the flight of large numbers of additional refugees to Zambia.”⁶¹⁷ For 1991, the PITF recorded a range of approximately 16,000 - 32,000 intentional war-related civilian deaths.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁶ U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.2.

⁶¹⁷ U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.1.

⁶¹⁸ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

27. Angola II (1992 – 1994)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

*General Information & Overall Severity*⁶¹⁹

After a year of peace in 1991 and then a disputed September election, Angola slid back into civil war in October of 1992, leading once again to mass displacement and the widespread killing of civilians.⁶²⁰ The fighting was prompted by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's refusal to accept his own electoral loss, and this second Angolan complex emergency lasted from 1992 to 1994. Over this period, several sources suggest, over 100,000 civilians lost their lives to war-related causes.⁶²¹ The war ended with the signing of a new peace agreement, the Lusaka Accords, on November 20 1994. Despite ongoing peace negotiations in the months beforehand, however, the war intensified that fall as both sides sought to strengthen their military positions in advance of a final settlement.⁶²²

Annual Data

1992 (Certainty: 5)

In 1992, USCR estimated that 6,000 persons died and 900,000 were newly displaced as a result of renewed conflict in the final months of the year.⁶²³ The U.S. Department of State reported that 400,000 fled to neighboring Zaire alone.⁶²⁴ The PITF's genocide and politicide data estimated that the number of civilian deaths in 1992 was between 32,000 and 64,000.⁶²⁵

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: USCR reported that numerous civilian casualties were attributed to government forces.⁶²⁶

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: All major relief organizations suspended their efforts in providing aid to the region due to the renewed conflict.⁶²⁷

1993 (Certainty: 5)

The renewed war in Angola caused catastrophic levels of civilian suffering and death in 1993. According to USCR, "At least 100,000 persons died from war-related causes during the year—some estimates said 500,000—and some 1 million persons were newly displaced from their homes by fighting that centered around several major towns. At least 3 million of the country's 12 million people were in dire need of food or other emergency assistance."⁶²⁸ A significant contributor to this situation was the government practice of long military sieges of major cities and towns that trapped populations, sometimes for months at a time, without access to food or supplies. In one instance,

⁶¹⁹ A more detailed description of the origins of the conflict is found in the summary for Angola I, 1975-1990.

⁶²⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p. 57.

⁶²¹ U.S. Department of State 1995c; United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.50.

⁶²² United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p. 50.

⁶²³ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p. 57.

⁶²⁴ U.S. Department of State 1994a.

⁶²⁵ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶²⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p. 57.

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p. 47.

almost 30,000 persons died in the town of Cuito as combatants fought block by block. In another instance, close to 15,000 died in the city of Huambo. Approximately 9,000 Angolans perished in the town of Menonge, many from malnutrition. More broadly, mid-year estimates suggested that some 4,000 children were dying each month, mostly due to war-related disease and malnutrition.⁶²⁹ For 1993, the PITF estimated that the number of civilian deaths ranged between 32,000 and 64,000.⁶³⁰

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: As noted above, government forces employed military sieges of major urban areas, which trapped entire populations without access to food and other necessities and also caught them in the crossfire of fighting between government and rebels.⁶³¹

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: As noted above, USCR reported that a quarter of the Angolan population was in “dire need of food or other emergency assistance.”⁶³²

1994 (Certainty: 5)

After the end of the war in November, USCR’s estimate for the conflict’s total civilian death toll from 1992 to 1994 differed little from its estimate for 1993 alone, as it noted that over 100,000 were thought to have died since the war resumed. In addition, two million Angolans were internally displaced at the end of the year.⁶³³ Although USCR provides few specifics on 1994 in particular, however, the U.S. Department of State reported that 1,000 civilians were believed to have been dying *daily* early in the year.⁶³⁴ In addition, the PITF estimated that the number of civilian deaths in 1994 alone ranged anywhere from 32,000 to 64,000.⁶³⁵

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to the U.S. State Department, “Military and security forces on both sides flagrantly disregarded fundamental humanitarian values in their treatment of prisoners of war (POW’s), their extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, including humanitarian relief workers, women, children, and the elderly. Both sides repeatedly interfered for political purposes with internationally provided humanitarian assistance.”⁶³⁶

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: As in 1993, large numbers of displaced persons were trapped in urban areas besieged by combatants and thus unable to flee or gain access to international relief at various times during the year. Still, according to USCR, although malnutrition persisted in many areas and despite the combatants’ interference, a huge international relief effort during the year succeeded in bringing the daily death toll down significantly from 1993.⁶³⁷ On the other hand, poor sanitary conditions and a lack of clean water in urban areas “led to a serious health crisis, with outbreaks of polio, cholera, and measles.”⁶³⁸

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶³¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p. 47.

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p. 50.

⁶³⁴ U.S. Department of State 1995c.

⁶³⁵ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶³⁶ U.S. Department of State 1995c. See also United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p. 51.

⁶³⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p. 50.

⁶³⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p. 51.

28. Angola III (1998 – 2002)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internationalized Internal Conflict

*General Information & Overall Severity*⁶³⁹

The third complex emergency associated with civil war in Angola lasted from 1998 to 2002 after three largely peaceful years.⁶⁴⁰ Early in 1998, the low-level violence of 1996-1997 erupted into large-scale fighting between government forces and UNITA, which persisted for the next four years and again caused large numbers of civilian deaths and extensive displacement. For each year from 1998-2002 the conflict in Angola again made the PITF's list of genocides and politicides, with an estimated 16,000 – 32,000 intentional civilian deaths in each of these years. In February 2002, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in battle, and this proved to be the event that would finally end the war and dissolve UNITA. Within two months the government and UNITA signed a cease-fire and this was followed by a comprehensive peace agreement in August of 2002.

Annual Data

1998 (Certainty: 5)

According to USCR, fighting resumed early in the year but intensified later on: "Renewed war uprooted between 300,000 and 500,000 Angolans during the second half of 1998. At year's end, 1 million to 1.5 million persons were displaced."⁶⁴¹ As fighting increased there were also growing numbers of attacks against civilians, aid workers, and UN observers who were deployed in the country. In one incident alone, more than 1,000 civilians were killed in Malange.⁶⁴² As noted above, the PITF data set estimated between 16,000 and 32,000 intentional civilian deaths in 1998.⁶⁴³

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: USCR reported evidence of government attacks on civilians.⁶⁴⁴
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Camps for the displaced suffered from poor sanitation and a lack of proper health care. Increasing insecurity and violence hampered outside relief operations.⁶⁴⁵

1999 (Certainty: 5)

USCR estimated that ongoing war newly displaced between 500,000 and 900,000 Angolans in 1999, leaving some 1.5 to 2 million people displaced at the end of the year.⁶⁴⁶ Displacement was also spread widely throughout the country, with eight provinces each totaling more than 50,000 newly

⁶³⁹ A more detailed description of the origins of the conflict is found in the summary for Angola I, 1975-1991.

⁶⁴⁰ Despite some low-level violence in 1995-1997 that at times threatened to erupt into full-scale war and created limited new displacement, the 1994 ceasefire seemed to solidify in 1995 and violence during these years appears to have fallen below the threshold of a complex emergency. For more information see e.g., Sambanis 2004, p.6-7; Human Rights Watch 1999.

⁶⁴¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p. 48.

⁶⁴² Ibid.

⁶⁴³ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶⁴⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p. 49.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p. 64.

displaced during the year.⁶⁴⁷ Again, the PITF estimated that there were between 16,000 and 32,000 intentional civilian deaths in 1999 alone.⁶⁴⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to USCR, both sides engaged in widespread abuse of the civilian population, including through forced conscription of minors and the increased use of landmines to control civilian movements.⁶⁴⁹ The U.S. Department of State reported military attacks that resulted in robbery, indiscriminate killing, and summary executions, of internally displaced Angolans.⁶⁵⁰

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Additionally, USCR noted that in Kuito and Huambo some 15% of children under five (both IDP's and residents) suffered from severe malnutrition.⁶⁵¹

2000 (Certainty: 5)

USCR reported that fighting newly uprooted approximately 300,000 Angolans in 2000. Compared with the previous year, however, large-scale displacement occurred in fewer areas, with only two provinces totaling more than 50,000 newly displaced in 2000.⁶⁵² Again the PITF estimated between 16,000 and 32,000 intentional civilian deaths in 2000.⁶⁵³

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The U.S. Department of State reported that government forces repeatedly harassed IDPs, and in some instances denied them humanitarian assistance.⁶⁵⁴

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: USCR noted that despite extensive humanitarian assistance, mortality rates among the displaced were 'exceptionally high.'⁶⁵⁵

2001 (Certainty: 5)

In 2001 USCR claimed that nearly 350,000 Angolans became newly displaced by continued fighting as the government gradually made progress against UNITA.⁶⁵⁶ The PITF estimated that there were again between 16,000 and 32,000 intentional civilian deaths during the year.⁶⁵⁷

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to USCR, both sides continued to abuse civilians in 2001: "UNITA engaged in abductions, beatings, sexual abuse, and summary executions, while government troops killed civilians and burned villages during counterinsurgency operations."⁶⁵⁸

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: USCR reported that poor sanitation and lack of proper health care contributed to the spread of disease in displacement camps. Overall humanitarian conditions

⁶⁴⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.58.

⁶⁴⁸ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶⁴⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p. 64.

⁶⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State 2000b.

⁶⁵¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p. 65.

⁶⁵² United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.57-58.

⁶⁵³ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State 2001c.

⁶⁵⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p. 59.

⁶⁵⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p. 53.

⁶⁵⁷ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶⁵⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p. 53.

continued to worsen during the year as well, with child mortality rates reaching 40% and 30% of the displaced lacking access to medical care. Many civilians died of communicable and other preventable diseases.⁶⁵⁹

2002 (Certainty: 5)

According to USCR over 200,000 Angolans were newly displaced early in 2002 as the Angolan government sought to further its military advantages over the rebels and gain a final victory.⁶⁶⁰ PITF indicated that, as in previous years, there were an estimated 16,000 - 32,000 intentional civilian deaths in 2002.⁶⁶¹ As noted above, however, in February UNITA leader Savimbi was killed in battle, leading to an April ceasefire and a remarkably swift end to the long and brutal conflict. With the fighting over, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan remarked, Angola was left to deal with “a generalized humanitarian crisis of immense proportions.”⁶⁶²

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Much of the new displacement in 2002 is attributable to a government strategy of intentionally uprooting civilians in UNITA territory in order to deprive the rebels of support from the local population.⁶⁶³

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Malnutrition remained widespread and UN officials described camp conditions of the displaced as “shocking.”⁶⁶⁴ Additionally, the UN estimated that between 2 and 6 of every 10,000 IDPs died each day in 2002.⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁵⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p. 54.

⁶⁶⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p. 48.

⁶⁶¹ Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2013.

⁶⁶² United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.48.

⁶⁶³ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p. 48.

⁶⁶⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.48-49.

⁶⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State 2003.

29. Burundi (1993 – 2004)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

Violent conflict between Burundi's majority Hutu and minority Tutsi populations has marred the country for decades. Despite making up less than 20 percent of the population, ethnic Tutsi have exercised control over political and military power in Burundi since national independence in 1962, generally marginalizing the Hutu population. This political and ethnic tension erupted into serious violence in 1972 when, following a military crackdown, clashes between the two groups left 150,000 Burundians dead and forced some 300,000 to flee the country. After a Hutu uprising in 1988, another military crackdown led to the deaths of 10,000 to 20,000 Burundians and generated an additional 60,000 refugees.⁶⁶⁶ Violence then flared again in 1991 during confrontations between the Tutsi-dominated military and armed Hutu insurgents who opposed the government in the capital, Bujumbura, and other areas. This led to the deaths of up to 3,000 people and the flight of an additional 40,000 to 50,000 people.⁶⁶⁷

After the events of 1991, 1992 was a relatively peaceful year. Political reforms encouraged Hutu refugees to repatriate, voters approved a new multiparty constitution in March, and Hutus gained substantial representation in the ruling cabinet. In October, authorities guaranteed safety to all returning refugees, and, in anticipation of large-scale repatriation in the coming year, UNHCR worked to enlarge a returnee reception center. Despite the number of returnees, 143,000 Burundian refugees remained in Tanzania, 24,000 in Rwanda, and 17,000 in Zaire at the end of 1992.⁶⁶⁸

In 1993, a Hutu was victorious in Burundi's first democratic presidential election. Four months later, however, Tutsi soldiers assassinated the new president and several high-ranking Hutu officials, sparking widespread political and ethnic violence and starting a civil war that would continue for over a decade. Both sides attacked civilians, with Hutu militia targeting displaced Tutsis and the Tutsi-dominated military targeting Hutus. In 1996 a military-led coup installed Tutsi-backed former president Pierre Buyoya, and fighting continued.

The last several years of the war were punctuated by drawn-out peace negotiations alongside continued large-scale violence as government and rebels each sought to secure the best possible position. In August 2000 the government and 17 other political parties signed the Arusha Accords, which led to the installation of a multi-ethnic transitional government in November 2001 with representation for 17 political parties, including the predominantly Tutsi Union for National Progress (Uprona) and the mostly Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu). President Buyoya of Uprona served for 18 months and then turned power over to Vice President Domitien Ndayizeye of Frodebu in 2003.⁶⁶⁹

Two key rebel groups, however, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the National Forces of Liberation (FNL), refused to sign the Arusha Accords and continued fighting. In October 2002, offshoots of both of these groups reached agreements with the government, and a ceasefire between the government and the main FDD body followed in December (although there were frequent violations). Nearly a year later, in October – November 2003, the transitional government and the FDD signed a comprehensive ceasefire agreement (the Pretoria Protocols),

⁶⁶⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.48.

⁶⁶⁷ Sambanis 2004, p.24.

⁶⁶⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.58.

⁶⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch 2003b, p.7.

which both sides respected.

The FNL continued to cause havoc, however. FNL forces attacked Bujumbura in July 2003 and began clashing with the FDD as well as the government as it became clear that the FDD intended to make peace.⁶⁷⁰ After the Pretoria Protocols, FDD troops were incorporated into the army. The FNL was seriously weakened by operations against the newly integrated government forces and declared a unilateral truce in April 2004. By mid-2004 Burundi had become much safer and for the first time it seemed that the war might genuinely be coming to an end.⁶⁷¹

Indeed, despite continued low-level violence, the next several years saw major political progress. In 2005, Burundi held its first democratic elections since 1993 and in September 2006 the government and FNL finally signed a comprehensive ceasefire, which further improved the security situation.⁶⁷² Low-level fighting continued to generate small-scale displacement in 2005-2006, but it does not appear to have approached the threshold for a continued complex emergency.⁶⁷³ In addition, 2004-2005 saw the massive return of IDPs to their home areas.⁶⁷⁴ By 2005, approximately 300,000 people had been killed in the conflict since 1993.⁶⁷⁵

Annual Data

1993 (Certainty: 5)

After a peaceful June presidential election in which Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was elected, approximately 10,000 refugees repatriated.⁶⁷⁶ On October 21, however, sections of the Tutsi-dominated military assassinated the newly elected president and several other high government officials, setting off massive political and ethnic violence in most regions of the country as civilian Tutsi and Hutu attacked each other and sections of the military attacked Hutu.

The scale of the violence was clearly massive, although estimates of its toll were highly imprecise. At the end of the year, estimates of deaths ranged from 30,000 to 200,000. In addition, approximately 600,000 people – mostly Hutu – fled the country, and some 500,000 to 700,000 of both ethnic groups became internally displaced.⁶⁷⁷

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Though surviving members of Burundi's democratically elected government remained in office at the end of 1993, they proved unable to gain control of the country's ongoing humanitarian and security crisis, and their request for international peacekeeping troops went unanswered. Ethnic violence abated as soldiers returned to their barracks, evidence of the military's role in perpetuating the violence.

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Around 350,000 of those who fled the violence that began in October went to Rwanda, where UNHCR staff reported that the speed and size of the influx of

⁶⁷⁰ For a more extensive summary of the peace process and ongoing violence during this time see Human Rights Watch 2003b, p.7-18.

⁶⁷¹ International Crisis Group 2004.

⁶⁷² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008c, p.17-18.

⁶⁷³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008c, p.29-31.

⁶⁷⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008c, p.85-86.

⁶⁷⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008c, p.16.

⁶⁷⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.49.

⁶⁷⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.50.

people “totally overwhelmed relief efforts.”⁶⁷⁸ In 24 designated camps, refugees were subjected to overcrowding, inadequate shelter, and shortages of food relief. This led to malnutrition and outbreaks of cholera, dysentery, and measles. According to USCR, “Tentative studies indicated a death rate of 3.7 per day per 10,000 refugees—nearly double the death rate considered normal in a refugee emergency. Some camps recorded death rates of nearly 6 per day per 10,000—nearly three times the normal level.”⁶⁷⁹

1994 (Certainty: 5)

Political turmoil continued in Burundi in 1994. Following the 1993 assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye, Cyprien Ntaryamira, a Hutu, was named interim president in January. Three months later, he died in a plane crash that also killed the president of neighboring Rwanda and was replaced by another Hutu, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya.

Although violence continued in 1994, it was lower than during the previous year and Burundi managed to avoid the scale of genocidal killing that engulfed Rwanda. An estimated 5,000 people died during the year.⁶⁸⁰ According to USCR, “the worst incidents included the deaths of more than 200 Hutu civilians in March, and the deaths of 600 in April during army nighttime raids in the capital.”⁶⁸¹ In February, violence tied to political unrest in the capital displaced approximately 100,000 people. By year’s end, approximately one in every six Burundians had been uprooted by the ongoing war.⁶⁸²

The year also saw the large-scale return of refugees, which aggravated ethnic tensions. At the beginning of the year some 780,000 Burundians were refugees in neighboring countries, but nearly 400,000 spontaneously repatriated from Rwanda and Tanzania during the year due to a temporary lull in violence, poor conditions in Rwandan refugee camps, war and genocide in Rwanda, and a desire to return to their homes and crops. Due to political and ethnic tensions, however, many were unable to return to their homes and became internally displaced.⁶⁸³

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness:* The government remained in chaos in 1994, and many high-ranking Hutu officials lived in fear of assassination by extremists and elements of the Tutsi-dominated army. Extremists assassinated some Tutsi leaders, while other officials stayed in hiding.
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* The return of so many refugees to Burundi added to the country’s humanitarian needs, and the internally displaced population was “plagued by a pervasive sense of insecurity.”⁶⁸⁴ Roadblocks and harassment by extremists hindered food transportation, and camp residents of both ethnic groups fell victim to targeted attacks.

1995 (Certainty: 5)

Burundi’s civil war gained momentum in 1995. In the northern and central areas of the country, tens of thousands of people, including many Hutu residents of the capital and Cibitoke

⁶⁷⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.64.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.61.

⁶⁸¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.52.

⁶⁸² United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.51-52.

⁶⁸³ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.53.

province, became newly displaced.⁶⁸⁵ The constant, pervasive violence between Hutu opposition groups, Tutsi extremists, and the Burundian military generated casualties virtually every week, totaling at some 5,000 to 10,000 deaths over the course of the year, more than 40 percent of which were women and children. A December MSF report indicated a ratio of ten deaths for every injury, indicating a clear intent to kill.⁶⁸⁶

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: A June report from Amnesty International indicated that members of the Tutsi-dominated security forces were “taking the law into their own hands.”⁶⁸⁷ That same month, for example, during a military offensive in Kamenge, soldiers “killed large numbers of civilians” and forced between 40,000 and 60,000 Hutu to flee.⁶⁸⁸

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: According to MSF, 1995 saw 27 attacks against international relief groups and the assassination of eleven foreign employees of international agencies.⁶⁸⁹ A December grenade attack on the offices of international relief agencies in Gitega prompted three NGOs, including the ICRC, to withdraw all foreign personnel from Burundi. USCR reported that conditions in Burundi’s 179 camps for displaced Tutsis were “basic at best.”⁶⁹⁰

1996 (Certainty: 5)

Violence in Burundi escalated during 1996 as the mostly Hutu rebel forces demonstrated their growing strength. Following a military-led coup that installed Tutsi-backed former president Pierre Buyoya, the civil war spread to previously peaceful areas of the country, and neighboring countries imposed an economic embargo. Various estimates suggested that at least 15,000 died during the year, but that this may have reached 30,000-40,000 or even more, while the military forcibly interned as many as 100,000 persons, the number of refugees increased by 80,000, and the number of internally displaced persons increased by 100,000. Nearly half of the dead and wounded were believed to be women and children.⁶⁹¹ The number of refugees and displaced persons fluctuated throughout the year, and according to the IDMC, “It is probable that far more than a half-million Burundians were internally displaced at different times during 1996” and “more than 150,000 Burundians fled their country,” though nearly half returned later in the year.⁶⁹² In total, approximately 285,000 Burundians were refugees and 400,000 were internally displaced persons at the end of the year, though the violence left much of the country inaccessible to outsiders and made precise estimates difficult to obtain.⁶⁹³

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Though international diplomats discussed deploying UN peacekeeping troops in Burundi, as requested by the country’s president, no foreign intervention took place. Both the rebel forces and the government army were guilty of atrocities against the civilian population, but the government army and the extremist Tutsi militia were responsible for the

⁶⁸⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.42.

⁶⁸⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.41.

⁶⁸⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.40.

⁶⁸⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.42.

⁶⁸⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.41.

⁶⁹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.42.

⁶⁹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.60-61.

⁶⁹² United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.62.

⁶⁹³ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.60.

majority of these, according to independent human rights investigators. Following the mid-year coup, the military forcibly relocated approximately 100,000 people, mostly Hutu, into “regroupment” camps, ostensibly for security purposes.⁶⁹⁴

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Camps for displaced persons served as both sources and targets of violence. Due to security concerns, relief agencies and human rights workers were unable to reach large segments of the displaced population. According to USCR, early in the year an estimated 75,000 displaced persons in northwest Burundi lacked blankets, seeds, and plastic sheeting. In January, about 70 tons of relief food were looted, and in June, three ICRC staff members were killed in an ambush north of Bujumbura. This led international aid agencies to suspend most land travel in the country and rely on expensive air deliveries.⁶⁹⁵

1997 (Certainty: 5)

Though security improved in many regions of the country and many refugees were able to repatriate, violence in Burundi continued in 1997, generating tens of thousands of new refugees during the year. In addition, a rebel attack near Bujumbura at the end of the year reportedly killed 300 people and displaced 10,000. All sides continued to commit violence against civilians, and the government once again forcibly displaced “hundreds of thousands” of rural Burundians and sent them to camps in order to separate them from the insurgents and deprive the rebels of local support. At the end of the year, about 250,000 Burundians were refugees and about 500,000 were internally displaced.⁶⁹⁶

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: A UN report concluded that the government military was “first and foremost” responsible for the violence in Burundi.⁶⁹⁷ By mid-year, its policy of moving rural Hutu into ‘re-groupment’ camps had left 250,000 to 300,000 people (and up to half a million, by some estimates) in about 50 camps throughout the country.⁶⁹⁸

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: According to USCR, “many newly displaced persons spent weeks or months in forests and swamp areas before emerging with malnutrition and skin infections.”⁶⁹⁹ Conditions in camps were not much better: one in every five sites lacked access to health care, and, according to a UN survey, 60 percent had extremely poor sanitation. In the south of the country, conflict, rains, and poor roads prevented relief efforts from reaching the camps, causing malnutrition among occupants. Regroupment sites in particular suffered poor sanitation, insufficient water, minimal health services, and overcrowding, and were at times targets for attack.⁷⁰⁰

1998 (Certainty: 5)

The scope of violence generally declined during 1998, but as splits among the rebel groups and within the Tutsi-dominated ruling party began to appear, combatants resorted to tactics such as

⁶⁹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.62.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.53.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.54.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

killings, rape, disappearances, and forced relocations to punish civilians suspected of disloyalty. A rebel attack on the country's main airport at the beginning of the year left 300 people dead.⁷⁰¹ Violence near the capital uprooted 18,000 people in January.⁷⁰² In the northwest and south, approximately 200,000 were newly displaced by violence during the year.⁷⁰³

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Violence against civilians continued, and according to human rights investigators, government officials often blamed rebels for the actions of government troops. They did admit, however, that government troops massacred 50 to 100 unarmed civilians near Bujumbura in November.⁷⁰⁴

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Insecurity in southern Burundi prompted some international aid agencies to evacuate their staff. Highway ambushes and landmines further complicated relief efforts. Displacement camps remained targets for attack. Conditions in some camps were poor, with malnutrition rates of up to 21 percent among children in the northwest.⁷⁰⁵ Other camps were able to provide substantial aid programs and reasonable health conditions.

1999 (Certainty: 5)

In 1999, regular clashes between government and rebel forces in the southern and western regions of Burundi continued, and more than 400,000 Burundians were newly displaced. About 60,000 fled to Tanzania. At the end of the year, there were approximately 310,000 Burundian refugees and 800,000 internally displaced persons. Though there are no specific estimates of the 1999 death toll, USCR places the number in the thousands.⁷⁰⁶

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to Amnesty International, the army responded to Hutu militia violence during the year with indiscriminate reprisals against suspect civilian populations. Late in the year, they also engaged in another round of forcible displacement that sent 350,000 Hutu to regroupment camps.⁷⁰⁷

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: According to USCR, "only 12 percent of all internally displaced persons nationwide had access to potable water, and only 40 percent had latrines with appropriate sanitation." Combatants on both sides continued to target displacement camps. Soldiers killed at least six people who tried to leave regroupment camps or complained about conditions, which often involved inadequate shelter, drinking water, and toilets.⁷⁰⁸ In regions with large returnee populations, malnutrition rates reached 10 percent.⁷⁰⁹ After the murder of two international UN aid workers in October, UNHCR and other UN agencies evacuated all non-essential staff and suspended aid programs. Though other agencies were able to supply some camps, other camps were inaccessible.

⁷⁰¹United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.51.

⁷⁰²United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.53.

⁷⁰³ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.52.

⁷⁰⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.51.

⁷⁰⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.53.

⁷⁰⁶United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.67-68.

⁷⁰⁷United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.68-69.

⁷⁰⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.69.

⁷⁰⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.68.

2000 (Certainty: 5)

With the help of international mediation, 19 parties and factions signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August. The Arusha Agreement called for an ethnically mixed military, judicial reforms, and UN peacekeeping troops, but it lacked a cease-fire provision and the two main rebel groups refused to sign it. The attempt at peace negotiations spurred an increase in violence between rebels, government troops, and civilian militia in the southern and eastern regions of the country and later in the central and western regions. During the first 10 months of the year, more than 1,000 civilians were killed, with many atrocities going unreported due to insecurity and government restrictions. Approximately 150,000 Burundians were newly uprooted. At the end of 2000, some 400,000 were living as refugees in neighboring countries and an estimated 600,000 were internally displaced persons.⁷¹⁰

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: The Burundian government provided arms and training to Tutsi militia as the violence intensified. Restrictions and inadequate security rendered conflict zones inaccessible, halting the flow of information and preventing accurate reporting.

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: According to USCR, humanitarian conditions in the regroupment camps were atrocious. Aid agencies could not access the camps, which in many cases lacked adequate food, water, and medicines. Malnutrition rates reached up to 25 percent among young children, and communicable disease was rampant. Human Rights Watch reported that death rates in the camps were twice those outside of them.⁷¹¹

2001 (Certainty: 5)

According to USCR, at least 100,000 Burundians were newly uprooted during the year and violence destroyed “health centers, schools, churches, livestock herds, and thousands of homes.”⁷¹² Rebel forces allegedly included combatants from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwandan Hutu militia, and former Rwandan Hutu government soldiers in addition to native Burundian groups. A February-March offensive by the FNL killed several hundred and displaced more than 50,000 people, and additional rebel attacks in Rutana Province uprooted an estimated 10,000 in March. In April, fighting in central Burundi displaced 17,000 civilians. At the end of 2001, over 350,000 Burundians were refugees, approximately 470,000 were in refugee-like circumstances, and at least 600,000 were internally displaced.⁷¹³

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: The spring fighting in central Burundi left humanitarian workers unable to conduct assessment missions in the region.⁷¹⁴

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: A rebel strike against a WFP convoy carrying 60 tons of relief food injured four WFP workers. Armed opposition forces gathered in the southern provinces of the country prevented humanitarian efforts from reaching at-risk populations. Displaced persons living

⁷¹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.61-62.

⁷¹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.62-63.

⁷¹² United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.55-56.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

⁷¹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.56.

in camps, villages, mountainous regions, and forests had limited access to humanitarian assistance. Burundi's population suffered from food shortages and outbreaks of infectious diseases.⁷¹⁵

2002 (Certainty: 5)

Continued international efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting failed to stem the violence, and again encouraged both rebel and government forces to try to gain the upper hand before a political solution could be reached. The violence newly uprooted an estimated 1 million Burundians, although some returned home before the end of the year.⁷¹⁶

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to USCR, government-initiated violence in the form of targeted attacks, heavy shelling, ambushes, and retaliatory murders increased during 2002. Forced relocations continued as government soldiers interned more than 33,000 civilians in so-called protection sites in eastern Burundi's Ruyigi Province. Authorities ensured that these sites remained inaccessible to media and humanitarian agencies.⁷¹⁷ Government soldiers massacred at least 200 civilians in Gitega Province in September.⁷¹⁸

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Humanitarian agencies were able to provide some accessible displaced populations with limited food and health care. UN relief officials found, however, that more than 70 percent lacked potable water, and 30 percent did not have access to sufficient sanitation.⁷¹⁹ Since the start of the war, life expectancy had fallen from 53 to 40 years, maternal mortality rates had tripled, and per capita food availability had declined 15 percent.⁷²⁰ Unpredictable violence prevented UNHCR from assisting refugees seeking to return home.

2003 (Certainty: 5)

In 2003, despite the peaceful transfer of power from President Pierre Buyoya, an ethnic Tutsi, to Vice President Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu, the FNL continued to attack civilian and government targets. This once again newly displaced some 1 million Burundians during the year.⁷²¹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: FNL attacks against civilians continued unabated.

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Approximately 85,000 Burundian refugees repatriated from western Tanzania, of whom 45,000 returned to areas deemed unsafe by UNHCR.⁷²²

2004 (Certainty: 5)

Following the FNL truce in April, security conditions in Burundi improved dramatically, allowing tens of thousands of internally displaced persons to return to their homes in 2004. Still,

⁷¹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.56-58.

⁷¹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.51.

⁷¹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.52.

⁷¹⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.53.

⁷¹⁹ Ibid.

⁷²⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.54.

⁷²¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2004, p.24.

⁷²² Ibid.

violence continued near the capital, especially early in the year: 30,000 to 40,000 persons were displaced each month, and up to 80,000 were displaced in February and March.⁷²³

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Under the Arusha Accord, the government was required to allow humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons and to guarantee returnees the right to their property. Despite the efforts of the Ministry of Resettlement and Reintegration of IDP and Repatriates and the National Commission for the Reintegration of Disaster-affected People (CNRS), only about 18 percent of internally displaced persons received the standard three-month return aid package.⁷²⁴ Government and rebel forces in Bujumbura Rural regularly looted assistance packages, and agencies were forced to suspend delivery.

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Occupants in 30 percent of IDP camps in Burundi lacked access to health facilities. In addition, an outbreak of cholera struck the Kabezi camp, which housed 30,000 people.⁷²⁵

⁷²³ United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.63.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

⁷²⁵ Ibid.

30. Congo-Brazzaville (1997-1999)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internationalized Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

An eruption of violence that would lay the groundwork for civil war in Congo-Brazzaville occurred following a disputed parliamentary election in May 1993. President Pascal Lissouba's party, the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy, captured a majority vote that was questioned by the two other contenders, Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Congolese Party of Labour and Bernard Kolélas of the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development. Each of the three politicians exercised control over his own ethno regional-based militia: Lissouba asserted influence through his southern-based Cocoye, or Zulu, militia, Sassou-Nguesso depended on his northern-based Cobra militia, and Kolélas relied on his Brazzaville-based Ninja militia. Fueling the conflict was the desire to control the country's rich oil fields, with each faction competing to secure financial revenues for themselves and their dependents.

As the three militias clashed in the latter half of 1993, hundreds died and several thousand reportedly fled their homes in the capital. The violence continued into 1994, and by late January, up to 2,000 people had died and 400,000 had been displaced.⁷²⁶ On January 30, the government and opposition forces signed a peace accord, leading to a significant reduction in violence. Though the next two years were relatively stable, fighting erupted again in June 1997 after the Congolese military surrounded Sassou-Nguesso's home, ostensibly, according to the USCR, "to disarm his militia and to arrest 'criminals' in the lead-up to a presidential election scheduled for July."⁷²⁷

Following this incident, Congo-Brazzaville descended into an all-out war, primarily fought between forces loyal to Lissouba and Sassou-Nguesso, representing the north and the south, respectively. The conflict would take place over the next two years and was marked by indiscriminate bombardment, attacks on civilians, and looting. Exiled soldiers from Rwanda, Congo/Zaire, and the Central African Republic, as well as the Angolan government, Angolan rebel troops, and European mercenaries were drawn into the fighting.

With the help of Angolan forces, Sassou-Nguesso rose to power and declared victory in October 1997, bringing about a brief lull in the violence. Fighting broke out again between those loyal to the new government and a combination militia of those loyal to former President Lissouba and former Brazzaville mayor and Prime Minister Kolélas in August 1998. By 1999, violence in Congo-Brazzaville had claimed the lives of an estimated 20,000 people and had displaced up to 800,000, nearly one-third of the country's population of 2.7 million.⁷²⁸ The country's capital city and remaining infrastructure were severely damaged.

The conflict ended in November 1999 when the government and rebel representatives signed the Pointe Noire truce. This truce was consolidated with the signing of a second peace accord on December 29, with President Omar Bongo of Gabon acting as mediator. The agreement offered general amnesty, effective January 15, 2000, to rebels who would disarm and surrender.

The tentative peace held through 2000 and 2001, years that saw a general lack of violence. There were no conflict-related deaths in 2000, and in 2001, Congo-Brazzaville adopted a new constitution.⁷²⁹ New violence broke out in March 2002 between government forces and the Ninja

⁷²⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.51.

⁷²⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.57.

⁷²⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.66.

⁷²⁹ Sambanis 2004, p.54.

militia in the Pool region of southern Congo-Brazzaville, near the capital city.

Annual Data

1997 (Certainty: 5)

Beginning in June, the ethnically drawn political militias of then-President Pascal Lissouba and Denis Sassou-Nguesso clashed in the streets of Brazzaville. This violence uprooted an estimated 750,000 Congolese, most of whom were residents of Brazzaville.⁷³⁰ Fighting subsided in October after Angolan forces intervened on behalf of Sassou-Nguesso, allowing hundreds of thousands to return to the shattered capital city.⁷³¹ By the end of the year, approximately 250,000 Congolese remained internally displaced, and 10,000 to 15,000 had been killed.⁷³²

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: UN-OAU envoy Mohamed Sahnoun and President Omar Bongo of Gabon, tasked with mediating the conflict, produced numerous truce agreements, all of which were ultimately violated by one party or the other, or both. As the fighting intensified, international humanitarian organizations removed expatriate staff members from Brazzaville, leaving Congolese Red Cross workers with the task of collecting corpses from the streets.

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Due to fighting in northern Congo-Brazzaville, an estimated 150,000 displaced persons in the region were cut off from humanitarian assistance by September.⁷³³ Approximately 300,000 displaced persons were concentrated in the country's southern provinces near the Pointe-Noire area.⁷³⁴ Large-scale food distribution did not begin here until October 1.

1998 (Certainty: 5)

After Sassou-Nguesso declared victory in October 1997, Congo-Brazzaville saw relatively little violence. By early 1998, the vast majority of Congolese uprooted in 1997 were able to return to their homes, and reconstruction had begun in the capital. The calm was broken in August when fighting erupted between the new government and the combined militias of former President Lissouba and former Brazzaville mayor and Prime Minister Kolélas. The struggle for political control uprooted tens of thousands in the southern areas of the country during 1998.⁷³⁵ Some 20,000 fled to Brazzaville from rural areas, and the southern city of Nkayi was left virtually empty.⁷³⁶ Violence peaked in mid-December when the destruction of two neighborhoods in Brazzaville killed up to 6,000 people and displaced an estimated 200,000 to 300,000.⁷³⁷ Up to 40,000 people fled to Congo-Kinshasa, 20,000 of whom were citizens of that country who had been working or visiting in Congo-Brazzaville.⁷³⁸

⁷³⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.57.

⁷³¹ Ibid.

⁷³² United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.56.

⁷³³ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.58.

⁷³⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.57.

⁷³⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.56. I do not code a new complex emergency because the break in violence was less than one calendar year and the political issues involved and primary parties to the fighting were effectively the same before and afterward. See the operational guidelines for more details.

⁷³⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.56.

⁷³⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.74.

⁷³⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.56.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Violence resulted in civilian victimization and looting by both factions. Government forces sealed off the Pool region in the northeast, bombarding the area and killing an estimated 6,000, most of whom were civilians.⁷³⁹ Insecurity prevented international aid workers from assessing the rural population's humanitarian needs, and heavy fighting prompted aid agencies to flee from areas in need assistance.

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: During 1998, as few as 50 percent of Brazzaville's and Pointe-Noire's residents had access to clean drinking water, and fewer than 20 percent had access to properly constructed latrines.⁷⁴⁰ According to USCR, health workers recorded nearly 2,000 cholera cases and child malnutrition rates of up to 9 percent.⁷⁴¹ As many as 50,000 uprooted families in Brazzaville sought shelter in the city's churches, schools, and abandoned buildings, while rural families faced limited food and heavy rains in forests.⁷⁴²

1999 (Certainty: 5)

The first half of 1999 saw intense conflict as government forces and militia groups vied for control of southern Congo-Brazzaville, and the government gaining the upper hand by November. The region suffered severe water in food shortages after rebel militias cut power and railroad lines. In addition, alongside Angolan forces, in May 1999 the government launched a major offensive in the center of the country, a campaign that was marred by "blind and massive violence" on both sides.⁷⁴³ MSF reported that 250,000 refugees in the Pool region were subject to summary executions, looting, and rape.⁷⁴⁴

Fighting in 1999 resulted in the deaths of 10,000 people and the displacement of an estimated 800,000.⁷⁴⁵ As many as 80,000 civilians fled to neighboring countries.⁷⁴⁶ In November, the government and rebel representatives signed the Pointe Noire truce, and agreement that was consolidated by a second peace accord on December 29. The agreement called for a general amnesty that would take effect on January 15, 2000 for rebels who would disarm and surrender. All parties signed the agreement, effectively ending the conflict.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In January 1999, President Sasso-Nguesso claimed that the conflict had resulted in "several hundred killed."⁷⁴⁷ International organizations that had evacuated in 1998 began returning in March, but had little access to areas of the country outside of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire. Aid agencies reported that militia groups were holding civilians hostage, preventing them from returning to government-held areas and denying humanitarian aid to thousands.⁷⁴⁸ As civilians returned to government-held areas, they were, according to the U.S. State Department, extorted, raped, and summarily executed.⁷⁴⁹

⁷³⁹ Parker, Heindel and Branch 2000.

⁷⁴⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.56.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid.

⁷⁴² Ibid.

⁷⁴³ Sambanis 2004, p.54.

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.74.

⁷⁴⁷ Sambanis 2004, p.54.

⁷⁴⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.74.

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid.

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Displaced families and rural populations suffered from inadequate food supplies and medical care, and many fell victim to rape, looting, and extortion by armed combatants. In the second half of the year, an estimated 200,000 internally displaced persons returned to Brazzaville.⁷⁵⁰ Many were in extremely poor condition and died during the trip or soon thereafter. Among young children, malnutrition rates were as high as 40 percent, including 20 percent severe malnutrition.⁷⁵¹

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid.

31. Côte d'Ivoire (2002 – 2004)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

Since its independence from France in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire had been a relatively stable country, notable for its religious and ethnic harmony as well as its economic prosperity under the 30-plus year leadership of Felix Houphouët-Boigny and his Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI).⁷⁵² By 1990, however, an economic downturn caused by falling cocoa prices and internal corruption sparked a wave of dissent against the country's single-party system. Houphouët-Boigny's death in 1993 and a subsequent power struggle between President of the National Assembly Henri Konan Bedie and Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara further destabilized the country. After declaring himself president, Bedie quickly instituted a 1994 constitutional amendment requiring that both parents of a presidential candidate be born in Côte d'Ivoire. This amendment effectively barred Ouattara, whose parents were allegedly Burkinabe immigrants, from the 1995 elections. With virtually no opposition, Bedie won in a landslide. Under Bedie's government, nationalistic and xenophobic ideas swept the country. Migrants and settlers from other countries were made the scapegoat for the country's economic decline. The term "Ivoirite," which initially referred to the cultural identity of all residents of Côte d'Ivoire, came to include only those living in the south of the country, excluding the predominately Muslim north where immigrants from Mali and Burkina Faso made up approximately one third of the country's population.⁷⁵³ In 1998, Bedie enacted a new Land Code under which only Ivoirians could buy land.⁷⁵⁴ The code also prevented non-Ivoirites from settling in the southern part of the country, clearing the way for forceful land-grabbing from immigrant landowners in the region.⁷⁵⁵

Tensions boiled over when, in 1999, General Robert Guei deposed Bedie in a military coup. The new government only nurtured the seeds of ethnic discord planted under Bedie, and in 1999, a wave of violence mostly directed against foreign residents prompted some 10,000 immigrants to flee southwest Côte d'Ivoire. Following Guei's claim of victory in the 2000 presidential election, Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the opposition party, the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI), seized power in a public uprising that resulted in about 180 deaths, and the violence continued.⁷⁵⁶ That year, "tens of thousands" of immigrants and Ivoirians were displaced in the west and southwest, and in 2001, at least 10,000 people throughout the country were forced to abandon their homes.⁷⁵⁷ Social tensions continued to grow as northern ethnic groups, predominantly Mande and Krou, experienced increasing exclusion from the political system.

After nearly a decade of ethnic and political turmoil, the country erupted into a full-blown civil war in September 2002. Earlier that year, Gbagbo made the decision to demobilize northern troops recruited under Guei. This proved to be the catalyst for violence: on September 19, some 800 soldiers attacked military installations in Abidjan, Bouake, and Korhogo. What ostensibly began as a troop mutiny in protest of the demobilization sparked a movement that was quickly joined by other disgruntled soldiers and civilians. This movement, led by Guillaume Soro, came to be known

⁷⁵² British Broadcasting Corporation 2013.

⁷⁵³ Al Jazeera 2011.

⁷⁵⁴ Dabalen, Kebede and Paul 2012.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁶ Al Jazeera 2011.

⁷⁵⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.68.

as the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI). Among its demands were an end to the discrimination against the large Muslim population in the north, changes to the constitution, and the resignation of President Gbagbo. By the end of September, rebel forces had consolidated their hold on the northern half of the country. In response, loyalist security forces launched several unsuccessful military operations aimed regaining seized towns. By November, two additional rebel groups, the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Ivoirian Popular Movement of the Greater West (MPIGO), had emerged in western Côte d'Ivoire. These groups were believed to have included Liberian combatants "particularly prone to looting and human rights violations."⁷⁵⁸ Both government and rebel forces were alleged to have committed human rights abuses against the civilian population.⁷⁵⁹

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) swiftly began efforts to mediate the conflict, calling a meeting with President Gbagbo on September 30, but ceasefire negotiations were delayed due to the government's refusal to legitimize the rebel movement or partition the country. Both MPCI and Gbagbo agreed to a ceasefire on October 17, and peace talks began on October 24 in Lomé. These talks were stalled, however, due to MPCI's insistence that Gbagbo resign and the government's claim that the rebels were not honoring earlier agreements. In a fresh initiative in January 2003, the French-brokered Linas-Marcoussis Agreement led to the installation of a power-sharing government and scheduled elections for 2005. The peace accord did little to stem the unrest, and the country remained divided between the rebel-held north and the Ivorian government-controlled south. The two sides were separated by a 30-mile wide "comfort zone" patrolled by some 5,000 French and ECOWAS soldiers.⁷⁶⁰

In May 2003 the parties signed a "full" ceasefire. At that time, the IDMC reported, up to 1 million Ivoirians were displaced.⁷⁶¹ By September, the country again plunged into civil war when the rebels accused Gbagbo of failing to honor the peace agreement. After another year and a half, the war officially concluded in April 2005 when the government and the rebels declared an "immediate and final end" to the hostilities following talks in South Africa.⁷⁶² Just before this, in March 2005, the UN estimated the total number of IDPs in the country at 500,000.⁷⁶³ Inter-communal clashes continued sporadically, but aside from a wave of violence early in 2005 that displaced some 13,000 people, new displacement during the year and in subsequent years did not approach the level of a complex emergency.⁷⁶⁴

Côte d'Ivoire presents a challenging case for coding purposes in that the civil war from 2002 to 2004 was punctuated by periods of relative peace and was preceded and followed by years of inter-communal violence, which also went on during the 2002-2004 period. Nevertheless, because there is no clear evidence that deaths or displacement exceeded the relevant thresholds for any year before 2002 or after 2004, I code only one complex emergency, during these years. In addition, because the tensions generating the inter-communal violence were different from those that sustained the war (but from 2002 onward the inter-communal violence was nevertheless *influenced* by the course of the war) and because the inter-communal conflict during the war is extremely difficult to distinguish from the war, I code the *primary* conflict type to be civil conflict.

⁷⁵⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.64.

⁷⁵⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.65.

⁷⁶⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2004, p.22.

⁷⁶¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005b, p.37.

⁷⁶² United States Committee for Refugees 2006, p.52.

⁷⁶³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005b, 37.

⁷⁶⁴ See e.g., Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2010b, p.65-71.

Annual Data

2002 (Certainty: 5)

With the eruption of full-blown civil war following a troop mutiny in September 2002, MPCCI immediately seized key cities in northern Côte d'Ivoire. In response, pro-government militias "erected roadblocks along major roads and reportedly harassed foreign residents."⁷⁶⁵ USCR estimates that in the final four months of 2002, violence prompted 500,000 to 700,000 people to flee their homes and generated nearly 25,000 refugees, most of whom fled to Liberia.⁷⁶⁶ In an effort to quell the violence, France deployed over 1,000 soldiers to Côte d'Ivoire.⁷⁶⁷ By December, the peacekeeping operation had also fallen under rebel fire.

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: USCR reports that much of the displacement took place beyond the reach of humanitarian agencies and journalists, who were confined to Abidjan for security reasons. In particular, sporadic fighting in the northern and western regions of the country hindered the delivery of relief to affected populations and the relocation of trapped refugees and IDPs.⁷⁶⁸

2003 (Certainty: 5)

Despite various peace efforts throughout the year, including the establishment of a unity government and the signing of a "full" ceasefire in May, violence between the government and northern-based rebel groups continued in 2003. Throughout the year, government forces or allied militia razed shantytowns home to large numbers of West African immigrants, displacing and sometimes killing the inhabitants. Violent activity in February and March prompted around 85,000 people to flee the towns of Guiglo and Duekoue in western Côte d'Ivoire. MSF Holland reported an additional 2,000 new IDPs in Grabo after the town was looted.⁷⁶⁹ An armed attack on a state TV building in December left 19 dead.⁷⁷⁰

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Tens of thousands of displaced Ivoirians and third party nationals were unable to return to their homes during the year due to the presence of armed militias and the general lawlessness that pervaded the country.⁷⁷¹ The conditions also impeded the UN and other international humanitarian agencies from conducting assessment missions in the areas of Côte d'Ivoire most affected by violence. Because most IDPs relocated to host communities rather than to formal camps, humanitarian agencies faced difficulty in assessing and responding to their needs.⁷⁷²

⁷⁶⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.64.

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid. IDMC similarly cites a UN OCHA estimate of 600,000 displaced by November 2002, but suggests that subsequent fighting displaced an additional half million people by early January 2003, for a total of 1.1 million displaced at that time. Despite their differences, various credible estimates suggest that the scale of displacement was far more than enough to code a 5 for 2002. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005b, p.26-27.

⁷⁶⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.65.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004b, p.25.

⁷⁷⁰ British Broadcasting Corporation 2013.

⁷⁷¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2004, p.23.

⁷⁷² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004b, p.7.

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Humanitarian workers in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire's administrative capital, estimated that 80 percent of the local displaced population lacked sufficient food, medicine, and non-food items. IDPs in the region also faced the risk of gender-based violence.⁷⁷³

2004 (Certainty: 5)

Following deadly clashes during a crackdown on an opposition rally against President Gbagbo in Abidjan in March that killed over 120 people, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported an increase in human rights violations, including arbitrary detention of civilians, extrajudicial killings, and discrimination and violence on the basis of nationality, ethnic origin, gender, and political opinion.⁷⁷⁴ In April the UN deployed the first contingent of a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Nevertheless, violent ethnic clashes, intra-rebel fighting, and attacks by pro-government militia and government forces continued to cause displacement of civilians in the north and west, and in Abidjan, although precise figures are difficult to come by. For instance, in the west thousands of settlers were chased off their land, and some 3,000 were displaced in clashes in April.⁷⁷⁵ Later in the year, a November airstrike on the rebels by the Ivoirian government killed nine French soldiers, prompting the flight of some 2,500 IDPs within the country while an additional 15,000 Ivoirians fled to Liberia. Meanwhile, French forces retaliated against the government and the UN imposed an embargo on the country.⁷⁷⁶ Alongside the renewed government offensive at this time, rebels increasingly targeted the civilian population. Thus, kidnappings for ransom and village raids by the rebel Forces Nouvelles prompted the displacement of at least 3,500 people in early November.⁷⁷⁷ Finally, in December, deadly riots broke out in Abidjan, and the government displaced an additional 12,000 people when it demolished most immigrant squatter settlements in the city. At the end of the year, USCR estimated that there were still approximately 500,000 IDPs in the country.⁷⁷⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: USCR reports that authorities and rebels “harassed and extorted money from the displaced,” allegedly erecting roadblocks at which local civilian militia would demand payment, beat, or detain foreign travelers.⁷⁷⁹ More broadly, IDMC characterized the government’s response to the IDP problem as “generally weak and inconsistent.”⁷⁸⁰

b) Conditions of Life for the Displaced: Poor roads and bridges limited access to security, food, water, and medicine, particularly to the thousands of people along the Liberian-Ivoirian border. According to USCR, nearly 80 percent of IDPs were critically poor. In the northern region from which up to 85 percent of the health workers had fled, most health care facilities remained closed.⁷⁸¹ The UN attributed to the crisis an increase in epidemics and diseases such as cholera, yellow fever, meningitis, and measles, as well as the highest rate of HIV/AIDS in West Africa.⁷⁸²

⁷⁷³ IRIN 2003.

⁷⁷⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004b, p.7.

⁷⁷⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004b, p.6.

⁷⁷⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2005; British Broadcasting Corporation 2013, p.71.

⁷⁷⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005b, p.35.

⁷⁷⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.71.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2005b, p.6.

⁷⁸¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.71.

⁷⁸² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2004b, p.7.

36. Ethiopia / Civil War (1988-1992)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

In 1988, a conflict on two fronts that had been simmering in northern Ethiopia for nearly two decades boiled over. During the year that Human Rights Watch describes as “the most savage in the entire history of the war,” the region saw a significant escalation of violence between the Ethiopian government and the conflict’s two main rebel groups, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which was fighting for Eritrean independence, and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which was fighting to bring down the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

The origins of the Eritrean insurgency can be traced to a low-intensity Muslim rebellion in September 1961, one year before the formal annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia.⁷⁸³ Throughout the 1960s, conflict between rebel groups and the Ethiopian government was limited; most deaths resulted from infighting within the Eritrean movements.⁷⁸⁴ Both the Ethiopian government and the rebel groups, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the younger EPLF, were responsible for atrocities against civilians during this time. The situation escalated in 1974 when a collective military dictatorship called the Provisional Military Administrative Council deposed Emperor Haile Selassie. Commonly known as the Derg, the new government suspended the constitution and proclaimed a socialist state. The same year, the ELF and the EPLF combined forces with the goal of defeating the army in Asmara, an effort that the government met with scorched earth policies and the use of food blockades as a weapon. Around the same time, unrest in the northern regions of Ethiopia began to crystallize into full-scale rebellion. The TPLF, a Tigrayan nationalist guerilla group, formed in 1975. Though the TPLF and the EPLF were geographically close and occasionally coordinated their efforts, each had its own military, organization, and base of popular support.

In 1977, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam rose to power, and the situation escalated yet again. That year, Mengistu launched the Red Terror, a massive campaign of killing, detention and torture, and intimidation meant to crush urban opposition. The Mengistu government also heightened the war in Eritrea with a vastly expanded and reequipped army and air force. On both fronts, the government’s strategy included scorched earth, forced relocation, strict bans on movement, the bombing of marketplaces to disrupt commerce, and the utilization of international humanitarian food aid for counter-insurgency purposes.⁷⁸⁵ These strategies, in conjunction with policies of punitive taxation and requisitioning of food, contributed to a large-scale famine between 1983 and 1985 that killed in excess of 400,000 people.⁷⁸⁶ The years following the famine and the government’s implementation of resettlement and villagization programs were relatively quiet, and the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices do not report any conflict-related violence against civilians in 1986 and 1987.⁷⁸⁷

⁷⁸³ Sambanis 2004, 77.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁵ Beginning in 1976, the Ethiopian government was also engaged in war with Somalia and a domestic rebel group, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), for control of the southern province of Ogaden. Violence continued sporadically until the Ethiopian and Somali governments signed an agreement to end hostilities in 1988, though relations remained tense into the 1990s. This conflict was both geographically and ideologically separate from the movements in the north.

⁷⁸⁶ De Waal 1991, 11.

⁷⁸⁷ U.S. Department of State 1987a, 105; U.S. Department of State 1988a, 101.

The resumption of fighting and a significant EPLF victory at Afabet, the Ethiopian army's northern command, in March 1988 marked a turning point in the war, and in April, the EPLF and the TPLF began to coordinate activities. The government responded with a brutal counter-offensive, including a bombing campaign of unprecedented severity and a simultaneous ground offensive. In 1989, the TPLF and the EPLF went on the offensive, and the TPLF, at that point part of the newly-formed Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), managed to take control of all of Tigray and southern Wollo. In 1990, the EPLF captured the port of Massawa, the entry point through which most relief to government-held areas flowed. The government countered with a series of indiscriminate bombing attacks on Massawa and on other towns and villages throughout Eritrea.

Following rebel advances, the perception that the government was losing control ignited local disputes against government forces, which responded with punitive expeditions against civilians. Clashes between the government and rebel forces in the north continued as the EPRDF advanced southwards and eastwards toward Addis Ababa and the EPLF advanced on Asmara. On May 21, 1991, President Mengistu fled the country and the government army disintegrated. Three days later, on May 24, the EPLF captured Asmara, and on May 28, the EPRDF took Addis Ababa. The two groups agreed to an internationally-supervised referendum on independence in Eritrea, which was almost unanimously supported, and in April 1993, Ethiopia recognized Eritrea as an independent state.

The effects of the war were exacerbated by persistent drought in Ethiopia due to the failure of summer rains. Low rainfall coupled with the lack of oxen resulting from the 1983-5 famine, the presence of landmines, and inadequate markets led to particularly poor harvests in 1989 and 1990.⁷⁸⁸ Because all of Tigray and north Wollo was under EPRDF control, the government Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and voluntary agencies working alongside it could not distribute food aid to the region. Relief convoys could only enter the area with government consent or by crossing the border from Sudan, where they were subject to numerous government attacks.⁷⁸⁹ Eritrea faced a situation that mirrored that in Tigray: because Asmara and the surrounding area were controlled by the Ethiopian government, relief could only be brought in with EPLF permission or by airlift. The 1990-1991 siege of Asmara led to severe famine in the city and its surrounding enclave, as the army prevented large quantities of grain from entering the city "partly by a deliberate plan to make the civilian population of the town suffer."⁷⁹⁰ In both Tigray and Eritrea, fighting between the Ethiopian government and rebel groups, though not the primary cause of the famine, magnified the problem by limiting free movement, redirecting food and other commodities to the armies, and blocking relief efforts.

Though violence between the Derg and rebel groups broke out in earnest in the 1970s, I code a complex emergency beginning in 1988.⁷⁹¹ The years following the famine of 1983-1985 saw a significant break in violence, and while there were reports of civilian deaths and displacement, these appear to be a result of the government's resettlement and villagization policies. These policies, in turn, seem to have been intended mainly as a social engineering project of Ethiopia's Marxist government rather than as a counter-insurgency strategy. While the argument could be made that the Ethiopian government forced the resettlement of civilians from regions with high rebel activity to remove the insurgent groups' support bases, it is impossible to prove this as a justification for

⁷⁸⁸ De Waal 1991, 227.

⁷⁸⁹ De Waal 1991, 229.

⁷⁹⁰ De Waal 1991, 233.

⁷⁹¹ Earlier years of the conflict would certainly qualify as a separate complex emergency, but are not included as one in this dataset because such a complex emergency would fall entirely during the Cold War period.

coding a complex emergency in 1986 and 1987. Thus 1988, the year in which the rebel movements in Eritrea and Tigray broke the stalemate with successful offensives, is the first year that qualifies.

Annual Data

1988 (Certainty: 5)

Following the stalemate of the mid-1980s, 1988 was a particularly bloody year. On March 17-19, the EPLF and the Ethiopian army clashed at Afabet, and over 15,000 soldiers were killed, wounded, captured, or dispersed.⁷⁹² Left in disarray, the Ethiopian army went on the retreat, committing numerous atrocities against civilians in the process. In Sheib in the Semhar district, 400 Eritrean civilians were killed by tanks and foot soldiers.⁷⁹³ At least 100 more died in 30 other villages in the vicinity.⁷⁹⁴ The fighting displaced about 110,000 civilians.⁷⁹⁵ TPLF advances following the EPLF victory at Afabet forced the Ethiopian army to retreat in Tigray as well. In reprisal, the government carried out a number of punitive air raids, one of which killed 1,800 marketgoers in Hausein.⁷⁹⁶ Coupled with a major ground offensive, the air raids are estimated to have displaced 60,000 people.⁷⁹⁷

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Intensified fighting in conjunction with the previous year's drought left five to seven million Ethiopians dependent on foreign food aid.⁷⁹⁸ Yet in April, the Ethiopian government forced most western aid workers, including the Red Cross, to leave the country.

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: During the fall of 1988, many displaced Eritreans fell victim to a severe malaria epidemic. Because they had moved from the highlands, where there is no malaria, they had no acquired immunity. Human Rights Watch cites a study of mortality among refugees in Sudan that found that the rate of death from diarrheal diseases and malaria approximately doubled during the displacement.⁷⁹⁹

1989 (Certainty: 3)

By early 1989 the EPRDF had driven the Ethiopian army from Tigray and managed to penetrate southern Wollo. In an effort to maintain control, the Ethiopian government responded violently to local uprisings. During a punitive expedition in the Tcheffa Valley, government soldiers killed over 200 Oromo civilians.⁸⁰⁰ Facing the EPRDF advance, the government continued its bombing attacks in Tigray and Wollo, killing over 200 civilians in the latter half of 1989.⁸⁰¹ Though there were no reports of large-scale military activity in Eritrea in 1989, one incident in February involving the

⁷⁹² De Waal 1991, 193.

⁷⁹³ De Waal 1991, 195.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁵ De Waal 1991, 196.

⁷⁹⁶ De Waal 1991, 210.

⁷⁹⁷ De Waal 1991, 217.

⁷⁹⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, 41.

⁷⁹⁹ De Waal 1991, 196.

⁸⁰⁰ De Waal 1991, 219.

⁸⁰¹ De Waal 1991, 220-221.

Ethiopian army generated between 600 and 1,000 civilian casualties in the Semhar district.⁸⁰²

The specter of famine continued to hover over northern Ethiopia in the face of the widespread drought and crop loss in 1989, and was particularly pressing in the EPLF and TPLF-held areas of Eritrea, Tigray, and Wollo. The problem was exacerbated by intense fighting between government forces and Tigrean and Eritrean insurgents. Neighboring Sudan saw a steady flow of new arrivals during the year, some fleeing the escalating violence and some seeking relief from the famine in the north. In the early months of 1989, more than 6,000 Tigreans reportedly entered Sudan, followed by 1,300 Eritreans in November and an additional 2,600 Ethiopians in December.⁸⁰³

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Uncertainty over the ability of international efforts to deliver food to famine-affected areas in the north raised the possibility of large-scale migrations of famine victims to Sudan in 1990.

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Due to debate over whether food aid should be channeled primarily through the Ethiopian government or through the main Eritrean and Tigrean relief groups, the international community was slow to respond, and by late December, food warehouses were empty.

1990 (Certainty: 3)

In February, the EPLF captured the port of Massawa in a three-day battle. Approximately 200 civilians were killed in the fighting.⁸⁰⁴ Shortly after the battle, the Ethiopian government launched a series of air raids intended to level the port. These attacks killed approximately 120 civilians and wounded almost 200, and destroyed some 50,000 tons of food aid using cluster bombs.⁸⁰⁵ During the raids, the Ethiopian army prevented civilian inhabitants from leaving villages near the front lines in order to deter EPLF artillery barrages.⁸⁰⁶ Between March and June, about 60 civilians were killed by EPLF shelling in Asmara.⁸⁰⁷ In north Shewa and southern Gonder, continual skirmishing between the Ethiopian army and the EPRDF killed approximately 170 civilians.⁸⁰⁸ USC reports that in 1990, “thousands more refugees entered Sudan,” joining the 700,000 that were already there.⁸⁰⁹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: At the beginning of 1990, USCR estimated that, due to drought and war, 5 million were at risk of famine in northern Ethiopia.⁸¹⁰ As many as 500,000 people in Eritrea, Tigray, and Wollo were at imminent risk of starvation.⁸¹¹ Because Addis Ababa would not agree to international relief efforts that crossed from government into rebel-held areas or vice versa, the majority of those at risk were unable to receive aid. Eventually, an agreement between the government and rebel groups opened relief corridors for food, but continued fighting and the failure

⁸⁰² De Waal 1991, 198.

⁸⁰³ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, 48.

⁸⁰⁴ De Waal 1991, 199.

⁸⁰⁵ De Waal 1991, 203.

⁸⁰⁶ De Waal 1991, 204.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁸ De Waal 1991, 222-223.

⁸⁰⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, 54.

⁸¹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, 41.

⁸¹¹ Ibid.

of the summer rains caused drought in late 1990 and again raised the specter of famine for some 5.6 million people throughout the country.⁸¹²

1991 (Certainty: 5)

By 1991, the Ethiopian government was confined to Asmara and its surrounding area. As the government gripped the city in the face of the EPLF advance, famine conditions developed and civilians were prevented from leaving the city. On May 24, Asmara was captured intact without widespread violence. Farther south, as the EPRDF advanced on Addis Ababa in late May, President Mengistu fled the country. The EPRDF took the capital on May 28 in a campaign that generated between 600 and 800 civilian deaths, most of which were attributable to retreating government soldiers.⁸¹³ Following the collapse of the Mengistu regime, the EPRDF was not able to exert control over the eastern regions of Ethiopia, where widespread banditry and inter-ethnic clashes hampered relief efforts for refugees and returnees.⁸¹⁴

Of the 398,000 Sudanese refugees living in Ethiopia, all but 15,000 fled to Sudan.⁸¹⁵ Thousands of demobilized Ethiopian soldiers were left displaced or in difficult circumstances, and more than 50,000 soldiers and their dependents fled to Sudan. According to the Sudanese government, these new arrivals numbered more than 160,000 people.⁸¹⁶

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The overthrow of the regime brought confusion and lawlessness that prompted UNHCR to pull 20 of its 30 international staff from Ethiopia in June. The theft of 347 UN trucks between August and December hindered the distribution of relief to refugees. Due to continuing drought and conflict, an estimated 6 million people remained vulnerable to food shortages.⁸¹⁷

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced:

As more than 300,000 Ethiopian refugees who had been living in Somalia fled back to Ethiopia during the year, they were met with poor conditions in returnee camps. A UN team reported that over a single 22-day period in December, 452 people in returnee areas died as a result of malnutrition and diarrhea.⁸¹⁸

1992 (Certainty: 5)

The lawlessness and ethnic violence that took off in 1991 after the fall of Mengistu continued and intensified in 1992. According to USCR it newly displaced an estimated 350,000 people.⁸¹⁹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: An estimated 7 million people in Ethiopia and Eritrea remained dependent on food aid. Ethnic strife, banditry, and infrastructural and budgetary inadequacies

⁸¹² Ibid.

⁸¹³ De Waal 1991, 234.

⁸¹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, 42.

⁸¹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, 41.

⁸¹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, 41, 53.

⁸¹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, 41.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.

⁸¹⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, 60.

frustrated relief efforts, and continued violence killed fifteen relief workers, including a UNHCR field officer.⁸²⁰

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: In southeastern Ethiopian returnee camps, death rates were recorded at five to ten times the normal level, and acute malnutrition rates reached 65 percent among children.⁸²¹

⁸²⁰ Ibid.

⁸²¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, 61.

37. Kenya (2008)

Overall Coding: 1

Annual Data: 2008 (Certainty: 1)

Primary Conflict Type: Communal Violence

General Information & Overall Severity

Over the span of two months in early 2008, Kenya was rocked by widespread violence that left over 1,000 dead and as many as 600,000 displaced.⁸²² The outbreak of fighting began directly after the country's heavily contested 27 December 2007 presidential election, a race perceived in Kenya as a "winner-takes-all" situation. Under the Kenyan constitution, which had been in place for 60 years, the president was bestowed with "enormous powers" and held unquestioned control over the country's resources.⁸²³ Victory in the election therefore meant riches for the new president, and by extension, his or her ethnic group.

The Mwai Kibaki administration, which had been in power since 2002, frustrated all efforts to adopt a draft document seeking to give Kenyans more freedoms and more control over the country's wealth and resources. Rasna Warah, a columnist for the leading newspaper, *Daily Nation*, described the constitution as "colonial," stating that the distribution of resources, the dispensation of justice, and the manner in which institutions were governed were "our colonial legacy."⁸²⁴

Tensions were particularly high in the Rift Valley, where a growing population limited the amount of available land and had forced some of the indigenous people to seek ways of recovering land that had been "irregularly" allocated to non-indigenous communities.⁸²⁵ These tensions originated in Kenya's colonial period when the British transformed huge tracts of open farming and grazing land into estates and plantations for cash crops. This conversion particularly affected the Kikuyu and Kalenjin peoples in the Central province, who had been resettled and relegated to squatter status in the post-colonial period. A number of people from the Central province (particularly Kikuyu) were then given the opportunity to buy land in the Rift Valley through land-buying companies, much to the chagrin of the indigenous people in the region.

The 2007 election pitted 76-year-old incumbent Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) against opposition leader Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and was, according to *The Economist*, "a civil coup."⁸²⁶ Though Odinga led in early returns, a small group of leaders from Kibaki's Kikuyu tribe secured the election for their compatriot. Returns from Central Province, the Kikuyu heartland, were inexplicably held back, and in some constituencies, a large number of voters only cast ballots in the presidential race, ignoring the parliamentary ticket despite having waited for hours in the sun. In Nairobi, officials crossed out the number of votes as announced and scribbled in a higher number while election monitors looked the other way. Odinga's supporters, primarily from his Luo ethnic group, were guilty as well, having allegedly tampered with ballots in the candidate's home province of Nyanza.

On December 30, 2007, the Electoral Commission declared Kibaki the victor, his official vote count falling at 4.58 million compared to Odinga's 4.35 million. The votes appeared to fall along ethnic lines, with 97 percent of Kikuyu voting for Kibaki and much of the rest of the country,

⁸²² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.42.

⁸²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.21.

⁸²⁴ Ibid.

⁸²⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.19.

⁸²⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.43.

including 70 percent of Muslims, voting for Odinga.⁸²⁷ Almost immediately after the announcement, Kabiki was sworn in and the urban poor of Nairobi's slums, most of whom had voted for Odinga, erupted in rage. Violence primarily between Kibaki's Kikuyu tribe and Odinga's Luo tribe swelled across the country. Police received orders to shoot to kill, and looting, rape, and riots were rampant.

The United Nations estimated that by February, 600,000 people had been displaced: 300,000 in approximately 300 camps and the same number in host communities.⁸²⁸ The majority of displaced persons were fleeing from violent clashes in the Rift Valley. Because the region was also the country's agricultural center, the violence resulted in a disruption in food production, adding to existing worries about the country's food prices and security.⁸²⁹

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, charged with mediating the crisis, brought together Kibaki and Odinga on January 24 for their first meeting since the outbreak of the conflict. Negotiations faced a setback on January 28 when opposition legislator Melitus Were was murdered outside his home in Nairobi, triggering more rioting and ethnic killings. The two parties signed a power-sharing agreement on February 28. The deal called for a coalition government in which Odinga would serve as prime minister and Kibaki would continue to serve as president. The Cabinet was designed to consist of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the two deputy prime ministers and the other ministers.

Though the conflict officially ended with the formation of the coalition government in late February, people remained in IDP camps until well into the summer. Conditions in these camps were, according to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), "deplorable."⁸³⁰ People had no access to toilets, food was limited, and disease was rampant. In May, the government launched "Operation Rudi Nyumbani" (Operation Return Home), closing all IDP camps in the face of protests from displaced persons who feared returning home or had no home to which to return. Human Rights Watch reported looting and selective burnings and killings targeted against Kikuyu in the Rift Valley.⁸³¹

Although the violence clearly met the displacement-based quantitative standard for a complex emergency and although there is some confirming qualitative evidence (as discussed below), I nevertheless conservatively code an overall certainty of 1 because of the short time-frame.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Human Rights Watch investigations indicated in January 2008 that Kenya's post-election violence between members of the Kalenjin and Luya communities and their Kikuyu and Kisii neighbors in the Rift Valley was planned, organized, and incited by opposition party officials and local elders.⁸³² The attacks were concentrated around the town of Eldoret and targeted mostly Kikuyu and Kisii people. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, a preacher in Eldoret revealed that on the morning of December 29, 2007, a local ODM party mobilizer "called a meeting and said that war had broken out in Eldoret town, so the elders organized the youth into groups of not less than 15, and they went to loot [Kikuyu] homes and burn them down."⁸³³ Various community members provided similar accounts and told Human Rights Watch that if the area's ODM leadership or the local Kalenjin radio station KASS FM told people to

⁸²⁷ Ibid.

⁸²⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.41.

⁸²⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.55.

⁸³⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.67.

⁸³¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.42.

⁸³² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.44-45.

⁸³³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.44.

stop the attacks, the violence would have stopped immediately. The conflict was also marked by widespread police brutality. In January, the police confirmed the deaths of 526 people nationwide, including 81 shot by police officers.⁸³⁴ This figure was much lower than independent estimates. The government admitted in early June 2008 that it had no accurate figures regarding IDPs.⁸³⁵

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: John Holmes, the head of the UN emergency relief operation in Kenya, lamented in early February that the operation had only received about half of the \$42 million requested by the United Nations from the international donor community.⁸³⁶ Within the camps, IDPs suffered from increased sexual violence, which raised concerns about the spread of HIV/AIDS. The lack of security measures such as lights and separate latrines for men and women was cited as a cause of widespread rape.⁸³⁷ The camps also lacked proper food and sanitation. Long rains during the summer resulted in flooding, which facilitated the spread of waterborne diseases. Action by Churches Together (ACT) described the camps as “overcrowded, understaffed, and undersupplied.”⁸³⁸ Following the conclusion of the conflict in February, many displaced Kenyans refused to return home, either because they had nothing to return to or because of unresolved ethnic tensions. Returnees reported that their neighbors made it clear that they were not welcome by various acts of aggression and intimidation such as forcibly grazing livestock in their fields or destroying newly planted crops.

⁸³⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.42.

⁸³⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.52.

⁸³⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.41.

⁸³⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.57.

⁸³⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2008d, p.59.

38. Liberia I (1990 – 1996)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

A devastating civil war began in Liberia on December 24, 1989. Both rebel forces led by Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Liberation front of Liberia (NPFL), and government forces – known as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and led by Samuel Doe – engaged in widespread indiscriminate violence against civilians. The war became increasingly complex after Doe was killed in 1990 and the rebels splintered into different factions, with numerous new groups emerging. These players also targeted civilians, killing, raping, and looting in large numbers.

By the end of 1990, some 1.26 million people (over half the country's population) had been uprooted and were living as IDPs or as refugees in neighboring countries. The arrival of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force known as ECOMOG in August helped restore relative calm to the capital, Monrovia, where many of the displaced from the rest of the country were congregating. A ceasefire helped improve humanitarian conditions in the capital but left the country with two de facto governments, one controlling Monrovia and protected by ECOMOG, and one controlling the other 95% of the country and led by Charles Taylor. Although the ceasefire held through 1991, rebels continued to target civilians and aid workers living outside the capital, causing continued displacement and limited access to aid among the population living there.⁸³⁹ The most common estimate was that some 20,000 civilians died from violence and 40,000 from starvation prior to 1992.⁸⁴⁰

Subsequently, renewed fighting outside the capital in mid-1992 spread to Monrovia late in the year as Taylor's rebels attacked, killing or wounding an estimated 20,000 in the last three months of the year and uprooting up to 300,000.⁸⁴¹ Although ECOMOG was able to push the rebels out of the capital, the humanitarian situation clearly deteriorated.

As the war intensified and spread beyond Monrovia on a large scale in 1993, rebels committed large massacres against civilians, prevented relief delivery, and blocked uprooted civilians from fleeing the country. ECOMOG air attacks against rebel positions were also responsible for civilian deaths. Civilians trapped in rebel areas experienced severe malnutrition and many died of starvation. A July peace agreement lessened but did not stop the fighting. By the end of the year, estimates of those killed in the war ranged from 50,000 to 150,000, and it was thought that 75% of the country's 2.3 million people had been uprooted.⁸⁴²

The peace process collapsed in 1994 as more factions emerged and fought among themselves. As before, many of these targeted civilians, massacring and abusing them throughout the year. Hundreds of thousands were newly uprooted (or uprooted again), and the warring factions prevented aid delivery, with only 10 percent of territory regularly accessible.⁸⁴³ Health conditions were abysmal in many areas. A December 1994 peace accord collapsed in early 1995, and throughout 1995 rebel combatants—many of them children who had been abducted to serve as fighters—continued to terrorize civilians remaining in rebel-held areas, causing further large-scale population displacement. Those who arrived at camps for displaced persons were often severely

⁸³⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.45-46; United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.45-46.

⁸⁴⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.64.

⁸⁴¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.64-66.

⁸⁴² United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.58.

⁸⁴³ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.65.

malnourished and bore injuries from attacks they had suffered. Large areas were still inaccessible to aid personnel, and there were further outbreaks of infectious disease, including cholera. ECOMOG troops were also accused of abuses.⁸⁴⁴

In 1996, full-scale war once again broke out in Monrovia in April, badly damaging relief efforts and causing most international aid personnel to evacuate the country. ECOMOG largely restored order in Monrovia in June. When some aid workers did return later in the year, their movement was hampered by continued fighting outside the capital, and attacks against civilians continued. There were serious health problems, especially in western Liberia and in the two largest cities, Buchanan and Monrovia. These caused thousands of deaths during the year.⁸⁴⁵

By 1997, however, peace returned to Liberia. An August 1996 peace accord held throughout the year, and Charles Taylor was elected president in July. Although conditions for the many Liberians who returned to their homes during the year were often harsh, returnees reported few problems with security. According to USCR, "For the first time in eight years...Liberians generally were spared the threat of armed attack."⁸⁴⁶ One sign of the extent of improvement in conditions was that by late in the year, emergency assistance had begun to give way to development assistance.

Annual Data

1990 (Certainty: 5)

Due to the civil war and associated ethnic violence that erupted alongside it, USCR reported that by the end of the year over 730,000 Liberians were living as refugees in neighboring countries, and 500,000 were internally displaced. Overall, 1.26 million Liberians were estimated uprooted by the conflict.⁸⁴⁷ According to the U.S. State Department, moreover, "Thousands, if not tens of thousands," of Liberian civilians died in 1990 due to the war.⁸⁴⁸ In late November, all belligerent factions met and signed a ceasefire, but without arriving at a political solution to the conflict.

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: USCR reported that members of the AFL engaged in rape, looting of private property, and indiscriminate violence against civilians. In one incident alone, the AFL massacred 600 Liberian civilians at a church.⁸⁴⁹ Government forces were also accused of killing civilians for reasons of ethnic identity or enemy collaboration.⁸⁵⁰

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: According to USCR, tens of thousands of displaced Liberians experienced shortages of food, water, and medical care, and close to 80% of children suffered malnourishment. A reported 40 to 50 hunger-related deaths occurred per day in the capital, Monrovia, while intense shelling by rebel forces hampered relief efforts.⁸⁵¹

⁸⁴⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.53-56.

⁸⁴⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.76-79.

⁸⁴⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.77.

⁸⁴⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.45-46.

⁸⁴⁸ U.S. Department of State 1991b, p.193.

⁸⁴⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.45-46.

⁸⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State 1991b, p.192-193.

⁸⁵¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.45-46.

1991 (Certainty: 3)

After the November 1990 ceasefire, fighting declined sharply in 1991 but nevertheless continued. There was some improvement in conditions for civilians, but no political solution was in sight. Similarly, indiscriminate killings of civilians fell off significantly, but were still numerous as each fighting force continued to commit serious rights abuses, including summary executions.⁸⁵²

According to the U.S. State Department, the largest number of deaths may have occurred in July and August when NPFL forces passed through Grand Geddeh County, destroying entire villages and forcing many residents to flee their homes. According to survivors, as many as 1,500 civilians – mainly members of the Krahn ethnic group – may have been killed. In addition, also in July-August approximately 10,000 people – again mostly ethnic Krahns – fled to Cote d'Ivoire to escape NPFL attacks on their villages.⁸⁵³ By the end of the year, according to USCR, more than 661,000 Liberians were still refugees in neighboring countries and over 500,000 were still classified as IDPs.⁸⁵⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: As noted above, like the other belligerents government forces committed abuses against civilians. They also lacked control over most of the country and neither they, nor ECOMOG on their behalf, proved able to protect civilians there from NPFL and other rebel attacks.⁸⁵⁵ Aid organizations also suffered from insecurity. In December the UN suspended its operations in Grand Geddeh County after an NPFL attack killed one of its employees.⁸⁵⁶

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: USCR reported that conditions improved in Monrovia, with child malnutrition rates dropping from 35% in November 1990 to 2.5% in July. In the 95% of the country controlled by the NPFL, however, conditions were harder to assess and little aid reached civilians in most areas due to relief groups' limited ability to travel.⁸⁵⁷

1992 (Certainty: 5)

Early in the year conditions persisted much as in 1991: better than 1990, and with hopes that the warring parties would soon reach a negotiated settlement. Soon, however, fighting took off on the Liberia-Sierra Leone border and in the interior of the country. By August it had reached within 40 miles of Monrovia, and large numbers of people fled to the capital in search of safety, including some 40,000 in one three-day period. In October the NPFL attacked the city itself, newly uprooting at least 100,000 people and perhaps up to 300,000. ECOMOG responded with its own counter-attack, which succeeded in expelling the NPFL from the city. Altogether the fighting in and around Monrovia in the last three months of the year is thought to have killed or wounded an estimated 20,000 people.⁸⁵⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to the U.S. State Department, all factions – but most significantly the NPFL – were again “implicated in serious human rights violations, e.g., use of

⁸⁵² U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.199-200, 203.

⁸⁵³ U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.203.

⁸⁵⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.45.

⁸⁵⁵ U.S. Department of State 1992a, p.199-200, 203; United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.45-46.

⁸⁵⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.45-46.

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.64-66.

excessive force, arbitrary detentions, forced conscription, torture, or summary executions.”⁸⁵⁹ As in 1991 the nominal Liberian government – the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) only ever held authority over the capital and was unable to control these abuses by rebel forces in the countryside.

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: By the end of the year USCR and other humanitarian organizations were warning that humanitarian relief was in “dangerously short supply throughout Liberia.”⁸⁶⁰

1993 (Certainty: 5)

As the year opened many Liberians were fleeing the resumption of full-scale war as ECOMOG’s offensive against the NPFL continued, and fighting only intensified during the first half of the year. According to USCR, “Tens of thousands of new refugees fled...as the war spread far beyond Monrovia for the first time since 1990.”⁸⁶¹ A July peace agreement reduced but did not stop the violence. By the end of the year USCR estimated that roughly 1 million Liberians were IDPs, roughly 400,000 more than the previous year’s estimate. Some 50,000 to 150,000 Liberians had reportedly died due to the four-year civil war.

Various belligerents also continued to commit large-scale atrocities against civilians during the year. In one instance in June, the AFL – now only nominally under the direction of IGNU and with close ties to another faction known as ULIMO – massacred 547 displaced persons outside Monrovia. The NPFL also allegedly committed several large massacres and ULIMO committed numerous abuses, including executions. Even ECOMOG occasionally targeted relief operations and hospitals.⁸⁶²

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: As noted above, IGNU failed to stop various belligerents from killing civilians indiscriminately and in large numbers. With ECOMOG, it still maintained control only over Monrovia and the immediate vicinity. Within this area, the U.S. State Department reported that IGNU and ECOMOG personnel also committed ‘excesses’ during the year.⁸⁶³

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: The fighting hampered relief efforts and prevented aid from reaching displaced Liberians. As a result, humanitarian conditions for the displaced remained ‘precarious’ and ‘appalling.’⁸⁶⁴ According to USCR, “Health workers estimated in October that 140 children per day were dying of starvation in territory behind NPFL lines. Some 30,000 persons not far from Monrovia were suffering extreme malnutrition in mid-year, according to the ICRC, and several hundred children were dying weekly.”⁸⁶⁵

1994 (Certainty: 5)

The year began with some optimism about the prospects for peace based on the July 1993 peace accord. Some 1,700 new peacekeepers arrived to join ECOMOG and a new transitional government took power in March. In practice, however, violence worsened during the year as factions failed to follow through on their promises, making elections foreseen by the 1993

⁸⁵⁹ U.S. Department of State 1993, p.136.

⁸⁶⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.66.

⁸⁶¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.58.

⁸⁶² Ibid.

⁸⁶³ U.S. Department of State 1994a.

⁸⁶⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.59.

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid.

agreement impossible. New factions also emerged – 11 were active during the year – to further complicate the political scene.⁸⁶⁶

According to USCR, “As in previous years, civilians were targets for attack, massacres, and abuses by many of Liberia’s warring factions during 1994” and “Hundreds of thousands were uprooted anew within Liberia by ongoing fighting and atrocities.”⁸⁶⁷ Approximately 90,000 people fled to Cote d’Ivoire and about 50,000 went to Guinea. The U.S. State Department reported that some 130,000 refugees from Sierra Leone were also displaced repeatedly during the year, and “In all combat arenas, fleeing displaced persons reported villages looted and burned; use of excessive force; arbitrary detentions; impressment, particularly of children under the age of 18 into the NPFL and ULIMO-Mandingo forces; torture; individual and gang rape; summary executions; mutilations and cannibalism.”⁸⁶⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In addition to abusing civilians directly, USCR reported that the warring factions, including government forces, hampered relief efforts and increasingly targeted humanitarian organizations. As a result, only 10% of the country was reliably accessible to aid groups.⁸⁶⁹

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Due to the attacks against relief operations, many Liberians were cut off from assistance during the year. Parts of northern Liberia, in Lofa County, received no assistance whatsoever. As a result, the health and nutrition of many displaced and other citizens was very poor. Monrovia suffered a cholera outbreak in the middle of the year.⁸⁷⁰

1995 (Certainty: 5)

Intense fighting persisted in the first half of 1995 and continued to displace and kill many civilians. According to the U.S. State Department, as in the previous year the major warring factions “deliberately targeted, tortured, and murdered innocent civilians and regularly committed violence against women, children, and the elderly,” committing all of the abuses cited above for 1994.⁸⁷¹ Among many other examples, in March-April fighting between the NPFL and another faction known as the LPC in two counties “reportedly resulted in the death of over 1,000 civilians in a 1-month period...with few injuries to the fighters.”⁸⁷² Overall, according to USCR, an estimated 100,000 - 200,000 Liberians were uprooted in the early months of 1995, including some 60,000 who fled to the southeastern coastal town of Buchanan.⁸⁷³

In August the major factions signed a new peace agreement in Abuja, Nigeria – the thirteenth in less than six years of war. The agreement provided for a new transitional government, which was inaugurated in September, and largely held for the remainder of the year.

⁸⁶⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.63, 65.

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State 1995a. In addition, “All factions indiscriminately ransacked villages and confiscated scant food supplies. They deliberately targeted, tortured, and murdered innocent civilians and regularly committed violence against women, children, and the elderly.”

⁸⁶⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1995, p.65.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid; see also U.S. Department of State 1995a.

⁸⁷¹ U.S. Department of State 1996a.

⁸⁷² Ibid.

⁸⁷³ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.53-54.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: In addition to abusing civilians the warring parties continued to disrupt relief efforts. As a result it remained difficult to distribute aid outside the areas protected by ECOMOG and about 1/3 of the needy population failed to receive any early in the year.⁸⁷⁴

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Aside from injuries due to physical attacks, the displaced suffered severe malnutrition and there was also a cholera outbreak in a northern area inaccessible to relief agencies that caused hundreds of deaths.⁸⁷⁵

1996 (Certainty: 5)

Liberia's most recent peace process collapsed in 1996 with the renewed onset of full-scale war in April in Monrovia, involving three main armed factions and with participation by individuals from other groups as well. Over the course of two months of intense fighting and looting, some 3,000 people died (including civilians) and an estimated 850,000 were newly displaced.⁸⁷⁶ The U.S. State Department again observed that during the year, "The media, eyewitnesses, human rights groups, and international observers all reported flagrant disregard for human rights by the factional fighters. The factions committed summary executions, torture, individual and gang rapes, mutilations, and cannibalism. They burned people alive; looted and burned cities and villages; used excessive force; engaged in arbitrary detentions and impressment, particularly of children under the age of 18; severely restricted freedom of assembly, association, and movement; and employed forced labor."⁸⁷⁷

Yet another peace accord in August finally paved the way for a return to peace, although there were serious violations over the next several months and a disastrous humanitarian situation persisted. For instance, according to USCR, "Continued fighting and abuses near the western town of Tubmanburg resulted in more than 4,000 deaths among 26,000 inhabitants...More than one third of Tubmanburg's youngest children perished, and up to 80 percent of the town's surviving children suffered severe malnutrition."⁸⁷⁸ More broadly, relief operations were severely curtailed by the fighting and destruction in Monrovia, which destroyed UN and NGO facilities and supplies. This led to malnutrition and health problems later in the year, especially in Monrovia and Buchanan.⁸⁷⁹

By the end of the year the U.S. State Department reported that 7 years of war had left an estimated 200,000 civilians dead, 750,000 as refugees outside the country, and more than 1.2 million people displaced within Liberia.⁸⁸⁰

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: See above regarding combatants' widespread targeting and abuse of civilians, and disruption of aid operations.

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: See above.

⁸⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State 1996a; United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.55.

⁸⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State 1996a; United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.55.

⁸⁷⁶ U.S. Department of State 1997a. USCR estimates that the renewed fighting in April displaced approximately 300,000 from their homes in Monrovia, however. See United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.77.

⁸⁷⁷ U.S. Department of State 1997a.

⁸⁷⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1997, p.78.

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State 1997a.

39. Liberia II (1999 – 2003)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

After a peaceful year in 1997, generally improving conditions and reintegration and return of the displaced were marred in 1998 by sporadic outbreaks of violence. In total, 14,000 ethnic Krahn fled the country following a September battle in Monrovia between supporters of President Taylor and of former warlord Prince Johnson, although it appears that this may largely have been due to apprehension of possible attacks and harassment rather than imminent danger. In addition, inter-ethnic tension prevented secure return for IDPs and refugees in some areas, and World Food Program deliveries were still sometimes subject to harassment.⁸⁸¹

By 1999, however, renewed violence related to a burgeoning insurgency in northern Liberia's Lofa County met the standards for outbreak of a new complex emergency, albeit initially on a much more limited scale than during the prior war. The insurgency centered on a group known as Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and it grew progressively each year, spreading violence to other areas until government forces pushed it back in 2002. As in the earlier war, both government and rebel forces committed grave abuses against the civilian population. Finally, 2003 saw the resumption of war throughout the country, including fierce fighting in and around Monrovia over the summer, followed by an August peace agreement and the negotiated departure of President Charles Taylor with the help of UN peacekeepers and the United States.

In 2004 the peace process began in earnest. Some 100,000 former combatants were disarmed and the return of displaced persons began. The UN peacekeeping forces gradually took control of more and more of the country throughout the year. Riots in Monrovia in October disrupted the process for a time, but neither USCR nor IDMC reported any new displacement during the year, thus justifying coding 2003 as the end of the complex emergency.⁸⁸²

Annual Data

1999 (Certainty: 2)

According to USCR, in 1999 the renewed violence in northern Liberia's Lofa County displaced up to 50,000 people. While some returned within weeks, many had not returned by the end of the year. The government declared an emergency in the county and accused neighboring Guinea of harboring Liberian insurgents.⁸⁸³ The U.S. State Department reported that there were credible reports that hundreds of people were also killed in the violence.⁸⁸⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: USCR reported that the emerging conflict seriously disrupted relief work in the affected areas, with food, vehicles, and other equipment looted and stolen, and that government forces contributed to this problem. As a result, most organizations halted their

⁸⁸¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.74-75.

⁸⁸² E.g., United States Committee for Refugees 2005, p.92-93.

⁸⁸³ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.99-104.

⁸⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State 2000b.

operations for the last four months of the year.⁸⁸⁵ USCR and the U.S. State Department also both reported that government security forces committed frequent abuses against civilians in Lofa County and other areas.⁸⁸⁶

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: The flight of aid organizations made conditions and needs of the displaced difficult to assess, but virtually all development aid to the region was halted the second half of the year.⁸⁸⁷

2000 (Coding: 5)

In 2000 the insurgency in Lofa County increased in strength and expanded in geographic scope to nearby areas, notably the more populous Nimba County. An estimated 50,000 people were again displaced during the year. Perhaps 20,000 remained displaced at the end of the year, although estimates of the displacement problem were tentative because of difficulties in reaching affected areas.⁸⁸⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The U.S. State Department reported numerous incidences of government abuse toward civilians, which included extra-judicial killings. Indeed, “Human rights organizations estimate[d] the number of such killings to be have increased to several hundred during the year. Many of the abuses were linked to ongoing violence in Lofa county between security forces and antigovernment dissidents who launched a series of crossborder incursions from Guinea.”⁸⁸⁹ Efforts to distribute food aid were again disrupted on multiple occasions.⁸⁹⁰

2001 (Certainty: 5)

The scale of violence again grew in 2001, as LURD attacks increased and spread to yet new areas. An estimated 80,000 people were newly displaced during the year.⁸⁹¹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: Government efforts to crush the resistance often involved attacks on civilians as well, including killings, rape, torture, and forcible conscription. Aid agencies also faced new challenges in delivering relief due to government travel restrictions in the conflict zone, and “suspended aid to camps in Gbarpolu County late in the year because of security concerns.”⁸⁹²

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: USCR reported that IDP camps were dangerous and violent and that the displaced population typically lacked adequate supplies of food, medicine, and clean drinking water. Malnutrition was especially high among some IDPs who were forced to try to survive in the forest for weeks at a time.⁸⁹³

⁸⁸⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.99-104.

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid; U.S. Department of State 2000b.

⁸⁸⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.100-102.

⁸⁸⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.91.

⁸⁸⁹ U.S. Department of State 2001a.

⁸⁹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.92.

⁸⁹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.82-83.

⁸⁹² Ibid.

⁸⁹³ Ibid, p. 82

2002 (Certainty: 5)

LURD attacks increased yet again in 2002 and came within 50 miles of Monrovia, but by year's end government forces had succeeded in pushing them back to the northern border areas. USCR claimed that at least 200,000 people were uprooted during the year, although exact figures were the source of some controversy.⁸⁹⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: During the year, both LURD and government forces committed grave abuses against civilians, including IDPs. Government troops engaged in killings, rape, lootings, and forcible conscription. Rebels physically prevented thousands of civilians from fleeing and used them for forced labor.⁸⁹⁵

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: USCR reported evidence of poor health conditions among the displaced, citing a cholera outbreak, high death rates, and a lack of clean water. Some areas were inaccessible to aid agencies for at least part of the year.⁸⁹⁶

2003 (Certainty: 5)

In 2003 full-scale war resumed throughout the country, and was further complicated and exacerbated by the emergence of a new insurgent group known as MODEL. According to the U.S. State Department, "The fighting culminated with three LURD incursions on Monrovia from June through August, marked by intense urban combat that killed and injured hundreds of civilians, and MODEL's occupation of Buchanan at the end of July."⁸⁹⁷ According to USCR, hundreds of thousands were uprooted during the year and an estimated 1,000 civilians were killed in the fighting in and around Monrovia.⁸⁹⁸

With UN and U.S. assistance, Liberian President Charles 'Tyalor was forced out of office in mid-2003 and a peace agreement was signed in August. A civilian, Gyude Bryant, became interim president in November. UN peacekeepers arrived to help oversee the peace process, but fighting continued to displace civilians at the end of the year.⁸⁹⁹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to the U.S. State Department, both government and rebel forces (LURD and MODEL) committed numerous killings and other abuses against civilians during the year, increasingly so as the fighting spread to new areas: "During the year, government armed elements and uncontrolled rebels killed an undetermined number of civilians, who were suspected of being government or rebel sympathizers respectively, by shooting them, burning them alive, or cutting their throats. Some soldiers killed civilians while looting their villages. Human rights monitors reported that abuses included torture and rape."⁹⁰⁰ Both government and rebel troops also attacked IDPs and IDP camps. For instance, "Between March and June, government

⁸⁹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.78-81.

⁸⁹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.79.

⁸⁹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.80.

⁸⁹⁷ U.S. Department of State 2004a.

⁸⁹⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2004, p.22.

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁰ U.S. Department of State 2004a.

irregulars and LURD elements repeatedly raided IDP camps in the Western suburbs of Monrovia.”⁹⁰¹

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: According to the State Department, “serious health and sanitation problems arose in the greater Monrovia area as established camps for IDPs were disbanded and persons crowded into Monrovia.”⁹⁰²

⁹⁰¹ Ibid.

⁹⁰² Ibid.

40. Mozambique (1982 – 1992)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internationalized Internal Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

At the time of its independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique was bordered by two colonial regimes that were struggling to survive against nationalist liberation movements. To the west, Rhodesia, ruled by Ian Smith, struggled against the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its guerrilla army, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), which had mainly been operating from Mozambique since the early 1970s. To the south, the South African government faced the African National Congress (ANC) and its campaign to unseat the apartheid regime through domestic acts of terrorism, the training of recruits for the liberation army across the border in “friendly” countries, and an organized administrative apparatus for coordinating external support. Mozambique’s post-independence ruling party, the radical socialist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), was friendly to these movements and offered safe haven to both the ANC and ZANU. In doing so, FRELIMO magnified the internal threats faced by the South African and Rhodesian governments, placed itself squarely in alignment with the Eastern bloc in the Cold War, and ensured its neighbors’ interest in destabilizing its own hold on power.

In 1976, Rhodesian security services helped to establish the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) to help defeat the ZANLA guerrillas from within Mozambique. At this time the group had little domestic support and its direction was largely dictated by Rhodesia. Strategy focused on brief incursions into Mozambican territory to fight ZANLA guerrillas and placed little emphasis on establishing local bases. Fighting was concentrated near ZANLA’s bases along the border in southern and central Mozambique. MNR incursions often involved violence against civilians, which peaked in 1978.⁹⁰³ In 1979, however, the Rhodesian government fell and MNR lost its financial and organizational base of support. In October, Andre Matsangaissa, MNR’s Mozambican commander, was killed in a battle with government forces. By 1980 the group had all but collapsed and incidents of violence against civilians nearly ceased.⁹⁰⁴

Conflict reemerged in 1981 after South Africa took over supporting the Mozambican insurgents, now under the name of RENAMO. Under the South African Defense Forces, RENAMO benefitted from training, weapons, and logistical infrastructure. By the end of 1981, it had ballooned from 2,500 active soldiers to approximately 8,000 (and would grow to nearly 20,000 by 1985).⁹⁰⁵ Fighting escalated in 1982 as RENAMO operations expanded into Gaza, Inhambane, and Zambezia provinces. The group soon became known for mutilating civilians and attacking civilian targets such as transportation links, health clinics, and schools.

Over the next decade, war between RENAMO and the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) would uproot some 5.2 million of Mozambique’s estimated 15 million people and leave up to a million dead, half of whom were children.⁹⁰⁶ Both sides committed serious human rights abuses and killed civilians indiscriminately, although RENAMO was by far the worse offender. Still, most deaths were due to indirect causes such as war-related famine and disease. A U.S. State Department report estimated that as of 1988, 150,000 people had died of famine and 260,000 infants were dead

⁹⁰³ Weinstein and Francisco 2005, p.164; see also Human Rights Watch 1992, p.26.

⁹⁰⁴ Weinstein and Francisco 2005, p.164.

⁹⁰⁵ Weinstein and Francisco 2005, p.171.

⁹⁰⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.67. The UN estimated a lower total of approximately 600,000, however. See Human Rights Watch 1992, p.2-3.

from lack of food and medical care caused by the war.⁹⁰⁷ According to a 1992 Human Rights Watch assessment, the war reduced many rural areas “to a stone age condition, without trade or modern manufactured goods, education or health services,” and the country needed “to be built almost from scratch.”⁹⁰⁸

The war was so devastating largely because of the strategies used to fight it. Seeking to avoid direct battle and confrontations with one another, both FAM and RENAMO instead relied on controlling the civilian population in their areas of operation in order to extract resources from the people, deny the enemy access to them, and establish their own legitimacy. In order to exercise this control, they engaged in large-scale forced relocation of people and restrictions on movement and economic activity, among other abuses. In government-controlled areas, this often involved herding people together into garrisoned communities that were entirely dependent on international relief for food.⁹⁰⁹ For RENAMO, control of the population became especially critical after FRELIMO and South Africa signed the Nkomati non-aggression pact in 1984, agreeing that South Africa would end its sponsorship of RENAMO and FRELIMO would halt its support of ANC military operations. In response, RENAMO moved away from attacking military targets (which required large amounts of arms and ammunition) and began targeting and controlling civilians on a wider scale in order to ensure their access to food and supplies.⁹¹⁰ According to Human Rights Watch, these military strategies were “instrumental in reducing much of Mozambique's population to a state of chronic famine,” in which millions “endured miserable conditions of prolonged hunger, destitution and hopelessness” for a decade. Natural disasters “such as drought and floods...played only a secondary role” in this “wholly-artificial food crisis” that – along with the breakdown of public health infrastructure – killed far more people than the fighting directly.⁹¹¹

A series of South African-mediated negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO followed the Nkomati pact, but these talks quickly collapsed. In 1986, however, Mozambique's president, Samora Machel, was killed in a plane crash. His successor, Joaquim Chissano, undertook a major review of FRELIMO's foreign, economic, and human rights policies and began a series of reforms that would lead to peace negotiations beginning in 1990. Widespread famine conditions lent a sense of urgency to the peace process as RENAMO increasingly began to attack urban and semi-urban areas to obtain supplies, and as the war prevented the provision of adequate emergency relief to the needy population. After twelve rounds of negotiations, FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed to a ceasefire on October 4, 1992. The ceasefire held, and 1993 was a peaceful year marked by the return of 500,000 refugees and nearly 2 million IDPs.⁹¹² President Chissano won reelection in a nonviolent vote in October 1994, and displaced persons continued to return home.⁹¹³ Mozambique has since seen no significant violence.

⁹⁰⁷ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.104.

⁹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.3.

⁹⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.4, 42.

⁹¹⁰ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.31-33. Despite the agreement, however, RENAMO was not completely cut off from South African supplies – by their own admission, the South Africans did not stick to the agreement.

⁹¹¹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.5. While climate certainly played a role, the Mozambican government had managed to control the effects of a string of significant natural disasters in the late 1970s, and “it was only after the intensification of the war in 1981-82 that the processes which were to lead to widespread famine were set in train” (p.107). In addition, although famine was a foreseeable consequence of their policies of population control, there is little evidence that either army intended to create it intentionally (see p.114).

⁹¹² United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.61.

⁹¹³ United States Committee for Refugees 1996, p.59.

Annual Data

1982 (Certainty: 2)

It is difficult to discern in exactly which year the renewed violence in Mozambique exceeded the threshold for the start of a complex emergency – whether in 1981, 1982, or 1983. Based on information available from several sources, 1982 appears the most likely. According to William Finnegan, it was after 1981 that the war “intensified dramatically.”⁹¹⁴ Likewise, Martin Rupiya points out that there was a year of relative calm after RENAMO began receiving South African support in 1980 and before the rebels began to pose a “serious military threat” to the government.⁹¹⁵ Figures from USCR support this interpretation of events: as of the end of 1981, USCR reported no refugees or IDPs originating from Mozambique.⁹¹⁶ In addition, according to Human Rights Watch 1982 was the first year in which war affected the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, and Zambezia (the wealthiest and most populous in the country).⁹¹⁷ Meanwhile, violence against civilians, which had peaked in 1978 and nearly ceased in 1980, “picked up again after 1981.”⁹¹⁸ RENAMO burned 140 villages in 1982, and destroyed 900 rural shops in 1982-83.⁹¹⁹

1983 (Certainty: 3)

Mozambicans fleeing war and drought arrived in Zimbabwe in large numbers in 1983. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, by the end of the year there were 100,000 refugees in Zimbabwe, with 1,000 entering the country each week. One camp was filled to its capacity of 24,000 within a few days.⁹²⁰ The report was not explicit, however, that no refugees had arrived before 1983, and thus the number of arrivals for 1983 remains uncertain.

In addition, during 1983-84 much of southern and central Mozambique was affected by a famine that killed tens of thousands (and perhaps up to 100,000) people.⁹²¹ RENAMO activities were a major cause. According to Human Rights Watch, in Gaza and Inhambane provinces, “...by August 1983, people had lost much of their remaining foodstocks and cattle to RENAMO forces and were running out of roots and berries in the bush. An estimated 25 percent of the normally marketed grain was lost due to RENAMO action.”⁹²² Nevertheless, I have seen no clear figures for deaths exclusively from 1983.

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: According to USCR, Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe suffered many deaths due to severe malnutrition and related diseases, as well as health problems related to inadequate shelter and poor sanitary conditions.⁹²³ In addition, a survey of famine mortality among the internally displaced in Gaza and Inhambane provinces conducted in October – November found a mortality rate of about five times normal (96 per thousand per year) and a child malnutrition

⁹¹⁴ Finnegan 1992, p.4.

⁹¹⁵ Rupiya 1998, p.13.

⁹¹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1986, p.49.

⁹¹⁷ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.27.

⁹¹⁸ Weinstein and Francisco 2005, p.167.

⁹¹⁹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.123.

⁹²⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.48.

⁹²¹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.30, 102.

⁹²² Human Rights Watch 1992, p.109.

⁹²³ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.48.

rate of 19% (though infant mortality was considerably lower than UNICEF's estimate for the general population at the time). According to Human Rights Watch, these findings indicated serious famine, though not mass starvation, among this population.⁹²⁴

1984 – 1985 (Certainty: 1984 = 3; 1985 = 5)

Between 1984 and 1985, drought and violence – including RENAMO's largest offensive to date – displaced more than 1.5 million people and produced major flows of refugees out of Mozambique. By late 1985, estimates of the total number of Mozambicans outside the country ranged from 100,000 to 200,000.⁹²⁵ I have seen no estimates of displacement that distinguish between these years, although on average these figures imply that both dramatically exceeded the threshold required for a continuing complex emergency. In addition, UNICEF estimated that 82,000 children under the age of five died from famine and war during 1985.⁹²⁶ Though a comparable toll seems likely for 1984, I have seen no such estimate.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to USCR, both RENAMO and government forces acted with “brutal disregard” for civilians in 1984-85.⁹²⁷ According to Human Rights Watch, after 1984 the country “became massively dependent on international aid” and “food became almost unobtainable on the official market.”⁹²⁸ In addition, RENAMO continued to cut off food supplies, worsening the effects of continued drought.

1986 (Certainty: 5)

The war intensified in late 1986, leading almost 100,000 Mozambicans to flee into neighboring countries such as Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and South Africa and join the quarter-of-a-million who had already done so.⁹²⁹ By the end of the year, the total number of people displaced or seriously affected by the conflict had reached nearly four million.⁹³⁰

In addition, war-related hunger continued during the year. A major RENAMO offensive in Zambèzia Province late in the year, during planting season, left about 600,000 people without planting supplies, over half a million at risk of famine, and some 270,000 displaced.⁹³¹ War combined with flood and poor harvests to put 430,000 people at risk of famine in Niassa Province; 458,000 in Tete Province; 248,000 in Maputo Province; 430,000 in Inhambane Province; and 570,000 in Sofala Province. In some areas, there were deaths from starvation. RENAMO attacks displaced an additional 22,000 people along the Mozambique-South Africa border.⁹³² Finally, UNICEF estimated that 84,000 children under the age of five died from famine and war during 1986.⁹³³

⁹²⁴ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.109.

⁹²⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1985, p.45-46.

⁹²⁶ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.111-112.

⁹²⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1985, p.45.

⁹²⁸ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.110.

⁹²⁹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.31-33.

⁹³⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1986, p.43.

⁹³¹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.110-111.

⁹³² Human Rights Watch 1992, p.111.

⁹³³ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.111-112.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: RENAMO forces continued to attack food supply routes and disrupt distribution during the year, contributing significantly to the large numbers at risk of famine.⁹³⁴

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Among the 650,000 registered Mozambican refugees in Malawi, many were undernourished and among those under 5 the chronic malnutrition rate was estimated at 50%.⁹³⁵ The ICRC reported in November that the health condition of 70,000 of these refugees was critical.⁹³⁶

1987 (Certainty: 5)

In 1987, the FAM launched a major counter-offensive against RENAMO that put the rebel force on the defensive and proved to be a turning point in the war.⁹³⁷ Along with continued RENAMO activity, however, it led to massive new displacement of about 1.6 million people during the year.⁹³⁸ The total number of refugees doubled to 800,000, with approximately 350,000 people entering Malawi and the flow of people to South Africa reaching 1,200 per month.⁹³⁹ The estimated number of internally displaced persons reached up to 3.2 million.⁹⁴⁰ The year also saw a number of large massacres, including the largest of the war, with 424 people killed on July 17 in the village of Homoine in Inhambane province. Although RENAMO denied responsibility, survivor testimony suggested that they were almost certainly the culprits. In August, 92 civilians were killed about 95 miles away, in Gaza province. On October 29, gunmen ambushed two convoys about fifty miles north of Maputo, killing 278. RENAMO again denied involvement, but the available evidence suggests that they were responsible.⁹⁴¹ In December, President Joaquim Chissano made a move toward peace when he declared amnesty for RENAMO rebels in return for laying down their arms.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: The massive displacement in 1987 strained the country's food supply and another major famine began during the year, centered on Zambèzia Province and caused by the FAM counter-offensive as much as by RENAMO. As Human Rights Watch described, a result of the offensive was "that people who had been scattered throughout the countryside, surviving on what they could grow and what they could obtain from the forests, were herded into army-controlled garrisons where no food was available, and none could be grown."⁹⁴² In addition, the army burned crops throughout the region.⁹⁴³ Some 4.5 million people were affected, and the worst famine conditions were in displaced persons' camps, where mortality rates "reached great heights."⁹⁴⁴ Overall, more than 6.5 million people were forced to rely on food assistance from the international community during the year.⁹⁴⁵ Unfortunately, only 38 percent of the at-risk population

⁹³⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1986, p.43.

⁹³⁵ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.111.

⁹³⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1986, p.43.

⁹³⁷ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.34.

⁹³⁸ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.125.

⁹³⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.39-41.

⁹⁴⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.41.

⁹⁴¹ On the massacres, see Human Rights Watch 1992, p.34-35.

⁹⁴² Human Rights Watch 1992, p.112.

⁹⁴³ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.117.

⁹⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.112.

⁹⁴⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.7.

of about 3.5 million was accessible to relief agencies, whose efforts were regularly thwarted by RENAMO's attacks on relief convoys and food stocks.⁹⁴⁶ According to Human Rights Watch, "Between 1984 and 1987, RENAMO destroyed twenty-five trucks and damaged another fifty providing famine relief. Fifteen drivers were killed and 450 tons of food and relief supplies were stolen or destroyed. At least half this destruction took place in 1987."⁹⁴⁷

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Due to the famine and violence, refugees arriving in Malawi during the year frequently required treatment for malnutrition and shock, and many were emotionally incapacitated.⁹⁴⁸

1988 (Certainty: 5)

The USCR reported that 200,000 people became refugees during 1988, bringing the total number in neighboring countries to one million.⁹⁴⁹ Between April and June, more than 350,000 people were displaced from the Lago and Guru Districts and Tete Province, and during the latter part of the year Mozambicans entered Malawi at a rate of 20,000 to 30,000 per month.⁹⁵⁰

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The government of Mozambique, according to the USCR, was unable to protect its citizens against "massive, often unspeakable violence perpetrated against them by RENAMO."⁹⁵¹ The State Department report described a campaign of systematic civilian targeting by RENAMO, estimating that more than 100,000 civilians lost their lives directly as a result of RENAMO violence.⁹⁵² Refugees interviewed implicated RENAMO forces in 94 percent of the atrocities inflicted upon them.⁹⁵³ RENAMO also continued to attack supply convoys, destroying forty trucks and killing twenty-three drivers during the year, while transportation infrastructure was destroyed or rendered useless by mines and floods.⁹⁵⁴

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Mozambicans continued to suffer from severe food shortages and limited access to medical care in 1988. Since 1981, 800 health centers had been destroyed or seriously damaged, and only 17 of 27 rural hospitals continued to function.⁹⁵⁵ One unfortunate result of FAM's population relocations in Zambèzia Province were measles and cholera epidemics that broke out among the displaced between 1988 and 1990, thanks to the overcrowded and unsanitary living situations in government-held garrison towns. In one mountain village alone between October and December 1988, some 2,000 people died of measles.⁹⁵⁶

⁹⁴⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.10. Human Rights Watch (1992 p.125) cites a larger figure of 4.5 million who faced famine, however.

⁹⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.125.

⁹⁴⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.41.

⁹⁴⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.42.

⁹⁵⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.42-43.

⁹⁵¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.42.

⁹⁵² United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.43. See also Human Rights Watch 1992, p.35.

⁹⁵³ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.43.

⁹⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.125; United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.42.

⁹⁵⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.42.

⁹⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.80, 72.

1989 (Certainty: 5)

According to the USCR, fighting during 1989 drove some 15,000 Mozambicans across the border into Malawi each month. By the end of the year, the war was estimated to have killed some 500,000 people and there were approximately 6 million displaced or seriously affected people, including an estimated 1.7 million IDPs, 1.3 million refugees, and 2.9 million people who were dependent on food aid.⁹⁵⁷ The peace process continued during the year. Since President Chissano's offer of amnesty for RENAMO fighters in December 1987, over 3,000 of them had laid down their arms.⁹⁵⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Delivering food to people in need remained difficult due to RENAMO attacks and infrastructure destruction. RENAMO destroyed 37 relief trucks and killed five drivers during the year.⁹⁵⁹

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: Displaced persons' camps continued to suffer the worst of the famine conditions, with continuing high mortality rates. One 1989 survey conducted in nine camps in Lugela district found that 17.7% of children under four had died over the previous year. This figure represented several times the normal rate.⁹⁶⁰

1990 (Certainty: 5)

FRELIMO and RENAMO held direct peace talks in July 1990, and the government adopted a new constitution with democratic reforms. Some refugees began returning and the government requested aid for a total of 154,000 returnees during the year. Despite this progress, the war continued and USCR reported that fewer Mozambicans repatriated than fled to neighboring countries.⁹⁶¹ In addition, new estimates put the number of war-related deaths at 900,000 (nearly twice the previous figure), while the government claimed that there were 2 million IDPs and 1.4 million refugees.⁹⁶²

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: The government continued to have trouble providing for the war-affected population in 1990. Of the 2 million estimated IDPs, only 1.4 million were in government-accessible areas.⁹⁶³ And according to Human Rights Watch, despite international help the government's relief efforts "proved incapable of meeting all the civilians' food, medicine, and shelter needs."⁹⁶⁴ In addition, a new problem emerged during the year. While RENAMO attacks continued to hinder aid delivery, for the first time there were also reports of hungry, ill-disciplined government soldiers attacking and robbing relief supplies intended for the civilian population.⁹⁶⁵

What is more, the government's forced relocation policies took a heavy toll on the civilian population in 1990. For two-and-a-half months at the beginning of the year, some 10,000-20,000 civilians whom the army had removed from their homes in the town of Mugulama in Zambèzia

⁹⁵⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.41-43.

⁹⁵⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.43.

⁹⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.125.

⁹⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.112.

⁹⁶¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.49.

⁹⁶² United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.48.

⁹⁶³ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.49.

⁹⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.80.

⁹⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.43, 117.

Province were cut off from international assistance. When the army allowed relief agencies to access the area in early April, malnutrition was 50% and twenty people were dying daily.⁹⁶⁶ Similarly, following victories over the rebels in July and August, again in Zambèzia Province, the army brought some 70,000 people into government accommodation centers and denied them access to international relief for the next three months. The results were predictable: according to Human Rights Watch, “At least 3,900 people died in Mulevala alone in November and December due to malnutrition and an outbreak of cholera.”⁹⁶⁷ Witness reports also suggested that government forces and pro-government militia used “scorched earth tactics” in rebel areas during the year.⁹⁶⁸

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Given the above events, malnutrition remained widespread and affected an estimated 58 percent of the population in Zambèzia (the most populous province).⁹⁶⁹

1991 (Certainty: 5)

Although a partial cease-fire had been declared in December 1990 and there were several rounds of peace talks in 1991, RENAMO violations were frequent (including several before the first round of peace talks in January 1991). Indeed, as each side sought to strengthen its hand for peace negotiations, fighting increased in previously less affected regions and some 41,000 Mozambicans fled to Malawi due to violence and RENAMO terror during the year.⁹⁷⁰ The government reported that between January and October, RENAMO “killed 445 civilians, wounded 377, mutilated twenty-four and abducted twenty-seven.”⁹⁷¹ It also persisted in previous practices of kidnapping, detaining, and forcibly recruiting and moving civilians to suit its needs. In April, for example, it forced some 2,000 civilians to move fifty kilometers from their homes, and displaced another 18,000 people nearby.⁹⁷² By the end of the year, the USCR estimated that there were nearly 1.5 million Mozambican refugees in neighboring countries.⁹⁷³

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: RENAMO continued to attack aid supplies and deliveries throughout 1991, and reports of government soldiers assaulting and robbing international relief supplies also continued during the year.⁹⁷⁴

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Mozambicans across the country suffered from starvation and widespread malnutrition. In mid-1991, the U.S. State Department reported that in the capital of the Zambèzia Province, 30 to 50 people were starving every day.⁹⁷⁵ Meanwhile, more than twenty people were dying of starvation each day in parts of Nampula Province.⁹⁷⁶

⁹⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.79.

⁹⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.83.

⁹⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.80.

⁹⁶⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.49.

⁹⁷⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.47-48. See also Human Rights Watch 1992, p.37.

⁹⁷¹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.37.

⁹⁷² Human Rights Watch 1992, p.84.

⁹⁷³ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.47.

⁹⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.43, 117, 125-126.

⁹⁷⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.47.

⁹⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.125.

1992 (Certainty: 5)

In order to gain supplies, erode popular confidence in the government, and capture as much territory as possible prior to signing a peace agreement, in December 1991 RENAMO initiated a major offensive targeted at Mozambique's urban areas. In January 1992 alone, its forces conducted seventy-one attacks on Maputo.⁹⁷⁷ Yet a severe drought during the year left combatants and civilians exhausted and desperate. Finally, in October the government and RENAMO signed a peace agreement that concluded the war. This agreement made travel safer and sparked the mass migration of hungry populations toward relief centers inside Mozambique and in neighboring countries. The number of internally displaced persons increased from 2 million at the beginning of 1992 to an estimated 3.5 million by the end of the year, while the number of refugees grew from nearly 1.5 million to about 1.7 million.⁹⁷⁸

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: While RENAMO troops continued to threaten food distribution (the government and relief organizations blamed it for cutting off a million people from relief aid in 1992), around mid-year they also opened some roads to relief shipments for the first time in years and began allowing starving civilians to leave areas under their control. In some places, however, these relief shipments supplied less than half of the caloric intake necessary for survival.⁹⁷⁹ Reports of government soldiers stealing food intended for displaced civilians also continued in 1992.⁹⁸⁰

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: According to the USCR, civilians who were trapped in RENAMO territory during the year "regressed back to the Stone Age," and were forced to eat grass and roots and wear tree bark for clothes.⁹⁸¹ Along the Beira railway corridor, approximately 400,000 Mozambicans congregated for food and safety, and the area soon became rife with water pollution and unsanitary conditions. By the end of the year, 4,000 cases of cholera had been reported in the corridor and some 500 new displaced persons were arriving daily.⁹⁸²

⁹⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.133-134.

⁹⁷⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.67.

⁹⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.125; United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.67.

⁹⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch 1992, p.117.

⁹⁸¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.67.

⁹⁸² Ibid.

41. Nigeria (1997 – 2006)

Overall Coding: 3

Type: Communal Violence

General Information & Overall Severity

There is a decades-long history of communal violence in Nigeria, to some extent ethnic and religious, but mostly a result of inter-group competition for resources. Fierce economic, territorial, and resource-based competition has produced periodic bouts of violent inter-group conflict in the past, as well as violence between ethnic groups and the Nigerian government. Much of the conflict has taken place in eastern Nigeria, a region predominantly settled by members of the Ogoni tribe, and in the oil-rich south. It has involved numerous different ethnic groups in multiple episodes that are often far apart geographically each year. Still, although myriad different conflicts have often been taking place in Nigeria at any given time, they are related in important ways. In particular, the competition for resources that has spawned most of the fighting and related anti-civilian violence has been largely caused, and at least exacerbated, by environmental degradation and rural economic transformation related to oil exploration. Ineffective policies by the central government have failed to manage the tensions these changes have helped create. What is more, political changes in the 1990s helped create conditions that encouraged these tensions to erupt in new levels of violence. Given these common background conditions, we code a single complex emergency covering the especially unstable period from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s.

Ethnoreligious conflict increased in the mid to late 1990's for at least two key reasons. First, the government created new local administrative areas in 1996. This led to competition over the seats of local power, increased tension between groups, and numerous flashpoints of communal fighting. Second, a long period of authoritarian governance ended in 1999, and with nascent democratization groups increasingly began to express their long-standing tensions over resources and religion through violence, including attacks against civilians belonging to rival groups. We code the first year of the complex emergency in 1997. Although not all of the violence in Nigeria over the ensuing decade derived from communal conflicts exacerbated by these forces, the majority clearly did. Earlier, in contrast, though displacement occurred, the magnitude was lower and the causes more localized. According to Ibeanu, for instance, in the early 1990s displacement "was limited to occasional religion-linked conflicts in the North, rural development projects, communal boundary conflicts and environmental degradation, especially soil erosion in the southern States."⁹⁸³

The Nigerian government clearly worked to address the consequences, if not the causes, of the growing communal violence in the 1990s and 2000s. Still, it has been criticized for the excessive use of force in its efforts to do so and for poor coordination of the humanitarian response. Because the police often proved incapable of controlling violent incidents the government regularly deployed the military for this purpose, but on numerous occasions soldiers were accused of killing civilians and destroying property, at times making an explosive situation worse rather than better. In addition, since 1999 the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has had responsibility for coordinating emergency relief and helping to rehabilitate victims. In practice, however, while it "often supports IDPs in the emergency phase of a crisis," it has lacked the resources to assist longer-term displaced and assist with reintegration to society. More broadly, at the national level a lack of experience in handling IDPs, confusion over the respective responsibilities of different

⁹⁸³ Ibeanu 1999, p.174.

government bodies, and lack of a national humanitarian strategy have all hampered the government's responsiveness to IDP needs.⁹⁸⁴

In terms of overall certainty that it meets the full set of operational criteria, we code this complex emergency a '2' rather than a '3', for two reasons. First, estimating the overall scale of civilian deaths and displacement in Nigeria's communal conflicts is difficult, and while it seems most likely that the threshold of 500,000 displaced persons within a five-year period was met, there is some doubt. Most overall estimates of displacement come from the Nigerian government, but they are not always consistent with one another. As the IDMC has pointed out, moreover, there has been no independent or external verification of these figures, and "tracking of population movements have been virtually non-existent."⁹⁸⁵ Thus, it is difficult to know which government-reported figures are most accurate, or how much error there may be. For instance, in January 2004 the government's National Commission for Refugees (NCR) reported that an estimated 800,000 people had been displaced as a result of communal and religious clashes in the previous four years.⁹⁸⁶ In mid-2006, Moremi Soyinka-Onijala, Special Assistant to the Nigerian President on Migration and Humanitarian Affairs, suggested that estimates of the number of IDPs in Nigeria in recent years had ranged from 500,000 to millions.⁹⁸⁷ In 2008, by contrast, and citing a study conducted by the Swedish Development Agency in 2005, federal commissioner for refugees Hajiya Hadiza Kangiwa reported that an estimated 500,000 people had been displaced between 1999 and 2005, which would fall below the complex emergency threshold.⁹⁸⁸ Nor do figures on civilian deaths resolve the issue, since they appear to fall below the threshold of 20,000 within five years. According to the news organization Reuters, by April 2005 ethnic and sectarian violence had killed over 11,000 people since President Olusegun Obasanjo's election in 1999.⁹⁸⁹

The second reason for coding the complex emergency with a certainty of '2' follows from available information about the nature of most displacement. According to the IDMC, "The vast majority of displaced people in Nigeria seek refuge with family, friends or host communities in areas where their ethnic group is in the majority. Others seek shelter in major towns. Many appear to return to their homes or resettle near their home areas soon after the violence which forced them to leave has subsided, but an unknown number also resettle in other areas of the country. Even where camps for IDPs have been established...camp residents tend to integrate into the local community, join relatives in other states, or return to their villages to try and salvage what they can of their homes."⁹⁹⁰

As this information suggests, the conditions that so often contribute to disease and heightened mortality among IDPS – crowding and unsanitary conditions at displaced persons' camps, and exposure to the elements through lack of shelter – appear to have been relatively mild and temporary in Nigeria, compared with many other complex emergencies.

Finally, we code the end of the complex emergency in 2006, despite continued violence afterward. As discussed below, 2007 saw a substantial reduction in communal conflict compared with previous years. Moreover, in more recent years conflict in Nigeria has increasingly involved

⁹⁸⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.12. For a similar assessment in the late 1990s see also Ibeanu 1999, p.175-176.

⁹⁸⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.75. Likewise, according to UNHCR, as of 2007 there were "no reliable statistics on IDPs in Nigeria and no general agreement on their actual numbers in the absence of any comprehensive survey." See Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.12.

⁹⁸⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.75.

⁹⁸⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.12.

⁹⁸⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009e, p.64.

⁹⁸⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.35.

⁹⁹⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.11.

criminal violence and fighting between the Nigerian government and militant insurgents in the Niger Delta that is substantively distinct from the earlier communal conflicts and has had fewer consequences for the civilian population in the affected areas.

Annual Data

1997 (Certainty: 5)

In 1997, tens of thousands of Nigerians became internally displaced as a result of communal violence and hundreds – if not more – were killed. The U.S. Department of State reported that largely inter-ethnic conflict affected nine of the country's 30 provinces during the year. According to USCR, press reports suggested that this violence displaced some 50,000 people.⁹⁹¹ The numbers cited by the State Department were higher, however. It reported that violence in the province of Warri-South LGA in the spring displaced some 50,000 people and killed between 200 and 1,000 over the course of a single month. In addition, over several months violence in the new Ife East LGA also displaced at least 10,000 people and resulted in some 500 either being killed or going missing. Early in the year there was also severe violence in Benue State, which “virtually destroyed” the two communities involved and uprooted at least 10,000 people on one side alone. Thus, according to the State Department at least 70,000 people – and almost certainly more – were displaced by inter-ethnic violence during the year.⁹⁹²

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: The U.S. Department of State reports that the Nigerian government impeded monitoring efforts by foreign human rights organizations.⁹⁹³ In addition, across the country members of its 250 ethnic group claimed the Nigerian government remained indifferent to their needs. In particular, members of the Ogoni tribe alleged systematic governmental harassment and persecution throughout 1996-1997.⁹⁹⁴

1998 (Certainty: 3)

Although substantial ethnic violence continued into 1998, precise numbers of deaths and displaced are not available, although they may have diminished slightly. USCR reporting indicates the continued displacement of many Nigerians from their homes, but without citing estimates of new displacement.⁹⁹⁵ According to USCR the year's worst clashes involved the Ijaw ethnic group. One dispute in particular – with the Ilaje clan in August – led to several hundred deaths and the displacement of thousands of Ilaje people.⁹⁹⁶ The U.S. State Department also reported on this, noting that “many thousand” Ilaje fled their homes, and a number of other violent episodes. For example, violence between the Ijaw and Itsekiri and Urhobo clans in the Warri area of Delta State involved at least an additional 200 deaths. More broadly, as the State Department noted, “tensions among the largest ethnic groups generated violence related to control of the national Government,”

⁹⁹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.83.

⁹⁹² U.S. Department of State 1998a. On the violence in Warri and elsewhere in 1997 see also Ibeanu 1999, p.173-174.

⁹⁹³ U.S. Department of State 1998a.

⁹⁹⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1998, p.83.

⁹⁹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.79.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid.

while violence among smaller ethnic groups in at least nine different provinces often led to casualties, including 100 or more in each of two different cases.⁹⁹⁷ Thus, despite a potential lull in violence, it is clear that substantial anti-civilian inter-ethnic conflict persisted throughout 1998.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: As in 1997, members of the Ogoni and other tribes accused the government of trying to systematically deprive them of land and access to resources, and complained of environmental degradation. Clashes with government security forces increased in the most affected areas during the year.⁹⁹⁸

1999 (Certainty: 5)

In 1999 the election of President Obasanjo ended more than fifteen years of military rule in Nigeria. Although repression by the state decreased, clashes over control of land and natural resources became increasingly more violent and government efforts to restore calm often backfired. At least 1,000 people died in violent conflict in 1999, according to one estimate cited by USCR, and continued ethnic and religious conflicts uprooted “uncounted thousands” during the year.⁹⁹⁹ USCR also conservatively estimated that between 5,000 and 50,000 Nigerian civilians remained displaced at the end of 1999, although some local sources put the number in the hundreds of thousands.¹⁰⁰⁰

The U.S. State Department also reported an upsurge in lethal communal violence and cited numerous specific incidents. In addition to a number of episodes that killed fewer people, no less than 9 of these killed more than 100 people, with the sum of even the minimum estimates easily exceeding the threshold for an ongoing complex emergency:

- In March rioting between Hausa and local minorities in Kafanchan killed 130 persons.
- In July ethnic clashes in Kano and Sagamu killed approximately 200 deaths.
- In May and June, clashes in the Delta state town of Warri between the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo groups killed approximately 200 persons.
- In July, 3 days of violence between the majority Yoruba and minority Hausa in the city of Sagamu in Ogun State killed about 100 people, mostly Hausas. Reciprocal violence in the Hausa-dominated city of Kana then killed approximately 80 people, mostly Yoruba, in 4 more days of violence.
- On July 26, 120 people died in intra-Igbo violence in Otuocha, Anambra State.
- According to police reports, soldiers killed 162 persons during clashes in November in Odi, Bayelsa State, although local communities claimed there were more than 500 deaths.

⁹⁹⁷ U.S. Department of State 1999a.

⁹⁹⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1999, p.79.

⁹⁹⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.106-107.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ibid.

- On November 25, over 100 people were killed in fighting between Yoruba and Hausa traders in Ketu, outside of Lagos.
- Sporadic clashes between the Jokun and the Tiv in Benue and Taraba States over disputed land killed several hundred people over the course of the year.
- The Ijaw ethnic group was again involved in numerous conflicts. The conflict between the Ilaje and Ijaw resulted in the most deaths, with hundreds killed. Sporadic violence with the Itsekiri and Urhobo groups around Warri in Delta State killed at least an additional 200.¹⁰⁰¹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: In 1999 the Ogoni and other ethnic groups continued to insist that the Nigerian government systematically deprived them of their land and resources. What is more, both USCR and the U.S. State Department suggested that the Nigerian government's response to the growing violence during the year did more harm than good. Security personnel used excessive force in trying to suppress communal conflicts and local attacks on oil installations. In one instance, state security forces razed the village of Odi in southern Nigeria in response to the murder of 12 policemen.¹⁰⁰²

2000 (Certainty: 5)

Brutal group fighting continued into the new decade, as local groups clashed violently over economic, religious and political differences. Much of the year's violence was between Muslim and Christian communities, and was prompted by decisions in seven states to impose Sharia law. Again the violence led to significant population displacement and numerous deaths in 2000. Indeed, some observers described the fighting as the worst outbreak of violence since the country's 1967-1970 civil war. According to USCR, approximately 70,000 people became internally displaced and some 2,000 were killed during the year.¹⁰⁰³ The U.S. Department of State similarly estimates that there were thousands of civilian deaths as a result of the continued inter-ethnic and religious violence, including some 1,500 in February and May due to rioting over the issue of Sharia law.¹⁰⁰⁴

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to the U.S. State Department, "The police often could not protect citizens from interethnic, interreligious, communal, and criminal violence."¹⁰⁰⁵

2001 (Certainty: 5)

Localized inter-ethnic, religious and political violence continued to plague Nigeria throughout 2001 and spread to some new areas that had previously been peaceful. USCR reports that "massive communal violence" displaced approximately a half-million Nigerians during 2001, but also noted

¹⁰⁰¹ U. S. Department of State 2000.

¹⁰⁰² United States Committee for Refugees 2000, p.106-107. See also U. S. Department of State 2000.

¹⁰⁰³ United States Committee for Refugees 2001, p.96; United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.87. The 2001 report suggested that some 1,500 people were killed in communal conflict in 2000, but the following year it updated this estimate.

¹⁰⁰⁴ U.S. Department of State 2001b.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

that riots killed at least 1,500 people and forced between 400,000 and 800,000 from their homes for weeks or months. One official described the entire state of Benue as a “displaced people’s camp.”¹⁰⁰⁶ The U.S. Department of State similarly confirmed that ethno-religious violence was responsible for thousands of deaths during the year and the displacement of hundreds of thousands.¹⁰⁰⁷

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: USCR reported that the police struggled to restore order in violent areas during the year, with deadly consequences. In October, government forces retaliated against the killing of 19 soldiers who were trying to restore order in central Nigeria, allegedly killing some 300 people in Benue State.¹⁰⁰⁸ More broadly, the U.S. Department of State reported serious human rights abuses including extra-judicial killing and severe acts of repression by the Nigerian government and security forces in their efforts to quell inter-communal violence.¹⁰⁰⁹

b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: USCR reporting suggests poor conditions in some of the displacement camps, including food shortages, poor health conditions, and overcrowding.¹⁰¹⁰

2002 (Certainty: 5)

Massive communal violence persisted in 2002, driven by continuing conflicts over land use, political power, and the imposition of Sharia law in some states. According to USCR, fighting and rioting during the year “claimed approximately 1,000 lives, destroyed thousands of homes and other buildings, damaged livestock herds and crops, and uprooted 85,000 to 125,000 people for weeks or months.”¹⁰¹¹ The violence was spread around the country in the northern and central regions, the city of Lagos in the southwest, and other areas that had previously been peaceful. It followed the deaths of an estimated 5,000 people in communal violence from 1999-2001.

Confirming Evidence

a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: According to the U.S. State Department the police frequently proved unable to control episodes of communal violence during the year, and the government deployed the army on numerous occasions to restore order. While there were no credible reports of the army using excessive force in these operations in 2002, the police were accused of doing so.¹⁰¹²

2003 (Certainty: 5)

Ethnic and religious warfare appeared to diminish somewhat compared to the previous several years but was still substantial in 2003. Perhaps the most significant violence during the year was concentrated in and around the city of Warri in Delta State, where fighting and rioting between Ijaw, Itsekeri, and Urhobo groups broke out in late January/early February, March, May, August, and October. The Nigerian Red Cross reported that more than 6,000 were displaced in several days of

¹⁰⁰⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.87.

¹⁰⁰⁷ U.S. Department of State 2002.

¹⁰⁰⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.87.

¹⁰⁰⁹ U.S. Department of State 2002.

¹⁰¹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 2002, p.87.

¹⁰¹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 2003, p.84-85.

¹⁰¹² U. S. Department of State 2003.

fighting in January/early February.¹⁰¹³ According to the U.S. State Department, inter-ethnic fighting in the area displaced tens of thousands in March.¹⁰¹⁴ The Nigerian Red Cross also reported that 12,000 people fled fighting in mid-May and that when it resumed in mid-August, some 100 people died, over 1,000 were treated for injuries, and more than 4,000 were displaced from their homes.¹⁰¹⁵

Elsewhere, according to the U.S. State Department, sporadic communal and ethnic violence killed hundreds of people and displaced tens of thousands in Adamawa, Kogi, Edo, Delta, Nassarawa, and Plateau States. For instance, “Violence between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Adamawa State lasted for 2 weeks in March, resulting in as many as 110 deaths, and 21,000 displaced from their homes.” According to the Nigerian Cross, at least 11,000 of these were still displaced the following month. Conflict also persisted in many parts of Plateau State during the year: “Repeated outbreaks of violence caused dozens of deaths and resulted in the destruction of places of worship, shops, and homes.” In one two-day incident in June, “eight persons were killed, one mosque and four churches were burned, numerous houses were destroyed, and hundreds of persons fled.”¹⁰¹⁶

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: According to the U.S. State Department, Nigerian security forces proved unable to control outbreaks of violence in some areas and some units acted outside the law in the efforts to put down the violence. Following the fighting in Warri in August, the government had not managed to restore order in the area by the end of the year. According to both the local Red Cross and Human Rights Watch, moreover, the Nigerian government did little to assist people displaced by the year’s violence.¹⁰¹⁷

2004 (Certainty: 5)

The recurring violence in the Niger Delta region persisted into 2004, with some 100 people killed and over 6,000 displaced in the city of Port Harcourt (capital of Rivers State) from August through early September. In addition, a Human Rights Watch delegation to Rivers State in November found that over the previous year conflict over control of a number of villages in the area had displaced tens of thousands of people and led to the deaths of dozens of residents.¹⁰¹⁸

There was also substantial violence in central and northern Nigeria during the year. First, in Plateau State in the middle of the country, fighting between Muslims and Christians over land and cattle displaced at least 2,500 people in February. Subsequent conflict in early May in the Yelwa area prompted the government to declare a state of emergency in the province. The Nigerian Red Cross estimated that 600 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in this violence, and some 48,000 people were thought to have fled to Bauchi and Nassarawa states. In response to the events in Plateau State, Christian-Muslim violence then broke out in Kano and Adamawa states, with some 17,000 people becoming displaced in violence in Kano in mid-May according to the Nigerian Red Cross, and at least 2,000 more people uprooted in Adamawa state in June.¹⁰¹⁹

¹⁰¹³ Human Rights Watch 2003c, p.6.

¹⁰¹⁴ U.S. Department of State 2004b. See also Human Rights Watch 2003c, p.6-8.

¹⁰¹⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.67-69.

¹⁰¹⁶ U.S. Department of State 2004b.

¹⁰¹⁷ Ibid. See also Human Rights Watch 2003c, p.12-14.

¹⁰¹⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.70-71.

¹⁰¹⁹ For all of these figures see Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.44-47, 97-98.

Confirming Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Initially camps housing many of the displaced from Plateau State lacked adequate sanitation and water supplies and were overcrowded, threatening outbreaks of infectious disease and other social problems. There was an urgent need for food and medicine, among other supplies. By late June, however, UN OCHA reported that both in the camps and in affected villages, displaced persons' humanitarian needs in Bauchi and Nassarawa states were being largely met through assistance from the national and state governments, the Red Cross, other NGOs, and UN agencies. In response to the violence in Kano state, in May the Red Cross also reported needs for medical, food, and other emergency assistance items, and overcrowded conditions in local hospitals.¹⁰²⁰

2005 (Certainty: 3)

Communal violence continued in 2005, killing hundreds of people in more than 10 separate states. Nevertheless, according to the U.S. State Department, overall these conflicts remained at lower levels than in the previous year. For instance, in March conflict over the location of a public marketplace sparked violence on the border of Jigawa and Bauchi States. The fighting injured dozens and killed up to eight people. In April some 10-20 people were killed in Benue State in fighting between the Tiv and Fulani groups, and "many Fulanis fled into neighboring Taraba State." By contrast, around Warri in Delta State -- the source of so much violence in recent years -- a ceasefire negotiated in 2004 largely held in 2005, so violent incidents were relatively few. Likewise, around Port Harcourt in Rivers State, a 2004 ceasefire functioned fairly well until September, when violence renewed and sparked heightened tensions during the fall.

Overall, it was difficult to estimate the scope of new displacement in 2005. According to the State Department, "numerous persons" were newly displaced, and Amnesty International reported that "tens of thousands" remained displaced in the Niger Delta region, although it was unclear how many of these might have been displaced by violence in previous years.¹⁰²¹

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Ability/Willingness: According to the State Department, "Police generally lacked the resources to control communal violence." At the same time, the Nigerian police and military continued to employ excessive and sometimes deadly force in their efforts to suppress communal violence, especially in the Niger Delta region.¹⁰²² For instance, in one incident in February residents of the town of Odioma in Bayelsa State claimed that soldiers killed more than 30 people and set fire to houses while investigating an oil-related land dispute between two local communities.¹⁰²³

2006 (Certainty: 5)

Communal conflict continued in 2006, leading to "numerous deaths and the displacement of thousands of persons."¹⁰²⁴ The worst of the year's violence occurred in late February and was

¹⁰²⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.97-99.

¹⁰²¹ All of the information cited here comes from U.S. Department of State 2006a. See also Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.34-35, 53-54.

¹⁰²² U.S. Department of State 2006a.

¹⁰²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.71-72.

¹⁰²⁴ U.S. Department of State 2007a.

precipitated by the publication of a series of Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that Muslims saw as offensive. According to the Nigerian Red Cross this violence displaced an estimated 50,000 people and killed approximately 150 across at least 6 states. It was accompanied by the extensive destruction of property, including churches, mosques, and homes.¹⁰²⁵ Elsewhere, as in previous years incidents of ethnic violence and clashes with security forces continued in the Niger Delta region and, according to the State Department, “Conflict over land rights and ownership continued among members of the Tiv, Kwalla, Jukun, and Azara ethnic groups” in Nassarawa, Benue, and Taraba States.¹⁰²⁶

Confirming Evidence

a) Government Ability/Willingness: Once again, according to the U.S. State Department, rural police “generally lacked the resources to control societal violence.” Likewise, police and military personnel continued to employ excessive and sometimes deadly force in their efforts to suppress the ongoing communal violence.¹⁰²⁷

Post-2006 developments

In 2007 there were continued incidents of communal violence, but various sources suggest that the extent was far less than in previous years and did not approach the threshold of a continued complex emergency. For instance, according to the U.S. State Department, communal conflict around Warri in Delta State continued to decrease in the wake of the 2004 ceasefire mentioned above. Still, the State Department claimed that ethnoreligious violence killed ‘numerous’ people and displaced hundreds around the country, most of whom found refuge with family, friends, or their own ethnic community and were away from home only temporarily.¹⁰²⁸ Displacement numbers cited by the IDMC were somewhat higher, but still limited to the low thousands. Key incidents included the displacement of an estimated 3,000 people each on the border between Benue and Taraba States in July and August, and in the city of Bauchi (in Bauchi State) in December.¹⁰²⁹

In contrast, criminal violence involving kidnapping of oil company workers, armed robberies, and gang turf wars in the oil-rich Niger Delta grew in 2006 and increased further in 2007 and beyond, contributing to declining security in the area. Battles among criminal gangs in the region involved hundreds of deaths this year, including some civilian bystanders. These gangs were “widely believed to be sponsored by politicians to intimidate opponents and aid election rigging.”¹⁰³⁰

Communal conflict and associated displacement and deaths picked up again in 2008.¹⁰³¹ Nevertheless, given the clear break in this type of violence in 2007 and consistent with the coding rules, we code 2006 as the final year of the complex emergency.

¹⁰²⁵ Ibid; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.47-48.

¹⁰²⁶ U.S. Department of State 2007a.

¹⁰²⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁸ U.S. Department of State 2008a.

¹⁰²⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007b, p.54-55; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009e, p.33-34.

¹⁰³⁰ U.S. Department of State 2008a.

¹⁰³¹ See e.g., Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009e.

59. Kuwait (1990)

Overall Coding: 1

Annual Data: 1990 (Certainty: 1)

Type: International Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in a conflict over oil pricing. The invasion caused “as many as half of Kuwait’s citizens,” or some 380,000 people, to become refugees.¹⁰³² According to USCR some 300,000 fled to Saudi Arabia and an additional 60,000-100,000 Palestinians living in Kuwait fled as well, most to Jordan. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of expatriate workers mostly from Egypt, Jordan, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh also fled to Jordan in large numbers. In December, the Jordanian government reported that 750,000 displaced people had entered the country since August, in addition to some 220,000 Jordanian citizens.¹⁰³³

According to USCR, Iraqi occupation forces were responsible for serious violations of human rights, “including torture, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, robbery, and rape.”¹⁰³⁴ They also allegedly engaged in forced transfers of Kuwaitis and Iraqi dissidents living in Kuwait to Iraqi prisons, violating the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Mitigating Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: Jordan established three temporary camps for the displaced, which initially lacked proper sanitation, safety, and health services. Soon, however, the international community offered extensive assistance and conditions rapidly improved. Just as significantly, most of the displaced also did not experience the sustained or life-threatening consequences of violent displacement typical of a complex emergency due to 1) a large and coordinated international evacuation effort and 2) the ability of the displaced Palestinians to receive help from the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) and, in the main, avoid refugee camps. As a result, by late November Jordan’s camp population was reduced to 2,255 people.¹⁰³⁵ These circumstances justify coding the conflict as a ‘1’ both overall and for 1990.

¹⁰³² United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.99.

¹⁰³³ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.98.

¹⁰³⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.99.

¹⁰³⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.98; United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.103.

60. Lebanon I / Civil War (1975 – 1991)

Overall Coding: 3

Primary Conflict Type: Internationalized Internal Conflict

General Information and Overall Severity

The first phase of the Lebanese Civil War started on April 13, 1975 when clashes erupted between members of the Lebanese Christian Kataeb Party and Palestinian organizations.¹⁰³⁶ The main issue was the proportion of political power to be held by the various communities in Lebanon, and as the fighting spread the lines were drawn mainly between Christian parties allied with the government on one side (the Kataeb Party and the National Liberal Party), and the PLO along with various Lebanese allies on the other. These included, notably, the Amal Shi'a party and the Progressive Socialist Party, mainly consisting of Druze. This phase of the conflict lasted for about two years and ended with the government and Christian parties in control of eastern Beirut, with the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies in control in the west. In April 1976, Syrian forces entered the war on the side of the Lebanese government. In November, Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) troops joined them after the Arab summit meeting in October 1976 called for a cease-fire. Joint Syrian and ADF efforts unified Beirut by the end of the year.¹⁰³⁷

The second phase took place 1978-1982, and while there were many parties fighting in the war, the two main groups fighting against each other remained the ones in support of the state, and the ones against it. During this phase Beirut was divided by the allied Kataeb party and Lebanese army and the allied Palestinian and Lebanese militias. Syria remained aligned with the Lebanese government, and in June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon, attacking PLO forces.¹⁰³⁸

The third phase, beginning with the Israeli invasion, lasted from June 1982 until October 1990. The Israeli army invaded Lebanon to fight Hezbollah. Soon after, Israel fought the PLO and Lebanese militias, and the Syrian army in order to aid the Lebanese government and Christian Kataeb party. In September 1982, Israel attempted to create a friendly government by supporting Bashir Jemavel for the presidency of the Lebanese Parliament, but Jemavel was assassinated before beginning his presidency. Fighting between East and West Beirut continued, but for the first time, intraparty conflict began as well. In February 1987, Syrian forces reentered the city and attempted to control the fighting in West Beirut.¹⁰³⁹

A two-government situation emerged when outgoing President Amin Jemavel (Bashir's older brother) unilaterally appointed General Aoun as president of a council of ministers. The existing government refused to acknowledge Aoun's legitimacy, and it resulted in two competing Lebanese governments. Eventually the war came to an end when Aoun was forced from the country in October 1990.¹⁰⁴⁰ The conflict gradually came to an end in 1991, although even after this some violence persisted within Palestinian factions, and Israeli shelling continued in Palestinian areas.¹⁰⁴¹

Intense battles and looting throughout the war caused a severe breakdown in social services.¹⁰⁴² By some estimates, more than 144,000 died in the sixteen years of war, and many thousands became refugees or internally displaced.¹⁰⁴³

¹⁰³⁶ Sambanis 2004, p. 131.

¹⁰³⁷ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.63, 66-67. See also United States Committee for Refugees 1977, p. 15-16.

¹⁰³⁸ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p. 67.

¹⁰³⁹ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.66-67.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.68.

¹⁰⁴¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.104.

¹⁰⁴² United States Committee for Refugees 1977, p.15.

¹⁰⁴³ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.69.

Annual Data

1975 (Certainty: 5)

In 1975, fighting was mostly between the Christian parties and the PLO. The PLO and Lebanese Coalition controlled West Beirut, while the Christian parties and Lebanese army had control of East Beirut.¹⁰⁴⁴ As the Christian Kataeb Party took control, they forced residents in Beirut and Palestinians in refugee camps to leave.¹⁰⁴⁵ According to the French newspaper *Le Monde*, by the end of the year at least 15,000 people had been killed and 50,000 injured, and other estimates were even greater.¹⁰⁴⁶ According to Human Rights Watch later on, moreover, from the start of the war in April 1975 until October 1976, more than 50,000 were estimated to have been killed and 100,000 injured, with the overwhelming majority being civilians.¹⁰⁴⁷

1976 (Certainty: 2)

In April, Syrian forces joined with the side of the Lebanese government, the Christians, and the Kataeb party and began fighting the PLO and Lebanese militias. In October, an Arab Summit was held in Riyadh to discuss a cease-fire that would be controlled by an Arab Deterrent Force made of troops from Syria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, but it was only successful temporarily.¹⁰⁴⁸ As noted above, according to Human Rights Watch, from April 1975 through October over 50,000 people, mostly civilians, are estimated to have died.¹⁰⁴⁹ Because there is no other independent estimate of deaths in 1976, however, I very conservatively code 1976 a 2 for certainty.

1977 (Certainty: 3)

On January 1, press censorship began in Lebanon. On January 3, a car-bomb explosion in the Christian district of Beirut killed about 40 people, and injured an additional 50. On January 4, more than 100 Muslims were killed on East Beirut streets in retaliatory attacks. Some were also taken as hostages. Press censorship failed to report the majority of what occurred.¹⁰⁵⁰ On March 16, the Druze leader, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated; over 100 Christians were killed in response.¹⁰⁵¹ More fighting between Israel and Palestinians, Palestinians and Shia militias, Christians and Syrians, Muslims and Christians, and Christians and Druze occurred sporadically throughout the year.¹⁰⁵² According to USCR, by the end of 1977 nearly three years of war had displaced an estimated 500,000 people who had either fled the country as refugees or become IDPs.¹⁰⁵³ It was unclear, however, how many fled in each of these years.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.66.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.67.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Cited in O'Ballance 1998, p.40.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch 1995a, p.132.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.66.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch 1995a, p.132.

¹⁰⁵⁰ O'Ballance 1998, p.61.

¹⁰⁵¹ O'Ballance 1998, p.63.

¹⁰⁵² O'Ballance 1998, p.66-70.

¹⁰⁵³ United States Committee for Refugees 1977, p.15.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* USCR suggested there were significant needs in makeshift IDP camps in Lebanon for shelter and medicine.¹⁰⁵⁴ Safety within the camps was minimal, for clashes occurred often, and the Syrian forces rarely intervened.¹⁰⁵⁵

1978 (Certainty: 5)

Fighting continued in the south, and people were still unable to return to their homes despite a cease-fire the previous year.¹⁰⁵⁶ Christian militias and the Kataeb party/Falangists became involved for the first time with fighting against the Syrian ADF troops in Beirut on July 1. Within the first week, more than 250 people were killed, the majority being civilians.¹⁰⁵⁷ In March, Israel invaded Lebanon. According to Makdisi and Sadaka, this resulted in 2,000 deaths and 250,000 displaced persons.¹⁰⁵⁸ In October, Syrian shelling in East Beirut left over 800 Lebanese killed and 1500 injured.¹⁰⁵⁹

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Conditions of Life for displaced:* Shelling, fighting, and looting destroyed UNRWA facilities, and two camps were entirely destroyed. Several hospitals were also damaged.¹⁰⁶⁰

1979 (Certainty: 5)

Starting in January, Israeli forces and Palestinian militias clashed throughout southern Lebanon.¹⁰⁶¹ On April 22 the PLO attacked an Israeli town, causing retaliatory strikes in southern Lebanon that killed over 60 people.¹⁰⁶² In May, inter-Christian violence developed in Fern al-Shebak and Ain Rumaniyeh. The Lebanese army was deployed, and fighting was temporarily stopped.¹⁰⁶³

In August, about 30 people were killed and over 50 injured in fighting between the Falange and Armenians in Lebanon.¹⁰⁶⁴ A UN-brokered ceasefire on August 26 was unable to keep the peace; about 100 people were killed and 270,000 made homeless, just in August clashes.¹⁰⁶⁵

1980 (Certainty: 2)

Inter-Christian fighting left around 2000 civilians displaced in February, and caused 18 deaths.¹⁰⁶⁶ As of June 30, UNHCR reported that there were 400,000 IDPs within Lebanon.¹⁰⁶⁷ On

¹⁰⁵⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1977, p.16.

¹⁰⁵⁵ O'Ballance 1998, p.70.

¹⁰⁵⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1978, p.31.

¹⁰⁵⁷ O'Ballance 1998, p.80.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.92. Human Rights Watch similarly claims that the Israeli invasion killed or injured "thousands of civilians." See Human Rights Watch 1995a, p.132.

¹⁰⁵⁹ O'Ballance 1998, p.83.

¹⁰⁶⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1978, p.32.

¹⁰⁶¹ O'Ballance 1998, p.85.

¹⁰⁶² O'Ballance 1998, p.86.

¹⁰⁶³ O'Ballance 1998, p.89.

¹⁰⁶⁴ O'Ballance 1998, p.91.

¹⁰⁶⁵ O'Ballance 1998, p.92.

¹⁰⁶⁶ O'Ballance 1998, p.95.

¹⁰⁶⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1981, p.27.

July 7, inter-Christian fighting between Jemavel's militia and the NLP occurred in Beirut, leaving over 300 people dead and more than 500 injured.¹⁰⁶⁸ After this, all Christian militias were united into one party, named the Lebanese Forces.¹⁰⁶⁹ Additionally, Israeli attacks continued in response to Palestinian attacks, and tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims heightened.¹⁰⁷⁰

1981 (Coding: 5)

1981 was complicated because many new parties and militias began to appear.¹⁰⁷¹ In early April, the Falangists and Syrians began fighting again. The Syrians created a blockade in Zahle, Lebanon that lasted until June 30. The lack of medical supplies from the siege left over 200 dead and up to 500 injured.¹⁰⁷² Additionally in April, 40 were killed in a Beirut battle and another 30 were killed in May from ADF attacks on Christians. Israeli air strikes destroyed infrastructure like roads and bridges.¹⁰⁷³ In October, bomb attacks on Syrian and PLO offices in Beirut killed over 100 people. In December, a bomb exploded at the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, killing over 60 people, including the ambassador. By the end of the year, over 2000 people had died and 6000 had been injured.¹⁰⁷⁴

Confirming Evidence

- a) Conditions of Life for Displaced: The siege in Zahle left residents without electricity, basic sanitation, and medical supplies, and water was available just once a week.¹⁰⁷⁵

1982 (Certainty: 5)

The first half of the year was much like previous years, characterized by rival militia fighting, bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings.¹⁰⁷⁶ Then in June, Israel launched a 52-day land, sea, and air attack, crushing the PLO and its Lebanese allies. According to Human Rights Watch the invasion left over 20,000 dead, mostly civilians (civilians also accounted for some 80% of the 14,000 reported killed in the first two weeks of the invasion).¹⁰⁷⁷ According to the Red Cross, the invasion also left over 30,000 people displaced.¹⁰⁷⁸ Israel aimed to ease the conflict by imposing a "friendly government" with the election of Bashir Jemavel on September 14. This gambit failed, however, as Jemavel was assassinated before he ever took office.¹⁰⁷⁹ After the assassination, the Kataeb party responded by targeting Palestinian refugees. Two days after the assassination, more than 1,000 unarmed refugees including children, women, and elderly men, were killed in the Sabra and Shatila camps. Israeli forces did nothing to end the massacre.¹⁰⁸⁰ According to USCR, some 60,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were left homeless from the fighting in the summer.¹⁰⁸¹

¹⁰⁶⁸ O'Ballance 1998, p.100.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.66.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.69.

¹⁰⁷¹ O'Ballance 1998, p.110.

¹⁰⁷² O'Ballance 1998, p.106-107.

¹⁰⁷³ O'Ballance 1998, p.108-109.

¹⁰⁷⁴ O'Ballance 1998, p.111.

¹⁰⁷⁵ O'Ballance 1998, p.107.

¹⁰⁷⁶ O'Ballance 1998, p.113.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch 1995a, p.133.

¹⁰⁷⁸ O'Ballance 1998, p.116.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.66.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch 1995a, p.133.

¹⁰⁸¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1983, p.26.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness*: Lebanese forces and the Lebanese government were unable to protect the Lebanese population from the effects of the Israeli attacks or the Palestinian refugees from the massacres by Christian Falangists.

1983 (Certainty: 3)

Fighting continued in 1983 and in the southern areas of Lebanon, refugees were cut off from aid and supplies as a result.¹⁰⁸² According to Makdisi and Sadaka, fighting was particularly fierce in the summer, “between the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze dominated) and the Lebanese Forces in the Shouf Mountains east and southeast of Beirut. The end result was a mass exodus of Christian communities from the region, the destruction of many Druze and Christian towns, and the killing of hundreds of civilians.”¹⁰⁸³ On top of this, according to USCR, an estimated 600,000 people were uprooted by fighting between September 1983 and the end of 1984.¹⁰⁸⁴ It is unclear, however, how many of these were displaced in each of these years.

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Conditions of Life for Displaced*: The displaced lived in apartment garages, storefronts, unfurnished apartments, or shelters built from scrap. Many homeless Palestinians reported gastro-intestinal disorders due to unsanitary conditions. 12,000 Palestinian refugees in the Beka’a Valley reported poor living conditions and inadequate resources.¹⁰⁸⁵ Health care was rarely available for Palestinian refugees, and while new facilities for the refugees were under construction, refugees still lacked water and sanitary facilities. Palestinians in camps were unsafe, and in February, the UNRWA reported 15 deaths in just two weeks in Sidon camp.¹⁰⁸⁶

1984 (Certainty: 3)

Continuous conflict in southern Lebanon cut off Palestinian refugees from aid and supplies from the north. As noted above, according to USCR over 600,000 people fled from their homes from September 1983 through 1984, although it is unclear how many of these fled in each year.¹⁰⁸⁷ I thus conservatively code the year a 3 for certainty, since there is evidence of new displacement and evidence that the displaced faced serious obstacles to accessing emergency aid.

1985 (Certainty: 5)

In early 1985 after Israeli troops withdrew, conflict between Christian and Muslims and pro- and anti-Arafat factions erupted anew. There was considerable violence in and around the refugee camps in the Sidon area in northern Lebanon. About 40,000 people were left homeless from the Ein el-Hilweh and Mieh Mieh refugee camps. In July UNRWA also reported that some 45,000

¹⁰⁸² United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.55.

¹⁰⁸³ Makdisi and Sadaka 2005, p.68.

¹⁰⁸⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.55.

¹⁰⁸⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1983, p.26-27.

¹⁰⁸⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1983, p.71.

¹⁰⁸⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1984, p.55.

refugees had fled shelling around Sidon in April. During this violence there was also substantial displacement of Lebanese Christian civilians, who abandoned some 57 villages near Sidon in April.

Soon, heavy fighting moved to Beirut. The mainly Shi'ite Amal militia wanted to prevent a Palestinian 'state within a state,' and tried to remove armed Palestinians in the refugee camps. As a result, intense conflict and fighting erupted within the camps in Beirut and southern Lebanon. The fighting reached a peak during Ramadan when over 638 Palestinians were killed in Beirut and over 2,000 were left injured.¹⁰⁸⁸

Finally, in September there was heavy fighting for control of Tripoli in the north, leading to massive displacement of civilians. According to USCR an estimated 250,000 people abandoned the city and 275 were reported killed, while according to Human Rights Watch 500,000 were displaced from Tripoli and over 500 civilians were killed.¹⁰⁸⁹

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* A blockade kept all food and medicine from entering the camps, and the camps faced inadequate water and sanitation. Some died from the conditions. Additionally, a hospital and a mosque were bombed by the Shia Amal organization.¹⁰⁹⁰

1986 (Certainty: 5)

Daily fighting between Lebanese militias and Palestinian refugees plagued Lebanon during 1986. Amal's militia justified his attacks on Palestinians by saying he wanted to prevent "the return of Palestinian armed strength to Lebanon."¹⁰⁹¹ Fighting in the Burj al Barajinah and Shatila camps occurred throughout the year. In the fall, Amal's militia staged a ten-week siege of the Rashidiyeh camp causing an extreme threat of starvation. In response, the Palestinians began attacks in Sidon. 157 people died, and 604 were injured. Reports of killings, abductions, looting, and home destruction were common. An additional 30,000 persons were displaced from East Beirut after inter-Christian violence escalated earlier in the year.¹⁰⁹²

Confirming Evidence

- a) *Government Inability/Unwillingness:* UNRWA staff members were arrested by Amal's militia, and the UNRWA office was forced to close in Tyre.¹⁰⁹³
- b) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* Refugees living in camps were highly vulnerable to aerial attacks from Israeli as well as from Syrian forces and Lebanese militias. Most victims were women, children, and the elderly. In the Shatila and Burj al Barajneh camps, people were cut off from supplies and basic sanitation was unavailable. The Burj al Barajinah camp faced severe food shortages, and by December 90% of the Shatila camp had been destroyed.¹⁰⁹⁴

¹⁰⁸⁸ United States Committee for Refugees 1985, p.64.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid; Human Rights Watch 1995a, p.134.

¹⁰⁹⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1985, p.64.

¹⁰⁹¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1986, p.67.

¹⁰⁹² Ibid.

¹⁰⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid.

1987 (Certainty: 5)

Refugee camp violence continued to affect people in and around the camps. The most severe fighting occurred between the Lebanese Shia Amal militia and Palestinian groups, and most of the Palestinian refugee camps were located in the areas under control of the Shia Amal militia. Due to Amal's control, Palestinian and Lebanese citizens continued to face armed violence in refugee camps. Half of the 281,520 Palestinian registered refugees in Lebanon lived in those camps. While USCR noted that there was no reliable estimate of all Lebanese civilians who had been displaced by the war, experts believed that a third of the Lebanese population had been displaced at one time. As of 1987, USCR estimated that there were 300,000 Lebanese currently displaced.

Violence and a siege during the first months of the year by Amal's militia left the camps of Shatila, Burj al Barajneh, and Rashideieh with shortages of food, clean water, and medicine in 1987. 110 died in Shatilla, and 135 died in Burj al Barajneh by April after five months of near-total siege. Still, at some times, the PLO and Amal would make agreements to allow food and medicine. Before the siege, the Shatila camp housed 17,000 refugees, but after, it was 85 percent destroyed. During the worst of the siege, hunger and disease threatened the camp's remaining 3,000 refugees. In Burj-al-Barajneh 65% of the housing was similarly destroyed and the population dropped from 25,000 to 18,000 as people were displaced (some estimates suggested it was as low as 9,000). By May, USCR estimated that over 30,000 Palestinian refugees had been displaced from the Sidon and Beirut areas. According to Palestinian sources, the Amal militia displaced another 4,000 in July.¹⁰⁹⁵

Confirming Evidence

- a) Conditions of Life for Displaced: In Burj-el-Barajneh there were reports of severe psychiatric disorders and the inhabitants faced food shortages, inadequate medical attention, and prolonged evacuation. Sick and wounded people were often not allowed to leave.¹⁰⁹⁶

1988 (Certainty: 5)

In 1988 most violence came from internal fighting within groups such as the Palestinians, Shiites, and Christians. These clashes led to more casualties and displaced persons. By June 27, the Shatila camp and the Burj-el-Barajneh camps were completely destroyed. The Haifa hospital was in ruins, and Beirut appeared to be a ghost town. In June, 112 people were killed, 502 wounded, and 8,000 displaced. The southern Lebanese refugee camps, Ein el-Hilweh and Mieh Mieh were struck by Israeli rockets often while Amal's militia was stationed there. In the suburbs of Beirut, roughly half of the 500,000-600,000 residents were displaced from their homes due to fighting that was especially heavy in May.¹⁰⁹⁷

Lebanon failed to elect a new president in 1988, so a new two-government situation emerged. President Amin Jemavel appointed General Michel Aoun as the new president of a council of ministers. The other ministers refused to recognize Aoun's legitimacy.

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: In February, due to violence, the UNRWA cancelled operations in Sidon and Tyre; UNRWA removed international staff from Lebanon

¹⁰⁹⁵ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.70-71.

¹⁰⁹⁶ United States Committee for Refugees 1987, p.71.

¹⁰⁹⁷ United States Committee for Refugees 1988, p.78.

completely. By the end of the 1988, four UNRWA members were killed and two were kidnapped in 1988.¹⁰⁹⁸

1989 (Certainty: 5)

While the intra-factional conflicts mostly came to a halt in 1989, sectarian fighting began again. In addition, for six months Beirut was constantly shelled by Syrian troops; about 900 people were killed and 3,000 injured, almost all being civilians. About 15,000 homes were destroyed in the short period. About 90% of the 1.5 million citizens were forced to flee Beirut, and 200,000 fled the country. 600,000 Muslims left Beirut and stayed with family and friends in southern Lebanon. However, many of the displaced people were unable to stay with friends and family, and were forced to live along the Awwali and Zahrani rivers in unsanitary conditions, without shelter. Sidon was able to take in 60,000 IDPs. Back in Beirut, about 150,000 Christians fled East Beirut to Christian-controlled areas in the north. Additionally, 20,000 fled to the “Israeli security Zone.”¹⁰⁹⁹

By the end of the year, about a million Lebanese were internally displaced in some way. In October, the Lebanese Parliament agreed to the Ta’if Accord, which called for “more equitable distribution of power and the disbanding of armed militias.”¹¹⁰⁰ However, Aoun, the acting interim prime minister, did not acknowledge its legitimacy.

Confirming Evidence

- a) Government Inability/Unwillingness: The Lebanese government and military failed to halt the shelling backed by Syrian troops on both Muslim and Christian neighborhoods in Beirut.

1990 (Certainty: 5)

By the end of 1990 about 800,000 civilians remained displaced or had become newly displaced. Most of the violence this year was intra-sectarian. In September, intra-Palestinian fighting occurred in Lebanon’s largest refugee camp, Ein el Hilweh. Some 15,000 people were forced to flee and more than 75 were killed. Additional fighting within the Christian Maronite community caused 100,000 people, mostly Christians, to flee Lebanon, and between 200,000 to 400,000 to become internally displaced temporarily around Beirut. After four months of warfare about 1,200 were dead.¹¹⁰¹ In October, acting Prime Minister Aoun was defeated by Syrian air attacks. This defeat left hundreds dead, many being shot at close range by the Syrian troops.¹¹⁰²

Confirming Evidence

- a) Conditions of Life for Displaced: During the fighting within the Christian community, about 500,000 people in Beirut were trapped in their homes, bomb shelters, and basements for many days. They were left without food, water, and electricity. Beirut did not have electricity and water for months, and tens of thousands of homes were destroyed.¹¹⁰³

¹⁰⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁹ United States Committee for Refugees 1989, p.84.

¹¹⁰⁰ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.104.

¹¹⁰¹ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.99-100.

¹¹⁰² United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.100; Sambanis 2004, p.131.

¹¹⁰³ United States Committee for Refugees 1991, p.100.

1991 (Certainty: 1)

At the beginning of the year about 750,000 people remained IDPs. However, after 15 years of fighting, a sustainable return to their homes finally became possible for many people during 1991. Slowly, the Lebanese army, with the aid of the Syrian army, was able to regain control of Beirut.

Tensions rose, however, as the Ta'if Agreement was imposed and the militias were called upon to disarm. In July, clashes occurred between the Palestinians and the Lebanese army, leaving 52 dead and 184 injured. About half of the residents in the Ein el Hilweh and Mieh Mieh camps were forced to flee. However, refugees and IDPs quickly began to return to their homes and camps after this brief round of fighting.

Israel conducted 12 different air raids in Lebanon in 1991 that killed 23 people and wounded 96. In November, about 100,000 people were forced to leave their homes during a five-day shelling of the area, but this displacement was only temporary.¹¹⁰⁴

Mitigating Evidence

- a) *Conditions of Life for Displaced:* Newly displaced persons were only temporarily displaced, and most were able to return to their homes quite quickly.¹¹⁰⁵ For this reason, and because the strong trend during the year was toward recovery, I conservatively code it as a 1 for certainty.

Post-1991 Developments

Although Israeli shelling of southern Lebanon continued intermittently in 1992 and 1993 and produced occasional new displacement, it was overwhelmingly temporary.¹¹⁰⁶ I therefore do not code these years as a continuation of the complex emergency, although there could also be an argument for including them and code them with a certainty of '1.'

¹¹⁰⁴ United States Committee for Refugees 1992, p.104.

¹¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁶ See United States Committee for Refugees 1993, p.106-108; United States Committee for Refugees 1994, p.112.

61. Lebanon II / Israeli Air Attacks (2006)

Overall Coding: 1

Annual Data: 2006 (Certainty: 1)

Type: International Conflict

General Information & Overall Severity

On July 12, 2006, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) began heavy shelling and air strikes into southern Lebanon in response to provocations by Hezbollah. Over the next five weeks, according to the UN's OCHA, the Israeli attacks displaced an estimated one million Lebanese, including some 16,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. While most were displaced within Lebanon itself, some 230,000 fled the country.¹¹⁰⁷ Official Lebanese figures showed that as of August 31, 2006, 1,187 people had died and 4,092 had been injured as a result of the conflict.¹¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch accused the IDF of serious violations of humanitarian law, including "a systematic failure...to distinguish between combatants and civilians."¹¹⁰⁹ In addition, a hallmark of the conflict was Israel's use of cluster bombs, mostly dropped over a three-day period immediately before the August 14 ceasefire that ended hostilities. In November, the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre estimated that there could still be as many as one million unexploded cluster sub-munitions on the ground.¹¹¹⁰ These munitions caused numerous deaths and injuries among displaced families as they attempted to return to their homes and resume agricultural activities, thus prolonging displacement and the effects of the conflict.

Mitigating Evidence

b) Conditions of Life for Displaced: The displaced population faced significant hardships. Due to the destruction of houses and other infrastructure, during the war they sometimes lived in overcrowded and insecure conditions, including with "limited access to safe drinking water, food, sanitation, electricity and health services."¹¹¹¹ Obstruction by Israeli and Hezbollah forces and the destruction of numerous roads and bridges also prevented humanitarian aid from reaching people in need. According to the UN on August 10, humanitarian workers were unable to reach over 200,000 war-affected people throughout the country.¹¹¹² After the hostilities were over, there remained persistent shortages of water and shelter.¹¹¹³

Still, despite these challenges and the large scale of displacement, there is important mitigating evidence that justifies coding the overall and annual certainty for this complex emergency at the level of 1. That is, there is some doubt about whether the level of disruption to civilian life fully reflects the definition of a complex emergency. Significantly, many of the displaced were able to find shelter in private homes. While 142,397 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were accommodated in schools, over 600,000 stayed with families, friends, or in other public infrastructure.¹¹¹⁴ Just as importantly, moreover, most displacement was short-lived. As the IDMC put it, "Most of the displaced returned to their homes in south Lebanon and the southern suburbs

¹¹⁰⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006c, p.10.

¹¹⁰⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006c, p. 41.

¹¹⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch 2006, p.3.

¹¹¹⁰ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006c, p. 106. On Israel's use of cluster bombs more generally see p.65-67, p.81-82, p.106-108.

¹¹¹¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006c, p. 83.

¹¹¹² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006c, p.117-118. See also p.41.

¹¹¹³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006c, p. 79.

¹¹¹⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006c, p. 83.

of Beirut immediately following a UN-brokered ceasefire in August 2006.”¹¹¹⁵ An estimated 200,000 were still displaced as of November, but most of these were living with friends or relatives. Because of these features of the conflict, the indirect consequences of violence that typically lead to most of the morbidity and mortality in complex emergencies – disease, starvation, exposure, etc. – were quite limited.

¹¹¹⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2006c, p.8. See also p.49-50.

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